




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THE FIRST READING OF THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION BEFORE THE CABINET

From the original picture painted at the White House in 1864

THE WORLD'S BEST HISTORIES



UNITED STATES

FROM THE DISCOVERY
OF THE NORTH AMERICAN
CONTINENT UP TO THE
PRESENT TIME
IN NINE VOLUMES

BY

JULIAN HAWTHORNE

(— TO 1783)

JAMES SCHOULER

(1783 TO 1865)

E. BENJAMIN ANDREWS

(1866 TO 1904)

ILLUSTRATED




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HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

VOLUME SEVEN

VI.

THE CIVIL WAR.

PREFACE.

FAVORED by health and opportunity, the author, after an interval of eight years, completes his History of the United States under the Constitution by issuing a sixth volume to cover the period of the Civil War and President Lincoln's memorable administration.

During the active composition of this volume, — a labor which would not have been undertaken but for the zealous prompting of others, — I have formed the impression that, with all that has been written, and well written, touching America's gigantic conflict, a narrative within the present compass, viewing events in the calm perspective, developing the story on its civil as well as its military side, and making just use of those copious historical materials which have accumulated during the last thirty years, remained a desideratum. Whether the present work, projected as the companion of former volumes in a consecutive tale, may in a measure supply such a need, the reading public, always indulgent to my efforts, must determine. Among the serviceable works I have consulted and cited, these deserve especial mention: the printed War Records, Union and Confederate,¹ the munificent gift of our government to historical investigators; the Life of Abraham Lincoln by his private secretaries, Nicolay and Hay,² whose ten large volumes are an ample treasure-house of authentic information, illumined by personal acquaintance; Moore's Rebellion Record,³ an immense work, compiled as the war went on; the American Annual Cyclopædia, 1861-65; Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,⁴ voluminous with its mili-

¹ Cited "W. R."

² Cited "N. & H."

³ Cited "Moore."

⁴ Cited "B. & L."

tary and naval descriptions by surviving participators, North and South; biographies, prepared from the private papers of great civilians, like Seward,¹ Chase, Stanton,² and Sumner on the one side, and Stephens and Toombs on the other; likewise the authorized Memoirs of Grant, Sherman, McClellan, Sheridan, Lee, the Johnstons, Jackson, Longstreet, and other famous commanders. The Confederate histories of Jefferson Davis,³ Stephens, Pollard, and De Leon have been duly explored. From magazines and newspapers, contemporaneous with the war, much pictorial matter has been gathered, as also from the descriptions supplied by Carpenter, Chittenden, Noah Brooks, Ida M. Tarbell, and others. Nor have I been disinclined to reproduce some of my own vivid impressions of the period, formed in early manhood, not without some special opportunities for observing. In apportioning space for this narrative, I have subordinated battle details still in controversy, and the arithmetic of slaughter, for the sake of bringing out clearly the drift and purpose of successive campaigns and the traits of different commanders, and so as to present, moreover, some general features of the warfare worth dwelling upon. I have sought besides to present the political and social progress of this grave epoch, and the variations of our public opinion, in the course of what, after all, ought to be deemed the bloody culmination of a long political feud of sections. And while, throughout, I have striven to do full justice to honest and patriotic motives, North and South, and to that noble spirit of heroic devotion and self-sacrifice which animated the common people of both sections, — Americans all, and brethren, — I have not suppressed my personal convictions as to the real merits of this sanguinary strife, nor amiably shifted the ground of discussion. For, as it seems to me, if our grand experiment of popular government is to grandly endure, the real reconciliation of sec-

¹ That prepared by his son and assistant Secretary, Frederick W. Seward, is cited "Seward."

² The author acknowledges special favors received from Stanton's biographer, Hon. George C. Gorham, and from Mr. Frederic Bancroft.

³ Citations "Davis" refer to that writer's *Short History*.

tions will come finally in the common recognition, as a lesson for all future time, that between the social and industrial systems of equal opportunity and of race subjection, each ambitious of expansion in a confederated Republic like ours, there is a fatal antagonism.

I have now reached the ultimate goal proposed in these historical labors. I have told my tale; I have finished my task; and the story of reconstruction and of a broader national existence I willingly leave to other pens. Whatever may have been my imperfections as a narrator of events,—and no one, I am sure, whose aims are high, can be unconscious of his own shortcomings,—I trust it may be said of me that I have written with a constant purpose to be just and truthful.

JAMES SCHOULER.

Boston, October 3, 1890.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

FIRST ADMINISTRATION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

PERIOD OF THIRTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS.

MARCH 4, 1861-MARCH 4, 1863.

SECTION I.

A REPUBLICAN ADMINISTRATION.

	PAGE
Lincoln's colossal greatness ; comprehension of his task, . . .	1
Utterances of his journey ; draft of inaugural address, . . .	3
His inauguration as President,	5
Last hours of the expiring Congress,	7
Cabinet nominated and confirmed,	8
First Cabinet meeting ; startling situation at Fort Sumter, . .	11
Commissioners from Southern Confederacy ; Campbell and Seward,	13
Question of reënforcing Sumter,	15
Drift of opinion during March,	17
President framing a conclusion ; the Virginia convention, . .	18
Executive appointments and the rush for office,	19
First impressions of the President ; his personal appearance, .	20
The Sherman interview ; Premier or President,	23

SECTION II.

FORT SUMTER AND THE APPEAL TO ARMS.

Military temper and preparations of the Confederate rulers, . .	26
Major Anderson at Fort Sumter ; President Lincoln's conclusion,	27
Sumter to be provisioned and Pensacola reënforced,	29
Campbell and the Southern commissioners self-deceived, . . .	29

	PAGE
Relief expedition ordered to Sumter ; Anderson's situation, . . .	31
Fort Sumter cannonaded and captured by the Confederates, . . .	32
President's call for militia ; spontaneous Northern uprising, . . .	33
Volunteer enlistments ; offers of money and men,	35
Enthusiasm for secession in the cotton States,	36
Border slave States distracted ; Virginia secedes, with North Carolina, Arkansas, and Tennessee,	38
Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware hold back, . . .	40
Northern war governors ; earliest militia regiments,	42
Massachusetts Sixth at Baltimore ; riot and bloodshed, . . .	43
Route of other troops by Annapolis ; Washington city isolated, .	45
Arrival of New York Seventh ; capital rescued from danger, . .	46
Maryland saved to the Union ; military arrests, etc.,	46
Militia of Northwestern States defend Mississippi Valley, . . .	48
Confederate Congress votes more troops ; Lincoln's new call for volunteers,	48
Increase of navy ; Southern privateers ; a blockade proclaimed,	49
Strength of Union sentiment tested ; DeTocqueville's predic- tion,	49

SECTION III.

THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY.

Antagonism of slave and free labor systems ; slave expansion checked,	50
Virginia and South Carolina ; the latter leads in rebellion, . .	51
Slave population and wealth in 1860 ; Lincoln's Presidency resisted,	52
Conspiracy of leaders for State secession ; Montgomery govern- ment organized,	52
Davis and Stephens, provisional President and Vice-President ; Confederate Cabinet,	53
Permanent constitution and government ; Davis and Stephens chosen anew,	54
Confederate constitution examined ; its leading provisions and purpose,	54
Not State autonomy, but recombination, the Southern intent, . .	56
State sovereignty and secession practically a means to an end, . .	59
Enthusiasm for slavery, and Southern homogeneousness,	60
First session of Confederate Congress at Montgomery,	61
Second session ; ample preparations for resistance,	63
Confederate government centralized ; Davis and his policy, . . .	64
Southern military appointments ; Lee, the Johnstons, and Jack- son,	66

SECTION IV.

FROM REBELLION TO CIVIL WAR.

	PAGE
First theory of rebellion ; appeal for the Union as unchanged, .	68
Scott in command ; war aspects in Washington ; public impatience,	70
Big Bethel ; Vienna ambuscade ; death of Ellsworth,	72
Extra session of Congress ; the two Houses organized, . . .	73
President Lincoln's message ; confident national resources, .	74
"On to Richmond ;" Scott's forward movement begun, . . .	76
Patterson ; McDowell ; battle of Bull Run,	78
Retreat to Washington ; loyalty's sterner task,	80
McClellan in western Virginia ; Union political movements, .	82
Military victories at Rich Mountain and Carrick's Ford, . . .	84
McClellan summoned to Washington ; West Virginia to become a State,	85
Congress provides men and means ; the Crittenden resolution, .	86
Confederate Congress at Richmond ; dissensions among Southern leaders,	87

SECTION V.

THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY.

Strategic importance of this region ; the "far West" at this date, .	89
The great river and its tributaries ; Cairo and St. Louis, . . .	90
Harney and Lyon in Missouri ; Kentucky and State neutrality, .	91
Military conflict in Missouri ; Blair and Governor Jackson, . .	92
Lyon's prompt measures ; disloyalists put to flight,	93
Loyal State convention and provisional government,	96
Fremont placed in command ; his military errors,	97
Lyon killed at Wilson's Creek ; Fremont's proclamations, . . .	100
Emancipation controversy with President ; Fremont displaced for mismanagement,	102
Kentucky treated with delicacy ; fallacy of neutrality shown, .	104
New legislature ; governor overruled ; State stands by Union, .	105
Anderson, Sherman, Thomas, and Buell ; Johnston at Bowling Green,	106
Grant and his tardy recognition ; promotion to brigadier, . . .	108
Paducah occupied by Grant ; affair at Belmont,	109

SECTION VI.

FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE "TRENT."

Foreign policy of the Union ; situation at Lincoln's accession, .	111
Diplomatic appointments ; Secretary Seward's instructions, . .	111

	PAGE
Europe's attitude toward disunion ; concert of England and France,	114
Confederacy recognized as a belligerent ; privateering,	114
Expedition against Mexico ; Russia friendly to the Union,	116
Methods in our diplomatic relations,	117
European sentiment ; private American citizens sent to influence,	119
Spies and sympathizers checked ; passports ; political arrests,	120
The <i>Trent</i> affair ; Wilkes seizes Mason and Slidell,	121
Demand of Great Britain ; an amicable surrender,	122
Blockade made effective ; Southern privateers and cruisers,	125
Our State Department ; Seward's character and constancy,	127

SECTION VII.

THE FIRST WINTER'S OPERATIONS.

McClellan in Washington ; flattery and high expectation,	130
He dislikes the administration ; Scott makes way for him,	133
Failure at Ball's Bluff ; an inactive autumn,	135
The Union navy ; Southern disadvantage ; blockade-running,	137
Expeditions to Hatteras and Port Royal ; Burnside,	139
Halleck in Missouri ; battle of Pea Ridge ; disloyal elements,	140
Buell in Kentucky ; Thomas victorious at Mill Springs,	144
Grant captures Fort Henry ; Confederates leave Bowling Green,	145
Fort Donelson surrendered ; Grant and Foote,	148

SECTION VIII.

CONGRESS AND THE CABINET.

Long session of Congress ; new finance and taxation,	152
Chase at the Treasury ; a legal tender currency,	153
Evils of inflation ; the Secretary and his assistants,	156
Cameron succeeded by Stanton in the War Department,	157
Stanton's character and energetic methods,	158
His close relations with the President,	162
McClellan and the President's military orders,	163
Johnston confronts McClellan's army all the winter,	165
Permanent Confederate government installed at Richmond,	166
President Davis and his Cabinet ; new and vigorous plans,	167
Civil arrests ; sweeping conscription act ; Confederate financial policy,	168

SECTION IX.

THE MISSISSIPPI CAMPAIGN.

	PAGE
Expedition to New Orleans ; Butler and Porter,	169
Farragut selected to command ; his fleet prepared,	170
Wooden vessels pass Forts Jackson and St. Philip,	172
New Orleans captured ; Farragut's supreme achievement,	174
Island No. 10 ; Albert Sidney Johnston and Beauregard,	175
Halleck in full Union command ; relations with Buell and Grant,	176
Grant in disfavor ; approach of Confederates from Corinth,	178
Battle of Shiloh or Pittsburg Landing,	179
The first day's dangers ; Grant commands ; arrival of Buell,	180
Confederates driven the second day ; controversial discussions,	182
Albert Sidney Johnston killed in battle,	183
Halleck arrives to take Union command ; the march to Corinth,	184
Campaign prematurely ended ; Halleck called to Washington,	180

SECTION X.

MCCLELLAN'S PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

Plans for a deferred campaign ; Johnston leaves Manassas,	188
Fight of <i>Merrimac</i> and <i>Monitor</i> ; ironclad naval vessels,	190
McClellan in the peninsula ; his morbid distrust,	192
Issues with the President and Stanton,	194
Capture of Yorktown ; Potomac corps and commanders,	196
From Williamsburg to the Chickahominy,	199
Battle of Fair Oaks ; incessant rains and flood,	202
McDowell's column ; Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley,	203
Lee succeeds Johnston ; his aggressive plans,	204
The seven days' battles ; base changed to the James,	206
More volunteers summoned ; Pope in Virginia,	209
Peninsular troops recalled ; Confederates mass against Pope,	211
Second battle of Bull Run ; Washington in-danger,	212
McClellan recalled to command ; Pope and McDowell detached,	213

SECTION XI.

EMANCIPATION PROCLAIMED.

American sentiment concerning the negro problem,	214
Practical disturbance of slavery by war operations,	215
Constitutional constraints ; conscience of the majority,	216
Military emancipation discussed ; "contrabands ;" attitude of Union generals,	217

	PAGE
Philanthropic drift in 1862; slave-trade treaty with Great Britain; emancipation in District of Columbia, etc.,	219
Offer of indemnity to States emancipating; measures in Congress,	220
President Lincoln's proclamation of freedom,	222
Incidents of a new military policy; colonization fails,	224
Closer relations with the Northern abolitionists,	225
Garrison and Phillips; Sumner in the Senate,	227
Sumner as a statesman; his rivalry with Seward,	230

SECTION XII.

OPERATIONS EAST AND WEST.

Lee invades Maryland; battle of Antietam,	232
Lee's disaster and escape to Virginia,	235
McClellan's tardy pursuit; his removal from command,	237
McClellan's military character considered,	240
Burnside succeeds to the command; his change of plans,	242
New movement towards Fredericksburg; Lee shifts to correspond,	244
Union assault at heights of Fredericksburg; severe repulse,	246
Burnside's depression; army discontent; new plans frustrated,	249
Burnside relieved at request; Hooker succeeds him,	251
Halleck's errors at the West; Buell detached; Bragg invades Kentucky,	252
Buell relieved by Rosecrans; battle of Murfreesboro,	255
Price and Van Dorn threaten Grant; Iuka and Corinth,	256
Schofield in Missouri; local disorders suppressed; Curtis promoted,	257
Butler at New Orleans; intense antipathy; Banks succeeds him,	258
President Lincoln's comments; abuses of a reopened commerce,	260

SECTION XIII.

FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN.

Louis Napoleon's schemes in Mexico,	261
Attitude of our government; Mexican default in foreign debt,	261
Joint invasion of England, France, and Spain; capture of Vera Cruz,	262
France violates compact; triple alliance dissolved,	264
French invasion; military failures; more troops from France,	265
Forey despatched to conquer Mexico; Napoleon's mystic letter,	265
Policy of President Lincoln; French assurances of good faith,	267
Napoleon proposes mediation between North and South,	268
Palmerston ministry unfriendly to the United States,	269
Confederate cruisers built; the <i>Florida</i> and <i>Alabama</i> ,	270

CONTENTS.

XV

	PAGE
The slave-trade treaty ; British philanthropy,	272
Friendship of Russia a safeguard,	273
Blockade of Southern coast ; European complaints ; Confederate recognition postponed,	274

SECTION XIV.

THE NEW POLITICAL SITUATION.

Adverse elections in autumn, 1862 ; reasons stated,	274
Democrats and the peace men at the North,	275
Final session of Congress ; President firm in his announcement,	276
Border States urged to emancipate ; final military edict of freedom,	276
New policy of 1863 ; border slave States hesitate to abolish, .	278
Congress sustains President in suspending <i>habeas corpus</i> , . .	280
New State of West Virginia ; emancipation a requisite of admis- sion,	281
Financial legislation ; gold and government paper ; national banking system,	282
Ample borrowing powers ; popular investments invited, . . .	284
Internal taxation reëstablished ; details of system,	285
Miscellaneous measures of this Congress,	287
Cabinet changes ; Senatorial cabal rebuked,	287
The President master of his administration,	289

CHAPTER II.

FIRST ADMINISTRATION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

PERIOD OF THIRTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS.

MARCH 4, 1863—MARCH 4, 1865.

SECTION I.

THE SOLDIER OF THE CIVIL WAR.

North and South in conflict ; foes of one household,	290
Comparative advantages of the two sections,	291
Enlistment of troops ; volunteers and conscripts,	294
Composition of armies ; infantry, cavalry, and artillery, . .	296
Designation of ranking officers,	294, 298
Bands and battle flags ; uniform and equipments,	298
Soldiers' monuments, North and South,	302

	PAGE
Tents and barracks ; wagon trains ; rations,	304
Ordnance and projectiles ; forts and turrets,	307
Camp life at the seat of war,	308
Methods in battle ; improvised defences,	308
Soldierly spirit ; battle localities ; the cheer and yell,	310
Railroads, telegraphs, and signals in the war,	311
Tactics and manuals ; cheerful disposition under hardship,	312
Routine at headquarters ; official correspondence,	313
Hygiene of armies ; hospitals ; Sanitary Commission, etc.,	314
Sensibility to suffering ; general reflections,	315

SECTION II.

GENERAL TRAITS AND INDUSTRIES.

American tendency to drift rather than oppose,	316
Dependence of South in 1861 ; undeveloped industries,	316
Fatalism of slaveholders ; sectional misconceptions,	318
Southern plantation traits ; men and women,	319
Southern aspects ; absence of luxury ; few large centres,	320
The sites of heroism ; Washington during the war,	323
New York and other Northern cities ; sudden wealth acquired,	325
Agriculture as a national industry ; farms and plantations,	326
American manufactures ; growth and diversity,	328
Mineral products ; recent discovery of petroleum,	330
Commerce and transportation ; decay of shipping ; railroads and telegraphy,	330
Evils of war ; inflation and extravagance, gold gambling, etc.,	332
Patents and useful arts ; photography ; the newspaper,	334
Education and literature during this era,	336
Patriotic songs and oratory,	338
Deaths of illustrious civilians,	340
Preponderance of the North in population and wealth,	340

SECTION III.

CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG.

The President's experiment to find a commander,	341
Hooker's merits and demerits ; his vigorous beginning,	341
A new forward movement ; the Rappahannock crossed,	343
Chancellorsville reached ; further progress feeble,	345
Lee's approach ; Jackson's last assault,	346
Battle of Chancellorsville ; Hooker disabled ; retreat across the river,	346
Hooker's loss of prestige ; new movements postponed,	349

CONTENTS.

xvii

	PAGE
Lee takes the offensive ; campaign to Maryland and Pennsylvania, . . .	350
Hooker's obstructive strategy ; Lee crosses the Potomac, . . .	351
Hooker and Halleck disagree ; Hooker reprimanded, . . .	353
Ewell invades Pennsylvania ; Hooker's parallel advance, . . .	354
Hooker relieved at request ; Meade succeeds to the command, . . .	356
Preparations for battle ; accidental encounter at Gettysburg, . . .	358
Battle brought on by Reynolds ; his death ; first day's incidents, . . .	360
Lee risks a pitched battle ; second day's fight, . . .	362
Third day at Gettysburg ; Confederate repulse and disaster, . . .	365
Meade slow in following up success ; escape of Lee's army, . . .	367
The most portentous battle of the war, . . .	369

SECTION IV.

FALL OF VICKSBURG.

A memorable Fourth of July ; two great Union victories, . . .	370
Preliminary movement against Vicksburg, . . .	370
Grant, Sherman, and McClelland, . . .	372
Sherman's expedition returns ; Fort Hindman, . . .	374
Grant takes personal command ; real campaign begun, . . .	375
Winter projects against Vicksburg fail, . . .	377
Grant and Porter ; Vicksburg defences passed, . . .	380
A landing gained below ; Grant's march into Mississippi, . . .	382
Old base relinquished and former plans changed, . . .	384
State capital captured ; Johnston and Pemberton, . . .	386
Battle of Champion's Hill ; Pemberton reaches Vicksburg, . . .	387
Assault by Grant ; McClelland superseded, . . .	390
Siege of Vicksburg begun ; its progress, . . .	392
Milliken's Bend ; plans for Pemberton's relief, . . .	393
Distress of the besieged ; Pemberton's surrender, . . .	395
Results of Union triumph ; Port Hudson ; other gains, . . .	398
Mississippi River fully reopened, . . .	400

SECTION V.

VOLUNTEERS, PRISONERS, AND DRAFTED MEN.

Enrolment of colored men ; progress of experiment, . . .	400
Massachusetts regiments ; troops under Union auspices, . . .	402
Legislation by Congress ; negro soldiers under fire, . . .	404
Vindication of President's policy ; Southern opinion, . . .	406
Prisoners and their exchange ; mutual stipulations, . . .	407
Difficulties of arrangement ; a final settlement, . . .	410
Treatment of prisoners North and South ; Andersonville, etc., . . .	411
Draft and volunteering on the Union side, . . .	414

	PAGE
New enrolment act of 1863 ; opposition to conscription, . . .	416
Governor Seymour ; draft riot in New York City, . . .	417
Commutation and substitutes ; extreme Southern conscription, .	419
Military arrests ; Vollandigham court-martialled in Ohio, . .	421
Burnside sustained ; Vollandigham's temporary banishment ; Ohio election,	422

SECTION VI.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN 1863-65.

Effect of emancipation policy in Great Britain,	424
New violations of neutrality ; <i>Alexandra</i> and Confederate rams, .	425
Perilous climax passes ; building of warlike cruisers stopped, .	426
Other relations with Great Britain,	427
Louis Napoleon's imperialism in Mexico ; capital city taken, .	427
Flight of Juarez government ; crown offered to Maximilian, .	428
Coronation in Austria ; convention with France ; arrival in Mexico,	430
Maximilian's embarrassments ; Juarez and liberty,	430
President Lincoln favors Mexican Republic ; neutrality ; Monroe doctrine and Congress,	432
Slidell at Paris ; Napoleon's intrigues and dissimulation, . .	433
Russian relations ; treaties with China and other nations, . .	435

SECTION VII.

A NEW CAMPAIGN.

Southern blockade ; Du Pont's fleet off Charleston harbor, . .	436
Dahlgren and Gillmore ; operations resumed ; Fort Wagner, . .	439
Sumter destroyed ; Charleston harbor in control,	440
Rosecrans in Tennessee ; Bragg forced southward ; Chattanooga captured,	442
Return of Bragg ; battle of Chickamauga,	444
Thomas's firmness ; Bragg invests Chattanooga,	446
Grant summoned to command ; Rosecrans relieved ; new supplies, .	448
Confederate movements ; battle of Chattanooga,	450
Sherman's advance ; Hooker on Lookout Mountain,	451
Missionary Ridge carried ; Sheridan's pursuit,	453
Burnside at Knoxville ; a loyal welcome ; Longstreet's move- ments,	455
Sherman brings relief ; retreat of Longstreet,	457
Campaign successfully ended ; Grant's merit recognized, . . .	458
Bragg's mortification ; Confederate changes ; Johnston arrives, .	458
Winter operations unimportant ; Sherman's expedition, . . .	458, 460

SECTION VIII.

THE LONG SESSION OF CONGRESS.

	PAGE
Long session opened ; House organizes ; President offers amnesty,	460
New legislation ; enrolment ; tariff ; internal revenue,	461
Other enactments ; Nevada a new State ; temper of Congress,	462
A Presidential campaign opened,	463
Chase and the "Pomeroy circular" ; opposition to Lincoln,	463
Fremont and the Cleveland convention,	465
Union-Republican Convention at Baltimore ; Lincoln renomi- nated,	466
Chase leaves the Cabinet ; Fessenden succeeds,	468
Dissensions in Congress ; reconstruction policy,	469
Fruitless peace missions ; temporary despondency,	471
Democratic convention at Chicago ; a peace platform,	472
McClellan nominated ; his acceptance,	473
Party lines drawn ; old Whigs and abolitionists,	474
Arguments of the canvass ; Southern opinion,	475
The elections of 1863 ; military successes,	477

SECTION IX.

GRANT GENERAL-IN-CHIEF.

Grade of lieutenant-general revived ; Grant appointed,	478
Grant at Washington ; new promotions and preparations,	479
Meade and Lee after Gettysburg,	481
The President's military discretion ; Grant plans a grand cam- paign,	483
Grant's high subordinates ; preparations to move in concert,	486
Grant advances in Virginia ; battle of the Wilderness,	488
Night march to Spottsylvania ; Lee opposes,	493
Prolonged fight at Spottsylvania,	494
Promotions and more troops ; new march by the flank,	500
Grant's change of base ; Butler's and Sheridan's movements ; Cold Harbor,	502

SECTION X.

SHERMAN AND SHERIDAN.

Sherman commands at the West ; resources and preparations,	505
The advance against Johnston ; various battles,	508
The Chattahoochee crossed and Atlanta threatened,	509
Johnston supplanted by Hood ; McPherson's death in battle,	510

	PAGE
Hood evacuates Atlanta ; important capture,	513
Sherman's opportune victory ; subsistence upon the foe, . . .	514
Grant's excellent subordinates ; Lee compared,	515
Movements in the Shenandoah Valley,	516
Early's Northern raids ; Sheridan placed in command, . . .	516
Sheridan's victories over Early ; his memorable ride, . . .	518

SECTION XI.

LINCOLN REELECTED PRESIDENT.

Presidential campaign of 1864,	519
Disloyal plotters at the Northwest ; raids from Canada ; St. Albans,	520
McClellan's canvass injured,	522
State indications ; Lincoln's overwhelming reelection, . . .	522
Congratulations at the White House ; McClellan and Sheridan, .	524
Changes in the Cabinet ; Blair, Bates, and Fessenden retire, .	525
Taney's death ; Chase appointed Chief Justice,	526
Final session of Congress ; constitutional prohibition of slavery, .	528
Compassion for the negro ; a freedman's bureau ; the franchise, .	531
President and Congress as to reconstruction,	532
Lincoln's latest views on this subject,	534
Blair visits Richmond ; conference at Hampton Roads, . . .	535
Last efforts of the Davis government,	537
Desperate financial straits ; Southern distress,	538

SECTION XII.

THUNDER ALL AROUND.

Grant's new base south of James River,	540
Petersburg threatened ; siege operations,	541
Grant's dogged purpose ; Burnside's mine ; approach of winter, .	544
Sherman's march through Georgia ; Hood's counter movements, .	546
Sherman begins the march ; foraging upon the foe,	548
Milledgeville reached ; the seacoast ; Savannah captured, . .	552
Sherman's unique methods ; his military traits,	554
Thomas at Nashville ; plans of Beauregard and Hood, . . .	555
Hood's eager advance ; battle of Franklin,	556
Hood before Nashville ; Thomas's anxious responsibility, . .	558
Battle of Nashville and rout of Hood ; Johnston reinstated, .	561
Farragut in Mobile Bay ; a naval fight and victory,	562

CHAPTER III.

SECOND ADMINISTRATION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

MARCH 4, 1865-APRIL 15, 1865.

SECTION I.

LINCOLN'S SECOND INAUGURATION.

	PAGE
Inaugural ceremonies ; a memorable address and occasion,	565
Lincoln's Gettysburg oration,	566
Impulse of reconciliation ; the Hampton Roads report,	566
Electoral count of February ; Lincoln's present Cabinet ; new proclamations,	568
Confederacy in its death throes ; ruinous financial condition,	568
Last session of Confederate Congress ; public recriminations,	569
Bitterness of feeling in Southern States,	571
Disintegration of armies ; desertions ; wholesale conscription,	571
Southern proposals to arm the negro ; too late for effect,	573
Dissipations of the hour ; Richmond starvation parties,	574
Union operations at Wilmington ; fall of Fort Fisher,	575
Blockade-running stopped ; a hazardous commerce,	578
The <i>Kearsarge</i> and <i>Alabama</i> off Cherbourg ; Winslow's victory,	578
Destruction of Confederate ram ; Cushing's exploit,	580

SECTION II.

DOWNFALL OF THE CONFEDERACY.

Sherman's new march through the Carolinas,	581
Charleston falls ; Goldsboro approached,	582
Johnston at Bentonville ; Schofield and Sherman unite,	583
Sherman confers at City Point and returns,	584
Union cavalry raids ; Stoneman, Wilson, and Sheridan,	585
Grant's army at City Point ; James River preparations ; Sheridan and Early,	586
Confederate assault fails at Fort Stedman,	587
Grant's grand movement commenced ; orders to Sheridan,	589
Lee strongly confronted ; Sheridan's fight at Five Forks,	590
Onset of the Potomac army ; Lee's line broken,	592
Evacuation compelled ; Lee's message to Davis and flight,	594
Petersburg and Richmond captured ; Grant in pursuit,	595
The chase to Appomattox ; a summons to surrender,	596
Lee's army brought to bay ; final terms of surrender,	598
Armed resistance practically ended ; Grant's military merits,	601

SECTION III.

DEATH AND TRIUMPH.

	PAGE
The Confederate government leaves Richmond,	604
The Sunday of evacuation; turbulence and waste,	605
Union troops quench flames and feed the hungry,	606
President Lincoln visits Richmond from City Point,	607
Submission without reconciliation; a new calamity,	608
The 14th of April; Stars and Stripes raised at Sumter,	609
Peace and thankfulness at Washington; Lincoln's generous disposition,	609
The last Cabinet meeting; reconciling policy proposed,	610
Assassination of the President at Ford's Theatre,	611
Lincoln's death; attempt on Seward's life; the Booth conspiracy,	612
Pursuit and punishment of the assassins,	613
A bereavement to South and North; Europe mourns,	614
Andrew Johnson's accession; a sterner policy foreshadowed,	616
Surrender of Johnston's army to Sherman,	616
Subsequent capitulations; armies disbanded; statistics, Northern and Southern,	618
Capture of Jefferson Davis; Confederate civil government extinguished,	620
Triumph of Union diplomacy; French withdraw from Mexico; Maximilian shot and Juarez government reestablished,	621
Great Britain tenders indemnity; new treaty negotiated,	622
A public funeral; sorrow of the people,	622
Character and fame of Abraham Lincoln,	624

APPENDIX.

A. Electoral vote of 1864 for President and Vice-President,	635
B. Length of sessions of Congress, 1861-1865,	635
GENERAL INDEX,	637

HISTORY

OF

THE CIVIL WAR.

CHAPTER I.

FIRST ADMINISTRATION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

PERIOD OF THIRTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS.

MARCH 4, 1861 — MARCH 4, 1863.

SECTION I.

A REPUBLICAN ADMINISTRATION.

THE farther we recede from the era of our great civil strife, the more colossal stands out the figure of Abraham Lincoln upon the dim perspective. As when one leaves some mountain region, where comparative heights deceive the immediate vision, the tallest peak among those clustering giant forms seems solitary in grandeur when he looks back from the distant plain; yet other high summits have blended into the sky-line to enhance the symmetry and splendor of that highest. Our martyr President never through life stood alone; he lived among grand subordinates; and though his head looked heavenward, as we now well realize, his base was strongly rooted in common earth. He lived in perfect harmony with his age and surroundings; and when posterity fully comprehends how his character and public purpose developed, it comprehends that loyal generation of plain and freedom-loving Americans, who, under God's guidance, solved the stupendous problem of saving the Union and yet destroying slavery.

What did not this son of the Mississippi Valley owe to the Union, that he, one of the humblest of the whole people in birth and early advantage, should have risen to the highest official honors? And what did he not owe to free industrial surroundings besides, by migrating early from a slave State, where caste would probably have kept him a poor white for life, to that ampler domain across the Ohio River which the Ordinance of 1787 had consecrated to liberal education and equal rights? Lincoln had struggled long and earnestly in his younger years to win honorable renown; and self-culture brought him three matchless gifts for a high public career, self-discipline, self-restraint, and self-reliance. All human nature and occurrences he studied from a standpoint of his own. That "tall, gaunt, melancholy man," whose very jocularity was tinged by a sense of life's tragic lessons, and whose lonely and abstracted moods, as he moved among them, excited the sympathy of his neighbors and fellow-townsmen, seemed predestined to influence for some political crisis like the present. It was his unique and impressive exposition of freedom and free speech in the Territories, of the new Republican cause and creed, that made him a Presidential standard-bearer in 1860. Chosen chief magistrate without a previous executive experience, state or national, long unfamiliar with Washington life, and having little personal acquaintance with the recognized dominators of national thought except for Douglas, his late adversary, who had once looked condescendingly upon him, he was easily thought lacking in appreciation of the tremendous task which awaited him; yet, posterity should recall him as, at Springfield, the home where he had dwelt for a quarter of a century, and to which he never returned alive, he took sad leave of his friends and neighbors, announcing his conviction that a duty devolved upon him greater than had

1861. devolved upon any other man since the days of
Feb. Washington — a duty which Divine aid alone could enable him to perform.¹ He comprehended his task better

¹ See Am. Cycl. 1861, 410. This admirable and pathetic speech has received less historical notice than it deserves.

than most of his countrymen. They looked for some miracle to relieve the present duty; he felt that miracles must fail, that his duty and theirs must be met with courage. Observe now his various utterances as he journeyed eastward, — utterances which disappointed so many at the time because their own minds were set upon schemes of sectional compromise, — and their drift is seen to establish that, failing all such schemes, as was now most likely, loyal people must rely at length upon their own united courage and constancy to save the Union. “I would rather be assassinated on this spot,” he proclaimed at Philadelphia in his clear and piercing voice, on the 22d of February anniversary, when raising the stars and stripes over old Independence Hall, “than surrender that sentiment in the Declaration of Independence which gave liberty, not alone to the people of this country, but to the world for all future time.”¹

To the few gifted for governing, a year is worth the decade of ordinary men, and a lesser sphere expands confidence for the greater. One single term’s experience in Congress during the Whig era had given Lincoln the epitome of Washington life and a range of Southern acquaintance not to be forgotten;² and in Springfield, the capital of the growing State of Illinois, to which he belonged, he had long seen in miniature that political upheaval which agonized the nation. From leader in that State of a party minority which revolutionized public opinion on the issue of slavery extension, he assumed with serene self-possession the place of public leader for a like national controversy. And when chosen President, he proceeded with the same calm reserve to shut himself up at his home and compose unaided an inaugural address, which he brought with him to Washington already printed. That address, as he wrote it by himself, showed a sober purpose to treat secession as void and to maintain the Union unbroken; to take care, as

¹ Am. Cyclop. 1861, 418. For the other speeches of this journey, see *Ib.*, 410–420.

² See, *e.g.* vol. V, 493, 499.

the constitution expressly enjoined upon him, that the laws of the Union were faithfully executed in all the States; to hold, occupy and possess the property and places belonging to the Government, and even to repossess himself when he could of the places and property already taken. This was a plain position, if men could only understand him to mean as he said. Such words he did not wish regarded as a menace, "but only as the declared purpose of the Union that it will constitutionally defend and maintain itself." Nor did he mean to invade or to use more force than necessary in pursuing these ends; for "there need be no bloodshed or violence, and there shall be none unless forced upon the national authority." He had no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with slavery in the States where it existed; he did not object to the proposed constitutional amendment which forbade all such Federal interference;¹ and he recognized, moreover, the full authority of the people to amend the existing constitution as they might see fit in the future, under the modes which that instrument prescribed.

A few private copies of this drafted address Lincoln submitted to personal friends before his inauguration; and the comments of Seward, his intended premier, were especially invited. That distinguished son of New York, who had labored as a Senator through the perplexing winter, to bring the first of Republican administrations safely into place, was extremely solicitous for an auspicious start. His hope for peace, his desire to conciliate and his taste for smooth expression, led him to suggest some changes which Lincoln for the most part adopted. A few quaint or dubious phrases were thus smoothed over; the blunt statement of a purpose to retake and repossess was dropped;² but as to the general tenor and argument there was nothing which friendly criti-

¹ Vol. V, 507.

² Seward drafted as a less alarming substitute an ambiguous statement of policy; but Lincoln in preference struck out the objectionable passage, following apparently the suggestion of another friendly critic (Orville H. Browning), who had said, "You might get back the fallen places, but do not announce that you mean to." 3 N. & H. c. 21.



The United States in 1864.

cism could alter or object to. Chief of all the changes, perhaps, was that which replaced the categorical conclusion of Lincoln's draft, which threatened like low thunder, by a closing passage of exquisite grace and tenderness, whose melody lingered long as an angelic strain; it was the last appeal for a departing conciliation, the first prophecy that it would yet return.¹

That final passage of a most admirable inaugural address Abraham Lincoln pronounced with suppressed feeling as he stood at the east front of the Capitol, on the day of the induction ceremonies, facing a crowd of spectators, many of whom truly believed or even hoped that this national occasion would be the last. The 4th of March came in 1861 on Monday; and while the weather was variable, clouds dispersed and a chilly wind subsided as the day drew on. A small wooden canopy before the grand eastern portico sheltered the public dignitaries, among whom were to be seen Buchanan, the retiring President, careworn and ill at ease; Chief Justice Taney, bowed with years and frail of aspect, who sat, robed in black silk, ready to administer at the close of this address the same oath he had administered to six predecessors; and those two defeated candidates of the Sundered Democracy, Breckinridge and Douglas. Breckinridge, now retiring as Vice-President, had borne his part honorably in the electoral count, whatever disaffection he might have felt; Douglas, no longer condescending, held courteously the hat of the president-elect, which he had taken when the ceremonies began. To the crowd of auditors in front, some drawn by

¹ This fine passage was roughly sketched by Seward, but Lincoln shaped out the finer imagery. "We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battle-field and patriot grave, to every living heart and hearthstone over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature." See 3 N. & H. c. 21; 2 Seward's Life, 517.

sympathy and others by critical curiosity, Senator Baker of Oregon, a personal and political friend, presented the man of the occasion, Abraham Lincoln, who, walking deliberately forward to the front of the canopy, bowed in response to the faint cheers that greeted him, and, after adjusting his glasses, read his address from printed sheets, altered by his pen, which lay upon a small table in front of him, and were kept in place by his cane. The applause increased as he went on, and though the reader's voice seemed to falter in the last affecting paragraph, it had otherwise its usual penetrating tone.¹

A strange and ominous spectacle was presented. The old steps of this eastern portico had disappeared; the new ones were not yet in place, and spectators gathered before a sheer wall, as it were, to confront a chief magistrate specially introduced who spoke down as though from the height of some safe fortress. That superb central dome of the Capitol extension, which grew presently to be the crowning visible glory of our Capitol, was quite incomplete,² and the spectator, perchance, whose gaze wandered carelessly during the ceremony toward that circular mass of exquisite marble whose iron crown was wanting, felt that this dome would never round to its finish. It symbolized, at this imperfect stage of progress, some allegorical flight of the genius of Union, which, one might fancy, had just burst its cerement and soared from the temple, leaving a wreck behind. Was it possible that so splendid an architectural type of national growth and expansion as this grand edifice, should be arrested midway in its enlargement, surmounted in high air by this unfinished cage, so to speak, of public aspirations?

Though concealed from sight as much as possible, precautions against riotous outbreak had been carefully taken. The carriage in which Lincoln and Buchanan came and returned together over Pennsylvania Avenue had been closely guarded in front and rear by a military escort of

¹ Newspapers of the day; 3 N. & H. c. 21.

² See picture in 2 Seward's Life, 516.

regulars and the District militia. Cavalry detachments protected the crossings at the great squares; skilled riflemen were posted on the roofs of convenient houses with orders to watch windows opposite from which a shot might be fired. On Capitol Hill the private entrance and exit of the presidential party was through a covered passageway on the north side, lined by police, with trusted troops near by. General Charles P. Stone of the regular army took immediate charge of these preparations; but the veteran Scott supervised the whole, and watched intently the ceremonies, stationed with his battery of light artillery on the brow of the hill near the Senate entrance.¹ "God be praised!" was Scott's hearty utterance, when a prominent Republican,² returning from the rotunda, assured him that all was going well. All day long the stars and stripes floated from buildings in the city, public and private, in token of Union sentiment, and many were the efforts made to give to the new *régime* a loyal if not hospitable welcome; yet, though the whole programme of the day was worked out, disquiet was felt, for Southerners here had long given the social tone.³

So tardy on this 4th of March had been the inaugural ceremonies that the sun-dial marked half-past one in the afternoon before Lincoln began his address; for the final pressure of Congressional business kept President Buchanan at the Capitol signing bills until the stroke of noon, while the procession at the other end of the avenue waited for him. Those last hours of the Thirty-sixth Congress witnessed exciting scenes.⁴ In the new Senate Chamber a twelve hours' session from the twilight of Sunday evening, the 3d, showed by gaslight a lively spectacle; galleries were crowded during the midnight debate; lobbyists pushed vig-

¹ 1 B. & L. 24; 3 N. & H. c. 21.

² Thurlow Weed.

³ Newspapers of the day; Am. Cycl. 1861, 751, 752; Chittenden's Recollections, 82, etc.; 2 Seward, c. 54.

⁴ This year, for the first time in our annals, records the date of an expiring Congress as "March 4th," instead of "March 3d."

rously about the entrances, and with Crittenden, Douglas, Wade, Wigfall, and Trumbull contending earnestly in argument, it seemed as though Aaron Burr's famous prediction were about to be realized, that on this floor would be witnessed the death-throes of our expiring Republic.¹ But at seven in the morning of Inauguration Day an adjournment was carried, and at ten o'clock both branches of Congress reassembled, the burden of unfinished business resting upon the Senate. There, as the hands of the clock pointed at noon, the hammer fell and Hannibal Hamlin took the chair, sworn in as Vice-President, while Breckinridge, his predecessor, now joined the group of new members in front of the desk who waited to be sworn in as senators. While oaths were being administered, the guests began gathering in the chamber, and by the time that the Presidential carriage stopped outside, this decorous branch of Congress, Democratic an hour before, had become, through the defection of Southern States, Republican in preponderance, with a Republican Vice-President in the chair.²

To a Senate thus reorganized in harmony with the new administration, and reassembled in executive session on Tuesday noon, the list of President Lincoln's Cabinet was brought from the White House by John G. Nicolay, his chosen private secretary. William H. Seward of New York, was nominated Secretary of State; Salmon P. Chase of Ohio, Secretary of the Treasury; Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania, Secretary of War; Gideon Welles of Connecticut, Secretary of the Navy; Caleb B. Smith of Indiana, Secretary of the Interior; Edward Bates of Missouri, Attorney-General; and Montgomery Blair of Maryland, Postmaster-General. This whole list was promptly confirmed by the Senate; indeed unanimously, except that a few Southern votes were thrown against the two selected from slave States, to rebuke them for affiliating with the "Black Republicans."

The entire cast of this Cabinet had been determined sev-

¹ Vol. II, 89.

² Newspapers of the day.

eral days before; the nominations were such as the Senate had anticipated, and it is proof once more of Lincoln's self-reliance that the chief names stood in the list about as he arranged them in his own mind at Illinois on the very evening of November that the returns by wire assured him of his election.¹ His chief party rivals for the supreme candidacy he had then and there designed for his chief advisers. Seward, whom he invited first of all, about a month later, was likely to satisfy public opinion and his own, for the preëminent Secretaryship of State; a statesman, adroit, subtle and resourceful, diplomatic by habit, and though no compromiser of principles, considerate of an opposition in applying them. Bates, conscientious in refusing to own slaves in a slaveholding State, and solid in wisdom and sobriety, was Lincoln's second selection. Both Bates and Seward had been Whigs in earlier days, and so had Smith, the ripe fruition of a young State seeking recognition, eloquent in the late campaign, and of sound antecedents. Chase was a Republican of a different and a Democratic type, whom Lincoln earnestly wished for the Treasury; while Cameron, fourth among these Chicago rivals, wanted the place for himself as earnestly and pressed through personal friends to receive it. Chase had aspirations still for the presidency, and doubted whether a Cabinet position would aid them; but Cameron, on the other hand, was content to control other men's chances and make crafty commerce of his influence. Not without reluctance did the one give up a seat just taken in the Senate to occupy the Cabinet place assigned him; while the other with good grace accepted the War portfolio, in fulfilment of what he considered a pledge to be put into the administration.² Cameron's antecedents, like Chase's, were, on the whole, Democratic, and so were those of Welles, the untried representative of New

¹ 3 N. & H. 345, 347.

² Cameron had bargained at Chicago with Lincoln's friends for transferring from himself the vote of the Pennsylvania delegation, and Lincoln was forced, rather against his will, to abide by it. A. K. McClure's *Lincoln*, 141-146.

England, whom Lincoln added. In a fusion Cabinet thus compounded, antagonism between two old political elements was likely to arise under any circumstances, and during the past winter, moreover, Seward had stood for suavity toward the South, Chase for severity. The seventh and last Cabinet selection of all Lincoln deferred until he reached Washington, desiring some one from an Atlantic slave State, and when Blair was fixed upon, the scion of a Jacksonian stock always combative, intense, and unimpressible, Seward's chagrin was so great that he recalled his own acceptance just before the inaugural ceremonies, but was induced to remain. "I am myself an old-time Whig," said the new President, when remonstrance was made against bringing four Democrats into a board of seven advisers, "and I shall be there to make the parties even."¹ Time made that promise good.

Lincoln proved admirably qualified to conduct an administration where great leaders were in rivalry; for, unlike Washington, who failed in so hazardous a civil experiment, he was a consummate manager of men and leaned upon no one. "In weaker hands," it has well been said, "such a Cabinet would have been a hot-bed of strife; under him it became a tower of strength."² Others were more competent than himself to conduct and systematize details, but he was the best of all to blend those who conducted and their operations for the public benefit. Among all the great men and great minds of this period in contact with him he showed subservience to none, but held an easy intercourse. The long, green-covered table, already famous, and soon to be more so, occupied the familiar south room, plainly furnished, in the second story of the Presidential mansion, whose windows looked toward the smooth Potomac and the unfinished marble shaft to Washington's memory. Strong rivalries and strong wills found expression within that narrow chamber, but the chief's generosity and good humor, his considerate

¹ 3 N. & H. c. 22, details the interesting circumstances attending the selection of this Cabinet.

² 3 N. & H. 374.

forbearance, tact, and sympathy, and the pressure besides of a great war crisis, soon brought all into patriotic concert.

Here, then, convened the first Cabinet meeting to consider the state of the country, on Saturday night, the 9th of March, and the military situation that Lincoln revealed was grave and startling. Fort Sumter had scarcely a month's supply of provisions on hand;¹ relief would have to be afforded within that space of time, if afforded at all, and would cost an expedition of twenty thousand men and a bloody battle. Such was the report of General Scott and his military experts, and the first disposition of the Cabinet was unquestionably to yield to their counsel and order the fort evacuated. Various informal conferences followed, and when the President, on the 15th, asked formal opinions as to whether or not an attempt ought to be made to provision Fort Sumter, five of his seven official advisers replied in the negative.² For the hazard of such an attempt seemed greater to them than the prospective gain; we should probably fail, while provoking by the effort a premature civil war, and disuniting those loyal elements on whose support the country depended.

The President, who had kept his own views in reserve, did not think fit to overrule or oppose so clear a majority of his counsellors. But he still held silently to the declared purpose of his inaugural address, and his suppressed declaration both to possess and repossess, sooner or later. One of his earliest official acts had been to direct General Scott through his Secretary of War, "to exercise all possible vigilance for the maintenance of all the places within the

¹ Joseph Holt, the retiring Secretary of War, received this information from Major Anderson, March 4, and communicated it to President Lincoln the next day. 3 N. & H. 377; 1 W. R. 197.

² 3 N. & H. 380-388. Blair was the only outspoken adviser in the affirmative. Chase returned a similar answer, but under an express reservation which neutralized. *Ib.* For Cameron's opinion, based upon adverse military advice, see 1 W. R. 196.

military department of the United States." He now made searching inquiries on certain points: how customs duties might be collected on shipboard, with the aid of a naval force; what was the real condition of the beleaguered garrison at Fort Sumter, and whether the people of Charleston were really disposed to fight for possession. Blair from the first had counselled vigorous measures, and his young brother-in-law, Gustavus V. Fox, formerly of the navy, and a man of zeal and resource, submitted an ingenious plan for reënforsing Fort Sumter by a fleet of vessels. Lincoln sent Fox secretly to Charleston to spy out the situation at the garrison; despatching two political friends, besides,¹ for a study on shore. From the latter he learned that separation was a fixed purpose with the South Carolinians; from Fox that the situation at Sumter was desperate, in the opinion of Major Anderson, who named to him the 15th of April as the very latest date to which he could hold out without supplies, and like General Scott believed that no entrance from the sea for his relief was possible.²

The Cabinet opinion we have described rested mainly upon military advice, and was liable, of course, to change. All admitted it humane and wise to provision Fort Sumter, were that possible, and the political effect of surrendering it was deemed injurious to the Union cause at home and abroad. Seward, whose personal views influenced the first conclusion, understood that a conflict was possible, in spite of ourselves, in which emergency the Union ought to be maintained, peaceably or forcibly, under all circumstances. But he proposed keeping on the defensive, as much as possible, holding the border States to their allegiance, of which he was still hopeful, and gaining time. Only give our new

¹ S. A. Hurlbut and Ward H. Lamon.

² 3 N. & H. 389, 390; 1 W. R. 211. Fox only sounded Major Anderson concerning the plan he had proposed. Ib. Confederate authorities claimed afterward that all these visits were perfidious; yet they were spying constantly for their own information. The postal service of the Union was still operating in the Confederate States, and the prevalent disposition there was to let this administration explore and discover how hopeless would be all effort at coercion.

administration time to operate and show its generous spirit, and disunion, he believed, would crumble away. But he seems to have overestimated the latent loyalty of these cotton States; hence the President's new information from South Carolina furnished a just corrective.

Meanwhile the provisional government of this insurgent Confederacy, organized at Montgomery,¹ had sent three commissioners to Washington, empowered to negotiate for peaceful separation of these cotton States from the Union, and a final partition of the forts and other public property.² Pierre G. T. Beauregard of Louisiana, a West Point graduate of engineer distinction, who had resigned from the regular army when his State seceded, was made a brigadier-general of the Confederacy and sent to command Charleston harbor. Thus quickly was that issue with the Union which South Carolina had first evoked as a sovereign State made the united concern of a new confederated government, disposed to act deliberately. Beauregard reached Charleston on the 3d of March, while the three commissioners we have mentioned, John Forsyth of Alabama (a son of the famous Georgian of that name), Martin J. Crawford of Georgia, lately a member of Congress, and A. B. Roman, governor of Louisiana, reached Washington separately, Crawford just before, and Forsyth shortly after Lincoln's inauguration. Forsyth and Crawford were zealous for the new cause, Roman more conservative. Politely repulsed in the effort to gain an interview with the new Lincoln administration, and failing wholly of recognition, these commissioners lingered about the capital, to gather such scraps of information as they might pick up unofficially and magnify their mission.³ John A. Campbell of Alabama, still high honored as

¹ Vol. V, 490.

² 1 W. R. 26, 259.

³ 3 N. & H. c. 24, with Ms. citations at length; 1 Moore, 426-428. Forsyth writes to Walker, the insurgent Secretary of War, March 14, that "we are playing a game in which time is our best advocate;" "there is a terrific fight in the Cabinet; our policy is to encourage the peace element in the fight, and at least blow up the Cabinet on the question." 1 Russell Diary, 86, 92-96, gives some of the boastful dinner-table talk in which these gentlemen indulged in his presence.

a justice of the Supreme Court, placed his services confidentially at their disposal, with no very keen sense of the dishonor involved in doing so. His State had already joined the Confederate cause, and he was planning to follow;¹ but, as he wrote Jefferson Davis, with whom he was now seeking favor, he deferred his resignation so that he might procure that official access which otherwise would have been denied him.² Seward knew Justice Campbell as one of the dignitaries of the nation, an anti-secessionist, a Southerner still loyal, and a citizen whose influence he strongly desired to keep. His memorandum, declining to receive the commissioners, was already on file in the State department and withheld from delivery simply at their own desire. Campbell, about the middle of March, called upon the Secretary in company with Justice Nelson, one of his brethren of the bench, who as an old acquaintance in New York State, and almost a neighbor, seemed by his added presence to insure safe confidence. All three present desired from different motives to keep the *status quo* as long as possible, and while Seward said clearly that the commissioners from Montgomery could not be recognized, he told his two visitors in the course of an intimate conversation that he thought Fort Sumter would soon be evacuated. He said as he then supposed, and as there was good reason at the time for supposing, and his only indiscretion seems to have been in misapprehending what use one of these two callers might make of such a statement. Campbell, after giving him the idea that he was zealously bent on preserving the Union and recalling the South to allegiance, at once conveyed the good news about Sumter to the commissioners, further informing President Davis by letter the same evening.³ He counselled that the commissioners should tarry longer and not bring

¹ Campbell had not been an original disunionist; but he was a States-rights Democrat of the South, who believed his present allegiance to Alabama superior to any obligation he owed to the United States as a sworn officer of the highest judicial grade.

² See his letter of April 3, quoted in 3 N. & H. 411-413.

³ 1 Moore, 427. Seward here had made no pledge, but expressed his honest opinion.

matters to an issue. Forsyth and Crawford were unduly elated by what Campbell told them; for though, like so many of the fire-eaters, disheartened at first by the decisive tone of Lincoln's inaugural message, they cherished the illusion that Seward, with his temporizing disposition, would be the guide and dominant spirit of the administration. A peaceful surrender of the last Southern forts was what the Montgomery government had wished of all things to bring about, and with such a prospect there was no wish to cut short their mission. Three conferences did Campbell hold, apparently, with Secretary Seward before the end of March, Nelson, whose good faith in the whole affair there is no reason to question, calling with him.¹

In recounting the particulars of those first four anxious and bewildering weeks, while this untried administration was feeling for a practical application of its cherished purpose, one must not lay too great stress upon formal Cabinet votes taken in March at long intervals. Cabinet officers saw the President and one another almost every day, and as new phases of the situation were revealed or new facts presented, the drift of official opinion was liable to change. Each member of the administration advised the President honestly and as he believed the public good required, and pressure was constantly brought to bear upon each one by Senators, party friends, and professed Unionists of every stripe. There was not one of the Cabinet who had not from the first desired to relieve Sumter if it could be done.² But scarcely one of them believed that relief was practicable without a more momentous sacrifice of life; and it proved, indeed, as had been predicted, not only that practical relief was impossible, but that, if the effort was made, Sumter would fall by assault before the relief came. Differences of opinion were accordingly divulged, the main difference being on the point of displaying hostile force and provoking a bloody collision. But as the days drifted by, it

¹ See Campbell's letter of April 13, 1 Moore, 427. Allowance should be made for his *ex parte* and not disinterested statements.

² Cf. 3 N. & H. 434, and 2 Seward, 528, 529.

became clear to most who accepted collision as inevitable, that in attempting, if not to throw troops into Charleston, at least to save Anderson's little force from being starved into a surrender, the Union had as strong an issue upon which to rally the loyal public to its support as could possibly be raised. That conclusion, to which the President's own mind tended, seems to have prevailed at a Cabinet meeting held on the 29th of March. Scott by this time volunteered his opinion on political grounds that it would be well to abandon Fort Pickens at Pensacola as well as Sumter. He meant well, but the administration were a unit in remanding him to his military sphere, and his former advice suffered from this indiscretion. The Cabinet advised without a dissenting voice that all forts in the Gulf of Mexico still left to us should be strengthened and held firmly; while as to Fort Sumter the majority opinion of two weeks earlier was now so far reversed¹ that the President felt justified in preparing at once to test Fox's experiment of throwing in supplies. Not meaning to be left in a false position, Seward at once, and with great alacrity, pushed forward the reënforcement of Fort Pickens, which was soon accomplished unopposed and without bloodshed. The President ordered his Secretaries of the War and the Navy to have a relief expedition for Fort Sumter in readiness to sail by the 6th of April.²

¹ 3 N. & H. 394, 395, 429-432. It should not be understood that the former Cabinet opinion was wholly reversed; for the record shows that Chase, Welles, and Blair were strongly in favor of provisioning Fort Sumter and risking all armed resistance; that Seward and Smith believed it unwise to force the issue of civil war at Charleston with a certainty of failure there, and that Bates was non-committal. Cameron's opinion, if given at all, is not stated. 3 N. & H. 429-432. The President himself inclined unquestionably to the heroic course and thus gave it preponderance.

² 3 N. & H. 433; 1 W. R. 226. Probably there were various other Cabinet conferences on the subject, formal or informal, later than March 29. 2 Seward, 533. This Sumter preparation was "to be ultimately used or not according to circumstances," as the President's message of July 4 stated afterwards.

The same principle applied to Fort Pickens as to Fort Sumter in

These changing phases of opinion concerning Sumter had been reflected through most of the month in the Senate, whose executive session closed March 28, after much fruitless discussion on the situation, leaving the Executive to formulate its own policy, and take the full responsibility of initiation. Hitherto it had been taken for granted that the administration had no fixed policy, beyond "the exhaustion of all peaceful measures before a resort to any stronger ones."¹ The soothing language of the inaugural address offset in public effect the declared purpose to hold the forts and public property; for in most official utterances of late the people had found their rulers disposed to say one thing and do another. No body of intelligent citizens at that day, none of the political parties or party factions, comprehended the real power of that address, nor the sound sense and ability of its author;² but we who read it by the light of later events, and of Lincoln's sincerity, perceive its purport. So reticent, indeed, of his plans had been the new President while sifting opinions through the month that it seemed as though he had no policy of his own, but was wait-

respect of relieving it, but the place had not been practically threatened by any such display of force as at Charleston, and hence collision was averted. For the plan of sending supplies to Pensacola and its successful execution, April 18, by Meigs and Porter, see in detail, 2 Seward, 534-540; 4 N. & H. c. 1; Meigs' Diary Ms., etc. The good humor with which Scott received the news that his advice had been repulsed did him honor. "General Scott," said the Secretary of State, calling, March 31, at his headquarters, "you have formally reported to the President your advice to evacuate Fort Pickens; notwithstanding this I now come to bring you his order as commander-in-chief of the army and navy to reënforce and hold it to the last extremity." "Sir," replied the old soldier, drawing himself up to his full height, "the great Frederick used to say, 'When the king commands all things are possible.' It shall be done."

¹ Message, July 4, 1861.

² Russell inquired, March 27, at the State Department what would be done concerning the relief of Fort Sumter. The Secretary responded, with a pleasant twinkle of the eye, that the whole policy of the Government on that and other questions was put forth in the President's inaugural, from which there could be no deviation. "Turning to the inaugural message, however," continues the writer,

ing for his Cabinet to frame one for him. March was a dark and dangerous month of drift. A feverish uncertainty at the great commercial centres paralyzed the stock market and made business dull, in spite of easy monetary conditions. Newspaper projects for dealing with the situation were rife throughout the North, most of them of the *laissez faire* description. The *New York Tribune* argued that the wayward South would best be won back by a Fabian policy which used no force, but left secession to fret itself out. The hope had not yet passed that by repealing "personal liberty" acts, free States might yet win back the erring sisters.¹ What our border States would do in an emergency was asked with great anxiety. Proslavery men proposed that the Union should be reconstructed, leaving New England out. Kentucky statesmen urged a conference of the border States. Senators in their late debate had made ominous allusion to George III. and his thirteen colonies, and declared the coercion of sovereign States impossible. Finally, the Virginia convention, now in session, was again rehearsing its favorite rôle of sectional pacificator, notwithstanding its obstinate plan of a perpetual and irrevocable compromise line across the continent, to define between slavery and freedom, had already been defeated in Congress. This convention had been a constant menace and source of anxiety to the Government, ever since the new administration came into power. Meeting at Richmond, February 13, with its members chosen by a majority of Union voters, and nominally controlled by Unionists, it had yet been perversely kept in session to influence events. President Lincoln and his friends had hoped and endeavored to get that body adjourned *sine die* and out of the way, but they were cleverly thwarted.²

"there is no such very certain indication as Mr. Seward pretends to discover, of the course to be pursued by Mr. Lincoln and the Cabinet. To an outside observer, like myself, it seems as if they were waiting for events to develop themselves." 1 Russell Diary, 58.

¹ See as to acts of this character still in force, and the efforts to repeal, *Am. Cycl.* 1861, 437, 575-579. And see vol. V, 502.

² 3 N. & H. c. 25, with testimony of John M. Botts and others, *ib.* 423-428.

In the midst of such threatening issues, the rush for public office went on uninterrupted. A new political party had gained the citadel of power, and the spoils doctrine still held sway as in Jackson's time. Under any circumstances the places must have been largely rearranged, for disloyalty to the Union compelled vacancies. All through these early weeks Southern sympathizers were voluntarily resigning from the army and navy and the civil service, in compliance with the sentiment of their several States; while viperous incumbents still coiled tightly to strike unseen at the hand that fed them. Of Republican claimants from the North, hungry for place, some had sweated for promotion while others had lent their respectability; some were social outcasts for the negro's sake, denounced as fanatics, others had given free-soilism the entrance to good society; some had helped the cause by scurrility, others by the eloquence of tongue or pen; some were conscientious in philanthropy, others keen scenters of the prey. But the whole strange medley which first composed this party of moral ideas, Free-Soilers, Whigs, Democrats, and piebald Abolitionists, vied together for recognition in this hour of political triumph. Abraham Lincoln sought to deal fairly by all such elements. His Cabinet heads dispensed the patronage largely for their several departments; State delegations in Congress, headed by the Senators, would award the local appointments, and rarely could one get a place without filing first his testimonials and then bringing influence to bear. Fierce was the struggle of competitors, and competition fructified in calls at the White House. For all with congratulations to tender, advice to give, favor to solicit, or application to indorse, the President kept open house, while strained all the while by terrible problems of policy, which required close concealment. Physical endurance and good temper were of much avail, for the pressure for office, during this lull before the storm, was incessant and exacting. Each Cabinet officer, as the more immediate patron, was beset wherever he could be found. At the White House, day after day, the broad staircase was thronged with one line going and another coming, while on the second floor ante-

room and corridors leading to the Presidential office reeked with a restless and persistent crowd, that intrigued with the attendants, glanced through the door whenever it opened, or glared with envy upon those favored Senators and Cabinet officers who, secure in their own position, held the right of way. Here the President lived "in chambers at a business palace," with a sense of being surrounded by "jailers," the boldest of whom would hurriedly inject a word or place a paper in his hands whenever he passed through the corridor to take his meals. Amused, though worried, over this ignoble strife, Lincoln felt (to use his words) like a man letting lodgings at one end of his house while the other end was on fire.¹ "No, no, I won't open shop in the street," said he to one who brought credentials to his carriage when he went to ride.

Through March this administration gave no sign to the country, no sure indication of its purpose. Lincoln could not pose or make pompous utterances; what he did, he did naturally; and his solemn moments were not sought out, but came to him. He acted as the occasion required, and there was content to rest. Inexperienced in public business as he was known to be, it is not strange that his capacity was doubted longer than his good nature and good intentions. The first impression he made at Washington was not that of personal dignity; he joked, he made droll comment, he told inimitable stories, which, though not always suited for polite company, were original and strikingly pertinent. He took the humor of his sudden elevation, and his lightest thoughts took on a figure of speech in quaint dialect. Yet he had at once a self-possession

¹ 4 N. & H. 68, 69, describing the scene from memory. The experiences of the Jackson and Harrison times were repeated on a larger scale because the patronage to be bestowed had grown to be so much greater. At the White House, as Seward writes home, March 10, "the grounds, halls, stairways, closets, are filled with applicants, who render ingress and egress difficult." 2 Seward, 530; and see *ib. c.* 55. "Get rid of these people somehow," advised Stanton brusquely when turning over his portfolio this month to a successor; "fill all the places as soon as possible, so as to get at the real work before you."

among men of all degrees, which indicated conscious greatness. His jocose remarks or salient anecdotes served to parry many a thrust on affairs too delicate for discussion, since his cautious reticence was in truth very great;¹ and with all his light banter, he seemed invariably to preserve a natural dignity, as became chief magistrate, and secured, so to speak, the last word. Yet Lincoln was long believed by contemporaries secondary in point of statesmanship, and was chiefly praised for his virtues. His very figure and physiognomy served much for present ridicule. Nor were the "rail-splitter" caricatures of the late campaign yet forgotten.

A man grows in general estimation not only because his work expands him, but because he is better known. Lincoln as one of fame's immortals does not appear the Lincoln of 1861, whom men outside the administration likened in ridicule to the original gorilla.² Russell, arriving as war correspondent of the *London Times*, took his likeness at this time, and so a year later did Hawthorne, the best psychologist among our novelists; neither appreciated his worth, both inclined to make sport of his personal appearance. Later still, when Lincoln was heroic, a sympathetic artist essayed the task, and his pen has left a portrait as admirable as that of his brush. A man of singular aspect comes out in historic relief as the composite of these three delineators, but one who gained in polish and dignity with each year of his fame. Lincoln stood nearly six feet four inches in his stockings. His frame was tall, gaunt, and sinewy; but from youth he had a stooping habit when he walked, and his shoulders tended to roundness. He had long pendulous arms terminating in hands so large that he would joke about them when drawing on a pair of gloves for a levee; his feet, which corresponded in size, he could put down flat and squarely. Physically powerful for earlier feats of strength, his general vigor and robustness served well the

¹ Russell Diary, 41, relates a good incident of this kind, and one of the very earliest.

² McClellan's Own Story, 152.

sedentary pursuits of mature life and the iron toil of his present station. His complexion was dark and sallow, and became more so as anxieties increased; lines of care ploughed his face, and under the eyes were very marked. He had high cheek-bones like an Indian and a tough skin; his ears projected from either side of his head as a sign of generosity; the head itself, of full, medium size, and well poised, was of the Clay, rather than the Webster mould. His brow was broad, with thick eyebrows underneath, and a thatch above of rough, unmanageable hair, whose tendency was to stand awry. His nose and chin were firm, and the mouth, his plainest feature, showed strength and gentleness combined. There was a visible mole or wart on the right cheek; his eyes, bluish gray in color, and heavily shaded by the upper lids, were tender and pensive in expression, often inexpressibly sad, as though the reservoir of tears were close behind. "In repose," says Carpenter, "it was the saddest face I ever knew." This was a homely yet not disagreeable ruler of men to look upon — one to inspire even in the casual observer a feeling of trust and confidence; a person, perhaps, of no great cultivation or refinement, but thoroughly honest to the core. Hawthorne was impressed by his essential resemblance to the typical Yankee, lank and sagacious, whom Europe and the Old World seemed determined to depict, and this very person who shook hands all round, unIntroduced, with the party in whose company this novelist called, he seemed himself to have seen in the village street a thousand times.¹ Lincoln had less of the wild Western look about him as his term went on at Washington. He went there with a sensible beard protecting the throat and windpipe, looking less a son of the prairie than when nominated, with "the fruit of Adam ripening in the air." While in office his hair became sprinkled with gray, and he began using spectacles; his long black suit with frock coat and tall black hat, his habitual concession to supreme station, lost something of the rusty funereal look, and fitted better;

¹ Carpenter's *White House*, 30, 217, 364; *Russell Diary*, 54, 55; *J. T. Field's Yesterdays*, 99.

his throat gear conformed more to fashion. Either he, or those about him, took increasing heed that preoccupation with public cares should not cause him to appear too slovenly. Still to the very last Lincoln remained "Old Abe" in the hearts of the people, prematurely paternal, indifferent to appearance, merciful when forced to be severe, and wholly without pomp or display.

Even thus early a chance collision with this deep and undisclosed nature showed that it neither drifted nor awaited direction. Two incidents of the first month's Presidency, both authentic, are left for illustration. Sherman, the soldier, relates the first, hardly apprehending its real meaning long after the war was over. That grand fighter, but obtuse observer in politics, fled from New Orleans, where he had lately lived a civilian. While in Washington, about the 10th of March, preparing to take up a new business pursuit at St. Louis, he fretted himself into the belief that all here was ignorance of danger, that the administration slept on a volcano. Calling in this mood at the White House with his brother, the Senator from Ohio, who, as Chase's new successor, had a slate of appointments for approval, he waited uneasily to explode his information when that grovelling business should be over. Next introduced to the President as fresh from Louisiana, he was genially asked how were things down there. "They are preparing for war!" replied the alarmist, starting off with vehemence to tell his tale. "Oh, well," said Lincoln, checking this ardor with instant discretion, "I guess we'll manage to keep house." Silenced and mortified, as he tells us, William Tecumseh left the mansion with his story cut short, and vented his expletives very freely to his brother John when he got out of doors, blaming the politicians who had got the country into this "devil of a fix," and could not somehow get it out again.¹ Lincoln in heart must have repelled the imputation conveyed by Sherman's manner; he did not need to be roused to a

¹ 1 Sherman, 196.

sense of danger, but was already revolving earnestly how that danger should be met.

The other incident has become historical as "Premier or President."¹ Two confidential papers which passed between

Lincoln and Seward on the first day of April are
April 1.

brought to posterity's light together, without contemporaneous hint or comment on either side that may help explain them. Under such circumstances a harsh construction is hardly admissible. Each statesman respected the other's feelings, and Americans should respect the feelings of both. No ignoble strife for mastery in the administration could here have arisen to disturb the free current of confidence, else jealous spirits in the Cabinet would have quickly noticed the change. The premier's right to advise the President privately was, at least, as good as that of his colleagues and Senators who often did so; and by giving that advice in writing, he pledged himself to good faith. But the advice itself was indiscreet, wild almost in some aspects, and indicates an overstrained apprehension. Seward certainly could not have realized the President's capacity for the coming crisis, nor was this strange. He himself had kept open the path for Lincoln's induction during the past winter, while his party friends were stern and unyielding. He with Adams in concert had pacified Congress, and said soothing words for Union at the seeming cost of party consistency.² With baffling designs and cheerful predictions in the midst of dismay, he had mystified Republican friends and offended rivals.³ Since the inauguration, what with military conferences, expeditions to arrange,⁴ Cabinet discussions to take part in, and an immense correspondence

¹ See 3 N. & H. c. 26. The story never reached the public until divulged in the *Century*, February, 1888, in one of the magazine articles which forestalled this important biography.

² Vol. V, 501. See Seward's private letter in 1 Schouler's *Massachusetts*, 41.

³ See 4 Pierce's *Sumner*, 13, 17.

⁴ Secretary Welles of the Navy never forgave Seward for intruding upon his department concerns at this period. See *Galaxy* recollections (1870).

to care for from prominent men in every quarter who looked to him as the guiding genius, besides the perplexing charge of foreign relations, he had overestimated possibly his indispensableness. "These cares fall chiefly on me," he wrote home wearily, feeling much overburdened. His own policy for the hour was to temporize to the utmost without yielding in substance what had been morally and permanently won. Every week's advance would, he thought, assuage Southern prejudice against the new administration and win back the disloyal. Moreover, the idea of a compound Cabinet had been distasteful to him. He saw rival colleagues winning over the President, whose long reserve seemed to indicate an unsteady purpose. Hence, perhaps, this last appeal before the Sumter expedition had been actually ordered, to divert the whole issue from fratricidal war. News came only the day before of European designs in St. Domingo; and the sudden thought seized the Secretary that Union sentiment might be reunited, and the whole question changed before the public by making a bold stroke for the Monroe doctrine, and initiating, if need be, a foreign war. Such was the tenor of that written proposal which posterity has brought to light; rash enough, we may think it, yet others had counselled just such a diversion. The language of Seward's letter intimated further an opinion that the President had been drifting all the month without a policy, and that he himself stood ready to take the whole responsibility for this new departure, regardless of what his Cabinet colleagues might think.

Lincoln's reply here in evidence was in admirable taste and temper. Betraying no irritation at the imputation of his feebleness, he met Seward's memorial, point by point, and exposed its fallacies. He made clear his own apprehension that bloodshed was inevitable; that the South had been arming and fortifying all the while we were parleying; and that if the patriotic stand could not be made at Sumter, still less likely could it be made at other forts. He did not seem to think the plan of foreign diversion worth debating; but, reminding his Secretary that both of them had agreed at the outset in a definite policy,—that of holding all forts and

public property,—he declared that he had never once changed that policy. He further made it manifest that he himself, as chief executive, was the fit person to carry out whatever policy might be fixed upon, and that points arising in its progress would be submitted for advice, not to one, but to all of the Cabinet.¹ The Secretary's mortification, on receiving such a reply (to take this correspondence in all seriousness), was less, most probably, than his sense of relief. The heaviest burden was off his shoulders; the President's logic must have convinced him that there was no evading the fight at home; and he comprehended, as he had not before, that the President was equal to his own responsibilities. So far from alienating them, this incident certainly brought the two into closer harmony than before in their true relation. From that day forward Seward gave all his talents, industry, and influence to his chief, and the policy now fully fixed upon, without reservation and with a sincere and devoted personal attachment. And Lincoln, in return, when Seward's enemies in the fold made their strongest demonstration to force him out of the Cabinet, stood firmly by him.²

SECTION II.

FORT SUMTER AND THE APPEAL TO ARMS.

If the commissioners from Montgomery felt sanguine that Fort Sumter would be peacefully surrendered, the government that despatched them was not equally so. It is claimed for Robert Toombs, the Confederate Secretary of State, that he perceived already the temper of Abraham Lincoln, and thought him willing to force the fight in order to secure a united North; and in vain, it is said, he counselled forbearance on the part of the South, predicting that

¹ 3 N. & H. 444-449; 2 Seward, 534; Lothrop's Seward, 279.

² 3 N. & H. 449.

a great uprising at the North would follow any forcible seizure of the last Federal fort in Charleston harbor.¹

Jefferson Davis, the President, however, was a determined man in his own policy, and so proud on military points because of his West Point training and experience, that, as Toombs was wont to declare, any Secretary of War was likely to be no more than a chief clerk. He himself states in the retrospect that while the general belief in his section was, that the North would bargain and not fight, he thought otherwise, and prepared early for a conflict that he felt was inevitable.² With that conviction he directed Beauregard on taking command at Charleston to strengthen his batteries, and be prepared to assault if necessary.³ In doing this he complied with South Carolina's urgent wishes, though observing a military prudence.⁴ His obvious purpose was to take Fort Sumter before many weeks, whether peaceably or by violence. "Give but little credit to the rumors of an amicable adjustment," wrote Walker, his Secretary of War, to Beauregard, on the 15th of March; "do not slacken for a moment your energies, and be ready to execute any order from this department."⁵ And again, April 2d, word was sent that the Confederate Government had at no time placed reliance upon assurances from Washington that Sumter would be evacuated, nor had believed Lincoln's administration disposed to yield or concede anything not absolutely necessary. Distrust of that administration, said the latter despatch, was to be deemed "the key to the policy" at Montgomery; and its tenor shows clearly the intention of the insurgent government to have Sumter either by negotiation or capture.⁶

Major Anderson was a Kentuckian born and a Southerner; and gladly would Davis's government have seduced him from allegiance to the Union, so as to gain the fort and its garri-

¹ Stovall's Toombs, c. 21.

² Davis's Short History, 59.

³ 1 W. R. 259, 260, 272.

⁴ 1 W. R. 259, 260.

⁵ 1 W. R. 276. The eccentric Wigfall, who left the United States Senate to recruit rebel troops in Baltimore, had telegraphed from Washington, March 11th, that the Lincoln Cabinet would probably try to throw the Montgomery authorities off their guard. *Ib.* 273.

⁶ 1 W. R. 285.

son by some such artful compliance as Twiggs had lately rendered. But Anderson's sense of honor was a flame unquenchable; and it was well for our national cause that the officer whose loyalty drew the opening cannonade of civil war was one who sympathized little with the political strife of parties, but did as his country bade him. President Davis had given direction that he should be gently dealt with; and that in case of his peaceful surrender he and his garrison should have a safe conduct out of the harbor.¹ But when his patriotism proved obstinate, new orders issued at Montgomery for starving him into surrender. By April 2d,

April. close espionage over the garrison was directed; former courtesies in supplies from the city were forbidden; Beauregard was ordered to watch the harbor, draw his lines rigidly against the fort, prevent its reënforcement, and hold himself in ample readiness for any surprise from without.² Such strict orders were not without reason; trustworthy advices had now reached Montgomery that President Lincoln's feelings and convictions of duty were strongly on the side of strengthening the beleaguered force. By April 8th, Beauregard was again instructed by telegraph not to allow any provisions to go to the fort from Charleston, while increasing his patrol boats in the harbor.³ And the next day came orders to stop Anderson's mails and isolate the fort completely.⁴

April, we have seen, opened on the Union side with expeditions preparing for Forts Pickens and Sumter; the latter, however, with the issue of sailing orders still deferred. Lincoln had chosen no such aggressive policy in Charleston harbor as these rebel despatches had assumed, and the surmise of intended perfidy was groundless. He did not decide positively upon an offensive and warlike reënforcement; he did not prepare for that expedition just as for Pensacola; but, as he explained to Congress afterwards, attempted simply "the giving of bread to the few brave and hungry men of the garrison." That intention when an-

¹ 1 W. R. 222, 279.

² 1 W. R. 289.

³ 1 W. R. 285.

⁴ 1 W. R. 291; 3 N. & H. 18-27.

nounced proved enough to stir the adversary to forcibly seize and possess. The issue thus joined was a demonstration of armed insurrection against the Union. For if, argued our President in proposing the experiment, the rebels fired to prevent him from provisioning, they could not convince the world that he, and not they, had begun civil war.¹

By Monday, the first of April, great activity was apparent in the War and Navy Departments, and at the Brooklyn navy yard. Men and supplies were mustered hastily, private steamships chartered, and war vessels put in commission for the two secret expeditions planned April. to Pensacola and Charleston. The press, as habitual, spread the news of such preparations over the land, and the Montgomery government took vigilant note of them. Justice Campbell's amateur mediation for the Southern embassy has been mentioned.² He called in trepidation at the State Department on that day, as he had done the Saturday previous;³ and under the changed circumstances, Seward, who by this time divined most likely his connection with Montgomery, took care to put himself in writing. He had reported their previous conversations to the President, who authorized him to reply that no attempt would be made to provision Fort Sumter, without giving due notice.⁴ And now, with Lincoln's knowledge, he placed in Campbell's hands a written memorandum, to the effect that the President might desire to supply Sumter, but would not do so without giving notice to Governor Pickens.⁵

Concerning relief to the fort at Pensacola, nothing had been said or promised on either side. That relief expedi-

¹ Message, July 4th, 1861; Am. Cycl. 1861, 603, 604; 4 N. & H. 44.

² *Supra*, p. 14. Justice Nelson had now left Washington.

³ 1 Moore, 427.

⁴ 4 N. & H. 33, 34. A despatch of the commissioners, dated March 22d, shows that notice of any change of status at Sumter had already been promised. And our Secretary of the Navy referred to that arrangement at the Cabinet meeting of March 29th.

⁵ 4 N. & H. 34; 1 Moore, 427.

tion went forward secretly, and by April 4th our President fully made up his mind to send the other also, and drafted instructions which the War Department transmitted to Anderson, telling him that relief would be sent and urging him to hold out if possible until its arrival.¹ More and more alarmed by flying reports, and by the sailing of armed vessels whose actual sealed destination was the Gulf, Campbell wrote to Seward April 7th to know if the assurance given him had been well founded. Seward sent a laconic written answer, "Faith as to Sumter fully kept — wait and see."² By that time President Lincoln's steps had been taken; Captain Fox and the Sumter expedition received sailing orders drafted by his own hand; and on Saturday evening, the 6th, a faithful clerk of the State Department was despatched by railway train to Charleston, with a copy of those orders, which he placed in the hands of Governor Pickens, thus giving the due notice promised. In all this Campbell and the commissioners at Washington found themselves ignored, as they deserved to be.³ The commissioners had just demanded the answer to their request for official recognition, suspecting the true situation. They received a copy; it declined all intercourse, as they had been well aware for weeks, and their mission thus formally closed. Late that same night of the 8th, a telegram from Beauregard informed them that a relief expedition was on its way to Sumter and that Governor Pickens had been notified. They angrily shook off the dust of Washington, and Campbell, resigning from the Supreme bench, followed soon after. No real duplicity had been practised towards them; but in their exaltation of spirits they had deceived themselves.⁴

¹ 4 N. & H. 27, 28.

² Seward here meant, of course, faith as respected the written pledge given April 1st. Campbell complained in later controversy that this answer meant something different; but his contemporary letter to the commissioners shows that he placed precisely the same construction upon it. See 4 N. & H. 37.

³ Campbell admitted, April 7th, that this written pledge did not warrant his previous assurance that notice of a change would come to himself. 4 N. & H. 37.

⁴ See 4 N. & H. 37; 2 Seward's Life, c. 56. "He is a Unionist,"

"If your flag is found flying, the attempt will be to supply you with provisions only; but we shall seek to reënforce you besides with men and military supplies, in case that attempt is resisted." Such, substantially, was the despatch sent to Anderson, and notice of the same tenor reached the Governor of South Carolina.¹ But madness ruled the hour. From the Confederate point of view, possession unsundered by the Union forces was a standing menace to independence; and drawing no humane distinction in the case, the Montgomery authorities now resolved to capture Fort Sumter by violence and at once, without awaiting the test of any expedition. The intercepted mail of Major Anderson disclosed the purport of Fox's late visit, and his own poor condition whether to repel assault or gain succor.² President Lincoln, most likely, had never expected the Fox expedition to accomplish its immediate ends; it left New York so tardily³ that Fox himself felt quite doubtful of success; but by the effort the onus of bloodshed at all events was placed where it belonged. On the Confederate

says the *New York Tribune* of Campbell, May 3d, "but feels bound to adhere to the fortunes of his State." See Campbell's further correspondence with Jefferson Davis, 1 Moore, 426-428; 4 N. & H. 148.

Some careful writers seem to have conceived the idea that President Lincoln had no knowledge of these Campbell negotiations nor shared in them. While 3 N. & H. cs. 24, 26 tend, perhaps, to convey such an impression, 4 N. & H. 33 shows clearly that Seward carried his conversations to the President, as any Secretary should have done, and received instructions accordingly. Were it otherwise, whence came the President's intervention in giving Governor Pickens due notice before provisions went forward? And note the plural form of the commissioners' joint despatch to Toombs, April 3d: "Our intermediary says they dare not deceive *him*, as they know we do not rely upon *them* but upon *him*." 1 W. R. 286.

¹ 3 N. & H. 27, 34.

² 4 N. & H. 39, 40; 1 W. R. 294. "We have not oil enough to keep in the lantern for one night. The boats will have, therefore, to rely at night entirely upon other marks." Anderson's mail was seized and opened by Governor Pickens under a disingenuous plea, and Beauregard evasively excused sending this despatch to the Montgomery government, because of Fox's alleged treachery as revealed by its contents.

³ April 8th, 9th. See 4 N. & H. 28.

side, the dilemma was to maintain Southern principles boldly enough to confirm the cotton States in allegiance, and risk losing allies at the northward.¹ The anger was felt of ill success in peaceful negotiation. With telegrams from the Davis government directing him to proceed, Beauregard at two in the afternoon of April 11th demanded the surrender of Fort Sumter, and after some vain parleying with Major Anderson which lasted through the night, opened his cannonade by early dawn of the 12th.²

Startling was the spectacle for this continent, and in scope and consequences unparalleled in the world's history. Throngs of Southern soldiers and civilians poured into Charleston on every train, and the wharves and April 12-14. housetops swarmed with eager gazers. But surrounding the fight in imaginary presence, were the superior millions of anxious inhabitants, North and South, dilating with various emotions, as the telegraph and bulletins of the daily press spread details of the combat through the amphitheatre of a nation. As the ensign of the Union on that slender staff waved its folds, more in reproof than defiance, from the brick ramparts of the little island midway down this harbor, the target of disloyal batteries from three different directions, hearts hardened towards one another with each fratricidal shot. And through the thickening smoke, as the roar of artillery went on, might be dimly discerned now and then a vessel of the provisioning fleet, defining the coast horizon with its spectral hull, watching but unable to succor. The result of such an unequal duel was not long doubtful. Anderson's brave little garrison, a mere handful for such a contest, and a force barely sufficient to keep a few of the answering guns active, had already exhausted their rations of bread.³ On the morning of the 13th, the barracks of the fort caught fire, and while officers and men were

¹ "Unless you sprinkle blood in the face of the people of Alabama," said one of Davis's uncompromising friends while discussion went on in his Cabinet, "they will be back in the Union in less than ten days." McPherson's History, 112, 113.

² 4 N. H. 45-48; 1 W. R. 13-18, 59, 297.

³ The garrison numbered 128 souls, and the guns were 48.

engaged for hours in getting the flames under control so as to save the powder magazine from explosion, the flagstaff fell, struck for the tenth time by hostile shot. Wigfall, who was now serving on Beauregard's staff, crossed over in a boat and volunteered honorable terms of surrender, which Beauregard confirmed after Anderson had accepted them. On Sunday, the 14th, Anderson and his command marched out with their property and all the honors of war, saluting the flag they had so gallantly defended; after which they were transferred to Fox's vessel, the *Baltic*, which waited outside, to sail for New York. The captured fort passed simultaneously into the formal custody of a Confederate garrison.¹

The curtain dropped upon this lurid drama, and sickened hearts at the North knew what next must follow. The same Monday morning's paper on the 15th of April, which described Sumter's last tableau, published the President's proclamation, bearing that date, but made and signed Sunday, which called at once into service April 15. seventy-five thousand militia for three months, and summoned Congress to convene in extra session on the coming July 4th. The phraseology of that proclamation scrupulously observed requirements of the old and imperfect act of 1795, which afforded the only legislative warrant for this new emergency; whence a dry legal expression, which casual readers might think inappropriate.² There was no heart, certainly, at the North to cavil or criticise when that sober appeal, following the Sumter spectacle, made men at last realize that the loved Union was in danger, and that nothing but heroic sacrifice, as in the days of old, could save it from destruction. This was eloquence enough; and the document inspired pen and tongue like a Pentecost

¹ 4 N. & H. c. 3; newspapers of the day; 1 W. R. 23.

² This act of 1795 permitted the State militia to be called out for only three months, and required a special notice given for insurgents to disperse peaceably within a stated time. Lincoln's proclamation announced as probably the first object of the force now called for "to repossess the forts, places, and property which had been seized." 12 U. S. Stats. Appx.

wherever through the rich and populous North the news travelled that Fort Sumter had fallen.

At once the great Union party of the nation sprang to its feet; not, indeed, with all the border allies hoped for, but, throughout the vast and populous region of free States, rallying the loyal in every city, town, and hamlet, and mustering tens and hundreds of thousands among the inhabitants, where thousands alone had been looked for. Party presses, some of them but lately protesting against coercion of the South, vied with one another in eagerness to sustain the President's summons, while the few that hung back were silenced by an indignant community or made to recant. The steamer that bore Anderson and his men into New York harbor, on the 18th of April, April-May. brought the flags of Moultrie and Sumter, and enthusiasm was wild to welcome those gallant defenders. All hearts at the free North beat in patriotic unison. Honest Democrats and Conservatives forgot their old antipathies and fraternized with Republicans of every stripe for the old Union of States, "one and inseparable." The inspiring utterances of Jackson and Daniel Webster were a thousand times repeated. The surviving ex-Presidents of the North, Buchanan among them, gave encouragement. Among northern statesmen once recreant to freedom, Cass, from his final retirement in Michigan, sent God-speed; while Douglas, for the few brief weeks left to him, threw aside his late sophistries, and, whole-souled in the new cause of upholding the Union, died illustrious.¹ Everett, whose palmy years of eloquence had been given to maintaining, were it possible, a Union of compromise and smothered animosities, now flamed into a pillar of guiding strength by his splendid example. The strong, sanguine enthusiasm of this first genuine uprising gave token that the Republic would not, should not perish. In public halls, on the village green, or wherever else a united gathering might im-

¹ 4 N. & H. 80-84; 3 Rhodes, 414.

press its strongest force, citizens met in mass to be stirred to fervency as at some religious revival. Spokesmen of varying political antecedents occupied the platform together to bear their testimony as honest patriots. Boston rocked thus in old Faneuil Hall; at New York City was held an immense mass-meeting in Union Square, on the 20th of April, under the shadow of Washington's monument, and the ablest leaders of parties hitherto opposing addressed the crowd from three several stands. At a Chicago gathering, where the speaker raised his hand to take the oath of allegiance, the whole audience solemnly rose and repeated the words with him. The "Star-Spangled Banner" was started at such meetings by others and sung strongly. There were flag-raisings, moreover, at which the national colors, red, white, and blue, were hoisted. One deep-rooted sentiment pervaded old and young throughout these free States: to serve, to sacrifice, but never to surrender. Only two sides of the question were possible at such a crisis, for the Union or against it; only two classes of citizens, patriots or traitors. "Fort Sumter is lost," said the *New York Tribune*,¹ "but freedom is saved." If there were a few men doubtful or disposed to palliate, they were swallowed into the resistless torrent of sympathy with the administration.²

Nor did all this passionate feeling exhaust itself in good words. The active militia of each loyal State was hurriedly put in readiness, and companies sprang up besides, organized in town-meetings, to tender their patriotic services to the President. For now it seemed but one strong pull to reach the shore. The quotas assigned under the proclamation did not begin to comprehend the volunteers freely raised and freely offered through the several State gov-

¹ April 14th, 1861.

² "The heather is on fire. I never before knew what a popular excitement can be. . . . Indeed, here at the North there never was anything like it; for if the feeling were as deep and stern in 1775, it was by no means so intelligent or unanimous; and then the masses to be moved were as a handful compared to our dense population now."

² George Ticknor, 433 (April 21st).

ernors to the War Department. Young men, the flower of each free State community, hastened to enlist, little reckoning so early how long the conflict would last. Tactics, camp life, and the manual were now the daily study of thousands in the rising generation who had been trained for the learned professions, and never dreamed of becoming soldiers. Old veterans of 1812 and those disqualified by age and disability offered themselves in vain; but whoever was able-bodied and had seen something of military life was specially welcomed. Meantime a militia whose only laurels had been won at holiday parade and musters made cheerful haste to go to the front for a real experience. Minute-men gathered on the town common as in the days of 1775; they departed in companies for the regimental rendezvous with the gifts and blessings of family, friends, and neighbors. For they who stayed behind were liberal to profusion with their means. Where the State legislature could not yet be assembled, banks and the leading citizens voted millions to the State executive for an emergency fund. The New York legislature, in session when Sumter fell, at once appropriated three millions. Towns and cities, besides, straining their legal authority, made provision for the soldiers' families, determined that they should be sacredly cared for while their bread-winners were absent. Red, white, and blue rosettes were worn, and the national colors displayed for dress and ornament. Even in private correspondence stationery came presently into use with Union emblems and mottoes, satirical or serious, expressive of the universal sentiment.¹

In the seceding cotton States denounced by Lincoln's proclamation, there was corresponding zeal and energy, with perhaps more effervescence of spirits. Charleston, just after Fort Sumter's capture, might have recalled Paris when the Bastille was demolished. The martial strains of "Dixie" mingled with the "Marseillaise." Crowds of men in party-colored uniforms sang and promenaded the streets, elated over their bloodless victory as though it were a Waterloo

¹ 1 Moore, 25-35.

conquest, and with civilian companions crowded the club-rooms and restaurants and revelled at the open bars, drinking clamorous toasts, with fervent hand-grasps and vows of eternal fidelity. At night, amid the blaze of lights and the continual roll of the drums, were heard the noisy music and yelling cheers of these Rupert cavaliers, while in the shadow the drove of negroes, male and female, shuffled hastily along the sidewalk to escape the vigilant patrol at the last peal of the curfew bell.¹ Equally strong of determination and hardly less sanguine, the people elsewhere of this reckless Confederacy awaited the outcome of their defiance. At first the Northern news spread dismay, for they had been taught by doughface allies to believe that, if coercion were attempted, the North itself would divide and fight on that issue. Now, even in New York City, the stronghold of subservient partisans, their meanest vassals had deserted them. Yet for all such disappointment they closed up undaunted, and denounced death to all who should pollute their soil or make war upon sovereign States. Enthusiasm for the Southern cause was to all appearances intense and earnest in this section. National allegiance raised scarcely a whisper; but in the whole insurgent area, volunteers rallied for defence, and at sight of the waving stars and bars as trains crowded with soldiers went by, the population of the hamlets, and the workers in the field, black and white, cheered for Jeff Davis and the Confederate States, and waved their arms wildly.² The Carolinian ruling set could manipulate the meaner elements of society, and, though brave, was much given to extravagant boast and menace. Against the "abolition hordes," "Lincoln's mercenaries and minions," and above all New England, these planters stirred the deadliest hate. "Creation could not conquer them;" "they would welcome the world in arms to bloody graves."³

¹ See graphic description in 1 Russell's Diary, 157-167.

² 1 Russell Diary, 220, 227. "People are swimming with the tide. Here are many men who would willingly stand aside if they could, and see the battle between the Yankees whom they hate and the secessionists. But there are no women in this party."

³ 1 Russell, 157-167; newspapers of the day. Hayne had elo-

An official salute at Montgomery greeted the fall of Fort Sumter, during whose bombardment the insurgent Secretary of War had predicted in a speech that the Confederate flag would "float over the dome of the old Capitol at Washington before the first of May."¹ President Lincoln's proclamation was treated by the Davis government with open derision.¹ And now, in addition to 21,000 volunteers already conditionally asked, Davis called upon the governors of the seven cotton States to get 32,000 more men to take the field at once, and to turn over all forts and military posts within their limits to the Confederate authorities.³

In the border slave States not already committed the distraction of sentiment became at once painful and deep-seated. Here families divided, and fathers and sons took sword against one another. Whether to join those whose social and industrial system they shared, or serve with sacrifice the historical Union, in its day of peril, was a problem brought home at once to every hearth and household. Virginia decided quickly, and the precipitate decision cost her in the end her autonomy and soaked her historic soil in seas of blood. Her pride to arbitrate had been the pride of dragging down the Union to the new behests of slavery, and by that pride she fell. Her convention,⁴ still unadjourned, April-June, hurried from menace to defiance. In secret session, on the 17th of April, passed by a large majority the fatal

quently said of South Carolina in the Senate (referring to the Revolutionary War), that "though her soil might be overrun, the spirit of her people was invincible."

¹ 1 Moore, doc. 188.

² "With mortar, Paixhan, and petard, we tender 'Old Abe' our *Beau-regard*." 1 Moore, 26.

³ 4 N. & H. 88. "What is to be the end of this impending conflict, or when the end will be," wrote Vice-President Stephens privately, April 29th, in a less sanguine strain, "is beyond my conjecture. Never was the country so thoroughly roused from the Rio Grande to the Canada line. The feeling of the North is just as intense, from all we can learn, as it is at the South." Johnston's Life of Stephens, 401.

⁴ *Supra*, p. 18.

ordinance of secession, subject to a popular vote later,¹ and without waiting for that vote and sanction Governor Letcher, who was a hot disunionist, published his official announcement, and gave signal for the seizure of national property, as planned already. Over two thousand State troops approached next day the arsenal of Harper's Ferry; its commandant, after applying the torch, fled with his meagre guard, leaving four thousand stand of arms and machinery to be captured, a Confederate prize indeed.² Gosport navy yard, with its valuable stores, timber, and munitions of war, was threatened by another State force and burned on the 20th by the Union officers in charge, several large frigates and other vessels being scuttled and sunk which could not be removed from the harbor.³ A singular compact was next concluded on the 24th, whereby were turned over temporarily to the Confederate government all Virginia's vast military resources, with men and supplies, and the whole conduct of military and moral operations within State limits, pending that popular vote which was nominally to decide whether or not to secede.⁴ Under such artful initiation and the logic of necessity, this compact and the convention's ordinance carried approval, when, May 23d, the popular vote was taken;⁵ but the western counties of the State rejected

¹ Or, as phrased, "to repeal the ratification of the Constitution of the United States." 4 N. & H. 72-91; 2 Tyler's Tyler, 660; Am. Cycl. 1861, 735, etc.; 1 Moore, doc. 61.

² 2 W. R. 4-6.

³ 2 W. R. 21; 4 N. & H. 144-148. One of these vessels, the steam frigate *Merrimac*, was rescued by the insurgents and put to good use later. 2 W. R. 894.

⁴ Am. Cycl. 1861, 736; 4 N. & H. 158; Johnston's Stephens, 399-401. This curious State-rights compact was John Tyler's last gift to his country. He died not long after; the only ex-President of the United States ever actually committed to secession's cause. 2 Tyler, 631, 641; 2 W. R. 911. By an act of the Montgomery Congress Virginia was, May 7th, admitted as a State into the Confederacy. Even in advance of the temporary compact with the Confederacy President Davis, with Governor Letcher's approval, sent troops into Virginia to aid her against the Union. 2 W. R. 773.

⁵ The popular vote in Virginia stood about three to one. See 2 W. R. 911 for Letcher's permanent transfer, June 6th.

emphatically the whole programme, and the Wheeling convention of June 11th, which met soon after, gave presage that upon that issue Virginia would be rent asunder.¹

Virginia's bold example of forestalling popular consent was followed elsewhere. Most of the border State executives treated with insult President Lincoln's call for militia, and spurred secession forward.² Governor Ellis of North Carolina seized whatever property of the Union he could lay hold of, and by a daring usurpation placed the whole military force of his State at the service of the Confederacy, secession in form following later.³ In Arkansas a convention had deferred decision; but when President Lincoln called for troops Governor Rector placed his State on the disunion side, and the convention, reassembling in May, sustained him.⁴ In Tennessee even more than in North Carolina the will of the people had been pronounced against holding any convention at all. There, however, the executive incumbent, Isham G. Harris, a man of strong will and resources, was bent upon disunion. Unsuccessful before, he succeeded in his plans when Lincoln's government pre-

¹ There had been a preliminary gathering at Wheeling on the 13th of May. *Am. Cycl.* 1861, 737, 743.

² Governor Letcher had answered, "You have chosen to inaugurate civil war." "You can get no troops from North Carolina," responded Governor Ellis of that State, denouncing such "wicked violation of the laws of the country." "The people of this Commonwealth are freemen, not slaves, and will defend to the last extremity their honor, lives, and property against Northern mendacity and usurpation," wrote Governor Rector of Arkansas. "In such unholy crusade," wrote Governor Harris, "no gallant son of Tennessee will ever draw his sword." "Illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary in its object, inhuman and diabolical," were the epithets applied by Governor Jackson of Missouri. 4 N. & H. 90.

³ 1 W. R. 487; 4 N. & H. 247, 248 (April 24th). Here the people had once refused already to call a convention. The legislature on assembling, May 1st, ordered a convention, which met May 20th, passed its ordinance the next day, and by a two-thirds vote refused to submit the question to the people. *Am. Cycl.* 1861, 539, 540.

⁴ The Arkansas convention passed the ordinance of secession, May 6th, with only one dissenting vote. 4 N. & H. 249; *Am. Cycl.* 1861, 23.

claimed coercion. Upon his passionate instigation the Tennessee legislature in special session passed a declaration of independence (disliking the word "secession") for submission to the polls. That submission he did not wait for, but made a military league with the Southern Confederacy a month before voting day. The vote of the people stood more than two to one in favor of independence, on the face of the returns, whereupon Harris proclaimed full dissolution with the Union.¹ Here, again, as in Virginia, appeared the ominous result that one end of the State, beyond a mountain barrier, had voted overwhelmingly to preserve the Union. Had military conditions here favored as in western Virginia, eastern Tennessee would probably have organized into a separate State. Neither violent nor mollifying overtures could make that large fraction of the State of Andrew Jackson submit to a spurious Confederacy, and Tennessee remained torn and distracted in allegiance, for all Harris's iron grasp and the persecution of the Davis government until the Union arms reconquered her whole soil.² Kentucky and Missouri had each strong Union elements to counteract the mischief of disloyal governors, and they were held finally to allegiance.³ Maryland, as we shall presently see, learned loyalty through tribulation. In Delaware alone, of all our slave States, affiliation with the peculiar institution and the South was so slight that the quota called for under the President's proclamation was procured without difficulty by prudent indirection.⁴

¹ The Tennessee vote, June 8th, upon separation stood as an aggregate 104,913 in favor, to 47,238 opposed. But in East Tennessee 14,780 voted for separation and 32,923 against it. A union convention held at Greenville, June 17th, declared unhesitating loyalty to the Union, denounced separation as illegal and impolitic, and made overtures to Congress for recognition as a separate State. 23 Harper, 404.

² 1 Moore, 201, 202; Am. Cycl. 1861, 676-685. John Bell, of this State, in whom the conservatives of the nation had so strenuously confided, by making him their Presidential candidate in 1860, caused much disappointment by his vacillation and final defection.

³ See section 5, *post*.

⁴ 4 N. & H. 92; 1 Moore, doc. 155. The governor in this State per-

The refusal of most border State governors to march their militia for purposes of coercion, caused such changes in assigning the several quotas that the excess of free State volunteers became partially absorbed.¹ But no matter how great the demand of the general government in this stirring exigency, the earnestness of the free States to supply and send forward was much greater. Among war governors this crisis made famous were Morgan of New York, Curtin of Pennsylvania, Andrew of Massachusetts, Sprague of Rhode Island, Blair of Michigan, Morton of Indiana, Randall of Wisconsin, Dennison of Ohio, and Yates of Illinois. In the uprising of a mighty people Massachusetts among the old seaboard States led the van, favored by the wisdom and foresight of her new executive, who had since January caused the militia to be placed upon a war footing so that they were uniformed, organized, and ready to march at once. Four State regiments were summoned to Boston, on the day of the proclamation, to meet the original call for half that number; and all were accepted by telegram from April. Washington the very next day. The companies came marching to Boston Common, uniformed. Two of those regiments sped by water to Fortress Monroe, and were the first of loyal State volunteers to land on Virginian soil. The gallant 6th Massachusetts, recruited from the neighborhood of Concord and Lexington, among whose men and officers were scions of the famous stock of 1775, hastened overland to the defence of Washington, to spill on their way the first blood of this revolution, as minute-men, their

mitted volunteer companies to tender their services directly to the United States, and thus avoided an issue.

¹ The original assignment of State quotas at the War Department, April 15th, to constitute the required 75,000 men, was as follows: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Delaware, Arkansas, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota, one regiment each; Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Tennessee, two regiments each; New Jersey, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, four regiments each; Illinois and Indiana, six regiments each; Virginia, three regiments; New York, seventeen regiments; Pennsylvania, sixteen regiments; Ohio, thirteen regiments.

sires, had spilt on the identical 19th of April in the previous century. Marching down Broadway from the cars about sunrise of the 18th, this earliest visible band of defenders was greeted in New York metropolis by throngs of early risers who marked the fine, soldierly bearing of the men, and their various uniforms covered with long gray overcoats. But a far different reception awaited the 6th on the next forenoon at Baltimore, where, after the custom of travel in those days, cars were hauled separately by horses over street tracks from the northern depot on President Street to the southern or Camden station. An excited and ignorant mob blocked the streets, after the earlier cars had passed by, laden with troops, and forced the last three companies to march about half a mile, exposed to showers of missiles, and a scattered musketry from the houses which they hastily returned as they advanced.¹ This collision, the earliest with loss of life, is memorable in history as the Baltimore riot; lawless turbulence occasioned it, not design, and the good people of that city deplored the incident. The regiment, reunited by noon, at Camden station, proceeded by rail to Washington, without further casualty, and quartered over night in the Senate wing of the Capitol.² This Massachusetts 6th, notwithstanding the long distance traversed from New England, was the first regiment, really organized and equipped, to reach the Potomac under the President's summons; and the only corps preceding it consisted of some three or four hundred unmobilized Pennsylvanians, whom Governor Curtin had despatched to Washington over

¹ Of the Massachusetts troops four were killed and thirty-six wounded. How many the casualties on the other side is unknown, but one prominent citizen among the chance lookers-on lost his life.

² For full account of this riot, see 4 N. & H. c. 6; 1 W. Schouler's *Massachusetts*, 92-97; *Brown's Baltimore*; *Hanson's Sixth Regiment*, 25-58. "I pray you," telegraphed Governor Andrew to Mayor Brown, "to cause the bodies of our Massachusetts soldiers, dead in Baltimore, to be immediately laid out, preserved with ice, and tenderly sent forward by express to me." The authorities of Baltimore responded suitably, and a year later the Maryland legislature appropriated seven thousand dollars for the families of the victims.

the State line, the day before, to be armed, equipped, and put in regimental condition by the War Department.¹

The spontaneous spark of passion made disunion rampant for a time in Baltimore, for here was a desperate rowdy element, and the Southern cause, besides, had many sympathizers. On the afternoon of the riot, at a mass-meeting held on Monument Square, both Governor Hicks and Mayor Brown pledged themselves publicly that no more troops should be sent through that city to coerce a sister State. The mayor, who in the morning had made honest effort to protect the soldiers while they marched, sanctioned the destruction of the railroad bridges north of the city, to force the stoppage of all trains; the governor, in his distress, implored the President to make pacific settlement with the South, to compromise, to refer the pending national issue to the arbitration of Lord Lyon, the British minister.² Neither of these men, we imagine, failed in loyal sentiment to the Union, but both felt the peculiar environment of Southern interests, and bent before a tempest that nearly swept the State from its safe moorings. For Baltimore was the one populous community of this genial and hospitable State, and in its society surged all the crests of opposition to Lincoln's policy of coercion, from dislike to the maddest avowal of secession and Southern sympathies. Allowance should be made for an executive under such conditions; and of all governors in the border slave States, except Delaware, at this crisis, Hicks was the only one tractable and true, and his record, on the whole, in time of trial, did him lasting honor. President Lincoln, who appreciated his good intentions, and humored his moods, yielded far enough, upon General Scott's advice, to march troops around Baltimore for a time, instead of through it, on their way to the capital. The 8th Massachusetts and that pride of the Empire State militia, the New York 7th, sailed by water transports from quiet

¹ 2 Seward, 548.

² 1 Moore, docs. 78-80, 133; 4 N. & H. 119-128; 2 W. R. 12-15, 58.

Perryville, where they left the cars, to Maryland's quaint historic capital, Annapolis.¹ Upon these regiments as pioneers it devolved to repair together the tracks and locomotives of the cross railroad which tapped the thoroughfare from Baltimore to Washington—there was at this period but one—at Annapolis Junction. Annapolis offered no positive resistance, and through the sparse, flat country of this new progression, no enemy came in sight. The work was slow and tedious, but the rich scions of the New York regiment fraternized with the hardy toilers of the Massachusetts, and the job was done.

At Annapolis Junction, trains for the capital, sent by Scott, were kept ready and waiting. The New York 7th reached Washington on Friday, April 26th, and the 8th Massachusetts with other troops followed the next day. Washington, in the meanwhile, cut off for nearly a week from the outer world after the Baltimore riot, felt all the anxieties of isolation. Such news as reached the Government from the Virginia side were disheartening enough; and but faint conception was gained of the patriotic uprising at the North and its magnitude, when the mails and telegraphs were completely cut off. National officials and the inhabitants prepared for a siege. Stores of flour and grain at Georgetown were detained from shipment and impressed; the treasury with its vaults of treasured coin was guarded by barricades, and sentinels paced the corridors, among stacks of rifles; government clerks organized with the citizens as military companies. In the great east room of the White House an extemporized soldiery drilled at night under the gorgeous chandelier and made their bivouac on the velvet carpet. "Why don't they come?" murmured Lincoln repeatedly, as he paced his chamber in agitation, while nothing could be seen or heard of the volunteers ordered round Baltimore. But when at last the superb

¹ During the Civil War the naval academy was temporarily moved from Annapolis to Newport, Rhode Island; but later, at Maryland's earnest request, Congress restored it to the Annapolis site. Hauling into the bay the old frigate *Constitution* (here as a practice ship) was an incident of the tarry at Annapolis.

New York 7th, under its commander, Colonel Lefferts, marched in orderly step with full ranks up Pennsylvania Avenue, towards the executive reservation, to the loud music of its regimental band, gloom and depression vanished; cheer upon cheer went up, and Washington's whole population poured out for a joyous welcome.¹ This was the escort proper of that Northern phalanx of defenders whose numbers increased daily until the national capital, safe from hostile surprise, began to wear the new aspect of a camping rendezvous.²

With the Massachusetts quota, Governor Andrew had despatched, as brigade commander, General Benjamin F. Butler of the State militia, an able and adroit practitioner at the bar, a Democratic delegate in 1860 who at Charleston had voted repeatedly for Jefferson Davis as the party nominee, but now a most zealous convert, such as the administration strongly desired. He had a temperament to make friends and enemies equally intense in their regard. His striking physiognomy and bearing, with an obliquity of vision, bespoke great shrewdness and craft, self-confidence, quickness of humor, and disrespect for authority. Having directed at Annapolis with the 8th Massachusetts, Butler was now detailed to guard the railroad connections which flanked Baltimore, and gradually to reopen a free highway. Maryland needed, just now, close watching, for her accession to the Southern Confederacy was insidiously attempted.³ Governor Hicks, while in a yielding frame of mind, had been persuaded to call an extra session of the legislature, and that April- session meant mischief. President Lincoln watched December. the movement and prepared to counteract disloyal designs by military stress. Construing the Federal Constitution in favor of his executive discretion in the existing

¹ See for full and lively details, 4 N. & H. c. 7; 2 Seward, 559, 560; *Atlantic Monthly*, June, 1861; Chittenden's *Recollections*, c. 18; 1 W. Schouler's *Massachusetts*, 98-105.

² "Ten thousand of our troops," writes Seward, April 27th, "are arrived here, and the city is considered safe." 2 Seward, 560.

³ 2 W. R. 773.

emergency, he authorized General Scott and his deputies to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus*. On the 4th of May, Butler advanced with his military force to Relay House, nine miles south of Baltimore, menacing the city and controlling the railway approaches. The Maryland legislature convened at Frederick, April 26th, and remained in session until May 14th; disunion projects were broached, but no decisive step was taken. Late on the evening of the 13th, Butler made a sudden entry into Baltimore, which was unopposed. Proceeding next to make vindictive civil arrests, he was promptly displaced by General Scott, who deputed this "high and delicate trust" of suspending *habeas corpus* to Cadwalader of Pennsylvania, another militia general.¹ In vain did Chief Justice Taney record his protest against such suspension, when the mandate he issued on his circuit was disregarded at Fort McHenry in a test case.² Nathaniel P. Banks, who took command still later, commissioned a major-general, pursued by orders from Washington the same stern military course. He broke up Baltimore's police board, whose designs were believed disloyal. He prevented the State legislature from meeting once more in September by boldly arresting its disunion members and preventing a quorum. But the secession spirit of Maryland waned speedily, as the popular vote for Congress on the 13th of June first indicated, and the "Star Spangled Banner" State could not be seduced by lyric or artful flattery from her national allegiance.³ All this harsh discipline — though some of her best citizens deprecated it — seemed needful to bring Marylanders to their duty and interest before worse should befall. Arbitrary arrest was less terrible to bear than the drenching of their soil in the vain effort to block the

¹ See 2 W. R. 618-639; 4 N. & H. c. 8; 1 Am. Cycl. 1861, 444. General Butler, May 18th, received an important command at Fortress Monroe, and soon after was promoted to be major-general of volunteers.

² Tyler's Taney, 640-659; 4 N. & H. 174-178.

³ "Maryland, my Maryland," borrowed the melody of "Lauriger Horatius," a college song popular a few years earlier. And see plausible letter from Jefferson Davis, reported to the Maryland legislature in June, 1861.

way to the Potomac. By midsummer, transit from the North was restored, and troops passed through Baltimore to the nation's capital unmolested. Hicks in the autumn was reëlected governor by a very large majority, and when in December a newly chosen legislature, loyal in its composition, convened at Annapolis, this executive, no longer wavering, announced with emphasis that Maryland had no sympathy with rebellion, but desired to do her full share in the duty of suppressing it.¹

While volunteers of the Eastern and Middle States hastened to defend the nation's capital, close at hand, the great outpouring of the northwestern States tended rather to points of danger in the Mississippi Valley, these earliest levies aiding the Union element of Missouri, Kentucky, and Western Virginia in military operations to be described later. Meanwhile the Confederate Congress at Montgomery had, in prompt extra session, supplied new sinews of war to the insurgent government, whose jurisdiction immensely widened with the new accession of border States. In view of such gigantic resistance and of the enthusiastic rally at the North to sustain his authority, President Lincoln exerted further his executive power in anticipation of the legislation sure to follow when Congress should meet in July. A new call issued May 3d for 65,000 more troops, for "the speediest possible restoration of peace and order." Two-thirds of this force were specified as State volunteers, and the rest as regulars. Volunteers were henceforth to enlist for "three years unless sooner discharged," a solemn change, as it proved, in the contract of service; yet so passionate was the desire to take up arms for the Government, that whole regiments, which had been offered for three months under the April call, voted unanimously to accept the new terms

¹ 2 W. R. 138-156; Am. Cycl. 1861, 444-448. The four Maryland regiments under the President's first call were permitted to serve simply for home defence and the preservation of our Federal five-mile square, once within Maryland jurisdiction; they were not required to "subjugate" other States. 1 Moore, 245.

and be enrolled.¹ Many noble souls found in this substituted term their death-warrant. The amended force thus called for matched fairly in number the troops that President Davis had purposed organizing.

This proclamation of May 3d asked for 18,000 men to increase the navy.² While so many naval officers had resigned, their crews in general remained faithful. Two days after President Lincoln's earliest summons of an armed force, Davis by proclamation offered letters of marque and reprisal, that privateers might ravage Northern commerce. To this Lincoln promptly responded on the 19th of April, by proclaiming a blockade of all ports within the insurrectionary States, a competent force to be posted for its enforcement. All who should molest the national commerce of the United States were threatened with death, the penalty of piracy.³ In maritime strength at this age free States had vastly the advantage.

De Tocqueville once predicted of the American Union that, if put to the test, it would prove powerless against State pressure, and incapable of sustained exertion. It was, he thought, a vast body which could present no definite object to patriotic feeling. Our Civil War disproved that assertion, especially in these earlier months, though Northern enthusiasm kept still in reserve another strong incentive,

¹ Among such regiments was that raised in Boston by Fletcher Webster, the last surviving son of the transcendent orator. He was killed in battle in 1862, at the head of his command.

² The whole Union military force, prior to the assembling of Congress in July, may be thus reckoned :—

Regular army before April 14	17,113
Three months' volunteers	75,000
Volunteers under May 3d call	42,034
Regulars under May 3d call	22,714
Total	156,861

The United States navy, prior to May 3, is computed at 7,600 men. See 4 N. & H. c. 14. For apportionment of volunteers under the new call, see 1 Moore, doc. 237.

³ See 12 U. S. Stats. Appx. By proclamation, April 27, this blockade was further extended to the ports of Virginia and North Carolina.

should the South fight too obstinately. Seventy years of national development had knit the homogeneous free States and the grand majority of our people too closely in affection and pride to permit that the power, the glory, and the solid interests of so grand a Union should be sacrificed by any minority combination of States or individuals.

SECTION III.

THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY.

Our former volumes have traced that growing antagonism between Northern and Southern States of this American Union, between slave and free industrial systems, which the spirit of national harmony and concession failed at length to compose.¹ Admirably, no doubt, did the convention of 1787 manage that antagonism for thirteen States, already inseparably united in common defence and welfare, that had gone shoulder to shoulder through an armed revolution for a common independence. For the unsettled territory to the westward then remaining, a partition was mutually arranged, whereby the sectional equipoise of systems might be preserved until haply slavery should disperse in the sunbeams of another civilization. But when, under Southern lead and Southern Presidents, this Union enlarged its domains, first passing beyond the Mississippi River, our earliest western boundary, to the Rocky range, next spanning the continent with a broad belt from ocean to ocean, besides dominating the Gulf, so vast an acquisition with new Territories and potential States, projected the strife of systems into an area far greater than was sound or safe. For long ere this expansion a new cotton culture hardened the heart of the South, and made a large section of adjacent States firm in the espousal of slavery. It was not devilish suggestion, but the voice of honest prophecy, that by this time foreboded that so grand an experiment of confederated Union could not forever continue half slave

¹ Vols. I-V, *passim*.

and half free, but that one system or the other—the theory of free labor or of fixed caste—must finally dominate throughout the country. As a practical issue within our national Territories, the fight for five years, which now ended in the admission of Kansas as a free State, settled the supremacy. Slavery was worsted, and would be again by free labor in any future contention for populating the virgin soil. Had the South but yielded to the logic of facts, slavery as then existing in the States would have remained unmolested, by force of the constitutional bond and Northern toleration, and there need have been no civil war. But the pride of the slaveholder was wounded by this prohibition to expand. He would not permit his institution to exist by sufferance within present limits; the rays of a disapproving civilization beat down too hot for him. He had come to believe at this epoch in the righteousness of his system; and, rather than live as one of the minority, he would found a new plantation empire and propagate slavery as he chose. It was thus that he dogmatized. Against the philanthropy of the age, whether in the New World or the Old, he believed he could balance its grossest materialism. Rather than learn to readjust economic and industrial conditions, he would rupture the Union. “Cotton was king,” and he had been taught to consider that cotton culture and slave labor were inseparable.

Virginia and South Carolina were seen in the convention of 1787, exerting each a positive influence in shaping out the Federal plan of Union; the former State, then in the plenitude of her leadership, keeping the word “slave” out of a permanent instrument, and using every palliative; the latter bent on gaining for slavery all she could under that instrument, and frankly confessing that she felt no shame. Seventy more years and South Carolina, rather than Virginia, was the guide of the slave section. It was in the Palmetto State, where blacks now outnumbered the whites, that an oligarchy of the master race fully monopolized political power. It was South Carolina that first made cotton a staple, and reared Calhoun, whose subtle and ingenious brain devised the whole mischievous programme

of a separate establishment. South Carolina was long eager to try conclusions with the Union. Her tariff nullification in 1833, then denounced as a heresy by most sister States, gave partial victory. Next in 1850, though thwarted in disunion efforts by Clay's compromise measures, she brought a large fraction of her section to the Calhoun postulate, that a State might with constitutional right resolve itself out of the Union. Finally, in 1860, after Lincoln's election to the Presidency, she plunged boldly into the vortex of secession and bade the other cotton States follow.

The slave population of the United States was, in 1860, near four millions, and its money valuation not far from twenty-five hundred millions. Ignoring, then, the moral side of the question, so vast a moneyed interest was an adequate cause of anxiety and preparation.¹ Southern men believed that, with such bitterness of feeling between the sections, separation was sure to come, and that, being inevitable, it would be better accomplished at once than after, when the disparity in population would be greater. There was no concealment of warlike preparations in the cotton States after Lincoln's election; men were openly enlisted, national forts and public property were seized; but there was then no chief magistrate in Washington to rally Northern sentiment or teach loyal people their duty by an object-lesson.

There was something of a conspiracy, however, in the present Southern movement for breaking up the Union. How far the "Knights of the Golden Circle," a secret order, may have operated to this end is unknown. Through the winter of 1860-61, a committee of Southern Senators sat as a provisional junta in Washington, arranging the course which the cotton States should take in concert. Secession, it was well understood now as in 1850, could be of little avail, unless the seceding States should combine together. Threats to secede, to break up the Union, had been freely uttered in 1856, as in 1860, should the Republicans succeed in electing their candidate for President; so that time

¹ 2 Sherman, 382.

for secret coöperation among Southern leaders had been abundant. The main plan was to recombine these States as a Southern Confederacy and to give that Confederacy full headway before Lincoln's administration could come into power. Six seceding States met accordingly, ^{1861,} by their chosen delegates, at Montgomery, Ala- ^{Feb.} bama, on the 4th of February, 1861; and a seventh State, Texas, joined soon after.¹ All these were plantation States, and all felt essentially the same industrial interest in slave labor and agriculture. The Montgomery Congress in four days adopted a provisional instrument of government for the "Confederate States of America," which should continue in force for one year unless superseded earlier by a permanent organization. Jefferson Davis of Mississippi, who had shaped out the scheme while a Senator at Washington, was next chosen President of this provisional government, and Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia its Vice-President.² And thus, as in various other steps of this re-combination process, leaders of the South, not waiting for popular direction, took the full initiative for their States as they chose, leaving the people to follow with their consent, when no other choice remained.

Davis was inaugurated provisional President on the 18th of February,³ and composed a cabinet, as he relates, from persons, none of whom he had known intimately, and two of them not at all. Robert Toombs of Georgia, his rival for the first office, he made Secretary of State; Charles G. Memminger of South Carolina, Secretary of the Treasury; Leroy P. Walker of Alabama, Secretary of War; Stephen R.

¹ See vol. V, 490-492. The original seceding States were South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Texas formally seceded from the Union in early February and then sent delegates to Montgomery. 4 N. & H. 186. In Georgia, as in various other States, a convention of delegates quickly declared secession, without submitting the ordinance to a popular vote.

² See vol. V, 491.

³ The choice of provisional rulers by the Montgomery Congress was made by States; each State delegation casting one vote. All this was in a midnight session of February 8-9.

Mallory of Florida, Secretary of the Navy; Judah P. Benjamin of Louisiana, Attorney-General; John H. Reagan of Texas, Postmaster-General. Every State, as the Confederacy then existed, was represented in this administration.¹

The provisional government lasted a year, and was then superseded by one regularly organized under the permanent constitution of the Confederate States, with its Congress and executive chosen after the same essential mode as in the old Union. The elections were held in November, 1861; after which Davis and Stephens were regularly chosen by State electors to their respective offices for a term of six years, as that constitution provided, with no right of reelection. The first regular Congress, consisting of a Senate and House of Representatives, was, like that of the old Union, to last two years. Washington's birthday was substituted in the Confederate calendar for our national 4th of March; so that the first regular Presidency and the first Confederate Congress dated in 1862 from the 22d of February. Meanwhile by March 11th, 1861, the provisional Congress adopted by unanimous vote the permanent constitution drafted for the Confederacy by its committee, and sent it to the seven States to be adopted. Those seven States duly ratified, and when other States joined the Confederacy after the fall of Fort Sumter, they, too, adopted the instrument upon declaring secession. And thus was a new union put into formal operation as "The Confederate States of America," and one galaxy, one combination of elements, was replaced by another; for Southern revolution did not end, and was not meant to end, with the act of State secession.

When we examine the flag and the written charter of this aspirant to the family of nations, we are at once impressed by the infringement of copyright. Here, surely, was shown a poverty of ideas in the art of government; but the rebellious were flesh and blood of the old Union more than they

¹ Davis, 61.

dared own. Of the resemblance of the Confederate to the Union flag we shall speak elsewhere; but that of the Confederate constitution to its prototype was still more remarkable. It followed almost literally the language of our national document, except for a few changes of method which might even now be worth considering, and for the slave sections which deserve only infamy.¹ There was the same fundamental division into three departments; with a Congress of two branches, the Senate, where States should vote equally, and the House of Representatives, based upon population; with President and Vice-President to be chosen by electors; with judges to be appointed by the executive for a tenure of good behavior. So closely even in particulars was followed the phrase of our national text that forts and ceded places inclusive of a district seat of government, were declared to be under the exclusive control of the Confederacy. In vain does one scrutinize for some return to the league principles of 1783, for some declared reservation of efficient powers to the States. Now, unquestionably, was the occasion to have declared in express terms the pet dogma of secession, of the right of sovereign States to nullify, at the least, any act of Congress; but no assertion of the kind is hinted at. Nothing whatever did State sovereignty gain in this new instrument over that of 1787 but a bald avowal in the preamble, that each State in ordaining this new government acted in a sovereign and independent capacity; while, as actual offset, for methods of future amendment, for practical operation of the government upon the people, for State restraints and prohibitions, for interstate comity, for the supreme law of the land, this whole Confederate text was an essential repetition of the former fundamentals. Even that pregnant phrase, that "no State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation,"² was here word for word repeated.

¹ See this constitution, together with the provisional one (which much resembled it), printed in full, 2 Stephens War, Appx. ; 1 Davis Short Hist. 648. Some Southern writers since the war have praised the former class of changes, while silent concerning the latter.

² Cf. Const. U. S. Art. I, § 10.

It is the "black-letter" phrasing, if one may so term it, which brings this Confederate instrument into contrast with that of the United States. The word "slave," which the framers of 1787 had reverently suppressed, was in this new text boldly and even vauntingly employed. A clause of curious import excluded African, but maintained the domestic slave-trade.¹ State emancipation of the negro was checked; nor would State interference be tolerated against the master's claim to have his runaway slaves or those he lawfully took with him restored. To the familiar privileges and immunities of citizens of each State was added that of "transit and sojourn in any State of this Confederacy with their slaves and other property," and the right of property in such slaves was not to be impaired. The power of this Confederacy to hold and acquire new territory was clearly recognized; but in all such territory negro slavery should be safeguarded by the general government;² thus making that "slave-code" platform upon which our national Democratic party had split in Charleston convention, the year before,³ a supreme and fundamental erection.

In view of such a written constitution and the historical circumstances which gave this government birth, it seems fair to dismiss the idea, too often expressed as the after-

¹ This clause seems to have really intended an allurements to European sympathy, on the one hand, and on the other a warning to border slave States that unless they too joined the Confederacy, the human market might be shut upon them.

² "In all such territory the institution of negro slavery, as it now exists in the Confederate States, shall be recognized and protected by Congress and by the territorial government; and the inhabitants of the several Confederate States and Territories shall have the right to take to such territory any slaves lawfully held by them in any of the States or Territories of the Confederate States." Art. IV, § 3, 3. Compare this doctrine of 1860-61 with that of the Republican party which had maintained the right and policy of Congress to exclude slavery, and with the Douglas dogma which left territorial settlers to their own unfettered choice.

³ Vol. V, 455.

thought of defeat, that the Confederate States of America originated in spontaneous uprising at the South to vindicate some abstraction of the right of self-government and State autonomy against the oppression of a nation. No revolution was ever set in motion, more practical and prosaic in the immediate aims to be accomplished; and opinion contemporaneous with starting that revolution explains sufficiently what its leaders meant. State secession was but the means to an end; and that end was re-combination, fundamentally as before, save that slavery should forever dominate, whether in a new and detached Union, or in an old Union made over so as to pacify the pride of slaveholders and subserve their institution. Between the State, sovereign in shuffling off its old national allegiance, and the State, loyally submissive to its new one, a pin's point could hardly have been placed to mark the interval. South Carolina, who set the first sovereign example, would have squandered her new patrimony very quickly had a separate establishment remained her only ambition. Americans could no more, at this stage, live by separate States, than grapes could be made to grow without clusters. Southern citizens had, in truth, much the same general attachment to the Union as Northerners, and were equally disposed at heart to live under the institutions framed by the fathers. Their temperament and mental habits made them even more susceptible than their Northern brethren to the glory of a united government which should take its high stand among the powers of the earth and dominate in the world's destinies.¹ Their States-rights theories had never stood in the way of national aggrandizement, so long as Southern supremacy in affairs was not impaired, nor Southern institutions threatened. Page after page in our earlier narrative justifies such a statement.

Ten years of bitter territorial controversy had prepared the statesmen who now led that section for a resistance to

¹ As Benton observed in 1839, the South had gone for the honors and the North for the benefits of the government, and each had gained what it sought for.

the majority sentiment of the American people, commensurate with the political ends they had in view.¹ Common people of the South should not be harshly judged who had no share in such efforts, but obeyed the summons of a State. The appeal to State allegiance must always be a strong one the Union through; yet the sword of secession is simply the sword of revolution, and where dissolution is aimed at, that sword must be unsheathed. In some later century sound States may justly assert the right of revolution as a last resort, if the central government, forsaking ideals for idols, becomes despotic, oppressive, defiant of constitutional constraint, bloated and corrupt through imperial lust of conquest; and a combination of States in common purpose may make that revolution effective. But no such justifying or effective cause has yet been found, nor, God with us, will it ever come. Surely was not to be seen at the South, in 1861, a decent respect for the opinions of mankind. And yet the clay lent itself to the moulder's hand. The hope of establishing a new and more homogeneous slave Confederacy artfully alienated affection for the Union; and steadily was instilled the poison of State pride and State sufficiency to corrupt the fountain of supreme loyalty. The right of State secession, the constitutional impossibility of coercing a State, unlimited self-government, were dogmas convenient for the end to be attained. Leaders of this movement were confident and assuring; screw but its courage to the sticking point, and their people could not fail. The soul of sanguine revolt was in the cotton States, whose leaders nourished hatred, almost to ferocity, against antislavery men at the North; failing utterly to discriminate between conscience men who had and those who had not constitutional

¹ For concerted intentions, see William L. Yancey's "scarlet letter" of 1858, in which he advised the appointment of committees of safety all over the cotton States. Thus, as he wrote, "we shall fire the Southern heart, instruct the Southern mind, give courage to each other, and by one concerted action we can precipitate the Southern States into a revolution." Stovall's Toombs, 178. And see, *ib.*, Yancey's prediction in an Alabama speech, just after the rupture of the Charleston convention in 1860.

scruples.¹ They, among these leaders who were ardent proselytes of the peculiar institution, and they too, less confident on that point, who would have pushed a new bargain with the free States as the price of allegiance, believed as a whole that the North would not fight, but show the same truckling and commercial spirit which had secured concessions before, cancelling the results of the late Presidential election. The one thing unexpected which really happened was the passionate uprising of the whole indignant North, spurning bargains and denouncing treason to the Constitution.

Doubtless State sovereignty as a dogma had its influence for reconciling to disunion reluctant Southern citizens who desired to do their duty in a crisis forced upon them. It was the anodyne of an operation which dismembered and then set anew. For secession, when left to itself, meant simply to disintegrate and destroy. Webster's masterly logic exposed the emptiness of that sophism in the former generation; and no later statesman confuted so convincingly the Calhoun philosophy of government as our President, destined to give it the death-blow when put to practical test.² Tennessee, more logical than South Carolina, declared in fact her independence, rather than ordain secession as a right. In a compact Commonwealth, with colonial and revolutionary traditions, like Virginia or South Carolina, abnormal State pride finds some excuse; and so might it be with Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New York. But what had there been in the history of Alabama and Mississippi, born and reared on national territory, to foster State arrogance? Or in Florida, Louisiana, and Texas, purchased

¹ The temper towards Northern agitators was well personified by Toombs, who said in one of his speeches: "When we choose to abolish this thing [slavery] it must be done under our direction, according to our will. Our own, our native land shall determine this question, and not the abolitionists of the North." Stovall's Toombs, 212. Yet Toombs had often conceded that slavery was a political if not a moral evil, and he yielded reluctantly to secession.

² See President's message, July, 4, 1861, as well as the inaugural address.

or conquered from foreign countries by the whole Union? The real passion of 1861 burst the bonds of statehood. Did Buckner and Breckinridge stay with their State on the Union side when the ordinance to secede failed of a passage? Did not thousands rush from Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri to aid the South, unrestrained by State policy? It was, more than State pride, then, sectional homogeneousness, blood alliances and family ties, the common investment in a species of property whose market was thought in peril, industrial interests assumed to be superior to those of the North, and that pride of ruling in politics which had become habitual through the long lapse of years, that drove these earnest slaveholders of 1861 and their people into bristling defiance of the Union. "Secession is nothing but revolution," wrote Lee of Virginia in January, clearly comprehending the fallacy of the whole movement.¹ Yet, like Georgia's statesman who accepted the second Confederate dignity, unable to resist the impulse of that dread current that swept doubters into its eddies, his plea, three months later, was not that Virginia's ordinance was mandatory, but that "with all my devotion to the Union, and the feeling of loyalty and duty of an American citizen, I have not been able to make up my mind to raise my hand against my relatives, my children, my home."²

In fine, the soul of the Southern revolution of 1861, the nucleus of its absorbing passion, was historically the zeal of founding a new or a reunited union of States whose cornerstone should be negro slavery,—the subjection of the colored to the white race as a normal and natural condition. "This, our new government," proclaimed Vice-President Stephens in a famous speech at Savannah, made about the 21st of March, "is the first in the history of the world, based upon that great physical, philosophical, and moral truth."³ Such was the social propagandism of the cotton-planting States

¹ Long's Lee, 88 (January 23).

² *Ib.*, 95 (April 20).

³ 1 Moore, doc. 48. Cf. Johnston's Stephens, 394, giving an abstract, which conveys substantially the same "corner-stone" idea.

that set insurrection in motion. It is a memorable fact, in this armed conflict of industrial systems, that the circumference of rebellion was bounded by the slaveholding States, and that not a single Commonwealth where freedom was the condition had the slightest inclination to be drawn into its toils.¹

The first session of the provisional Confederate Congress at Montgomery, a small secret body of a single chamber, on the old Continental plan,² lasted until the 16th of March. The earliest legislation of that session continued in force all statutes of the United States not inconsistent with the new fundamentals. Another early act tendered effusively to States of the Mississippi Valley still in the Union, the peaceful navigation of that great river at a moderate charge;³ unmindful, perhaps, that the effort of a foreign government to exact tolls at the mouth of the Mississippi at the beginning of this century roused that Northwestern spirit of resistance which induced the United States to purchase presently the whole river with all tributaries for the free use forever of all the people.⁴ Foreign

1861.
February-
March.

¹ 1 Russell Diary, 170, 171. The common sentiment gathered by this acute British observer as he travelled through the South, soon after Fort Sumter fell, was to this effect: "We are an agricultural people, pursuing our own system, and working out our own destiny; we have gentlemen and gentlemen in your sense of it; we have a system which enables us to reap the fruits of the earth by a race which we save from barbarism in restoring them to their real place in the world as laborers, whilst we are enabled to cultivate the arts, the graces, and accomplishments of life, to develop science, to apply ourselves to the duties of government, and to understand the affairs of the country." *Ib.*, 214. "States-rights," as it seemed to him, simply meant protection to slavery and its extension, and free trade in slave produce with the outer world. 2 *Ib.*, 31.

² In this provisional Congress (superseded in February, 1862), deputies were chosen as each State might direct, and one vote was allowed to each delegation. 2 Stephens, Appx. G.

³ Davis's Short History, 61.

⁴ Not a State, Southern or Northern, now bordered the Mississippi

negotiation was not forgotten. Even before Davis had been inaugurated provisional President it was resolved to send commissioners to Washington to adjust, if possible, a peaceable division of the public property and terms of final separation from the old Union.¹ Another commission, headed by the brilliant and impetuous Yancey, was despatched simultaneously to Europe, to solicit recognition for the new Confederate States, purchase supplies of war, and negotiate treaties of amity and commerce.² War was levied upon the United States by acts of this first session for raising 100,000 military volunteers to serve twelve months and for organizing the army of the Confederate States. A tariff law was also adopted, and a loan of \$15,000,000 authorized. Courts and executive departments under the provisional constitution were duly established. Meanwhile the seven States already combined in this new alliance turned over to the Confederate government such public property of the United States as they had separately seized upon secession, and confided to the powers at Montgomery full control and occupation of all forts in controversy.³ This transfer amounted eventually, as far as possible, to a joint confiscation, which Southern apologists have sought to justify on the specious plea that it was no more than the fair proportional part due this people upon winding up the concerns of the old Union and partitioning its effects. Querulous, fitful, uneasy in apprehension, as he presided over this miniature assembly, the philosophic Stephens commended it, when in an amiable mood, as "the ablest, most intelligent and conservative body" he had ever known: adding, with a flash of intuition as to its real description, "nobody looking in would ever take this Congress for a set of revolutionists."⁴

River, which had not made solemn compact with Congress when admitted to the Union that the navigation of that river should remain free to the whole Union.

¹ See *supra*, p. 13.

² J. D. Bulloch's Secret Service, 48, 51; 2 Stephens War, 359; Du Bose's Yancey, 588-604; Am. Cycl. 1861, 131. Agents were also sent secretly to the North to purchase arms and ammunition, whose delivery was prevented. Davis, 74.

³ 3 Rhodes, 320; Davis, 73, 121.

⁴ Johnston, c. 35.

Following the fall of Sumter and President Lincoln's call for troops, this provisional Congress once more hastily convened on the 29th of April. Jefferson Davis, whose inaugural address in February had dwelt soothingly upon the agricultural interests of his people and their wish for peace and free trade with the world, now used the bolder language of belligerency. "All we ask," said his new message in substance, "is to be let alone;" ^{April-May.} we will resist subjugation to the direst extremity; but the moment the pretension to coerce is abandoned, "we shall be ready to enter into treaties of amity and commerce."¹ Former illusions of peaceable secession now vanishing, the Montgomery Congress prepared resistance to the Union upon an ampler scale. War was recognized as existing between the two sections, and the issue of letters of marque and reprisal authorized. A new bill was passed for volunteer soldiers, in addition to the force already granted. To invite a rupture of President Lincoln's blockade, the export of cotton from any of the Confederate States except through its seaports was forbidden; a duty was also laid upon exported cotton.² With a war loan of \$50,000,000 promptly sanctioned, the pile of Confederate debt began in earnest.³ An act of doubtful honor prohibited the payment of private debts due to Northern creditors.⁴ The facilities of the Union government being now withdrawn, mail business was committed to the Confederate Postmaster-General, and it proved a burdensome charge. Finally, in the course of a feverish session lasting less than a month, Virginia, North

¹ 1 Moore, doc. 117; Am. Cycl. 1861, 612-619. His inaugural address had stated uncandidly that "as a necessity, not a choice" his section now resorted to the remedy of separation. For his own personal efforts at secession in 1851 see vol. V, 227.

² The fundamental difference between the Federal and the permanent Confederate Constitution in this respect is remarkable. South Carolina had in the convention of 1787 secured for agricultural staples a total immunity from export duty; but now in 1861 Southern policy was to permit its Congress by a two-thirds vote of each branch to lay such a duty, and much accruing revenue was hoped for from such a tax.

³ 4 N. & H. 263-265.

⁴ Am. Cycl. 1861, 147.

Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas were successively admitted into the new Southern alliance.¹ Adjourning at Montgomery by the 21st of May to meet at Richmond on the 20th of July, this Congress recognized Virginia's sacrificial choice to make her soil the battle-ground of sections; and to Virginia's capital, as likewise that of the Confederate States, were accordingly transferred the archives and government of insurrection. A common cause, a common duty, hastened the South to this scene of chief danger.²

Henceforth little or nothing of State sovereignty is visible in the practical operations of this pseudo-Confederacy. All elements of secession, now or later brought together, were welded vigorously into a consolidated central government which fought in the name of the Southern States for independence. The summer had not begun, nor had a battle been fought, before President Davis became the virtual military autocrat of the allied States. He procured authority from the provisional Congress to organize companies into regiments, regardless of any call upon the several States, and to assign officers of the Confederacy to command them; which was far more than President Lincoln ever undertook with volunteers from the loyal States.³ Southern governors and legislatures, it is true, viewed such procedure with obvious dislike in many instances; but Davis carried his point, long fixed in the personal belief that a centralized or regular army was the true one. To State complaints he pointed the need of confronting the vast hordes from the North now pouring together into Virginia, by a well-handled army which State pride could not resolve into fragments. The martial enthusiasm of Confederate troops quickly impelling them to press forward and defend their brethren of another State, his tact and military knowledge of his countrymen enabled him to amalgamate those diverse elements into something like a Southern revolutionary army under the stars and bars.⁴ Yet Davis, notwithstanding his upright character, and the talent, energy, and steadfastness

¹ 4 N. & H. 263.

³ *Ib.*

² 4 N. & H. 263-265; Davis, 73.

⁴ See 2 Russell, 17.

which distinguished him above his Southern contemporaries in civil life, was inflexible by temperament and imperious, hardening as in a mould; and the pride of military experience, which distinguished this West Pointer, confirmed a predilection to make his constitutional authority as commander-in-chief more nearly literal than Presidents are wont to exercise. His arbitrary course of conduct, his antagonisms, his interference and acts of personal favoritism, not to add his stern demeanor towards the Confederate legislature and State authorities, place him in the strongest contrast with the executive opposed to him, who wielded with consummate wisdom and considerateness for others the superior resources of loyalty.

Davis recites that, unlike most at the South, he had expected a long and bloody fight and felt little satisfied when the troops allowed him by the provisional Congress were for a brief year's term. The skill with which he officered these troops gave his cause at the start an immense advantage. For Lincoln, inexperienced in such matters, as well as his Cabinet, showed a civilian's inclination to make volunteer statesmen his ranking generals, as though the war would turn out an affair of political tact and administration; while his adversary, who had studied while Secretary of War the relative capacity of those ranking high on the regular army list, bestowed his chief honors almost invariably upon West Point graduates and soldiers bred to the profession. Butler, Banks, Dix, and Fremont stood among the earliest of high Union commanders; while Davis headed his own military list with Cooper for adjutant-general, the two Johnstons, Lee, and Beauregard, all educated officers.¹ The Confederate

¹ Scott headed the Union list, and McClellan, of course, was put forward on professional grounds. John A. Dix, too, had been a West Point graduate, but political prominence influenced chiefly his high appointment. Of highest generals in the provisional Confederate list, West Point graduates had nearly the monopoly. Scarcely a volunteer statesman of the South received a higher commission than provisional brigadier; while of political major-generals, Breckinridge, the late Vice-President, appears to have been the only one commissioned. See 2 Stephens War, Appx. L.

armies had thus an immense military advantage at once; for raw and undisciplined troops need most of all to be well drilled and well handled.

Now that a reunion of American hearts makes "the lost cause" seem to survivors who fought for it a distant romance, tinged with a vague regret, like those youthful day-dreams which dissolve as the judgment ripens, we may mourn the fatal error that drew Lee, the two Johnstons, and "Stonewall" Jackson to take up arms against the Union that had trained and trusted them. To follow the fortunes of a State is surely a poor plea for men brought up to serve the whole country.¹ Other sons educated for the Union fought bravely on disunion's side; but these did more, in giving to that struggle a moral dignity and strength in the world's estimation, and their skill and stubborn courage cost much innocent blood. No one of these four appears to have been directly responsible for the original disaffection of the South; each viewed the situation as soldier rather than politician; three at least of them are known to have drawn the sword of revolt reluctantly; and all but Jackson, who ranked lowest of the four, gave up honorable details under the Union to accept the wages of disloyalty.² From their own point of view the misconceived duty involved much personal sacrifice. For Robert E. Lee, most of all, such a choice was momentous, since the prospective military command on either side was for his selection. In 1861 a man of mature life, and habits fully formed, he was Scott's favorite among all junior officers in the whole United States to take the field in his place; and to Lee, at Scott's instance, President Lincoln offered indirectly the active lead when hostilities began, which presently must have placed him first. Lee

April 18-20.

¹ Albert Sidney Johnston was by adoption only a son of Texas, whose star he followed when it fell. His native State was Kentucky. The other three referred to in the text were Virginians, and Virginia's secession detached them all.

² Thomas J. ("Stonewall") Jackson had for the past ten years been professor in a Virginia military institute.

was agitated by this proof of confidence; and, after a secret interview with Scott, he retired to his home across the Potomac to deliberate and decide. There, receiving counter advice,—for Virginia had just seceded,—he tendered to his old commander his resignation from the Union service, acknowledging the mental struggle it had cost him.¹ Though sensible of the wrong of this new mad movement, he could not resist, nevertheless, the passionate sweep into its fatal current; and avowing at first that he would never draw the sword again save as a Virginian in defence of his native State, he was soon seen posting elsewhere under the mandate of the Confederate President, ready to serve wherever he might be ordered.² Terrible though his mistake, one cannot doubt Lee's sincerity in his choice, for he was the soul of honor. Great was Scott's chagrin when his young comrade thus deserted him; but greater far must have been Lee's own chagrin when forced finally to surrender on Virginian soil, like another Cornwallis, four years later. What different course might not this Southern revolution have taken, checked by his surpassing military lead and example, had Lee but obeyed the earliest dictate of duty and chosen to enroll himself upon the same bright scroll of Virginians with Thomas and the illustrious Scott himself. Others of his compatriots would have remained if he had done so. Time proved him, on the whole, the ablest general who fought on the Southern side, with somewhat of those attributes that made Washington peerless. He had good faculties of mind fully ripened. After his dignified surrender had closed the war, he took up private pursuits, betraying neither bitterness nor discomposure; but whatever the feelings he veiled from the world for the rest of his life, we may doubt

¹ 4 N. & H. 98-101; Long's Lee, 83, 95. Lee had affirmed in an interview that if he owned the whole four millions of slaves in the South he would sacrifice them all for the Union. He considered slavery a moral and political evil; nor was the Confederate revolution much to his liking.

² Lee accepted, April 23, and at once, the chief command of the Virginia forces, tendered him by the Virginia convention; and this, too, when his resignation had not yet been accepted at Washington.

whether his conscience was clear. He saw Virginia forever sundered through this experiment of secession. He saw his native soil drenched with fraternal blood which he was not guiltless of shedding. He saw his Arlington home converted into a national cemetery, now the hallowed ground for thousands of brave soldiers who fought against him. To-day, from the pillared porch of that stately mansion where his sinister resolve was taken, one sees across the blue Potomac and against the background of a bluer sky, the great white obelisk, reared to commemorate the nation's chief founder, which points its warning like a marble finger against placing the dignity of any State above that of the nation.

SECTION IV.

FROM REBELLION TO CIVIL WAR.

The first impulse of loyalty had been to regard this vast sectional revolt simply as a rebellion or insurrection, whose responsible leaders were traitors to the Union, and liable as such to civil prosecution. Upon that theory had proceeded the President's earliest proclamation and his denunciation of all privateering under the Davis government as piracy.¹ Declaring a blockade, instead of closing rebellious ports, might seem somewhat of a belligerent concession, but that was only for a legal convenience, which, in view of Europe's attitude, events fully justified. Nor did the call of May for three years' volunteers change the first hypothesis; but increased means were invoked under the pressure of an emergency.² For President Lincoln observed practical discretion in his policy and was never controlled by any theory. The removal of the rebel capital from Montgomery to Richmond simplified the strategic situation. It was now no longer the defence of the Federal district or the reoccupation of Federal forts to which military movements should

¹ *Supra*, p. 49.

² *Supra*, p. 48.

be confined, but to demolish the pretended Confederacy at its chosen centre and stronghold, not greatly distant. One short, sharp campaign, it was confidently hoped, with perhaps one pitched battle, would break the spine of insurrection. How short an expedition did it seem from Washington to Richmond in those days of military inexperience. "Old Chapultepec" was thought an overmatch for all treason's younger generals together; when only his combinations were formed and the order "forward" given, the rebellious would retreat, with panic-stricken fear, and loyalty's task find fulfilment. It seemed almost enough to make the South spiritless and shame it into surrender that Congress was convened for its special session on the natal day so dear to patriotic hearts.

Now did the Northern press teem with appeals to the nation to combine in one grand phalanx which should conquer a peace and restore the Union as before. Patriotic lyrics abounded in print, on the one theme of indivisible union, most of which were soon forgotten. "All hail to the stars and stripes!" had been the dying ejaculation of one of the young martyrs at Baltimore, May-June. a private soldier. At one of the flag-raising, now so common, Abraham Lincoln himself, in Washington, with his Cabinet officers present, pulled the halyards which carried the national ensign to the top of the Patent Office. Generous without stint at the North were the contributions of States, towns, and individuals, in these early days, for volunteers and their families; one estimate, about the 8th of June, figuring the total at upwards of \$25,900,000 by States, and nearly \$5,200,000 by cities and towns; nor did this reckon the gifts of individuals. These seemed tremendous figures at loyalty's first drum-beat; but we were yet far away from the hundred millions and billions of debt which the national treasury alone piled up before the long conflict ended.¹

All fears for the immediate safety of the capital were dispelled by the latter part of June, a large force of volunteers and regulars having collected there. The regiments raised

¹ See 23 *Harper*, 257; newspapers of the day.

for three years in New England and the Middle States here joined their three months' comrades of the militia, whose camp hardships had been assuaged by every convenience in equipage and utensils that home thoughtfulness could supply. Every railway from the North was now open to the capital, and Washington city wore the novel aspect of a military rendezvous. Dust arose from galloping chargers and army wagons upon Pennsylvania Avenue, shops were full of life, and throngs of people moved along the sidewalks, of whom a large proportion wore uniforms. Tents whitened the undulating hills to the northward; the reveille and tattoo beat the dawn and departure of each new day. Guard-mounting and dress parade attracted transient visitors to the camp whose brass band was most musical and the function most imposing. The President or some official spokesman of the Cabinet addressed new regiments as they arrived for duty from the different States, and the monotony of camp routine was relieved by distinguished visitors. The Union flag was seen flying on every street, and a chain of camps gradually encircled the city. Hospitals were soon established, as yet for the sick, not the wounded. Public contracts for commissary and quartermaster supplies were made and fulfilled on an immense scale.

General Scott had an office on a side street opposite the War Department, and lived in a house close by.¹ He was now seventy-five years old, of heavy frame and cumbersome, so that he mounted a horse with great difficulty. A man of methodical habits, used to arranging a precise campaign programme and then performing it, he was at this crisis, though still vigorous of mind, better fitted for exercising a general supervision than for marshalling the unexampled multitude of details. Some younger commander for the field, competent, deferential, and possessed of his fullest confidence, he looked for. Scott's military purpose was good if he could have pursued it in his chosen time without being driven. He had an "anaconda plan" for gradually strangling secession throughout its broad area;² and as between volunteers

¹ 1 Sherman, 206, 207.

² 4 N. & H. c. 17.

and regulars he meant that the latter should constitute his "iron column," as he expressed it.¹ He was disposed to rely on the longer levies for real campaign work, passing this first summer in drill, discipline, and minor operations only; and deferring all active campaign against Richmond until the fall, by which time his troops would be seasoned to endurance and fully organized. As for these three months' militia from the Atlantic States, they would secure the safety of Washington, recapture Harper's Ferry and the Gosport navy yard, intrench at Alexandria, and then return home.

But the new administration found the pressure of public opinion very strong to move forward at once, and that pressure could not be ignored. The press and the people of the free States were clamorous to close the conflict at once, nor did the patriot militia relish the idea of returning to their homes without a battle.² Inexperience makes men rash and sanguine. It was argued, with insufficient reason, that the South was as ill-prepared for fight as the free States, and that numbers might overwhelm. Northern governors, too, to whom the administration owed its gratitude, were nearly unanimous in the belief that the Union moved much too slowly for the mighty forces at its disposal; their advice, confidently given and deserving respect because of their energy, was for prompt, irresistible action, and that opinion was reënforced later by their representatives, when Congress came together. Responsible Northern journals, with sensational head-lines and intermingled statements of the false and true, aided the pressure which had public sentiment behind. It was impossible that a new administration, civilian in antecedents, unused to war, and highly susceptible to opinion, should remain unaffected. Nor could the unprecedented cost of these operations be lost sight of; for the Union force was already vastly greater than that which fought in 1812 or 1846.

¹ 1 Sherman, 206.

² 4 N. & H. c. 17. Scott announced in May, as the great danger to military success, the public impatience for instant and vigorous action, without waiting for sufficient military instruction. *Ib.*

Aggressive warfare requires skill far greater than standing upon the defensive. As an outlet for Northern impatience and prowess by the three months' men, General Butler at Fortress Monroe was permitted to capture any hostile batteries within half a day's march of his headquarters;¹ but detachments which he sent in force some eight miles from Hampton to capture overnight a rebel earthwork at Big Bethel, made first the blunder of firing upon one another while it was dark, and then, June 9, were repulsed by the enemy at early morn and forced to retreat.² The Vienna ambushade, by which about a week later, on the 17th, a force from Alexandria suffered loss, was another mortifying incident.³ Meanwhile the first grand advance across the Potomac for occupying Virginia's "sacred soil"

May 24. began on the 24th of May. In the bright moonlight at two o'clock of that morning one detachment from Washington crossed the long bridge, another the aqueduct bridge, higher up, while a third was conveyed by steamer down the river to Alexandria. Squads of cavalry, dashing ahead of the troops, secured the Virginia end of these bridges, together with a chain bridge a few miles higher up. Arlington heights and its house across the Potomac from Georgetown were occupied without hindrance; and so, far below, was Alexandria, most of the Southern garrison in the town escaping just in time to avoid capture.⁴ Here, however, was sacrificed a promising life which the North, not yet used to bloodshed, mourned with opportunity. Colonel Ellsworth, a young civilian of frank and attractive manners, quite intimate with the President, had recently raised in New York city a Zouave regiment, whom he now directed in person. Rashly entering the principal inn at Alexandria, in the gray morning, he mounted the roof to tear down a Confederate flag which he saw flying there, with only three of

¹ 2 W. R. 639-641.

² The Union loss was seventy-six in killed, wounded, and missing; among those fatally wounded being a young officer of rare literary talent, Major Theodore Winthrop. 2 W. R. 77-104; 4 N. & H. 319.

³ 4 N. & H. 319.

⁴ W. R. 37-44; 4 N. & H. c. 18; 2 Seward, 565.

his soldiers to accompany him. When descending the narrow staircase with his trophy, he was confronted by the landlord, who shot him full in the heart with a double-barrelled gun. The latter was instantly killed by one of Ellsworth's companions, and the body of the dead officer was tenderly taken back to Washington for the last obsequies. This was the first death by violence of a Union officer of rank or public prominence, the first real incident of this war attending the invasion of Confederate soil. By the President's express order Ellsworth's body was laid in state at the White House to receive honors befitting a general slain in battle; and in New York metropolis, on the following Sunday, a funeral procession passed through the crowded streets, the flag which Ellsworth had captured at the cost of his life being carried behind the *coarse*.¹ Until sterner scenes of savagery forced this recollection into the background, Ellsworth was mourned like the Warren of another Bunker's Hill; and unquestionably the love almost to idolatry which he had inspired among his acquaintance, and his power to rule the roughest elements such as composed his command, indicate strong traits of character.²

Under the unfinished dome on the 4th of July, the thirty-seventh Congress convened at Washington in its first and extra session. Hannibal Hamlin, Vice-President of the United States, called the Senate to order. In the Representatives' chamber Galusha A. Grow of Pennsylvania was elected Speaker by a vote of 99 in 159, the whole number cast.³ Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, now a refugee, alone answered to the Senate roll-call from a seceding State; though in the course of the session Willey and

¹ New York newspapers; 4 N. & H. 312-314.

² Pictures of this young Union martyr were long displayed in Northern homes. One volunteer regiment styled itself "Ellsworth's avengers," and various patriotic lays denounced death to all traitors for his sake.

³ So desirous were administration representatives to avoid factional division, that Grow's rivals quickly withdrew, so as to make his plurality a majority on the first ballot.

Carlile from western counties were admitted as representing the genuine Virginia. Kansas, at length a State, furnished its first Senators in James H. Lane and Samuel C. Pomeroy. Orville H. Browning, one of Lincoln's intimate friends, filled by appointment the vacancy for Illinois occasioned by the death of Douglas; John Sherman, transferred from the House, took Chase's place as a senator from Ohio, to continue a long and remarkable public career; while Cameron was succeeded for a while by the worthy Wilmot, of "proviso" memory.¹ In the Representatives' chamber appeared once more the venerable Crittenden, whose retirement from the Senate was not permitted by constituents to close his public service altogether; while among other border members was Horace Maynard, who had fled as a Unionist from eastern Tennessee, where his district was situated. Through the self-effacement of seceding States the political color of both Senate and House was now decidedly Republican; and most present were fresh from loyal constituencies, earnest and determined to put down rebellion at whatever cost, and flushed with the confidence that it would be done speedily. Hence, a ready disposition largely prevailed to vote all measures needful for a vigorous prosecution of the President's policy.²

The President's message, which was sent to the two Houses on the following day, stands for all time as the vindication of his government in accepting the ordeal of arms for its preservation. The issue of Fort Sumter, observed the Executive, "presents to the whole family of man the question, whether a constitutional republic or democracy—a government of the people by the same people—can or cannot maintain its territorial integrity against its own domestic foes." After defending his course in this inevitable emergency, "it is now recommended," he continued, "that you give the legal means for making this contest a short and decisive one; that you place at the control of the government, for the work, at least four hundred thousand men, and four hundred million dollars.

¹ See vol. V.

² Am. Cycl. 1861, 225, 226; 4 N. & H. c. 21.

That number of men is about one-tenth of those of proper ages within the regions where, apparently, all are willing to engage; and the sum is less than a twenty-third part of the money value owned by the men who seem ready to devote the whole."¹ This document, directed to the people as well as their representatives, was received approvingly in both Houses, and a passage which proposed to make the contest short and decisive was heartily applauded.

Lincoln was still somewhat sceptical on the point of Southern heartiness in the present revolt. "It may be questioned," said this message, "whether June-July. there is a majority of the legally qualified voters of any State, except perhaps South Carolina, in favor of disunion."² The strength of the protesting element in east Tennessee and western Virginia, supported such a doubt — the acts, moreover, by which a popular reference on the question of disunion had been baffled or postponed in so many States. Yet we must remark that the coöperative disposition is strong in America; loyal resistance was itself local; and Southerners whose local influences for revolution had been much too strong to oppose, now found pride, necessity, and the fervor of a new allegiance, all hindrances to returning. Then, as ever, the prime impulse was to accept the inevitable, to swim with the stream. Our Congress, on the other hand, seized every incentive for pushing rebellion to the wall. The three-months levies would soon be lost to us; the moment we moved, the conscience-stricken would run; and as the Confederate legislature had planned to meet at Richmond before July was out, why not forestall its gathering? With the pressure thus redoubled before Congress had been in session a fortnight, Scott yielded, against his military judgment, and the press of our northern seaports, whose impatient cry had been "On to Richmond!"

¹ Cong. Globe; Am. Cycl. 1861, 603-607. "Having thus chosen our course," so the message concludes, "without guile and with pure purpose, let us renew our trust in God, and go forward without fear and with manly hearts."

² Am. Cycl. 1861, 606.

proclaimed presently with exultant head-lines, "The great advance; rebellion doomed!"

Already at a Cabinet council held on the 29th of June, the veteran general-in-chief had, in deference to the common desire, presented the plan of a forward movement, not unwise had its execution been wisely committed.¹ First of all, Scott placed too much reliance upon General Robert Patterson, an old companion in arms, whose skilful coöperation at a distance was indispensable. Sent from Pennsylvania as a militia major-general with three-months men, whose time, like his own, was soon to expire, and commanding in Maryland opposite Harper's Ferry, Patterson, though distinguished in a former war, was now superannuated; young and brilliant officers like Fitz-John Porter served on his staff, and his body of troops was much greater than that opposed, yet timidity marked his movements. His adversaries across the Potomac were two of the ablest and wariest on the Confederate side, both Virginians and West Point graduates. Colonel Thomas J. Jackson (soon to be immortalized as "Stonewall"), that grim young covenanter of the South, the antipodes of most who served under him, who prayed in his saddle, and led on in the faith that the God of battles upheld him, began his career of fame by drilling, instructing, and inspiring with all his might at Harper's Ferry a force of about five thousand raw Virginians collected there. Specially assigned by President Davis to command that region, General Joseph E. Johnston esteemed so highly this gifted subordinate, as presently to obtain for him a brigadier's commission. Johnston himself was a consummate officer in the prime of life's vigor, holding the high rank of quartermaster-general of the United States army when the war broke out.² Irvin McDowell, the man whom Scott selected to command the main Union column in Virginia, was a modest and accomplished general, of temperate habits and great physical powers, trained in the regular staff service, obedient to orders, intensely Union in sentiment, but too

¹ 4 N. & H. 322.

² Hughes's Johnston, c. 4.

ready possibly for his own good to undertake tasks likely to fail. Against him, at Manassas, in central Virginia, was pitted Beauregard, the hero of Fort Sumter, who signaled his arrival, on the first of June, with a stirring proclamation which denounced Lincoln as an unprincipled tyrant whose invading army made "beauty and booty" its motto.¹ Johnston and Beauregard were two of the five generals now ranking highest in the Confederacy; and to prevent their junction, holding the one in check far distant while the other was attacked, was the main strategy of Scott's aggressive plan for which preparations were pressed.

Johnston retreated from Harper's Ferry to Winchester on the 15th of June. Patterson then crossed the Potomac, elated over his easy capture of the post; but, instead of pursuing farther, as Scott desired him to do, he recrossed once more to the Maryland shore, while Johnston pushed his pickets up to the southern bank of the Potomac and made an exaggerated impression of his numerical strength.² Patterson was not superseded for such feeble conduct, as he should have been, but reënforced, in view of McDowell's intended march. He was not specifically ordered to attack the enemy down the Shenandoah at Winchester; but, with a force constantly larger, he was expected to keep Johnston fully occupied and prevent him by feints and threatened demonstrations from reënforcing Beauregard at Manassas.³

McDowell's forward movement had been set for July 9th, by which date the Union troops were heavily massed near Arlington at the south bank of the Potomac; but organization was slow, and marching orders were not promulgated until a week later. Even then the forward movement was made upon slender preparation; regiments and their new brigade commanders had but slight mutual acquaintance; there was good material, but cohesion, real discipline, and strict subordination were wanting. Now July 2-22. were to be seen, on each side for the last time, uniforms of

¹ 2 W. R. 806-907.

² 4 N. & H. 316-318; 2 W. R. 689-695, 901; Hughes's Johnston, c. 4.

³ 2 W. R. 156-187; 4 N. & H. 322-328.

every cut and color, such as militia pride and caprice had fostered during the happier days of peace. Obedience on the march was lax; men would straggle for water or blackberries, to pillage rebel property, and even to set a rebel house on fire; while rations were wasted on the way that there might be less to carry.¹ Confederate soldiers, many of them, were quite as raw and uncontrolled, but they were on their own soil and had a less difficult task to perform. In this advancing host might be seen Union officers now of inferior grade who rose afterwards to distinction — Sherman, Keyes, Hunter, Burnside, Heintzelman, Franklin, and Howard; but Daniel Tyler, the brigadier under whom these served on the present march, although himself from West Point, had seen little active service and gained no later renown. Thus did McDowell's column by July 18th reach the sluggish stream of Bull Run, which courses midway between Centreville and the high plateau of Manassas Junction where important railroads connected. The next two days were passed in finding a ford for a crossing-place. The Union base remained at Centreville, that of the Confederates being at Manassas; and on the line of this Bull Run stream both sides prepared for battle.

Meanwhile the forces of Beauregard and Johnston had made here a junction — the very thing Scott had been most earnest to prevent and the Richmond government to accomplish. Patterson, in fact, had again proved unequal to his opportunity. A second time crossing the Potomac into Virginia on the 2d of July, with heavy reinforcements, and driving the enemy's outposts before him to Martinsburg, he had shown nothing since but vacillation. When within nine miles of Winchester and the enemy he wrote out orders for an attack and tore them up, after which he made towards the northeast what was nominally a flank movement, but in reality a retreat. Early on the 18th Johnston received from Richmond an urgent telegram to join Beauregard at

¹ Sherman, 207-210; 2 W. R. 308. McDowell, in an order, July 18th, rebuked such misbehavior.

Manassas; and, relieved of Patterson, he lost no time in putting his whole effective force in motion, Jackson, with conspicuous celerity, leading the way with his brigade. Six thousand Confederate troops from the Shenandoah Valley were accordingly at Bull Run, ready for action, the day before the battle. Johnston, too, was present in person.¹ Patterson, though repeatedly urged from Washington to hold his adversary in check, was profoundly ignorant until the 20th that the latter had given him the slip, by which time it was too late for Scott to redeem his promise to McDowell that if Johnston moved to Manassas he would have Patterson on his heels.²

The battle of Bull Run was fought on Sunday, July 21st, each adversary having planned to attack the other. "It is now generally admitted," writes Sherman in the retrospect, a highly competent witness, "that it was one of the best planned battles of the war, but one of the worst fought; both armies were fairly defeated; and whichever stood fast, the other would have run." No others equally raw in war, he thought, would have done better, and though the North was overwhelmed with shame, the South had nothing to boast of, being too badly broken up to pursue, in spite of superior numbers.³ President Davis himself, who hastened to the scene from Richmond, thinking, perhaps, that he might have to assume command in person, confirms inferentially that conclusion.⁴ In the forenoon our force broke the Con-

¹ 4 N. & H. 326, 345; 2 W. R. 163. Patterson's force was from 18,000 to 20,000, while Johnston had only about 12,000. *Ib.*

Johnston, as superior in command, approved Beauregard's plan for an attack, which, however, was frustrated by McDowell's earlier advance to give battle.

² 4 N. & H. 324, 351; 2 W. R. 163-168.

³ 1 Sherman, 209, 210, approving as fair and correct the respective official reports of McDowell and Johnston.

⁴ On reaching Manassas Junction he found a crowd of Confederate soldiers fleeing in panic from the battle-field, who told him that the day was lost; but on reaching the scene of action he discovered a victory. Davis's *Short History*, 83-85. Pursuit was not to be thought of, for Johnston's troops were almost as much disorganized by victory as were the Federals by defeat. Stovall's *Toombs*, 238.

federate line and set the troops flying; but they re-formed with Jackson, who gained here his famous sobriquet,¹ and in the afternoon victory's scales were turned by the arrival of a fresh remnant of Johnston's army, which was thrown against the right and rear of the Union line simultaneously with Beauregard's rallying charge. It was then about three o'clock, and McDowell's soldiers, after a weary march, had been fighting for three long hours. "Johnston has come," was murmured from rank to rank;² the Union line broke in a panic and its flight was disorderly and desperate. In vain did McDowell try to rally his troops either at Centreville or Fairfax Court House; but, in disregard of all orders, they ran as for their lives, throwing away guns and accoutrements, until, a disorganized mob, they reached the Potomac. Monday, the 22d, was a gloomy and dismal day, with a drizzling rain, which lasted thirty-six hours; and throughout that day, beginning with sunrise, a wet and confused throng of men might be seen rushing across the bridges into Washington city. McDowell had no choice left but to fall back from Manassas to Arlington and this secure base of the Potomac, where he, too, arrived on Monday.³

Bull Run's disaster may be said to have enlarged the present conflict in effect from rebellion to a civil war. Such a campaign outcome was to the multitudinous North a terri-

¹ The Confederate General Bee (killed shortly after) exclaimed, "Look at Jackson's brigade; it stands there like a stone wall." 1 B. & L. 210.

² Our troops did not know that Johnston had been fighting against them since morning with part of his force.

³ 4 N. & H. c. 20; 2 W. R. 316, etc.; 1 B. & L. 167-261. The strength of the respective forces at Bull Run is estimated: Union army, rank and file 17,676; Confederate army, rank and file (including 8340 from the Shenandoah), 18,053. The total Union loss is reckoned: killed 460, wounded 1124, captured or missing 1312, grand total 2896. The Confederate loss was 1982, consisting almost entirely of killed and wounded. 1 B. & L. 191, 195. Cf. 2 W. R. 327, 570. Throughout the Civil War we find a marked discrepancy in the estimates of numbers engaged, because of the different manner of reporting those "present for duty" in the two armies, the effect of which is to make the Confederate force seem smaller by comparison than it really was. 5 N. & H. 326, note.

ble disappointment; the more so, that inexperience had inspired the most sanguine hopes. Possibly, had this battle been completely won by the army of loyalty, Southern insurrection would then and there have been crushed.¹ In that case the contest had been worth trying. But with results so utterly reverse, the cause of the Confederates at home and abroad became immensely strengthened. Their gain in prisoners alone was enough to dispel President Lincoln's threats of severity toward privateer culprits. Illusions in the free States now melted away; and dreams of a ninety days' insurrection were over. Loyalty felt at length that a gigantic task was before it—a protracted struggle whose end only the God above could discern. But none the less duty remained recognized. Despondency, like the clouds of heaven, disappeared before a truer sunshine; and administration and Congress united heartily in drawing out vaster resources of the people than before. The military panic subsided; volunteers returned crestfallen to their several camps and yielded themselves to sounder drill and discipline; new levies for three years now reached the capital by every train, while three months' troops returned home to be mustered out. Where so many had pressed for this premature advance, few felt disposed to lay the blame heavily upon any one. McDowell received words of generous encouragement and no reprimand. Instead of being cashiered for cowardice, as they dreaded, officers who had fled from battle with the rest found their names sent to the Senate for promotion, and were confirmed without opposition. Patterson was at once honorably mustered out, having completed his three months' service.² Winfield Scott, whose long record of invincibility was now broken, exhibited some wounded pride; but President and Cabinet soothed his feelings, appreciating the immense weight of his influence and their own error in overruling his advice.

¹ There is Southern opinion to this effect. Hughes's Johnston, 58. For this battle closely followed McClellan's successes in western Virginia to be presently described.

² He asked for a court of inquiry, but it was refused on the ground that he was already discharged without blame. 2.W. R. 171, 175.

A new star had just risen whose earliest lustre was without a spot. The young hero of Rich Mountain had brought the Union arms a positive success in western Virginia. George B. McClellan, this new Napoleon, fortunate in all things but the power to escape being magnified while the Northern mood remained so impressionable, was born in Philadelphia, and graduated at West Point in 1846. After serving under Scott in the engineer corps during the Mexican War, he was assigned to various important tasks for the government, once travelling to Europe on a military commission to study the Crimean War. Resigning in 1857 his army commission as captain for a good civil employment, like so many other army officers in times of peace, he identified himself with railway construction at the West, and was in 1860 chosen president of an Ohio railroad with a handsome salary. Only thirty-four years when the war broke out, ardent in loyalty, extremely attractive in person and manners, and favored as he had always been by friends and high social influence as well as his own superior talent, McClellan was made major-general of the Ohio three-months' militia by the Governor of that State. Scott in a personal letter welcomed his reëntrance into the military service, and honors followed quickly from Washington. A military department consisting of the three great Northwestern States was created, May 3d, and placed under his supreme command; on the 14th of the same month, the War Department made him a major-general of the United States army, thus changing his militia commission into one of permanent service; next, on the 6th of June, his department was enlarged by the addition of the State of Missouri and portions of western Pennsylvania and Virginia.¹ All this was in advance of his new service in the field, for his present duty was to organize, equip, and discipline the new quotas of the Northwest, a task to which he applied himself with consummate aptitude, as an eminently congenial one. In him West Point found its choicest representative at the start to offset the civilian major-generals, of whom the ad-

¹ 4 N. & H. 281-285; 3 W. R. 384.

ministration was creating so many. McClellan was rather under the medium height, but muscularly formed, with broad shoulders and a well-poised head. Quiet and modest in demeanor, he nevertheless, when drawn out, showed no lack of self-confidence. Ohio men compared him much with Beauregard, the Southern hero, as one who had also in youth stood well in the engineer corps and would match well that famous adversary.¹

To such a military leader on the Union side, who took up the preliminaries of war with an evident understanding, the loyalists of western Virginia looked, not in vain, for deliverance. Wheeling, their chief town, was a port of the Ohio River, midway between Pittsburg and Cincinnati. Their counties thrived upon a river trade in lumber and the useful minerals; while the railway to Baltimore, on the line of the old national road, afforded for the same natural products an eastern outlet. With so compact an area, and with solid interests and a market neighborhood remote and separated from eastern Virginia by a mountain barrier, there was an inducement here for setting off a separate State. Western Virginia had long-standing grievances which grew out of an unequal representation at Richmond; slavery retained but little footing on her soil; nor was State pride sufficient to detach her people from intercourse with Pennsylvania and Ohio, or from allegiance to the Union. As Massachusetts had lost already part of her eighteenth-century domain, so, by more violent disruption, was the other chief Commonwealth of revolutionary days now destined to a final subdivision.

Urged by these loyal people of the Old Dominion frontier, and pursuant to orders received from Washington, McClellan, on the 26th of May, sent a small force from across the Ohio River, which, aided by a loyal regiment of these counties, drove the Confederate soldiers to the little town of Philippi, where, by a sudden surprise on the 3d of ^{May-July.} June, the latter were dispersed in a rout. Under the shelter of that success assembled the loyal convention of June

¹ Jacob D. Cox in 1 B. & L. 89.

11th, at Wheeling, delegates from about forty of Virginia's counties being present. On the 13th, that convention adopted an ordinance which declared the recent acts of Governor Letcher and the Richmond convention treasonable and void, and vacated the State offices accordingly. On the 19th followed an ordinance which created a provisional government for the State, loyal and submissive to the Union. Francis H. Peirpoint was chosen temporary governor, and a legislature was constituted from loyal members-elect who should take a test oath and proceed to fill vacancies. That Legislature organized July 2d, to enact laws for the provisional government, and on July 9th chose two United States Senators who, at Washington, were admitted presently to the vacant seats.¹ Governor Peirpoint had in the meantime made formal application to the President for military assistance.²

The State government at Richmond sought with solicitude, but in vain, to check so dangerous a schism. The Confederate General Garnett, who was fortifying two mountain passes which led to the eastern portion of Virginia, reported the miserable condition of his troops, and the obstinate public sentiment which opposed his progress.³ Towards the end of June McClellan went to this vicinity in person to assume the offensive, Brigadier-General Rosecrans, a West Point officer, serving under him. With a vastly superior force, consisting in part of Virginians here collected, and with the local sentiment of the inhabitants to hinder his enemy, he made a series of brilliant successes with the aid of Rosecrans, which culminated on the 11th and 13th of July in the decisive victories of Rich Mountain and Carrick's Ford; Garnett was killed in the latter conflict and the scattered Confederates put to rout. These two encounters, though scarcely more than skirmishes in comparison with the great battles of the Civil War yet to follow, were a godsend to the longing North; and McClellan's campaign,

¹ *Supra*, p. 74.

² 4 N. & H. 330-332; Am. Cycl. 1861, 744.

³ 2 W. R. 217, 238.

sharp, short, and wholly successful, like that of Cæsar in Gaul, brought great results, both to the country and the conqueror. Rebellion never again penetrated the Kanawha Valley, but was forced eastward of the mountain frontier into Virginia proper, and meanwhile the political transformation of these protected counties went steadily on until, in June, 1863, with the Old Dominion rent fully asunder, West Virginia became formally admitted into the Union under that schismatic name as a single and separate State.¹ Scarcely less remarkable was the effect which this most timely campaign had upon McClellan's personal fortunes. Action, rapid and effective action, such as the American heart most welcomes, had been displayed; yet symptoms were not wanting of a military disposition to be surer, while already sure.² There was something in the commander's ringing congratulations to his troops which somehow gave to the country the impression of operations more magnificent than they really were. "I have come," he announced, on reaching Grafton, "to place myself at your head and to share danger with you." And, enumerating their brave deeds and endurance after Carrick's Ford was won, "I have confidence in you," he proclaimed, "and I trust you have learned to confide in me."³ This was Napoleonic language; and when just after the Bull Run disaster McClellan was summoned to Washington to re-create the army of the Potomac, the whole loyal people hailed him as

¹ 4 N. & H. 338; 2 W. R. 193-292; (General Cox's narrative)

¹ B. & L. 126-148.

² See July 10 despatch to the War Department; 2 W. R. 202.

³ This order of July 16 sums up vigorously the military results: "You have annihilated two armies commanded by educated and experienced soldiers, intrenched in mountain fortresses, fortified at their leisure. You have taken five guns, twelve colors, fifteen hundred stand of arms; one thousand prisoners, including more than forty officers; one of the two commanders of the rebels is a prisoner, the other lost his life on the field of battle. You have killed more than two hundred and fifty of the enemy, who has lost all his baggage and camp equipment. All this has been accomplished with the loss of twenty brave men killed and sixty wounded on your part." 2 W. R. 238.

chieftain and preserver; the "Little Corporal" of fields to be fought and gloriously won.

Congress provided with unstinted generosity for carrying out the warlike plans of the government. On the gloomy day of the disorderly return from Manassas, President Lincoln signed his approval to the general enlistment act which had passed Congress just before the battle, authorizing 500,000 volunteers (more in fact than his message had asked for), for terms of service at his discretion, ranging from three years to six months.¹ The earliest act of this session enlarged the scope of executive authority in the emergency of rebellion. Three millions were appropriated for the temporary increase of the navy by building or purchasing vessels, besides a sum half as large for experimenting in iron- or steel-clad steamships and floating batteries. Other measures increased the efficiency of the war and navy departments; abolished flogging in the army; provided for the equipment of gunboats on the Western waters, for new fortifications, for assuming debts created by the States in defence of the Union, and finally for raising the pay of soldiers to thirteen dollars a month, and fixing the date of its commencement. A joint resolve, on the last day of the session, legalized all prior military acts, proclamations, and orders of the President since the 4th of March as though performed under a previous sanction of the legislature. To meet such vast expenditures a national loan of \$250,000,000 was authorized, and the rigid sub-treasury plan of the old Democracy was modified so that public money obtainable on these loans might lie on deposit in solvent banks. A direct tax of \$20,000,000 upon real estate was to be levied annually by the States,² while a war tariff act increased the import duties, by removing tea and coffee from the free list and raising the rates on other specified articles.³

¹ Act July 22, 1861.

² The land tax proved a failure, some States complying while others failed to do so.

³ 4 N. & H. 379.

Just after the disaster at Bull Run, Crittenden, whose unshaken support of war measures kept him a sort of loyal pacificator for a while longer, offered by common consent a resolution which passed both Houses with little opposition. It declared that this war was not waged "in any spirit of oppression, or for any purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions" of States now in insurrection, "but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired; and that as soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease." This, like the reckoning of a ship at sea, marked only a point that was receding; for a confiscation act, which passed shortly after, declared among other penalties that all claim of a master should be forfeited to slaves employed with his consent in disloyal service, such as building forts or digging intrenchments. Viewed merely in the light of property used for rebellion, such chattel confiscation was just, and members from slaveholding States who opposed the plan, — Crittenden among the rest, — did so without threat or acrimony. Trumbull in the Senate and Thaddeus Stevens in the House were champions of such a penalty; and of those disliking this entering wedge against the peculiar system, many refrained altogether from voting on the confiscation bill. This special session closed on the 6th of August, most of its measures having passed by very large majorities and with very little open dissent.¹

The Confederate provisional Congress sat at Richmond from July 20th to August 31st, most of its proceedings being conducted in secret conclave.² Stringent measures were now adopted for confiscating to the use of the Confederacy all

¹ Am. Cycl. 1861, 259; 12 U. S. Stats. The chief opposers of a force policy were the few lingerers from Kentucky and Missouri who soon after joined the Confederate cause, together with Vallandigham of Ohio, who, during July, was hung in effigy in a regimental camp.

² Members occupied chairs without desks, after the manner of the British Parliament. Stovall, 236.

debts and property of whatever description within its limits belonging to alien enemies; and all citizens of the Northern free States were assumed alien enemies, together with those resident in border slave States who should aid the Union. All males of fourteen years and upwards within the Confederacy, not sustaining its cause, were denounced as alien enemies, and liable to punishment.¹

Quarrels now sprang up among those upon whom the Southern cause leaned for success. In dating the commissions of his five chief generals confirmed by the Confederate Congress during this session, President Davis placed Albert Sidney Johnston, his favorite, next to Cooper, the adjutant-general, ranking both him and Lee by arbitrary dates above the two victors of Bull Run. Joseph E. Johnston, who had held the highest rank of them all in the Union service, filed his remonstrance, and received in reply a sharp reprimand.² The breach, which never healed, bore military fruits in the years that followed. On the civilian side, Davis's first difference was with Robert Toombs, his Secretary of State, who resigned about the time the Confederate capital was moved to Richmond. Notwithstanding great brain power and ability, Toombs was a difficult man to get on with; his tongue was sharp, and his disappointed ambition to be first made him sharply censorious of the man who preceded him. Whatever Davis chose to do, he himself would have done differently. Foreign relations gave him but little employment, for he used to say that as Secretary of State he carried the archives of the Confederacy in his hat. He criticised his chief as one too partial to regulars and West Point; and Davis, to humor him, after R. M. T. Hunter of Virginia had taken his place in the Cabinet, made him a brigadier-general of volunteers.³ Toombs was one of a type of Southern statesmen, now extinct with slavery, possessing much political ability, but combative, intractable, and self-

¹ See Am. Cycl. 1861, 147, 148.

² Hughes, c. 6. See *supra*, p. 65.

³ Toombs had vented his spleen at those who were seeking "bomb proof positions."

asserting. His military success was not great. Too late for prowess at Bull Run, he idled his time during the inaction of a Virginia camp, indulgent to "the boys," exasperating to superiors, incapable of military discipline, fault-finding, and, not in expression alone, intemperate. Before the war was half over, this man, who so nearly led the Southern cause in early 1861, retired to his home, vexed and soured against the whole concern.¹ Contemporaries had said at the outset that Toombs was the brain of this Confederacy; but that title, as events developed, belongs rather to Attorney-General Benjamin, the ablest, most versatile, and most constant of all Davis's civil counsellors, who acted as Secretary of War after Walker's retirement in September, and was then installed Secretary of State, by the following March, to remain premier until the bitter end, sanguine and serene in bearing, through all mutations of fortune and misfortune.²

SECTION V.

THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY.

While great events transpired at the national capital and along the declivity of States on the Atlantic seaboard, there were stirring scenes in the valley of the Mississippi, and at each great river confluence. Here were strategic points for needful occupation in so extensive a conflict; and here, too, Lincoln's administration meant to put final limits to secession's enlargement by holding Missouri and Kentucky fast bound to the Union.

This immense river basin fairly comprised the inner area of the present strife; for the remaining continent westward to the Pacific from the Rocky range furnished natural barriers for its remote security. Even in 1865, when civil war ended, America's railroad system reached no farther

¹ Stovall's Toombs, 237, 249-259.

² Judah P. Benjamin was of English-Hebrew descent, and born in the West Indies.

west than the Kansas frontier by way of Hannibal and St. Joseph in northern Missouri; and from Atchison, the terminus of that system, it was a stage-coach ride of two thousand miles, through a wild and unpeopled country for the most part, to that projecting arm of the California railroad which brought San Francisco within reach by steam in a final journey.¹ The Pacific coast States of California and Oregon were so utterly beyond the range of military operations, that filial love furnished the only pledge of abiding loyalty to the Union through the four years of trial. Eastward of California, Nevada, famous for its silver mines, was admitted a State in course of the conflict. The vast intermediate Territories—Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and the rest—slowly developed their varying resources of mining and agriculture; and as to all of these embryo Commonwealths a Republican Congress and administration had resolved not to surrender, nor even put to hazard, the cause of free labor.²

The military importance of the Mississippi River with its chief tributaries is seen at a glance. That saffron water-course, once the western boundary of the United States, became, after the Louisiana purchase, the common highway for North and South. The South in the present struggle, while controlling its contiguous banks, shut off Northern commerce at discretion and sealed all outlet to the sea; the North, on the other hand, if securely holding the whole river to its mouth, would cut the pretended Confederacy in two, detach at once from the Richmond government the States of Texas and Arkansas and most of Louisiana, and guard that whole Spanish-American domain to the southwest which slavery was ambitious to conquer. As for tributaries of the Mississippi, the Red River, with its sparsely settled banks, was of little immediate consequence; but the Missouri river afforded an outlet for the farm prod-

¹ Bowles's *Across the Continent*, I (May, 1865).

² The population of these Territories aggregated in 1860 less than 220,000 by the census tables, New Mexico ranking first in numbers and Utah second.

uce of Kansas, Iowa, and a thriving back country, while the Ohio, longest owned and longest settled by our English-speaking race, flowed for nearly a thousand miles as the boundary in chief between slave and free States, studded on either bank with important cities engaged in friendly trade. Two points were thus of prime consequence to control: Cairo, the southernmost town of Illinois, at the junction of the Ohio River with the Mississippi, and St. Louis near the junction of the Missouri. Both points were secured to the Union cause, and to Illinois belongs the praise of promptly forwarding volunteer troops at the President's request essential for each enterprise.¹

Cairo was a forlorn little settlement within Illinois jurisdiction; but to control the populous city of St. Louis and a slave State was far more difficult. Here at the United States arsenal were about thirty thousand stand of arms and an abundance of other munitions of war. The Illinois volunteers, gathering in response to the President's call, were in great need of such weapons; while on the other hand Missouri secessionists plotted to seize the arsenal and appropriate its contents for themselves. Governor Yates of Illinois applied for arms to General William S. Harney, the Union commander at St. Louis, who, conservative and overcautious, refused permission. But his young subordinate, Captain Nathaniel Lyon, who had been lately sent thither from Kansas, a stern New Englander and a readier man for the emergency, indorsed the application for ten thousand stands, and Yates despatched a message to Washington, in response to which came orders directing that the governor should have them, and relieving Harney from command. Lyon quickly took the responsibility of stripping the arsenal of its contents altogether, and, with great secrecy and discretion, the arms, packed in boxes, together with quantities of ammunition, and two field-pieces, were loaded at St. Louis on a river steamer at midnight, and delivered

¹ An Illinois force under Colonel Prentiss (an officer who had served in the Mexican War), made Cairo secure, April 23d, 24th. 4 N. & H. 194-200.

by daybreak of April 26th at Alton landing, twenty-five miles above, on the Illinois side, from which place they reached by rail the State capital.¹ Such arms as remained were supplied to the Union home guard of St. Louis; and thus without provoking a collision did Lyon checkmate the earliest designs of disloyal citizens.²

Missouri's situation was unfavorable for secession, being actually north of the Mason and Dixon line, with the more populous Illinois across the river on the east and Iowa and Kansas, zealous for freedom, on the north and west; though Arkansas, rude and thinly settled, which had just seceded, was contiguous on the southern frontier. Kentucky's opportunity was but little better; for western Virginia remained loyal, Tennessee on its south was distracted in sentiment, while across the river to the northward bristled a tier of vigorous States overwhelmingly committed to the cause of Union and free institutions. All honor to those far-sighted statesmen whose ordinance of 1787 now gave loyalty at the West the momentous preponderance. A border State convention met for conference May 27th at Frankfort, Kentucky, in pursuance of a call. In representative character it was a disappointment. All delegates present were from Kentucky, except four from Missouri, and one, irregularly chosen, from Tennessee. Crittenden presided in person, and addresses to the people were framed and issued. These addresses were Union in sentiment, but laid down a false line of policy, that border slave States should take no part in the present armed conflict but that of mediator and intercessor.³ This delusion of State neutrality took its course in Kentucky, as we shall see presently; there President Lincoln guided the loyal elements of his native State with considerate delicacy, but elsewhere the experiment was allowed no range whatever.

In Missouri secession's hand was violently forced, as the

¹ 4 N. & H. 198-200; 1 W. R. 667; 1 B. & L. 265.

² This is conceded by good Confederate testimony. 1 B. & L. 264.

³ 1 Moore, doc. 243; Am. Cycl. 1861, 396.

bitter factional spirit of the State compelled. Of her million and more white inhabitants, those sympathizing with the South were led by Claiborne F. Jackson, the newly chosen Governor of the State, while Francis P. Blair, Jr., who in 1860 had achieved the feat of organizing a Republican constituency strong enough in a slave State to choose him to Congress, was the soul of the Union cause. Jackson was a Southern-bred Democrat, who shaped his conduct by his feelings; but Blair, the namesake and younger son of Andrew Jackson's trusted friend,¹ had settled in St. Louis for politics and journalism, after a youth spent at the nation's capital. The Blairs were tough fighters in politics, aggressive and unyielding. The general assembly of Missouri had, under Jackson's lead, called a State convention; but, largely through Blair's tact and influence, the members chosen were Unionists by a large majority, and the convention on the 19th of March adjourned to December.² When Sumter fell and troops were called for, Jackson insultingly scouted the President's call,³ summoned his legislature at the State capital in extra session, and renewed his intrigues for carrying Missouri into the Southern Confederacy.

Blair, the leader of the loyalists, now found in Captain Lyon a military ally whom Jackson's party learned to dread with good reason. Intensely devoted to the Union, intrepid, lightning-like in movements and the quickness to apprehend, this regular army officer was of remarkable promise. He stood little upon personal dignity, being undersized, red-bearded, and homely of aspect, but his vehemence of purpose impressed every one. With his full countenance, Blair raised, as a Missouri home guard, four regiments, which were largely composed of German citizens in and about St. Louis, who had paraded as "Wide Awakes" in the late Presidential campaign. These regiments were accepted by the Secretary of War, and sworn into service as Missouri's quota tendered under the President's call. We have seen

¹ Montgomery Blair, of Lincoln's Cabinet, was his elder brother.

² Am. Cycl. 1861, 477-479; 1 B. & L. 262-264; 4 N. & H. 207.

³ *Supra*, p. 40.

Lyon depleting, partly for their benefit, the United States arsenal in St. Louis which Jackson had plotted to seize.¹

May. Next was established by the governor a Confederate rendezvous, in the western part of the city, under the guise of affording militia instruction. Young Missourians of the best families resorted thither, and "Camp Jackson," as it was termed, was stealthily supplied with muskets and artillery by President Davis's order. Aware of Jackson's designs, Lyon, on the 10th of May, after a secret inspection, marched a strong force of home guards and regulars from the arsenal to the camp, and, surrounding the latter, compelled its summary surrender. While returning to the arsenal with his well-born prisoners in custody, he was greeted by a hostile city mob, which hooted at the military "Dutchmen," and hurled missiles after the Baltimore example. Lyon's troops cleared their way through the crowd by a volley from their loaded guns; whether they were first fired upon or not is disputed, but, as often happens in such a disturbance, inoffensive men, women, and children, drawn to the scene in idle curiosity, bore the chief injury.² At the United States arsenal next day, the prisoners were paroled and disbanded with no worse penalty than a reprimand; but, such was the excitement produced through the State by this bloody accompaniment of a righteous seizure, that Lyon for a short time came into disfavor with his government.

General Harney, having vindicated his loyalty, now returned to take command of the department, whereupon the secession party of Missouri grew bolder. The Legislature, at Jefferson City, passed a bill for arming and equipping a State military force, and Governor Jackson made Sterling

¹ *Supra*, p. 92.

² 4 N. & H. c. 11; Peckham's Lyon, 147, 148. Both Grant and Sherman, though probably unaware of one another's presence, witnessed this St. Louis riot as casual spectators, and allude to it in their respective Memoirs. Sherman was impressed by Lyon's wild appearance, before the march to Camp Jackson, as he ran about distributing cartridges to the men, with his hair flying in the wind; and he sketches this riot with a graphic pen. 1 Sherman, 200.

Price major-general to command it. Price was a highly respectable citizen, a conservative ex-governor of the State, and a man of military talent; he had been reckoned a Unionist until Lyon broke up Camp Jackson, but like many other conservatives at this crisis, he drew the line of duty at deportment. Harney, unequal to the situation, made a truce with this major-general, at the same time protesting that the military bill aimed at secession. President Lincoln had by this time promoted Lyon to brigadier-general of volunteers, convinced of his worth, and placed in Blair's hands an order relieving Harney from command, which was served on the 30th upon that officer.¹

When Lyon resumed command the next day all truce with Price was at an end, and affairs hastened to a crisis. At a conference held with Blair and Lyon on the 11th of June, Governor Jackson offered to defer organizing his State troops under the military bill on condition that the Union home guards should also be disarmed and no further Federal troops stationed in Missouri. This proposal of nominal neutrality was flatly rejected; and the interview, which lasted about four hours, ended by Lyon's abrupt avowal that he would see every man, woman, and child in Missouri under the sod before he would consent that a State should dictate to his government on such a subject. "This," he added, "means war. One of my officers will conduct you out of my lines in an hour." And so saying, he left the conference without another word, not even a salutation.² All pretence of State neutrality by his opponents now ended. Jackson the next day at his capital summoned his fellow-Missourians to rise in their might and drive out these desecrators of State allegiance. Lyon, on the 13th, by way of response, steamed up the river to Jefferson City, with two thousand men, and the Governor and other State officers fled before him. Raising the stars and stripes over the state house and leaving a garrison, our intrepid Union general next pushed on to Boonville, fifty

¹ 2 B. & L. 266; 4 N. & H. c. 11. Cf. 3 W. R. 375-383.

² Snead's narrative, 2 B. & L. 267; 4 N. & H. 222.

miles farther up stream, where General Price was hastily collecting some fragments of State militia; these he attacked and dispersed on the 17th, driving Price and the governor in ignoble flight towards the remote and thinly settled southern border of Missouri, there to join their scattered standards as they might. Disloyalty, miscalled States-rights, was thus driven into exile before it could organize, and Missouri secession received a blow from which it never recovered.¹

The State convention now assembled in Jefferson City on the 22d of July, and, filling its own vacancies, inclusive of the chairmanship which Price had disloyally left, it declared the State offices vacant, abrogated all treasonable bills of the late Legislature, and provided for new elections to be held in the coming November. On the 31st was inaugurated a provisional government whose capital was transferred to St. Louis, Hamilton R. Gamble, a Unionist of moderate views, being chosen provisional Governor by the convention. The Missouri River was now wholly secured to Federal control, together with the more populous portion of the State, including St. Louis, and Missouri's secession became impossible.² But on the sparse and remote frontiers of the State, north and south, a fierce intestine strife was kept up longer, among the distracted inhabitants. Price and Jackson, on their southward flight, rallied recruits to the standard of secession, and near the Arkansas border, with a loosely united force of about six thousand men, of whom one-third were unarmed, effected a junction with Ben McCulloch, the Texas ranger, who, under Davis's commission as a brigadier, was assembling troops in Arkansas to hold that State and the Indian Territory for the Confederacy. Lyon, who had in the meantime left Boonville in pursuit of Missouri's fugitives, hastened with all speed for Springfield, south of the railroad terminus at Rolla, at the head of some seven thousand troops, to confront these combined forces.³

¹ 1 B. & L. 267; Peckham's Lyon, 252; 4 N. & H. 222-224.

² 4 N. & H. c. 11.

³ 4 N. & H. 399; 1 B. & L. 269.

Lyon deserved a new promotion with reinforcements sufficient to finish triumphantly the present campaign. But Bull Run's lesson had not been learned at Washington when a superior was fixed upon of that political type so greatly in favor when the war began. Of all high civilians named high commanders by the government of the Union, none proved so entirely unacceptable as John C. Fremont, and yet none was hailed with more universal acclamation than this pioneer Republican candidate for President, who, in 1856, had polled the votes so handsomely. When the war broke out, Fremont, being then abroad, offered patriotically his services, and something, the administration felt, ought to be done for him. He was talked of for Secretary of War, for the French mission; but a high command in the field was fixed upon as his most appropriate station. Soon after arriving from Europe, he found himself appointed, about the 1st of July, one of the four major-generals of the regular army, ranking, in fact, like ^{July.} McClellan, as secondary to Scott alone. On the 3d was created for him the department of the West, embracing Illinois and the whole region beyond the Mississippi River to the Rocky Mountains, with headquarters at St. Louis. The opportunity was magnificent, the theatre a splendid one, for any general whose genius could have risen to the difficult requirements. But Fremont, unfortunately, had no genius, and such talents and energy as he possessed were greatly overrated. The influence of the Blairs, cast strongly for his selection, augured well for his control of Missouri; his wife, daughter of the great Benton, now deceased, who for thirty years had represented that State in the Senate of the Union, had a family name to conjure with; the governors, too, of the free Northwestern States, who had urged upon the President the appointment of some commander competent to organize and direct the vast resources they were placing at military disposal, welcomed the choice. But Fremont's record was not consulted as carefully as his popularity. Rashness and romance had made him a reputation, rather than the realities of life or solid public service. His remembered energy was that of youthful years

commingled with indiscretion; his past exploits showed individual dash, but no great skill to combine; and though a dramatic figure in the conquest of California, he had manifested in that episode of mature life an immature sensitiveness to affront and a propensity to personal quarrels.

In short, granting freely his patriotism, integrity, and humane sentiment, Fremont was unquestionably destitute of the training or temperament for the immense responsibilities, civil and military, so confidently thrust upon his inexperience. His start in this new command was not auspicious. A lot of firearms which he had purchased for the government while abroad, and brought home with him, were found exorbitant in cost, and so poor when distributed that they could not be used to advantage. Moreover, instead of proceeding at once to his post of duty, where the emergency was highly critical, he lingered about New York City, largely absorbed in personal matters, and did not start for St. Louis until after the battle of Bull Run. When, on July 25th, he at last reached headquarters in Missouri and assumed formal command, the atmosphere of the situation soon dispelled his halo of popularity. Lyon was then far distant and disregarded, Blair was attending the Congress at Washington, and just as Fremont most needed sound counsel he seemed to do his best to exclude it. He was reticent and reserved towards his most distinguished military subordinates; he set up great state at St. Louis, surrounded by sentries and guards, and kept governors and the first citizens dancing attendance for days before granting an audience, at the same time that old civil favorites of doubtful repute found special access to him, some of whom served in confidential positions upon his staff, or under the irregular commissions that he arbitrarily bestowed. The error, extravagance, delay, and waste, almost inseparable from administration in this distant department, where government checks were imperfect, became doubled under such misdirection. Corrupt contractors for horses, forage, clothing, and supplies swarmed about headquarters like hungry locusts, while the general in command, ignorant, and remaining in ignorance, of his most pressing duties, repelled educated advisers of

the regular army familiar with organization and routine, and suffered scandals to be bred from too close intercourse with patronage-mongers and the dividers of prospective profits who wormed themselves into his employ.¹

In military plans Fremont dwelt much upon the distant, but too little upon what was close at hand. He saw himself conducting a conquering campaign down the Mississippi, but the enormous detail of preparatory campaigning he seemed hardly to imagine. Indeed, details vexed him, and the drudgery of economies most of all. Three great military tasks might well have absorbed his earliest attention. First was the lawless guerilla warfare, known as "bushwhacking," which, begun in political dissension throughout Missouri's sparsely settled towns, would degenerate rapidly into family feuds and the bloody reprisals of neighbors. For suppressing outrages of this character in northern Missouri, General John Pope, as Lyon had desired, was employed under wired sanction before Fremont left New York. Next, Cairo was in danger, for the Confederate Pill w had moved a force to New Madrid about the time of Fremont's arrival. This, the strategic key to the Mississippi, was threatened, and Fremont, promptly gathering after his arrival and loading on steamboats the nearest available reënforcements, led them to Cairo's relief,—a demonstration both opportune and salutary.

But while eight regiments went to Pope, and eight more to Prentiss at Cairo, Fremont neglected the third and greatest point of immediate danger,—the safety of Lyon and his dwindling force in southwestern Missouri. Again and again was he urged, before leaving New York, to relieve that critical situation, where a junction of disunion forces was threatened just beyond the Arkansas line. Three special messengers from Lyon awaited Fremont on his arrival at St. Louis, to emphasize the needs and danger. Fremont, if unable to send reënforcements for a fight, might at least have assisted the chief soldier that he superseded to withdraw safely to his railroad base at Rolla. But, though

¹ See 1 Sherman, 223; 4 N. & H. c. 23.

repeatedly warned, he was heedless, and did nothing; he neither recalled nor strengthened in this quarter. Lyon's situation was truly distressing. Over a hundred miles from a railroad base, neither men nor supplies reached him such as he had entreated; his army, ill-clad and nearly barefooted, with pay in arrears, was already reduced in numbers as the terms of his three months' men expired, many of whom, nevertheless, reënlisted in their eagerness to serve him.¹ Fremont was heedless and indifferent to his wants, too much absorbed in other schemes, and he did not, as he should have done, divide his forces and hasten to give Lyon his due share. By the end of July, McCulloch's formidable force, aided by Sterling Price and his Missouri recruits, approached Springfield, and Lyon concluded to go forth and give them battle at Wilson's Creek; for, if he should fall back upon Rolla, his retreat might be turned to a rout. His own troops had now dwindled to about half the combined forces of invasion. As lately happened at Bull Run, each contestant had planned to attack the other; but the Union general in command forced the fighting. The battle

of Wilson's Creek, which took place on the 10th of August.

August, was the bloodiest of engagements thus far in the Civil War, and one of the most unequal, in point of numbers, of them all. With immense odds against him, Lyon fell upon the enemy with great fury, and inspired his men to deeds of almost superhuman daring; but while leading his column in a bayonet charge at the supreme moment, after having been already wounded, he fell from his horse, pierced by a bullet, and expired in an instant. Major Sturgis, on whom the command now devolved, many of his senior officers having been disabled, ordered a retreat, and through the dense undergrowth of woods withdrew to Springfield; from which point, under Siegel, the remnant, unpursued, began falling back upon Rolla and a railroad base the following day.² By Lyon's untimely sacrifice was

¹ 3 W. R. 408, 424; 4 N. & H. 407.

² See 4 N. & H. 411; 3 W. R. 72, 106; 1 B. & L. 289-306. The strength of the opposing forces in battle is estimated: Union, 5400;

lost an officer of extraordinary promise, one whose prolonged life for another year might have been worth to the Union cause an army corps. For grand armies and operations, Lyon was of course never tested, but McClellan himself could not yet show such a fighting record. With growing sphere and opportunity such as his service merited, he would have been, we may fairly believe, the Union counterpart, at least, of Stonewall Jackson. The same celerity of movement, the same fearlessness, was shown; while his intense love of freedom and his country's flag inspired almost to fanaticism all who fought under him. They whom he baffled have generously testified to the respect they felt for him.¹

This battle disaster, and, above all, the death of that brave general to whom loyal Missouri owed the most, turned censure sharply upon Fremont, whose other shortcomings had been noticed. Lyon's complaints were reported to show that his life had been sacrificed through the neglect of his new commander. Turning at last his tardy attention to that remote quarter, Fremont sent reinforcements to Rolla, calling upon the northwestern governors for all the regiments at their disposal, and declaring martial law in St. Louis.² But at the same time he needlessly increased instead of diminishing that factional feeling in Missouri which the government had expected him to soothe. In a proclamation of martial law, which he issued on the 30th of the month, he raised two points for controversy: he announced that "all persons taken with arms in their hands" would be tried by court-martial and summarily shot; and he threatened, moreover, to confiscate the slaves of active enemies of the government, declaring free all such persons held to bondage. The President at once cautioned

Confederate, 10,175, and perhaps more. The Union loss is officially reported, 1235 in killed, wounded, and missing; that of the opposing force, 1095. 1 B. & L. 273, 306. It is observable that, in spite of so great inequality in point of numbers, the Union and Confederate losses were nearly the same.

¹ See 1 B. & L. 273.

² 3 W. R. 437.

his high subordinate, confidentially and not unkindly, that September—any such shooting of civilians must be done sub-October. ject to his own approbation, and that all confiscation must conform to the recent act of Congress.¹ The threat of military emancipation at so early a date must have been like throwing a new firebrand upon flames already difficult to check, and Lincoln, as commander-in-chief, meant to keep that whole vexed policy towards slaveholding States under his immediate control. But Fremont refused to be cautioned on this latter point; and, compelling the President to modify by formal order the objectionable passage of his proclamation, he made himself seem to the country the better philanthropist of the two.² Whether in this he was uninfluenced by political ambition and vanity may be questioned.

While Fremont was intent upon such manifestoes and his far-away campaigns down the Mississippi,³ he suffered Price to sweep unopposed across this turbulent State to the Missouri River. On the 20th of September this adversary captured Lexington, the place from which Lyon had once put him to flight, and compelled a small Union garrison at Fort Mulligan to surrender to his vastly superior force.⁴ Stung by the new disgrace, which precaution might have averted, Fremont now took the field in person and summoned about him a nominal army of about thirty-nine thousand men, under generals who were destined to eclipse him in permanent fame.⁵ His incapacity to organize, his chronic inattention to details, and his utter inexperience for such high command, now grew manifest; and about the 13th of October, while his force assembled all too slowly, the Secretary of War and Adjutant-General reached his camp at Tipton, sent on from Washington to investigate the complaints of extravagance and inefficiency which were already notorious. They found all in confusion, and the complaints

¹ *Supra*, p. 87.

² 4 N. & H. c. 24; 3 W. R. 466-486.

³ See 3 W. R. 478; 1 B. & L. 285.

⁴ 1 B. & L. 307-313; 4 N. & H. 426-428.

⁵ 3 W. R. 184, 185, 504. (September 23d.)

well founded. The means of transportation for so large a force as Fremont sent for were quite inadequate. Soldiers who had been on the march, exposed all night to violent rains, went without food for twenty-four hours, and were then regaled upon beef already spoiled. Divisions were scattered, half organized, not brought within supporting distance. Pope's marching orders found him utterly without supplies and transportation, and he had written to that effect. The highest subordinates under Fremont knew nothing of his plans, not even Hunter, the second in command, having ever been consulted by him; and regular officers of high talent and experience waited for him to reveal what they should undertake. His reserve indicated, in their belief, either vanity or a professional incompetence which he feared to betray. He had not a single Missourian on his staff,—not a man personally acquainted with the topography of the State, or its people, and he was on ill terms with the governor and other loyal civil leaders. He had issued some two hundred irregular commissions; he had made verbal and indirect demands upon the Federal disbursing officers; and corrupt contracts for supplies, in which his clique of adventurers shared, had been awarded without competition, in disregard of the statute and army regulations. Costly barracks were needlessly constructed at St. Louis, costly quarters rented; and even upon the march, erections were more permanent and expensive than any moving army would require. Fremont seemed to competent observers unable to concentrate his attention; his present campaign promised to be barren of results; and by vacillation and mismanagement since his arrival here, he had, in less than three months, almost lost the State he was sent out to confirm in loyalty.¹

With such arraignment added to the multitude of miscellaneous complaints, Fremont's military displacement was inevitable. Before returning east Secretary Cameron issued orders checking the prodigal expenditure of this Western

¹ See Adjutant-General Thomas's Report (October 21st); 3 W. R. 538-545.

department and discharging all officers irregularly commissioned.¹ In consideration of his friends and high character, Fremont himself had been gently dealt with,² and the President despatched an order of recall, not to be delivered if he had personally fought, or was on the eve of fighting, a battle. Fremont was now at Springfield, where Lyon so long awaited his fate; the order was served, Hunter assumed the command, and, much to the President's relief, Fremont showed no sign of disobedience, but retired with becoming grace.³ A few days later the Western department was reorganized; Hunter was assigned elsewhere; while Henry W. Halleck, another regular of high repute, became Fremont's full successor, with a portion of Kentucky annexed to his command.⁴

While Missouri felt a forcible grasp, Kentucky was permitted to test for herself the hollowness of State neutrality in a conflict like the present. President Lincoln, who felt the pulse of every border slave State, to know what treatment it would bear, guided with consummate tact and patience the Union sentiment of his native commonwealth. Lieutenant William Nelson of the navy, a man heroic and of impulsive spirit, aided him in his plans; and Major Anderson, too, the hero of Sumter, whom he sent to Cincinnati in May on a special commission to receive volunteer regiments from Kentucky and western Virginia.⁵ The Kentucky

¹ 3 W. R. 532 (October 14th).

² Lincoln had delicately sent the Postmaster-General to St. Louis, September 9th, to give Fremont some judicious advice. And see Meigs to Francis P. Blair, Jr., August 28th; 3 W. R. 463.

³ 4 N. & H. c. 24; 3 W. R. 555, 560. Cf. Fremont in 1 B. & L. 287, 288.

⁴ 4 N. & H. c. 24. Price, whose soldiery had very little cohesion after the Lexington raid, now retreated towards Arkansas.

⁵ Joshua F. Speed was an intimate friend, of much service at this time; Crittenden threw his own vast influence in the right direction; and Holt, at Washington, Guthrie, Garrett Davis, and others, of this State, assisted. See 4 N. & H. c. 12. The "Union Club" of Louisville rendered important aid. 1 B. & L. 377, 380.

legislature, which was loyal, baffled Magoffin, the governor, in his disloyal purposes. The latter having proclaimed "neutrality" as between the "two sovereignties," placed Simon B. Buckner, a man of Southern sympathies, in charge of the State militia; but the legislature, recognizing a Union "home guard" besides, which Nelson secretly supplied with government muskets, required that militia and home guards should alike swear allegiance to both Kentucky and the United States. That searching test threw out the disloyal, who, with Buckner himself, went south and joined openly the Confederacy.¹ For Kentuckians had too keen a sense of honor to dissemble long their sentiments or perjure themselves.

On the 30th of June Union representatives to Congress were chosen in nine out of ten of Kentucky's districts. At the August State election a new legislature gave to the Union cause a safe two-thirds vote in each branch, for overruling the executive. The new Kentucky legislature assembled at Frankfort on the 2d of September, and by a decisive vote ordered that the stars and stripes should be displayed above the State House. Already were Union troops encamped within the State, and the President refused to remove them on Governor Magoffin's demand.² When, on the other hand, Leonidas Polk,³ who had been operating since July from Memphis with ambitious plans, advanced over the border and took possession of Columbus, excusing this action on military grounds, and offering to withdraw if the Federal forces would do the same, this legislature resolved that Kentucky's neutrality had been grossly violated, and called upon the Union troops and militia to coöperate in expelling him. In vain did Magoffin interpose his veto; the resolutions passed in spite of it, and at the peremptory command of that body he issued his proclamation commanding the Con-

¹ 4 N. & H. c. 12.

² See correspondence (August 19th-24th), 4 N. & H. 242.

³ Polk, a West Pointer by education, but ordained to the Episcopal ministry, was bishop of Louisiana when the war broke out. He resigned and was made a Confederate general.

federate or Tennessee force to withdraw. State neutrality had now been blown to a climax of absurdity, and the bubble burst. Anderson assumed command of the State and national forces, and called upon all true citizens of the Union to repel invasion. At disunion's instance Confederate troops were poured into the State at different points — Polk and Pillow concentrating west, and near the Mississippi, and Zollicoffer guarding the mountain gaps at the east, while Buckner, now serving under his commission from the Davis government, seized Bowling Green, an important strategic point and railway junction near the centre of the State. To command all these western forces of the Confederacy Jefferson Davis sent his favorite general, Albert Sidney Johnston, who made Bowling Green his headquarters.¹

When the hero of Sumter, now promoted to a brigadier, prepared to take formal command in Kentucky, he invited two officers to accompany him who had served in the Bull Run campaign — William T. Sherman and George H. Thomas. Both of these won immortal renown in the Mississippi Valley, with whose operations they were henceforth identified. Thomas, a Virginian true as the steel he wore at his side, was but gradually trusted by Lincoln's administration because so many high officers from his State proved recreant to the Union; Sherman, on the other hand, had political influence, and that of the strongest kind, at his service, but was too much of a soldier to use it. On the 8th of October-
November. October, Anderson, worn, harassed, and quite unequal to the new strain imposed upon him, relinquished this department to Sherman, his next in command; much, however, to the regret of the latter, who had left Washington intending to remain a subordinate. He, too, became vexed in mind over his inadequate strength in men and supplies, and the immense task of organizing, which would hinder all plans for active warfare. When the Secretary of War paid

¹ 4 N. & H. c. 12; Am. Cycl. 1861, 400-407. Breckinridge now joined the Confederates' cause, declaring in a letter that he exchanged with proud satisfaction a term of six years in the United States Senate for the musket of a soldier.

him a flying visit on the return from St. Louis, about the middle of October, Sherman, then in quite a despondent mood, announced no plans, but on being asked how many soldiers he wished, answered in his brusque and hasty way, that he needed sixty thousand at once, and for taking the offensive two hundred thousand. "My God!" exclaimed Cameron, "where do you expect to get them?" The report soon spread at the capital that Sherman was mentally deranged by his responsibilities, and he was sent to St. Louis about the middle of November, to report to General Halleck, Don C. Buell, a more phlegmatic officer and a strong personal friend of McClellan's, succeeding him.¹ But it was not a misconception of this kind that caused Sherman's transfer, so much as his own expressed dislike of the responsibility, his depression of spirits and desire to be relieved from the post. Sherman, when next he soared, rose by the more gradual flight that he wished; his constant preference was to be second, and there fame has finally fixed him. It was not, however, until Shiloh revealed his greatness in the field, that favor came to him again. Racy and frank in expression, warm-hearted, original in the point of view from which events impressed him, impetuous and fond of action, this genuine companion-in-arms has confessed himself deficient in that temper which calmly manages political communities and conceals within a glove the iron hand.

The friendship and the operations fitted to draw out Sherman's best traits of character were happily in store for him among his Missouri surroundings. It was the saving grace of Fremont's unfortunate career at the West that he initiated the brilliant movement on lesser rivers that first clove the Confederacy apart and started upon a conquering progress the obscure officer under whom our Union arms finally triumphed. Yet this was something of an accident. Ulysses S. Grant, born in Ohio in 1822 and four years older than McClellan, had graduated at West Point a moderate

¹ 1 Sherman, 227-242. Cf. 5 N. & H. 65; 4 W. R. 297.

scholar and an excellent horseman. Bearing, like McClellan, a youthful part in the Mexican War, he performed the duties of a regimental quartermaster, and did deeds of gallantry besides. In July, 1854, he resigned from the army with the full rank of captain, to enter upon civil pursuits. But fortune did not continue to befriend him as it did McClellan; and failing to make a living in St. Louis as a real estate agent, Grant, with now a wife and four children, moved to Galena in the spring of 1860, there to share a livelihood with two brothers in carrying on his father's tannery. Fighting poverty in this uncongenial pursuit when Fort Sumter fell, he was brought forward by Galena friends and neighbors as a fellow-townsmen trained to arms; and helping raise the first Galena company for three months, he accompanied it to the State capitol at Springfield, where Governor Yates installed him as a sort of unofficial adviser in military details. The call came presently for three years' men; and Grant, in a modest letter which referred to his army record, tendered his services until the close of the war, hinting that he felt himself capable of commanding a regiment. This application, mailed soberly to the Adjutant-General at Washington by an unknown person, without the slightest effort to attract special influence at a time when the White House and the highest official circles were besieged for commissions, met the usual fate—it was pigeon-holed and forgotten.¹ But Grant had won friends at President Lincoln's old home; and Governor Yates soon made him colonel of a half-mutinous regiment, which needed a firm hand, competitors for that position not being numerous. When ordered to Missouri with his command, Grant quietly declined the cars, and gave his men a lesson in military discipline. Starting them on foot from Springfield, he marched them a fixed distance each day towards the Illinois border, with the camp wagons following, until he had them well seasoned for active

¹ 4 N. & H. c. 16; Yates in Am. Cycl. 1864, 432. Grant took his aspirations to Cincinnati, hoping to see McClellan there, whom he had known in the old army; but he called twice at headquarters and did not find him. Badeau's Grant, 9, 10.

service. It was a unique proceeding, and stamped him at once as a man of uncommon character.¹

To General Pope, a former acquaintance, who commanded in northern Missouri, Grant's regiment was first assigned; and when Fremont, late in August, desired some one detailed for important work in the southeast of the State, with headquarters at Cairo, Grant, for conspicuous merit, was selected.² As further proof of the impression he was quietly making, Illinois influence at Washington caused his promotion to brigadier-general of volunteers, his watchful Congressman and fellow-townsmen, Elihu B. Washburne, proving a steadfast friend, whose zealous service he later requited when President. Foiled in some preliminary operation which Fremont had intended, Grant, with rare intuition, took what proved the initial step of a remarkably successful campaign. Columbus, whose high bluff commanded for miles the Mississippi River, was occupied by Polk's Confederate force, on the 3d of September,³ in a practical invasion of Kentucky. But Grant, who had just transferred his headquarters to Cairo, hurriedly organized an expedition, steamed up the Ohio River to its junction with the Tennessee, and on the 6th occupied Paducah. This was a strategic move which offset the Confederate advantage gained at Columbus, by controlling an interior watercourse; and confidence was given, besides, to the Unionists and legislature of Kentucky.⁴

Grant's industry, good sense, quickness to apprehend, and imperturbable temper, stood him well in his slow emergence from obscurity. The contrast he bore to McClellan in starting a career is remarkable. Fortune's real favorites are often those who suffer at first from her slights, but persevere until she repents or tires of annoying. There was no attractive

¹ 4 N. & H. c. 16. Cf. 1 Grant Mem. 247.

² 3 W. R. 142; 5 N. & H. 44; 1 B. & L. 284.

³ *Supra*, p. 105.

⁴ Grant had telegraphed to St. Louis for permission to make this seizure, and receiving no response, he proceeded on his own responsibility, anticipating the enemy in fact by only a few hours. 1 Grant, c. 19. But cf. Fremont in 1 B. & L. 285.

display about this soldier; sober performance alone spoke for him; of the friends he was making he was hardly aware. Always looking about with his own eyes, and quick to discover what might be achieved within his own immediate province, he accomplished the thing needful without show or bluster. Hence a confidence which grew insensibly, advanced him from one post to another. In his admirable *Memoirs* Grant relates the impression he early received at the theatre of war, that an enemy was as likely to be fearful of his force as he to fear that of the enemy,¹ — a lesson which too many of his present commanders were slow in learning. Grant did not like to idle with his troops, nor to spend months merely in preliminary drill and discipline; he could give raw soldiers an important experience; he was not even disposed to spare the sacrifice of life to gain some desirable object. In vain he asked Fremont's permission to move upon Columbus, just after Paducah had fallen; but when Fremont took the field in person, Grant was ordered to make a feint in that vicinity so as to keep reënforcements from reaching Price's army. Columbus had by that time become strongly fortified; but at Belmont, on the Missouri side of the river, there was a camp of Confederates which Grant concluded to attack, so as to give his men, who were in good spirits, a brush with the enemy. He wanted, as he relates, to do something. His detachment² fought finely, though under fire for the first time; but Confederate succor came from Columbus, so that, surrounded by a superior force, Grant had to cut his way out with his regiments and reëmbark on the transports. Being the last to reach his steamer on the retreat, just as the gang-plank was drawn aboard, his good steed and his daring horsemanship saved him from capture.³

¹ 1 Grant, 250.

² About 2500 men.

³ 1 Grant, 269; 5 N. & H. 112-114; 1 B. & L. 348-357. Belmont battle has been called a barren affair, and Confederates claimed it as a victory; but the losses on each side were fairly balanced, and Grant gained the prime objects he had in view.

SECTION VI.

FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE "TRENT."

The foreign policy of the United States during the Civil War was distinguished by strong leading traits, — patience, good judgment, a forbearance scarcely paralleled, and a faith in the final triumph of government which could not be shaken. The spirit manifested towards other nations was frank, conciliatory, and consistent. The policy was of necessity a defensive one; and, while important treaties were negotiated, the chief immediate gain was in warding off mischief. Persuasion, earnest and constant, was employed to make Europe respect the law of nations and refrain from intermeddling.

When this administration came into power, our European relations were in a pitiable state, and all seemed hastening to ruin. Friends of the Union abroad were lukewarm or divided, while the secret envoys of the new Confederacy¹ pushed clamorously its claims for recognition. Most diplomatic and consular agents sent out under President Lincoln's two predecessors had been remiss in their duties, some secretly favoring the Confederates, others manifesting a lukewarm indifference scarcely less injurious to the national cause.² Radical changes were speedily made in the diplomatic list after Lincoln came into office; and, although most of the leading missions were filled before armed conflict resulted, an admirable accord continued to the end between the administration and its accredited agents. Charles Francis Adams, stamped a statesman in a single Congress, served most capably as minister to England, like his father

¹ *Supra*, p. 62.

² Faulkner, minister to France, and Preston, at Spain, had the insolence, in their official despatches, to warn President Buchanan, with threats, against "coercion of the States," while the former seems to have been treacherous enough to lend his official influence in procuring arms to be used for the Southern cause. 1 Moore, doc. 137; *N. Y. Times*, August 13th, 1861.

and grandfather before him. William L. Dayton of New Jersey, the earliest Republican candidate for Vice-President, did good duty at France until his death at the close of 1864. No American citizen had gained more strongly the personal affection of the Mexican people than Thomas Corwin, the new minister to that Republic, whose eloquence against Mexican dismemberment was not forgotten. Norman P. Judd of Illinois, Lincoln's personal friend, was appointed to Prussia; Henry S. Sanford, to Belgium; Anson Burlingame, to China; and the scholarly George P. Marsh, to Italy. Of Free-soil orators in border slave States, Cassius M. Clay of Kentucky tarried for awhile in Russia, and Carl Schurz of Missouri in Spain; the latter, good citizen above all else in his adopted country, preferring to fight when danger summoned. The veteran Giddings calmly rounded life and his antislavery career as consul-general to Canada; and to various commercial ports consuls were appointed of unquestioning loyalty, ever watchful of the nation's interests.

When President Lincoln organized his Cabinet, he said he should leave foreign affairs largely in the hands of his accomplished Secretary of State, and he did so.¹ Seward's earliest instructions set forth the general principles which our ministers pursued abroad until military emancipation gave to foreign policy a new deflection. The preservation of the Union at all hazards was the key-note of these instructions. The idea of a dissolution, or even of compromise, was not to be entertained for a moment. No foreign arbitrament could be considered in such domestic controversy. To counteract the schemes of the South for Europe's favor and recognition was the chief work to be expected. Yet the duty of generous forbearance was urged, and our representatives were forbidden to indulge in expressions of harshness, or even of impatience, concerning their misguided countrymen.² Our Secretary, without dis-

¹ J. Monroe's Lectures, 234.

² "If the scourge of civil war for the first time in our history must fall upon our country during the term of this administration, that calamity will then have come through the agency, not of the government, but of those who shall have chosen to be its armed, open, and

simulation, brought special arguments besides to bear upon various countries. The commercial advantages likely to result from a continuance of the Union were impressed upon England and France. Spain was reminded that Southern aggrandizement looked to the conquest of Cuba; Italy, that our aspirations for freedom and unity were like hers; Switzerland, that constitutional integrity under a written instrument was an idea inherent in that model they had derived from us. The Dutch colonization of New York was an incentive to Holland's sympathy. Prussia was adjured to remember her early treaty relations; Russia, that she, like ourselves, desired a vast national integrity from ocean to ocean. Corwin's instructions for Mexico made a memorable departure from American aggressive policy towards Spanish-America for the past twenty years.¹

The leading European powers of Europe had motives for not wishing us well. An arrogant and offensive tone had sometimes crept of late years into our diplomatic intercourse with them, and the increasing rivalry in American trade and political power bred jealousy. To monarchies of the Old World and disbelievers in popular government the likelihood that this boastful and boisterous democracy must now fall asunder was not in any sense unwelcome. Apathy appeared among English writers and statesmen where sympathy had been confidently expected; the foulest chimney of the century, said Carlyle, with acrimony, should be allowed to burn out. The cupidity of British commerce was sorely tempted by the prospect of a freer trade. In

irreconcilable enemies; and the President will not suffer himself to doubt that when the value of the imperilled Union shall be brought in that fearful manner home to the business and the bosoms of the American people, they will, with an unanimity that shall vindicate their wisdom and their virtue, rise up and save it." *Dipl. Corr.*, 1861, 159. And see 1 Moore, 193.

¹ "Be just, frank, and magnanimous; in all your negotiations fear not to give strength to that republic; it can never be an enemy, it ought to be made a friend, of the United States." 2 Seward, c. 60.

France, Louis Napoleon, whose imperial strength was waning, had conceived a scheme for regaining popularity by some brilliant stroke on this Western continent in the name of his dynasty and the Latin race. France and England concerted early to act together in all matters pertaining to the American conflict; and both powers held unofficial intercourse with Yancey and the other Southern commissioners, as though believing the United States already virtually sundered into two Confederacies.¹ At the first collision of arms at Sumter their hostile accord was made manifest, for neutrality in the conflict as between two belligerent powers was quickly proclaimed, most probably at Napoleon's instigation. Great Britain on the 14th of

May.

May led off in that announcement, France followed, Spain, and other obsequious European powers, closing in the rear. Contempt for the legitimate sovereignty of a friendly nation could hardly have been shown more positively. They neither waited for official information of hostilities, nor suffered Lincoln's ministers, newly appointed, to reach their posts and explain the acts and intentions of the government. They hastened to accord to the Southern Confederacy the status of a belligerent before it had shown an armed vessel on the ocean or achieved a single victory in open fight. In vain did our administration, through the war that followed, press to have that hasty concession withdrawn, for these two leading powers would not recede until rebellion was subdued by national prowess under that obvious disadvantage.²

¹ 1 Message and docs. 1861-62, 84; 4 N. & H. 208. In March, 1861, Mercier, the French minister to the United States, confidentially advised the Emperor to recognize the Confederacy. Lothrop's Seward, 348.

² When Adams landed in England he found the Queen's proclamation of neutrality just published, evidently to forestall his arrival. He told Lord John Russell frankly in his first official interview that if Great Britain meant to extend the struggle by encouraging the rebels, he had nothing further to do as minister. The latter in reply denied all intention to aid rebellion, but explained that only strict neutrality was meant. 4 N. & H. 269, 276. Recognition, in the final sense of an independent power, of course never came.

Another vexation was suffered by our government in this connection. Secretary Seward sent a circular to the European powers, offering to accede without reserve to the Paris treaty of 1856,¹ by which most of them were already bound. This, among other rules of war, forbade privateering as opposed to the spirit of honorable warfare. The United States, it is true, had declined under President Buchanan to admit that principle, but negotiations over the treaty had not been broken off. Great Britain and France together refused, however, to grant any accession which should take effect on the hostilities then existing; hence Southern privateering received a ready dispensation from the ^{August.} powers that had condemned such international practice as barbarous. It afterwards transpired that these powers in concert had, by secretly approaching the Confederate government on this same subject, arranged through the English consul at Charleston that with freedom to send out privateers the neutral rules of 1856 should be observed by the Confederacy.²

Great Britain and France doubtless believed the American Union permanently disrupted, and their best defence, perhaps, for such hasty recognition, lay in the complexity of our system, which American representatives had made of late with their false dogmas of State right to withdraw the more confusing. For foreigners, indifferent as they usually are, can hardly be expected to comprehend fundamentals over whose meaning native citizens are themselves in controversy. But the course taken by England and France cost each heavily in the end, for they labored together to make their earliest conjecture good. Pride of opinion and supercilious rudeness towards the weak still characterized the English government in its dealings with mankind, nor were rebellious colonies forgiven.³ The enmity to which

¹ Vol. V, 365.

² 4 N. & H. c. 15; Am. Cycl. 1861, 258, 266, 275; 2 Seward, c. 60; Lothrop, 215, 316. The provisional Congress passed furtive resolutions which President Davis drafted, by way of assent to such neutral rules.

³ Dipl. Corr. 1862, 53. This is Minister Adams's indictment:

Americans are always most sensitive is that of the mother country from whom language, laws, and literature are derived. Yet France, or rather the ruler who now managed its concerns in the selfish interests of his ambitious family, formed plans more resolutely hostile to the United States. Masking by friendly professions his purpose to gain by the great Republic's dissolution a strong imperial footing on the North American continent, — a dazzling scheme inherited from the first Napoleon, — he strove to complete that dissolution by combining European powers for his ends. No monarch since 1815 had such aptitude for playing others as his pawns, or employing the serpent's art for sinuous ends; and he studied earnestly to be the Augustus of Europe's modern Cæsars. Ominous news reached our shores by October. A combined English, French, and Spanish naval expedition was fitting out against Mexico with the avowed purpose of making forcible collection of its defaulted debts by jointly occupying Mexican ports on the Gulf, and sequestering the revenues of that Republic.¹

This threatening aspect in Europe, while our attitude as announced was simply to maintain the integrity of the Union, had its brighter relief. Denmark entered into treaty relations, increasing her commercial friendship; Sweden, Italy, and Switzerland were, as anticipated, friendly in their professions. Something, after all, had been learned from the long free-soil struggle that brought this administration into power; and almost instinctively the friends of human rights in the Old World sympathized with it, while those who stood for aristocracy and class privilege sided in preference with the South.² Russia, who now abolished her serf system,

"That Great Britain did, in the most terrible moment of our domestic trial in struggling with a monstrous social evil she had earnestly professed to abhor, coldly and at once assume our inability to master it, and then become the only foreign nation steadily contributing, in every way possible, to verify its prejudgment."

¹ 23 Harper, 834.

² "Never for one moment was the democracy of Europe misled or confused by the Confederate pretensions of reserved rights and constitutional liberty; and no word of cheer ever reached its master-spirits

proved the potent friend of the United States. The Czar Alexander had abiding faith that the Union would triumph; and, declining Napoleon's early invitation to join the league in American affairs, he kept clear of every combination which threatened our permanency. We were not only essential to the world's equilibrium, in his estimation, but a government pledged by geographical position to peculiar friendship.¹

Great Britain's unkind disposition was hardest to bear; and a message from Lord John Russell sent discourteously by Adams's predecessor made Seward so indignant that he drafted a despatch which, though admirable in the main, contained some irritating phrases which the President softened when revising it.² Two minds in full sympathy upon the same subject may judiciously correct one another; and Lincoln here requited the service Seward had rendered him in the inaugural address. Henceforward there was abundant composition to employ each pen apart, uncriticised. These years of civil war were the last that saw European intercourse conducted by written despatches sent at the interval of ocean steamers, for by 1866 the Atlantic cable operated successfully. Seward's marvellous facility in such correspondence is shown by those printed volumes which remain a monument of his industrious direction, and vindicate the cause of his country before the world's tribunal. What wealth of soul do we see poured into these despatches, sympathy with the oppressed of all nations, confidence in the American experiment and in the permanency of institutions founded on the rights of man; what treasures of political and historical wisdom, what vehemence of will. The greatest task which the war imposed upon our Secretary of

from Kossuth, Mazzini, Victor Hugo, Ledru Rollin, Louis Blanc, Garibaldi, or any other of those who had sacrificed personal enjoyment for championing the rights of man." 1 Greeley's Conflict, 500.

¹ 2 Seward 595, 627; Am. Cycl. 1861, 272.

² See 4 N. & H. 269-277, where this incident is enlarged upon.

State, he perfectly performed, through his admirable agencies: namely, to prevent the recognition of Confederate independence by the great powers of Europe, and to restrain them from active intervention, when the temptation to intervene was very powerful. This he mostly effected through earnest, conclusive, and persevering reasoning, by constant vehemence in persuading the great powers to be just. Not an honest consideration, nor an honest argument, which might influence in his government's favor the nation addressed did he neglect, and in varied modes of acute, subtle, and ingenious reasoning he persisted from week to month, and from month to year, until the point was gained. In vain will criticism search the written record for baseness or despair. To encourage representatives abroad, and keep them sanguine like himself, and proof against damaging reports from false sources, he would send out with his official despatches a sort of diary or epitome of war events to be read and circulated.¹ In short, for the work of the State department at that particular time, Seward was the ideal Secretary. Few had filled that office among his illustrious predecessors, content that it should remain his last and crowning service.

Not the least admirable qualification of Seward for his post was his sublime faith in American institutions through trial and tribulation. Despite the ridicule that attached to his "ninety days" prophecy — which, we may remark, was largely due to a misconception of what he really predicted — Seward's cheerful optimism in these years of depression was a fortunate habit of mind for himself and his country. For, granting that the military endurance of the South might have been underrated, absolute faith in an ultimate success could alone have brought to the Union ultimate victory. It will always prove wise statesmanship in time of public peril to lead the people on from hope to hope. During these weary years of strife Seward never sent abroad a disheartening despatch; and, convinced that victories would carry their

¹ 2 Seward, 604.

own reassurance, his faith was expressed most strongly when clouds hung the darkest.¹

But Seward's mind was uneasy from the time he first learned through Russia that France and England had agreed to act jointly in all matters pertaining to this war, including the recognition of the Confederate States.² This, to use his words, was a "most portentous incident"; for the influence that the united wills of these two great maritime powers carried in the councils of other European countries was immense. To make their impression still stronger, the French and British ministers at Washington sought early to procure a joint audience at the State de-
June.
partment, conformably to their instructions; but that indignity to his government the Secretary would not permit, and the experiment was not repeated.³

The Emperor of France was the managing partner in this sinister alliance. By October he would have pressed the United States to make terms with the South, but
July-
Lord Palmerston objected.⁴ Each power wished to
October.
break the Southern blockade, but they could not unite in measures for disregarding it. A "cotton famine" ensued; British textile factories had to reduce hours, and thousands of operatives were thrown out of work.

Social influences at the chief centres, Paris and London, were against the Union cause, and the press of those two capitals abounded in attacks upon President Lincoln's administration. To offset somewhat these disadvantages,

¹ His son furnishes the key to his character in this respect: faith in the right is always a duty; the Union can and shall be preserved, and to betray apprehension would be to betray the Union. 2 Seward, 556.

² Probably most of the negotiations between England and France on this subject were oral. 2 E. B. Washburne's Recollections, 46. The first news came from St. Petersburg, and Dallas, the returning minister, brought the confirmation from Lord John Russell. Am. Cycl. 1861, 272.

³ 2 Seward, 581, relates how Seward, with affable demeanor, frustrated the attempt.

⁴ Lothrop's Seward, 348. Lord John Russell (promoted to the peerage as "Earl" in July) inclined to the Emperor's policy on that occasion.

and produce a better foreign opinion in favor of his government, Seward began sending abroad private citizens of experience and ability, whose duty it should be to communicate with the metropolitan press, respond to Confederate statements of injurious tendency, seek interviews with the French and English legislators and leading men of influence, and be instant at all times to set right the Union cause in all intelligent circles of influence. Such agents, untrammelled by the rules of etiquette which hampered ministers and consuls, might supplement the routine labors of diplomacy. Thurlow Weed, the veteran journalist and politician, was sent thus to traverse France and Great Britain; Archbishop Hughes to plead with the Romanists in Paris; and Bishop McIlvaine to visit prelates of the English church. A marked change in public opinion abroad was the result of their activities.¹ Such coöperation on their part was highly desirable, for the Confederate representatives, not having been officially received, had skilfully exerted their own opportunities in this unofficial manner. Yancey and his fellow-commissioners pushed Southern interests wherever they might with talent, tact, and plausibility. They promised all that the cupidity of foreign merchants could suggest, — cotton and free trade, treaties on the most favored footing, — if only their independence were favored. In their candor they professed themselves willing to submit the whole dispute between North and South to the Emperor Napoleon. They had even the effrontery to assure Lord John Russell on the 4th of May, that slavery was not the real cause of their secession, but the high tariff which Northern Republicans forced upon their section.²

Seward accepted, during these early months of the war, the ungracious task of checking spies and sympathizers who were rendering to the insurgents aid and comfort. He instituted a rigid system of passports, requiring proof of nationality from all foreigners; he placed the telegraph

¹ 3 Seward, c. 1.

² Monroe's Lectures, 224. That tariff did not pass Congress, as a matter of fact, until after the Southern Confederacy was formed.

offices under government supervision, stopped the sending of supplies through the lines, registered political arrests under the President's suspension of *habeas corpus*, and sustained the civil arm of the government in coöperation with the military. Complaints were vehement against him, yet after all the oppression was what the exigency called for, and in all respects Seward acted with honest intent and as the chief executive had directed. No nation ever dealt so leniently with its spies and conspirators at such a crisis.¹

By the middle of autumn the pressure of hostile interests and ambition upon the courts of London and Paris brought joint intervention very close. The ill success of the Union arms through all these months weakened the national cause abroad. And now an exciting incident disclosed, while domestic strife was discouraging, the deeper and darker abyss of foreign war.²

The Confederate States had lately sent two new envoys to renew more imposingly the application for full recognition which Yancey and his associates had failed November-December. to procure. These were James M. Mason, of Virginia, sent to England, and John Slidell, of Louisiana, to France; both former Senators of the United States, and men of ability and standing. Reaching Cuba secretly, these envoys took passage with their families at Havana, November 7th, on the British mail-steamer *Trent*. Captain Charles Wilkes of the *San Jacinto*, a war-steamer of the United States, intercepted this vessel on the following day, and, having brought her to by firing a shell across her bows, sent aboard an officer to demand the envoys from among her passengers. There was confusion on board the *Trent*; but, after a search, made against angry remonstrance, Mason and Slidell with their secretaries were arrested, and Wilkes steamed away with his prisoners, leaving the *Trent* to

¹ 2 Seward, 572, 608; Lothrop's Seward, 356, 357.

² See circular of warning sent to the governors of seaboard States, 24 Harper, 114.

pursue her voyage. The Northern heart bounded with exultation over this exploit, which seemed like redress for British unfriendliness. The press gave free rein to enthusiasm. Wilkes with his officers received a banquet in Boston, to whose port Mason and Slidell had been conveyed, and the Secretary of the Navy wrote him a letter of emphatic approval. Furthermore, as soon as Congress could reassemble in December, the House passed a resolution of thanks with unanimity. In short, the first spontaneous impulse of our people, rash and fond of rashness, was for sustaining, regardless of consequences, this violence visited upon a British neutral vessel.¹

But if ever silence on the part of an administration was golden, it was golden at this hour. Most of Lincoln's Cabinet had been carried away by their feelings responsive to the general sentiment, but the President himself maintained reserve, while his premier at once perceived the dangerous complication that might grow out of the occurrence.² With consummate wisdom they left popular tumult to spend its first force before disclosing that there might be another side to the question. Nothing was said or done to commit the government, but Mason and Slidell were kept in custody at Fort Warren pending a decision as to what should be done with them. Seward promptly informed Minister Adams at London that Captain Wilkes had acted without the instructions or knowledge of his government, which waited accordingly to hear what Great Britain might have to say on the subject.³ British opinion, as borne over the ocean, was as quick to resent as American had been to uphold the aggression; and later it proved that France agreed to sustain her insular neighbor in demanding reparation.⁴ The cannon of these joint powers were loaded and primed for war and intervention. Simultaneously with formulating a demand for the release of Mason and Slidell the English ministry despatched troops and ships to Canada. Queen

¹ 5 N. & H. c. 2; Lothrop's Seward, c. 18.

² See 5 N. & H. 25, 26; 3 Seward, c. 1.

³ Dipl. Corr. 1861 (November 27); 5 N. & H. c. 2.

⁴ 3 Seward, 34.

Victoria was personally considerate of the United States at this crisis, and Prince Albert with her assent so smoothed Lord Palmerston's despatch to our government as to change its first phraseology of menace into a bland and temperate expression.¹ When Seward's disclaimer of authority for the arrest reached London the situation was relieved of its worst strain, and Earl Russell at the last moment permitted the demand of his government to be presented with a delicacy not at first intended.²

Yet the demand was, after all, a stern one, as Lord Lyons, the minister at Washington, made it in due form on the 23d of December; for without offering to discuss the legal aspects of the case, it positively required that Mason and Slidell and their two secretaries be delivered to him for British protection, failing which action in three days, as the dates now stood, he should close his legation and return to London.³ Receiving three days earlier, as the permitted grace, a copy of this despatch for informal perusal, the Secretary shut himself up in his inner office and prepared a reply. The whole framing of America's response had been left to his ingenuity and judgment, neither the President nor any member of the Cabinet having yet reached a final decision. The Cabinet met on Christmas day and again on the 26th. Seward read a draft of his despatch and stated reasons why the prisoners should be surrendered; there were some expressions of regret that the step was necessary, but the Secretary's views and his argument were adopted by a heartily unanimous vote.⁴ Seward's very able despatch

¹ This good office of Prince Albert's proved the last official act of his life; for the sleepless anxiety which this collision caused him aggravated the illness from which he died on the 14th of December. 5 Martin, 420-422; 5 N. & H. c. 22.

² 5 N. & H. 30; British Blue Book, 49 (November 30); 2 Seward, 23.

³ *Ib.*

⁴ There can be no doubt that Seward comprehended from the outset the danger of Wilkes's act. See Lothrop's Seward, c. 18; also 3 Seward, c. 2; 5 N. & H. 31, 35, citing Seward's letter to Weed, January 22, 1862. The narrative in 5 N. & H. c. 2 seems strained to discover in the President a directing influence and then justly concedes that he exercised none.

stated the determination of our government with forbearance, and, moreover, with what was quite as desirable, the disposition to shield his government from blame. The force of a precedent depends not upon the strain of argument, but upon the decision. The case was a novel one in international law, though contraband precedents bearing on the issue had been earlier discussed. Seward contended wisely that the hostile ministers and their despatches were contraband of war, thus rendering their capture proper, had only the *Trent* been brought into port as prize to await judicial procedure and sentence. And thus, while yielding to Great Britain's just demands, he based his reasoning upon domestic public sentiment, and pleased his countrymen; he soothed the feelings of Wilkes himself, who, in performing a courageous act, had, from the first, admitted a possible informality;¹ moreover, as it proved, his views coincided very closely with those expressed by the British crown lawyers.² Some jurists contend to-day that hostile ministers to a neutral country cannot be rightfully deemed contraband at all, nor extracted from a neutral vessel on the high seas by any process; this opinion, which has Earl Russell's later support, finds no real precedent for its sanction. But the present case establishes clearly, for international law, that no naval officer can seize or select from among passengers on a neutral vessel at his arbitrary will; and our Secretary, while gently extricating his people from a false position, gained half the moral victory by holding Great Britain to renounce forever her earlier claims to impressment and the right to search. "If I decide this case in favor of my own government," wrote Seward, in announcing that the prisoners were liberated, "I must disavow its most cherished principles, and reverse and forever abandon its essential policy. The country cannot afford the sacrifice."³

¹ Navy report, cited 5 N. & H. 24.

² 5 N. & H. 39 n.

³ Dipl. Corr. 1861, 425, etc.; 3 Seward, c. 4; 5 N. & H. c. 2; 2 B. & L. 135-142. The Southern press was gloomy over this surrender, and the *Richmond Examiner* proposed "dying in the last ditch."
⁴ Moore, 2. Friends of the Confederacy had looked upon this compli-

The four prisoners of State at Fort Warren were given, therefore, to the custody of the British minister; the war-clouds rolled away, and the incident closed amicably. To Seward belongs the chief praise of piloting through these perilous rapids. We give the laurel crown to him who wins a war, but he, too, deserves an equal meed who prevents one. The sober second thought of American people, that safeguard of public stability, sustained the administration in its course. Europe, so far from concluding such action as a weak surrender, accepted it as the strongest proof of a cool and calm direction. In Great Britain and France a sentiment reacted temporarily in our favor. The Southern envoys proceeded crestfallen to their unofficial posts, doomed to failure by the publicity of their credentials. Recognition of Confederate independence was postponed, and that issue never loomed so portentously close again. As for America, convincing proof was given that self-control, that most difficult lesson in the art of self-government, had been learned.

Great Britain, notwithstanding her other annoyances, had done well in withstanding the repeated efforts of the French Emperor to break this blockade of the Southern coast by joint endeavor.¹ As the work of Union squadrons became more stringent and effective for closing these harbors, the agents of the Confederacy redoubled their energy in blockade-running enterprises for information and supplies. Havana, Nassau, and various towns on the Canadian frontier became favorite points for Southern gathering and consultation. Southern privateers ravaged the seas already, being mostly vessels of light draft, fit for running into inlets where ships of war could not pursue. Out of international friendship, most European powers consented to discountenance privateering in pursuance of their previous policy defined

cation as a special dispensation, and their faction in Congress under Vallandigham's lead, tried to force a war with Great Britain by resolves which eagerly upheld Wilkes in his seizure.

¹ 3 Seward, 32.

by the treaty of Paris. Great Britain alone was dogged in discourtesy, for France was polite and politic, whatever might be the machinations. Every naval and commercial power, except England, practically excluded Southern privateers from port, except in distress, or for a visit not over twenty-four hours,¹ but the Palmerston ministry connived presently at an evasion by which such vessels ceased strictly to be "privateers" by receiving commissions from Jefferson Davis as regular war-vessels of the Confederacy. Such a discrimination might have accorded with England's grant of belligerency to the Davis government, which was a grievance in itself; but from the Union point of view there was no such rightful government at all, but an unlawful combination against the legitimate exercise of national authority. Hence our government, while pressing assiduously for the withdrawal of such belligerent rights, maintained consistently in official correspondence that these Southern armed vessels were but privateers or pirates still, — a bastard navy.² They skulked the seas as so-called privateers had done, to rob and plunder Northern merchant vessels, not to meet the naval cruisers of the United States in open and honorable fight. The policy thus pursued drew Great Britain gradually into a sort of freebooting partnership with the South, quite unique, which, in the end, cost her government a heavy reckoning.³ We are soon, however, to see Great Britain and France dividing in hostile purposes towards the United States, each pursuing dangerous projects which the other disliked.

The State department, during Lincoln's administration, occupied that primitive brick building, half a century old,

¹ 1 Moore, 91, 337.

² 2 Seward c. 66.

³ 24 Harper, 696. Even in this calmer moment (January, 1862), when Mason and Slidell were peacefully landed in England, a circular issued which forbade one belligerent vessel from following another from a British port for twenty-four hours, and the Confederate steamer *Nashville*, which had been watched at Southampton by a naval vessel of the Union, got to sea and eluded pursuit.

at the corner of Pennsylvania Avenue and Fifteenth Street, which soon after the war gave place to a granite extension of the Treasury. Books and archives cramped by this time the working space, the public records piling rapidly year by year. Two chief rooms, fronting northeast on the second floor, served the Secretary's personal use for study and reception, while across the hall were his confidential subordinates. The working force of this State department was small, consisting of thirty or forty clerks and messengers, many of whom had grown hoary in the service, and were experts in official information. The capable chief clerk, whose service had begun thirty years before the war, was authority in all matters of diplomatic ceremonial; while other assistants were posted in the routine methods of former Secretaries such as Webster, Van Buren, Everett, and Marcy. The tone of high breeding and confidential reserve traditional in this privileged of executive departments, Seward had no wish to disturb; it was needful, of course, to weed out disunion sympathizers and talebearers; but otherwise he kept most men in place as he found them. At a time when party pressure was strongest for office and each new Secretary was beset with influence, he made a rule for promotion by merit, from a temporary to a regular force of clerks, which worked so admirably that his five next successors followed it. During the whole eight arduous years of Seward's Cabinet service, as his son and assistant Secretary relates, no department duty was ever neglected, no paper ever lost, no State secret ever betrayed; and yet the average work transacted was far beyond that of previous years.¹

Sixty years of age before he had been three months in office, our Secretary kept himself vigorous for the immense task by fixed and regular habits. If up at sunrise, he retired long before midnight, procuring regularly eight full hours of daily sleep, as should every brain worker who has passed his physical prime. Buoyant and cheerful, moreover, in disposition, he would strive to divert the channel

¹ 2 Seward, 634; *ib.* cs. 55, 67.

of his thoughts from the anxieties of public station when the day's work was over. The worst of military disasters rarely cost him a sleepless night. Sound mind aids a sound constitution, and for all minor ailments nothing he thought was so good as "sleep and starvation" to bring the body to its normal tone.¹ Of abstemious habits, he yet enjoyed his cigar and a social glass of wine; and he kept a trained cook and an excellent table, holding himself free to invite a guest to dinner, any day, as chance might direct; and thus, in genial intercourse, would he cement friendship with some visitor from a distance or smooth out a public transaction. He was a pleasant host, affable and unaffected; ready to give to distinguished guests their full share of conversation, but otherwise inclining to sententious monologue, lit up with story and incident. Having an easy fortune at command, he made it a rule to expend his public salary in entertainment. But his tastes were strongly domestic. To his wife, whose shrinking and sensitive disposition kept her much secluded, he revealed his inner thoughts and wishes; her death in the summer of 1865, after a close companionship of forty years, was a lasting tribulation; and when, still later, his only daughter followed her to the grave, he adopted that daughter's intimate friend, and won her filial devotion to him for the rest of his life. His son shared with his own family the substantial mansion at the capital.² At the State department, across the avenue, Secretary Seward drafted his more important correspondence with his own hand, leaving other details, by a pencilled direction, to his assistants. He dealt systematically with his crowd of visitors; and of all who had mingled much in Washington society before the war broke out, few of North or South needed an introduction to one so long and widely known

¹ 2 Seward, c. 65.

² An ample and square-set brick house, with entrance door in the centre, across Pennsylvania Avenue from the State department, and fronting Lafayette Square. This mansion, which Secretary Blaine occupied many years after, was torn down recently and replaced by an opera house.

that his early title "Governor" clung to him as long as he lived.¹

Seward was of medium height, and had a compactly knit figure, inclining to corpulence. With a resolute chin and mouth, a nose like the beak of a hawk, laughing gray eyes such as do not betray the inner thought too quickly, ambushed under heavy eyebrows, his whole head was well fitted for a medallion profile. In speech and bearing he was genial and urbane, attracting the young strongly, and repelling no one; for, as Lincoln used to say of him, Seward was "a man without gall."² It is true that he made bitter and even virulent political enemies, for with keen insight he could penetrate and secretly baffle the designs of foes, and in political craft and ingenious mystery he was not wanting. But his public aims were lofty and noble, and he was steadfast through life to the great principles which he represented. His command of temper was so perfect, that when hated and feared by slaveholders for his influence he never provoked a challenge, nor in the stormy debates of the Senate once uttered an unparliamentary word. Personally, indeed, fair-minded men, of whatever section, reciprocated his courtesy; and while jealousy prompted some of his party associates to write or speak ill of him, not an unkind word did he manifest in return, but to all he accorded full credit for their patriotism. He served President Lincoln to the end with constancy and entire faith.³ Tactful as Lincoln was, at all times, with consummate policy, to propitiate all the varied elements which combined in his support, he gave his chief confidence among immediate counsellors to his Secretary of State. Both were old Whigs, who had stood together when sectional lines could not separate the members of one American household; both, though on freedom's side, were conservative in action, experienced party leaders of populous States whose sentiment on the slavery question advanced but gradually. Events showed that

¹ 2 Seward, c. 65.

² 6 N. & H. 262.

³ "He is the best of us," he wrote to his wife of Lincoln. 2 Seward, 590. "His magnanimity is almost superhuman." Ib. 575.

towards Southern brethren when vanquished, each wished a magnanimous course, and was content to take for revolution the best attainable; nor was their common faith wholly misplaced that, sooner or later, the wandering would in time return. Happily for Seward, he now looked up with trust to him who, of all men, was best fitted for the gigantic work of preserving the Republic; and dismissing at once and forever all envious aspirations, he shunned no danger and shrank from no responsibility in sustaining the people's President.¹

SECTION VII.

THE FIRST WINTER'S OPERATIONS.

We have seen the young hero of western Virginia² summoned to Washington, just after the flight from Bull Run, to restore the morale of our Potomac Army and reorganize it on a more comprehensive basis for the long conflict now seen to be inevitable. McClellan obeyed his orders with expedition; and leaving his mountain campaign for Rosecrans to finish, he reached the nation's capital on July. the 26th of July, there to assume command on the following day.³

The spontaneous confidence which now went strongly out to McClellan foreboded a new military illusion. His reputation and high character, enhanced by his preparatory work in Ohio and the victories he had just achieved, fairly justified his present choice; and in this instance, at least, a

¹ See 3 Seward, 50, where (1862) he peremptorily forbade his friends to consider him a possible candidate for President again, and declared that the salvation of the country was the only political object left to him. "If it [the Union] shall be saved, as I believe it will, I do not fear that any zeal in that great achievement will be overlooked by the grateful generations to come after me. If, on the other hand, it shall be lost, he who shall study the causes of the great ruin shall not find, among them, any want of self-sacrifice on my part."

² *Supra*, p. 85.

³ See 5 W. R. 11; 4 N. & H. 440.

professional soldier was put forward. Yet there was ground for caution. Those previous victories had been magnified in importance; the victor himself was but thirty-four years old; nor, after all, had McClellan's practical experience of war equalled his theoretical preparation. Railroad management requires superior business aptitude and an organizing mind, but no great strategy or heroism. McClellan was preëminently fit for the immediate task of putting an immense army into shape, but beyond that he had yet to learn and be tested. His personal attractiveness was very great, and heightened, perhaps, by the rank and influence he had come to possess; his manners were engaging, he inspired affection to a remarkable degree, and glowed with patriotic ardor. All through the loyal States, the handsome picture of the people's preserver adorned houses, high or humble, and his past victories were only less wonderful in rumor than those next expected to come.

We know now, not from hostile testimony, but from McClellan's own confidential letters written while credulous expectation stood thus on tiptoe, that a really estimable young patriot and officer was at once in danger of being spoilt by the attentions lavished upon him. Amazement possessed him as he found President, Cabinet, General-in-Chief, Senators and all, deferring to and overwhelming him with compliments. "By some strange operation of magic I seem to have become the power of the land." But a corresponding sense of self-importance soon developed. "All tell me," he writes, "that I am held responsible for the fate of the nation, and that all its resources shall be placed at my disposal. It is an immense task that I have on my hands, but I believe I can accomplish it." "I would cheerfully take the dictatorship and agree to lay down my life when the country is saved."¹ Such vanity might be amiably indulged, but for two errors of conduct into which it soon led him. First, he wished to grasp firmly and at once the whole inheritance of military power; Scott, therefore, with his age and transcendent service, was to be got rid of.

¹ McClellan's Own Story, 82, etc.

Next, his politics had been of the conservative cast; hence the President and his counsellors of free-soil antecedents he disliked and foolishly disdained. It is painful to see this young subordinate, whose path of distinction lay wide open, speeding into the background the illustrious Scott, and starting a quarrel with that veteran hero by little discourtesies and inattentions. Nor is it creditable to his discretion that he should have conceived so airy a contempt for Lincoln, as these letters indicate; for the President, with all his awkward admiration, felt, we may believe, that he held this new paragon in the hollow of his hand, and studied him carefully. Indeed, McClellan's petulance towards the able civilians in power was almost childish. "I am becoming daily more disgusted with this administration — perfectly sick of it." "It is sickening in the extreme, and makes me feel heavy in heart, when I see the weakness and unfitness of the poor beings who control the destinies of this great country."¹ McClellan himself in maturer life felt some consciousness of present indiscretion. "It would probably have been better for me personally," he confessed, "had my promotion been delayed a year or more."²

For industrious and systematic preparation, however, McClellan was highly capable. He was a grand organizer and drill-master. Though disposed to belittle what had been done already, he developed strong defensive works about the capital, protecting its entire circumference.³ He appointed an efficient provost-marshal, and made stragglers and deserters return to duty; sending the wounded to hospitals, and replacing with new equipage and supplies all that had been lost on the road to Manassas. Backed with energy by Congress and the governors of loyal States, whose three-years' regiments now poured in, McClellan, with a competent staff, assigned raw troops to brigades, to be well drilled and

¹ McClellan, 84, 152, 169, which shows other impatient expressions against "these incapables," the "pestering Senators," etc. "There are some of the greatest geese in the cabinet I have ever seen," he wrote in October; "enough to tax the patience of Job."

² McClellan, 56.

³ *Ib.* 73.

disciplined before they were sent across the Potomac. For the comfortable supply of his grand army he was so sedulous as greatly endeared him to the common soldiers, though besides this he was their first love. The three-months' militia, with officers elected under State laws, were now gone. State volunteer regiments came, under State officers specially commissioned; but as all Union generals in the field held by national appointment, McClellan found full scope and influence in promoting from among devoted friends and adherents. From such he chose discreetly, favoring young men bred to arms like himself, but attaching all to his person. It was not strange that so splendid a host, recreated through his skill and immediate vigilance, should soon have idolized him. This famous "Army of the Potomac" was in point of fact McClellan's army, before it had met the enemy or fought a battle, needing most, like its leader, that rough experience that spares polish for momentum. A man of muscular strength, thick-throated, and powerfully formed, though rather below the medium height, with broad chest and shoulders, a well-set head, auburn hair, and a prepossessing face adorned with military mustache, "Little Mac," as his men would call him, had the gift of magnetism. As he rode assiduously from camp to camp, sitting well in the saddle, and accompanied by a brilliant and admiring staff, all in untarnished uniforms, his alert and gallant bearing inspired a devotion to him which won his generous sympathy in return.¹

But all this, though admirable of itself for a beginning, was not stern war; and Sherman, who watched the new commander for a month before being sent west, thought McClellan kept his headquarters at Washington too long, and should have encamped across the river.² McClellan's moods varied as he studied the huge machine which grew to his hand. At first, projecting a bold advance, "I shall carry this thing on *en grand*," he wrote home, "and crush the rebels in one campaign." But that sanguine confidence did not last long, and

¹ See 4 N. & H. c. 25; 2 Russell, 268; McClell. 172; 5 W. R. 10, 12

² 1 Sherman, 219.

a morbid dread soon seized him that the enemy, whose comparative strength he forever exaggerated, would overwhelm him by another machine much huger. By the end of August that dread subsided. He felt himself ready to repel, and a week later talked of taking the aggressive; but the habit now gained upon him of accumulating preparations, so as to make doubly sure. October came, and though the capital was safe, he felt there was "an infinite deal" to do before he could go forward. By that time, too, the tone of his letters grew despondent once more. The press, for three months subdued in tone, began to be clamorous for action. Their abuse he could pass by with contempt; but the "wretched politicians" made him ready "to quit the whole concern" except for the sacrifice he owed his country.¹ Yet all the while his daily aggregates were running up like a table of railway earnings, while the enemy's effective strength, not nearly half his own, he constantly figured as greater. Whatever was choice, moreover, in troops, officers, or supplies, he jealously exacted for his pet command. In a plan of campaign which he laid before the President western operations were slighted; and while scanty detachments might suffice—so he thought—to conquer the Mississippi Valley, he asked for his own army, which was to do the real work, 273,000 men.² His haughtiness towards the authorities increased. In a peremptory tone he forbade Secretary Cameron to issue orders respecting his command without first consulting him;³ and still more pointedly he made issue with the President, and administered a rebuke, which Lincoln accepted good-naturedly, as also some supercilious slights of another sort.⁴

¹ McClellan, 82-85, 168-170.

² 5 W. R. 7; 4 N. & H. 448.

³ 5 W. R. 588.

⁴ 6 W. R. 179. See what McClellan, 177, writes about his "dodging all enemies" in the shape of "browsing Presidents," etc. Nicolay relates that the President, on one occasion where a conference at the White House was frustrated by him, said, "Never mind. I will hold McClellan's horse if he will only bring us success." 4 N. & H. 469, note.

Congress had already paved the way for Scott to retire with dignity, as he doubtless meant to do after initiating his junior in the preliminaries. The foibles of age should not be hastily weighed against immeasurable service and supreme rank. But after a needless goad, in the course of which McClellan called Senators he despised to support him, the lieutenant-general asked, on the last day of October, to be placed on the retired list; and with great compliment and ceremony, as was befitting, the President and Cabinet waited upon Scott in person and granted his wish.¹ McClellan, on the 1st of November, reached the plenitude of his military power in succeeding to the supreme command of the armies of the United States. He had pushed this rupture with Scott on the plea that the latter obstructed a forward movement,—that while he wished for action, Scott wanted inaction.² But now, with the operations of the whole Union in his personal grasp, he showed himself more reluctant for exploit than ever.

A serious experience had already occurred, which did not, however, hinder that premature promotion. In splendid weather, and with the Virginia roads in the best condition for an offensive, McClellan ordered a demonstration during October, intending to force the enemy to evacuate Leesburg, but planning no definite fight. General Charles P. Stone, misunderstanding the design, sent troops October. from across the Potomac in force, and at Ball's Bluff on the 21st an engagement ensued which, with retreat cut off, cost the sacrifice of some young Massachusetts officers highly connected, and of Colonel Baker, the eloquent Oregon Senator who had taken part at Lincoln's inauguration,³ and was now serving under a commission.⁴ Stone was made the

¹ "The people call upon me to save the country. I must save it, and cannot respect anything that is in the way." 4 N. & H. c. 25; 24 W. R. 114; McClellan, 83, 85, 171, etc. McClellan now issued an order of swelling praise for the retiring commander, but in private he expressed his relief at having the vast responsibilities of war under his own control.

² McClellan, 170.

³ *Supra*, p. 6.

⁴ 4 N. & H. c. 25; 5 W. R. 290; McClellan, c. 11; 2 B. & L. 123-134.

scapegoat for this unfortunate affair, and our Government dealt harshly with him. McClellan's huge mechanism had worked badly. He took no blame to himself, but the ill-success of that distant operation confirmed him in the wish to procrastinate and prepare further.¹

The golden weeks rolled by; the people and press began to grow restless and fault-finding at this costly inactivity, all the more critical of Ball's Bluff inasmuch as McClellan gave them no other incident to divert attention. Public men of influence began to lose faith in one whose political antipathy promised already a hindrance to his usefulness unless he could win a battle. Meantime the Treasury was in narrow straits, and so barren a campaign increased the imminence of foreign intervention. But McClellan stubbornly announced his purpose not to move until he was ready, and the President kept him in countenance. All was quiet on the Potomac. The daily reports piled up the aggregate of those present for duty. On the 20th of November was exhibited a grand review on Munson's Hill.

November. Fifty thousand men were drawn in line on an undulating plain, and the President, accompanied by McClellan and McDowell and a brilliant cavalcade, rode up and down the open ranks cheered to the echo. No such military display had ever before been witnessed on this continent; no single array of soldiery so enormous in numbers. But that magnificent spectacle betokened no marching orders, no advance to battle; on the contrary, drill, inspection, and the routine of camp life continued as before, new recruits and new equipments being constantly added. Men burnished guns and scoured their brass buttons for the daily guard-mounting and dress-parade. Harassed at length by incessant industry in polishing up these preliminaries, McClellan fell ill; and as all military direction centred in his person,

¹ The Count of Paris, who now served on McClellan's military staff, thinks that from the date of Ball's Bluff "a fatal hesitation" took possession of him, so that if he did not at once decide to postpone to the spring, his conduct of affairs soon left him no alternative, when he ought, on the contrary, to have taken the promptest offensive action. 2 B. & L. 114.

with his father-in-law for chief of staff, the Army of the Potomac waited weeks for his recovery, like a clock that had run down with no one to wind it up again.¹

Some important naval expeditions were successfully fitted out during this dilatory season, to strike at ports on the Southern coast. McClellan gave some directions regarding them, but they were prepared in pursuance of plans studied at the Navy Department, and approved by General Scott.² Hatteras and Port Royal on the Carolina coast were the more immediate captures of the winter; and the most important of all, that of New Orleans in early spring, will demand our notice later. The effectiveness of our Southern blockade had increased as the months went on, and though the coast line to be guarded was very long, the important harbors along so sandy a coast were few. One of the strongest conditions favoring the North in this struggle lay in its superior marine experience. Scattered over the globe as the naval vessels of the nation had purposely been before Lincoln came into office, there was little of a fleet at hand to make blockade effective when first declared; nor were those splendid men-of-war of which our navy then chiefly consisted suitable for such a purpose. But while Seward's vigorous despatches deterred European interference, Secretary Welles made urgent haste, seconded by his accomplished assistant, Fox,³ and a strong Union navy was soon rebuilt after the latest appropriate pattern. Northern merchant steamers of every description fit to carry a gun were purchased or chartered; and new gunboats, with steam motive power, were turned out rapidly for the Government at public and private shipyards.

The South, on the other hand, had very little of a navy or of nautical knowledge in comparison, and the opportunity to build or appropriate vessels was not great. Competent

¹ 4 N. & H. c. 25; 2 B. & L. 112-122; McClellan, 197.

² 1 B. & L. 671-673; 5 N. & H. c. 1.

³ *Supra*, p. 12. Fox was made Assistant Secretary.

men, to be sure, from every part of the Union, had been trained to the naval service, and of such officers secession took its share; but seamen and materials were little at command.¹ They who follow the sea, living on deck with streaming colors at the masthead, gain a certain pride in the flag and sovereign documents of isolated protection, and this strengthens the spirit of allegiance. Except for a few coasting or river steamers that were seized in rebel ports when the war broke out, added to the Union hulks appropriated at Norfolk and Pensacola, the Southern Confederacy had no ready material for a navy, when blockade shut up her ports, and, aided by some early expeditions, deprived her of means essential for ship-building. Privateering is the weapon that a weaker commercial adversary employs against the stronger one; and here, once more, the insurgents soon exhausted the supply in their own ports and were forced thenceforward to depend almost wholly upon British builders for sea-going cruisers.² So, too, from the time that the Union blockade became reasonably effective, contraband trade with Southern ports was carried on solely by a class of foreign-built steamers, specially contrived for secrecy and speed, which were known as "blockade-runners."

To diminish the facilities of blockade-running, and afford for the blockading vessels points of refuge and supplies, were lesser objects beside the greater one of recapturing an insurgent coast. Against Hatteras Inlet, off the North Carolina coast, where a narrow belt of sand affords the rim of vast inland waters, a small expedition sailed from

¹ The navy list of the United States comprised; in August, 1861, 1,457 officers of all grades; and for the newly expanded fleet 7,500 volunteer officers were also enrolled during the war. 1 B. & L. 623. The South received 322 naval officers from the Union (Ib. 631), as to whom Davis expresses his regret that in resigning they did not bring their vessels and thus give the Confederacy "its share." Davis, 74.

² 1 B. & L. 623-630. Among the Southern privateers set afloat in 1861 the *Sumter*, commanded by Raphael Semmes, lately a Lieutenant of the United States navy, was the most successful; its career lasting from June to the end of the year. 5 N. & H. 9.

Fortress Monroe on the 26th of August, commanded by Flag-Officer Silas H. Stringham, of the navy; Butler leading also a land force of about eight hundred troops. The forts were silenced by a short and easy bombardment, and the garrisons surrendered on the 29th.¹ A larger expedition to Port Royal, south of Charleston, was arranged about the same time, but did not leave Chesapeake Bay until the 29th of October. The fleet of fifty sail was under the naval command of Flag-Officer Du Pont, while General Thomas W. Sherman² conducted a land force for occupation. On the 7th of November fourteen war steamers, carrying a total of 130 guns, entered Port Royal Sound and made a successful attack, both novel and ingenious. By a circular manœuvre, in that spacious harbor, Du Pont leading with the *Wabash*, the Union vessels steamed into the entrance, delivered fire against the opposite forts at Hilton Head and Bay Point, and steamed out again, forcing with the aid of bombarding vessels a surrender. Shot fell during the engagement as fast as a horse's feet could beat the ground in a gallop, and such was the panic produced that instead of one harbor, half a dozen, all in the agricultural heart of South Carolina, came into Union possession.³ Port Royal harbor became thus an important base for operations against Charleston, and a blockading station besides for coaling and supplies. Here was the region of the famous sea-island cotton; and the lovely town of Beaufort at the head of the sound, with its verandas, rose-gardens, and orange-trees, which had been the tranquil home of lordly planters, was found unoccupied, save by the simple slaves they left behind, who trooped child-like to the pier, with their effects tied up in handkerchiefs, expecting to be taken away.

During the following spring Du Pont's expedition readily extended its operations to the Florida coasts; Fort Pulaski,

¹ 4 N. & H. c. 1; 4 W. R. 381-387; 1 B. & L. 634-640.

² See 6 W. R. 168. He should not be confounded with the more famous William T. Sherman.

³ 5 N. & H. c. 1; 1 B. & L. 671-691.

which commanded the entrance to Savannah River, being further reduced by General Gillmore on the 11th of 1862, March. April. Henceforth, for the rest of the war, all of the southern coast of the Atlantic to North Carolina's boundary was fairly occupied, except for Savannah itself and the stubborn port of Charleston.¹ On the North Carolina coast, moreover, the work begun by the Hatteras expedition was correspondingly completed by General Ambrose E. Burnside, an intimate friend and West Point classmate of McClellan. Under sealed orders Burnside put to sea from Fortress Monroe on the evening of January 11th, with three brigades, aggregating 12,800 men, under Generals January- Foster, Reno, and Parke; the naval fleet of twenty April. vessels which accompanied his transports being commanded by Flag-Officer Louis M. Goldsborough. Roanoke Island, New Berne, and Fort Macon were the brilliant conquest of this expedition; so that all that was valuable on North Carolina's coast, excepting Wilmington, came into control of the Union, and a broad shore base was gained for further operations.²

So far, however, as McClellan took direction, the winter brought nothing but these coast successes. For beyond sending out new military commanders to Kentucky and Missouri when he succeeded Scott, he gave but little personal heed to operations in the west. Henry W. Halleck, who assumed command at St. Louis in November, was at this time McClellan's next military rival, and indeed Scott's 1861, preference of the two for his own successor. He November. was now forty-six years old, a graduate of West Point, and in the prime of life. He had stood high as a subaltern in the engineer corps, taking part during the Mexican war in California operations, and resigning later to take up the pursuit of law and mining claims. Versatile in his range of studies, he gained special fame among

¹ 5 N. & H. 19, 248-250; 1 B. & L. 640; 2 B. & L. 1-12; 9 W. R. 358.

² 5 N. & H. c. 14; 9 W. R., *passim*; 1 B. & L. 660, etc.

military men as a writer on the art of war. Halleck was deliberate, sedate, and of a reflective cast. In August, at Scott's request, the President appointed him a major-general in the regular army.¹

Halleck's present opportunity as the successor of Fremont was very great, and so far as the mere administration went, he proved quite equal to it. In the theory of fighting he was unsurpassed in these years, and could mark out a campaign on the map as well as most men. At this time, too, he was very eager to excel. McClellan himself was scarcely more self-confident, more ambitious to expand the sphere first assigned him. The reforms expected of him at the west, in system and economy, he labored with good effect to achieve. With a strong hand he put down the turbulence and disorder which on the remote Missouri borders had become chronic. Against the insurgent Price, whose force of armed inhabitants would swell and dry up with equal suddenness like some mountain torrent, he despatched General Curtis, who forced him over the line into Arkansas to seek McCulloch, and finally on the 6th and 7th of March defeated their united forces, with an Indian con-^{1862,} tingent under Albert Pike, in the well-fought battle ^{March.} of Pea Ridge or Elkhorn Tavern. Major-General Earl Van Dorn led the Confederates' assault on that occasion, Curtis resting prudently with an inferior force on the defensive, until the field was won, and then pursuing with energy his retreating foe on the following day. The rough McCulloch, between whom and the well-bred Price there had never been a cordial feeling, fell early in the battle; and never again did the South attempt on any scale to carry the war into the heart of Missouri and capture St. Louis, as Van Dorn in his brief enthusiasm had dreamed of doing.²

¹ 5 N. & H. 85, 86; 8 W. R. 369.

² 1 B. & L. 314-334; 5 N. & H. c. 17. The total Union loss (and so far as known, that of the Confederates) reached about 1300 in killed, wounded, and missing; but the forces opposed were quite unequal. Curtis had not over 10,500; while the Confederates (with Price 6818, McCulloch 8384, and Pike about 1000) probably aggregated 16,200. 1 B. & L. 337.

Missouri's disloyal element in the scant towns north of the Missouri river was troublesome, while a hope of secession remained. Unionists were maltreated, bridges were burned, and roads destroyed; but no sooner did Federal troops arrive than the perpetrators disappeared. Halleck declared martial law, as Fremont had done, in order to suppress such warfare, and in a correspondence with Price, who played the uncongenial part of guerilla chief, refused to treat such persons, while clothed in civilian garb, as soldiers entitled, whenever captured, to the status of prisoners of war.¹ The loyal State convention, before Halleck's arrival, had prudently postponed for another year the State election, continuing Governor Gamble in authority. The provisional State militia or home guard was placed under the control of Halleck, who detailed General Schofield to raise and organize them, disbanding the fragmentary and irregular organizations hitherto employed. Amnesty was extended by the Convention to all Missourians who should take a new oath of allegiance to the Union; but there was political variance and strife in this State all through the war. Meanwhile Jackson, the fugitive ex-Governor, with the aid of his bauble State seal and a phantom power of attorney from the people, had near the Arkansas line proclaimed the independence of Missouri and its annexation to the Southern Confederacy.²

Turning now to Kentucky, we see one after McClellan's heart sent to replace the despondent Sherman.³ Don Carlos Buell, a brigadier, was a well-trained officer, studious and honorable, taking great pride in his profession. In active service and early prime when this war broke out, he had something of the martinet about him, and was reserved in imparting confidence. With McClellan for choice friend and benefactor, he suffered that chief's vicissitudes. The

¹ 8 W. R. 497, 515 (January, 1862).

² 5 N. & H. c. 5; 8 W. R. 456, 717-730.

³ *Supra*, p. 107.

department of the Ohio River being formed for him in November, inclusive of Kentucky to the Cumberland, he accepted his post, declaring himself content to try his chances with far fewer men than his predecessor Sherman had thought indispensable.¹ Buell resembled McClellan as the lesser does the greater; he, too, was a skilful organizer of troops, but while emulous to make good soldiers, he did not give the volunteer quite his due as against the riff-raff of a regular army.² Like his superior, now so influential, he disdained civil rulers and crossed their wishes more than was judicious. The President, urged by Johnson and Maynard in Congress, had been deeply anxious for Buell to relieve the loyalists of eastern Tennessee, whose cry came up from their mountain confines. McClellan, himself impressed, no doubt, by the earliest of western campaign experiences, emphasized in instructions what should be attempted for those loyalists. Reënforcements were sent Buell for such an expedition; department pressure at Washington was brought to bear; but Buell baffled, evaded, until, on the President's direct demand by telegraph, he disclosed a fixed intent to operate elsewhere whenever his troops were ready to move, leaving east Tennessee alone.³ This course of conduct raised against him bitter enemies at Washington before he had served two months in responsible command, and made civilians censorious. Adding his slowness to move at all—the fault for which McClellan was blamed—we need not wonder that Buell's campaign soon needed smoothing explanations, which he himself was ever too haughty to furnish.⁴

Early operations in western Virginia and Missouri may assure us that Bull Run's lesson against haste was not the only one to learn. Indeed, in these western pioneer States

¹ 7 W. R. 444.

² 1 Grant, 481.

³ 7 W. R. 530, 531, 927. President Lincoln's message, December 3d, showed how earnestly his heart was set upon relieving eastern Tennessee, whose want of northern railroad connections increased, in fact, the difficulty of despatching aid.

⁴ See 5 N. & H. c. 4, citing 7 W. R., *passim*.

volunteers were quickly trained to be good soldiers for marching, and for fighting, too. Thomas, one of the most prudent and deliberate of generals, would gladly have started his column towards Cumberland Gap and Knoxville early in November, but was not permitted; and on the very day, in fact, that Buell was assigned to Kentucky, a strong uprising in eastern Tennessee was reported at Richmond which the Confederate authorities crushed with remorseless vigor. Unsupported by a single Union regiment sent to their relief, these loyalists yielded their lives and persons to martyrdom, imprisonment, and a reign of terror.¹

Correspondence of these months between Buell and McClellan was full of friendly expression, heeding little their relative difference in rank. McClellan argued with his subordinate rather than gave direction.² Coöperation with Halleck became of the utmost consequence, when eastern Tennessee was left out. Albert S. Johnston, now the Confederate commander at the west, massed a force at Bowling Green, which could be reënforced at need from Columbus on the Mississippi. He had been sent thither, as a Kentuckian agreeable to Confederates of that region, who might hold Kentucky and Tennessee to the Confederacy. To divide Johnston's present forces, and keep them disunited, McClellan early in January suggested to Halleck a feint on the Tennessee River. Halleck, though unfavorably disposed, ordered Grant, who was at Cairo, to make a reconnoissance up stream with gunboats. This was done speedily, and with highly promising results. Fort Henry might easily be taken,

¹ Some charged with bridge-burning were hanged impressively on the spot, jails were filled with suspected persons, and the supposed ringleaders, men of local influence, were sent to Alabama as prisoners of war. "Parson" Brownlow, as he was called, a Knoxville editor, and one of the most constant and unflinching opponents of secession, was, with excepted leniency, sent into the Union lines. See various severe orders, which President Davis emphatically approved. 7 W. R. 701, etc.; 5 N. & H. 76-79; 4 W. R. 231, 477.

² See 7 W. R. 444, 483.

Columbus turned and captured, and the enemy forced out of Bowling Green altogether and its present position;¹ for the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers were navigable far southward, and from where they joined the Ohio, near Paducah, an expedition towards Nashville might penetrate with immense effect. An idea which Buell had been meditating now impressed Halleck; and to McClellan he wrote that a more feasible plan than moving down the Mississippi would be to treat the line of these two lesser rivers as a centre of operations; and with not less than sixty thousand men he believed he could make the effort.²

This, however, was prospective merely; and how long inaction might have lasted without other promptings, it is difficult to say. In Thomas and Grant were two generals of lesser rank who saved the winter from stagnation. The former, whom Buell had posted in eastern Kentucky with a few regiments, advanced to dislodge the Confederate General Zollicoffer from Cumberland Gap, the gate to eastern Tennessee. A remarkable battle took place near Mill Springs, in which Thomas, against much superior numbers, put the enemy to utter rout, and offered the mountain pass to possession.³ By that time, however, Buell's attention was diverted elsewhere; and the real advance movement at the west began under a subordinate of Halleck, destined in time to that immortal distinction which neither McClellan nor Halleck secured in the day of opportunity.

Grant rose constantly by merit against the prejudice, malice, or smothered jealousy that hindered him, and the same quiet diligence and good sense which procured him his first commission carried him gradually onward. He had no such excessive dread of the enemy as hindered his present superiors, but considered that in numbers and equip-

¹ 7 W. R. 71, 521-552.

² 8 W. R. 508-511 (January 20th). Cf. 1 Sherman, 248.

³ 5 N. & H. 117; Cist's Cumberland, 17. Zollicoffer was killed, and Crittenden, his next in rank, defeated.

ment the North was likely to be superior, and that whatever time we gained for seasoning and strengthening, the foe would gain also. Thorough aggressiveness, and the disposition to employ all means at hand, were qualities conspicuous in him as in every first-rate commander. The initiative rested under any circumstances upon the Union army, and performance is better than to allege the soundest reasons for not performing. Grant had a consummate advantage over either McClellan or Halleck, in the quiet opportunity to master the small tasks before the great, and gain confidence only as he earned it. Wherever he was stationed, or whatever he might be called upon to do, he made no complaint, asked no delay, but reported a performance, partial, at least; and more than that, as he looked carefully about him, he saw some new point to gain, something to achieve, and asked permission to attempt it. Brief, business-like, models of concise expression, his despatches carried weight, chiefly because they showed a clear self-confidence.

It was Fremont, we have seen, who gave Grant his first innings for fame by placing him at Cairo, the initial point for these new operations, and it was Grant himself whose foresight secured Paducah. Grant had not needed instruction of the immense possibilities of an invading campaign up the Tennessee and Cumberland water courses; but with quick intuition he applied for immediate orders to reduce Fort Henry; Flag-Officer Andrew H. Foote, who commanded the little naval fleet, a fearless fighter, and a man after Grant's own heart, seconding his request. Halleck, at first refusing, yielded his assent, influenced by other circumstances,¹ and Grant was authorized to carry operations before Confederate reinforcements could arrive, so as to cut the line between Columbus and Bowling Green.²

Grant had already begun preparations, and promptly on February 2d, the day after Halleck's written permission

¹ News just reached Halleck of Thomas's victory at Mill Springs, and of President Davis's intention to reinforce the Confederate army in Kentucky.

² 5 N. & H. c. 7; 7 W. R. 121, etc.; 1 Grant, 287.

reached him, he started off 15,000 men on transports; Foote on the 4th bringing up seven light-draught gunboats for convoy and attack. Fort Henry guarded the Tennessee River, and Fort Donelson the Cumberland at a short marching distance overland; and sailing up the former stream, Grant's expedition sought Fort Henry first. Its capture proved easy, for not only had a rise in the river drowned out a battery—the location of the fort being badly chosen—but General Tilghman, the Confederate commander, had just sent away part of his force in despondency. The stars and bars were hauled down, February 6th, after Foote's bombardment from his gunboats had continued two hours, and the Union troops, already landed under Generals McClernand and Charles F. Smith, marched in to receive possession. "Fort Henry is ours," Grant telegraphed the same day to Halleck; and he added, with impressive brevity, "I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th, and return."¹

The first triumph of this combined expedition filled the Confederate commander with consternation and dismay. By the capture of Fort Henry the navigation of the Tennessee River passed into Union custody, and Foote's gunboats began ascending higher. Fort Donelson was next in great danger; and should that, too, be taken, the Cumberland was lost, and the Union route lay clear to Nashville. Joined now by Beauregard from the east, Johnston called a council at Bowling Green, which agreed that with Columbus isolated the whole present line must be abandoned. Resolved, however, "to fight for Nashville at Donelson," as he expressed it, Johnston divided his slender army at Bowling Green, and despatching to Fort Donelson 8000 men under Buckner and Floyd, together with 4000 specially collected by Pillow, he hastened with his remaining 14,000 to the neighborhood of Nashville, and there anxiously awaited results.²

Had Buell been a ready fighter, he would have pushed upon Bowling Green and inflicted damage on the retreating

¹ 5 N. & H. c. 7; 7 W. R. 124; 1 B. & L. 369-371.

² 5 N. & H. c. 11.

Confederates, for his army, which was in splendid condition, greatly outnumbered Johnston's diminished force. But Grant's laconic telegram, announcing what he had done and meant to do, found Halleck and Buell referring to McClellan the expediency of this interior campaign, the one barely confident, the other distrustful. Buell's over-caution and obstinacy are revealed by these wired despatches. He kept his line at Bowling Green as though divining no change; then, when Johnston abandoned the place and retreated, he followed at cautious distance towards Nashville, leaving Grant's new campaign up the Cumberland to its chances. Halleck controlled one department, Buell another. Halleck appealed, but McClellan sustained his personal friend, and, against remonstrance, out of Buell's 72,000 men or more, nearly two-thirds of whom were fit for fighting, only a single drilled brigade and eight raw regiments were doled out to Grant's assistance.¹ Grant, however, had not waited upon such tardy coöperation, but completed his second conquest the day after Buell made his decision.

Yet Donelson was not to be taken in two days, as Grant had purposed. The rivers rose rapidly, and it was not until the 12th of February that he started on his half day's march over intervening ground to the second hostile fort. By this time Johnston's reënforcements had reached the garrison, and an extended line of substantial breastworks and rifle pits defended the land approach through the little town of Dover. Grant marched with only 15,000 men, but timely reënforcements swelled his force to about 27,000. The enemy, according to his own estimate, numbered 21,000.² Fort Donelson, whose guns were mounted in three stories, occupied one of the best defensive positions on the Cumberland River—a bold bluff on the west bank, at a bend of that stream. Foote with his gunboats began assailing the fort from the river on the 14th of February; then

¹ 5 N. & H. c. 11; 7 W. R. 122, 578-625.

² 1 Grant, 299-315. Some estimates make the Confederate force scarcely 18,000, and the exact number is not known. 1 B. & L. 429; 4 N. & H. 192. Foote's gunboats increased the aggregate strength on the Union side.

drawing off damaged, he arranged with Grant to return after the latter had perfected his lines in the rear. Grant's army, composed entirely of western volunteer regiments, behaved admirably; and in repelling a desperate sortie made on the 15th from the fort, Grant stormed the intrenchments before him, and drove the enemy back. To surround and capture the whole force had been with Grant and Foote a prime object; and this was gained on Sunday, the 16th, without further bloodshed. Johnston had erred in selecting Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner to be shut up together for defense, for the two former were in bad odor, while the third and fittest to command felt little respect for such superiors. At length, in a night council, Floyd and Pillow agreed to devolve the command upon Buckner, having done which they fled for their lives, taking some 5,000 men along with them. Day set in, and Buckner sent a note to Grant proposing an armistice to arrange terms of capitulation. "No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted" was Grant's written reply, despatched without hesitation; "I propose to move immediately upon your works." Buckner's situation being too desperate to admit of delay, he accepted these terms, protesting that they were "ungenerous and unchivalrous." And thus was obtained the surrender of Fort Donelson, with some 15,000 prisoners, including two generals, 20,000 stands of arms, and a large supply of horses, artillery, and commissary stores. By this brilliant Union victory, gained while the country was dispirited by long inaction at the Potomac, Grant sprang at once into national distinction. President Lincoln nominated him a major-general of volunteers, and the Senate at once confirmed the appointment. Promotion rewarded also his chief subordinates. The ringing phrase of Grant's latest despatch circulated through the North like some coinage fresh from the mint, and "Unconditional Surrender," which suited the initials of his modest signature, became like a baptismal name.¹

¹ 5 N. & H. c. 11; 7 W. R. 161, 618, 625; 1 B. & L. 412 (Low Wallace, etc.).

This popularity, though far yet from being firmly established, was of the sort that Zachary Taylor had similarly attracted, and Grant possibly emulated that hero of other days, under whom he had fought the first campaign of military youth. Like Taylor, he rode quietly about, using his own eyes to see what went on, and was simple and unpretentious in dress and manners, never discounting at sight the victories to come. Grant took the barren comforts of camp life contentedly. His figure was slight, and he ate with moderation and daintiness. He was neat and clean in person; his well-trimmed beard,¹ nature's own adornment, gave a closer set to features which suggested a steel trap; he always kept a good horse, well groomed, for he took great pride as an equestrian. But in military dress he was plain even to negligence, and donned often a soldier's blouse or overcoat as his own. His Memoirs record momentous interviews at which his attire was far less studied than other men would have thought appropriate. Grant's cigar became an almost inseparable incident of his general demeanor, which was quiet, secretive, and imperturbable, owing to habits of repression in speech formed early in life. Behind that curling smoke he thought out many an enterprise; and at his military council, so-called, he smoked and never said a word, framing probably his own plans, or composing the marching orders of the morrow. His taciturnity and silence, except among intimates, were remarkable, as was also his control of temper, and it took him almost eight years of his later Presidency to become a moderate talker. That impassive presence preserved a spell over those of greater stature whom he commanded, and aided the immense influence he exerted when once launched into fame. Even before Fort Henry his own men believed in him, because he had been the last one at Belmont to take boat from the enemy. He gave commands with effect in a quiet, conversational tone; and a countenance otherwise grim was lit up by a piercing blue eye and the aspect of sincerity. Nor was Grant wanting in those qualities of gratitude and affection that attach

¹ But cf. picture, 1 B. & L. 352.

and hold personal friends. The members of his faithful staff he chose to suit himself, liking good comradeship; nor was Rawlins, the chief among them, the only comrade whose interests he zealously promoted with his own. The greatest of his military friendships redounded immeasurably to the country's good; for Sherman, who soon came in close contact with him, proved a comrade worthy of his utmost love and confidence. A happier complement in war was never found; yet no rivalry was possible between them, for the irritable Sherman, splendid fighter that he was, praised Grant as his superior in sound judgment, and preferred of all things to remain his loyal subordinate.

Foote's admirable qualities as a naval commander deserve passing mention. Not only with Grant, and while reducing these two river strongholds, did he and his flotilla coöperate with skill and effect, but in Mississippi movements to be mentioned later. In those earlier days, officers of our navy had seldom risen to commodore, the highest grade hitherto, but ranked at best as captains, with the special compliment of "flag officer" when on fleet duty like the present. A year's splendid prowess by water, culminating presently at New Orleans, induced Congress to create, in 1862, the rank of admiral, and Foote was advanced with others, but increasing ill-health forced him to withdraw from new exploits, and he died the next year.¹ The "Mississippi flotilla," so-called, which Foote first brought into active renown, was begun in May, 1861, by Secretary Welles, under the active charge of Commander John Rodgers. But the first active demand for its creation came from the War Department, nor was this force regularly transferred to the navy until much later. For operating simultaneously with a land force on the Mississippi and its tributaries, over a hundred vessels of great variety were thus brought together, light in draught, and capable of penetrating shoal waters.² To Confederates, overmastered in all such amphibious arrangements, the very name of gunboat gained already a shuddering significance.³

¹ 1 B. & L. 338-346.

² 1 B. & L. 620 (Soley); 4 N. & H. 201.

³ De Leon, 162.

SECTION VIII.

CONGRESS AND THE CABINET.

Congress reassembled on the 2d of December for its long session, which lasted until the 17th of the following July. 1861, Dec.- The first concern of each branch was to purge itself 1862, July. of disloyal members; Breckinridge and Burnett of Kentucky, Jesse D. Bright of Indiana, and the two secession Senators of Missouri, being of the number. In the House Maynard was sworn in as a suitable representative from his district in Tennessee; and early in March Senator Andrew Johnson, with a brigadier-general's commission, went homeward to reorganize his State for the Union as military governor.¹

War tends naturally to accumulate force in the executive branch of government. In the present session the absorbing question to consider was how to raise funds for carrying on a conflict, more and more gigantic in its pressure. Every resource of revenue had now to be employed; and the internal revenue tax, once denounced as detestable and never applied in this century but for urgent occasion, was invoked for the national needs, to remain permanent in a sense never before experienced. The borrowing power was of course to be strained to the utmost; yet a national income had still to be raised by taxation sufficient to pay the ordinary expenses of the Union on its peace footing, meet the interest of this war debt, and establish the sinking fund. All supporters of the President now assumed that this income should be mainly raised by paper issues whose credit should be based upon adequate taxation; but concerning the character of such paper opinions greatly differed. Ever since Hamilton as financier placed the new Republic firmly upon its feet, all national tradition had been for

¹ 3 Moore, 100-105; 4 ib. 49.

national honor; "cherish public credit" was Washington's farewell injunction, and his successors, irrespective of party, clung to the maxim. But now that distress of revolution was to return which drove the earlier Union upon perfidious quicksands. With the first touch of civil war gold and silver coin had vanished from sight. Armed insurrection found the North in fair financial condition; but States, not the Union, had of late regulated the people's currency. For ordinary circulation the bills of local banks in good standing, those especially of New York and New England, had proved a convenient paper medium; but the best banks of the soundest States were forced in 1861 to suspend specie payments, and their bills floated about in a depreciated condition. Postage-stamps, private tokens and checks, and the "I. O. U." came early into use for small change in place of the silver half-dollar pieces, quarters, dimes, and half-dimes. Gold and silver rose in the market high above par; these precious coins were hoarded and hidden away; and, aside from the Pacific States, which preserved a gold standard, they could not be had at all unless purchased as a commodity.

Secretary Chase was the mighty magician who faced this distressing situation and worked out the problem of national public credit on new lines. Fortunate was it for the country that a man of such massive mould, physical and mental, had been placed by Lincoln in control of the Treasury. His dignified and imposing figure, his dome-like head, and serene face and features, suited the supreme financier of tempestuous weather. Of Seward's tremendous task as Secretary of State and the remarkable qualities he brought to it, we have spoken; and to Chase is due a corresponding tribute. The fitness of a legal training for developing the highest type of competent practical statesman was never more admirably shown than in the present conjunction of Lincoln, Seward, and Chase; and, as contemporaries have repeatedly remarked, no one of them could have served so admirably as in the relative places they now occupied. Chase found discouragement in the nation's finances from the first day he took charge of them; but he grappled

manfully with his difficulties. One of the first measures of relief adopted by him under the authority of Congress in special session, was the issue of "demand notes,"
1861.

so called, in which, since coin was scarce, the current public dues of government were paid and public salaries. At a gathering of financiers on the 19th of August in New York City, he eloquently appealed for patriotic aid; and a syndicate of banks was formed which advanced from their capital \$150,000,000 to the government upon its bonded securities. When Congress met in December, Chase in his first annual report disclosed the painful situation with courage and frankness. The public debt of the United States, which, on the 1st of July, 1860, figured but \$64,000,000, and a year later \$90,000,000, would probably reach \$517,000,000 on the 1st of July ensuing. These were appalling figures; yet small enough in comparison with the national indebtedness as it stood when the war was ended.¹

Some allowance may be made for the growing impatience of Congress and the government over McClellan's inaction, when one reflects that, besides the argument it furnished abroad for intervention, they who had the sinews to supply were in deep perplexity. The public debt had risen to \$300,000,000 already; the treasury was almost empty; and a Union of late so frugal and thrifty was spending at the rate of nearly \$2,000,000 a day for its war establishment. Good finance and good politics concurred in concluding that, since no end appeared in sight, resort must be had to government paper money.² To receivable and redeemable notes of the United States as currency there could be no objection. But how compel such notes to circulate? Hamilton's masterly statement was recalled, that bills of credit, and a paper emission, were by our present Constitution expressly forbidden to the States, the spirit of that prohi-

¹ Cong. Globe, documents. It was this disclosure which brought the strongest banks of the North to an agreed suspension of specie payments at the close of the year; leaving the government no immediate alternative but to follow. 24 Harper, 401.

² 6 N. & H. c. 11.

bition extending to the Union. The gloomy lesson of the old Continental currency the South now learned anew; and that seducing and dangerous expedient of inflation, even when not carried so far as thus to become a burst bubble, leaves surely a moral blemish upon the government once debauched by the experiment. Chase yielded, however, his reluctant support to a credit currency as indispensable for bridging over the chasm; and to force that currency to circulate, Congress, at his instance, now departed widely from the spirit of constitutional injunction, by declaring all such paper "lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts public and private," with a few stated exceptions. The first of these acts of Congress—since popularly known as the "legal tender acts,"—authorized the issue of \$150,000,000 of such notes;¹ and other acts of like import during the present Congress² increased the large volume of such currency immensely; not to speak of interest-bearing notes which were authorized besides. Never before had a statute of the United States made anything but gold and silver coin a legal tender in payment of debts. In both Houses of Congress the original measure was violently opposed; friends of the administration who yielded doing so with full warning that the experiment was dangerous. "The medicine of the Constitution," urged Sumner, "must not become its daily bread." And the ground upon which Chase and his friends put this legal-tender requirement, was that of absolute, overwhelming necessity; it was a forced loan, so to speak, upon the community. Even from so favorable a point of view there were not wanting party friends who believed that a loan extorted directly from the citizen would have been more honest and appropriate.³

Fortunately for the United States, Congress, with so impressive a warning, stood guard over its own temptation;

¹ Act February 25th, 1862.

² Acts July 11th, 1862, March 3d, 1863, etc.; 6 N. & H. c. 11.

³ See speeches of Sumner, Fessenden, Collamer, and others, cited 6 N. & H. 232-235.

as also did the Executive, indulging in far less than the full amount permitted.¹ Since States were fortunately under the ban of organic law, debauchment by bill of credit was in the national sense only; and national vigor and the early sense of honor saved the Union as from an opium habit. Yet this "greenback" money produced great mischief by accustoming the new generation to two currencies, the cheaper and the dearer, the one to pay with and the other to own. National parties palter accordingly in times of distress, the debtor class arrayed against the creditor, to this very day. In vain did our Supreme Court, soon after the war, pronounce the legal tender act unconstitutional; in vain did Chase himself, when presiding over that tribunal, confess that as Secretary he had erred in recommending it.² The Dred Scott case alone compares with this litigation for bitterly humiliating the Federal judiciary; and there, but not here, the mortifying reversal of a court's decision took place elsewhere.³

Chase's better gain with the banking currency will be described later. Though forced by present emergency to exercise arbitrary power, resolving doubts by the rule of necessity, he never abandoned the Democratic tenets in which he had been trained. Normally he was the friend of a hard-money government and opposed to centralizing tendencies. He was always the consistent champion of human rights; a man of integrity, pure, upright, and honorable; self-constrained as a rule, but with a haughty dignity when offended that bore down opposition. But an imposing ex-

¹ Before the war ended \$1,250,000,000 of legal-tender currency had been authorized by successive acts, of which nearly two-thirds was in interest-bearing notes; but the legal-tenders outstanding on the 30th of June, 1864, amounted to \$600,000,000, and a year later they amounted to \$669,000,000, the Treasury not availing itself of its full authority.

² Here he declared that in 1862 he had yielded his opinion reluctantly to the idea of annexing the legal-tender attribute to the paper currency he desired; and that examination and reflection under more propitious circumstances had satisfied him that his course was erroneous. 12 Wall. 576.

³ Cf. 8 Wall. 603; 11 ib. 682; 15 ib. 196.

terior veiled some minor faults of character. Chase was partial and easily perverted in his judgment of other men, and blind sometimes to moral obliquity; he did not easily resist the influence of personal admirers.¹ He took life hard, was prone to didactic discourse, and kept the bow bent too constantly. Unlike Seward he cherished deeply the ambition of succeeding Lincoln, and hence was peevish, captious, an engenderer of discontent, fault-finding with the administration he served. Lincoln, apprehending Chase's wish to supplant him, applied with good-natured comment one of his apt stories;² but the time came when he felt compelled to part with this Cabinet officer.

The Treasury Department at Washington, during the war, so extended its immense operations as fairly to absorb the new space gained by the great granite fronts which finally flanked the once imposing freestone colonnade on Fifteenth Street. Over this vast edifice, with rented buildings in the neighborhood besides and an army of subordinates, presided the great fiscal director. Chase had a faithful corps of assistants. Spinner, the Treasurer, whose unique autograph authenticated the national notes, gained the deserved sobriquet of "watch-dog of the Treasury"; Chittenden, the Register, has given a pen, untired by manual labor, to illustrating these busy times; and among faithful comptrollers and auditors, Brodhead and French passed war claims aggregating hundreds of millions with scrupulous system and integrity.

In the first month of 1862 a change in the War Department brought into the Cabinet a third remarkable man, unique in political antecedents. Cameron, Lincoln's first selection, had gifts of political craft and 1862. adroitness, but inspired little confidence in the community. Dominant in Pennsylvania politics, before and after the war,

¹ See Chittenden, 182.

² The story was of an ox who, stung by a chin-fly, pulled his load the harder. Carpenter, 129.

he was earliest perhaps among those senatorial satraps who now rule an American State without pretence of statesmanship. McClellan relates that Cameron gave him his way, but was absorbed in politics, political appointments, and contracts.¹ War, with its tremendous cost and sacrifice, required a broader manager, and, imputing nothing worse than loose methods which might bring profligate outlay, Northern bankers and men of influence demanded that this Secretary should retire.² Though Cameron's claims had been forced upon him in the first place, Lincoln could not be harsh or arbitrary with any one. But when the Secretary, in printing his annual report, inserted, without the President's knowledge, a paragraph which favored the arming of slaves, Lincoln caused the passage to be suppressed, and it was felt that the two must part. Rupture, however, was carefully avoided; and having, with the advice of Seward and Chase, fixed upon a successor, the President tactfully procured Cameron's approval of the selection, at the same time that he was personally complimented by the mission to Russia. Cameron in 1863 returned to this country and to Pennsylvania politics, and worked zealously for Lincoln's renomination and reelection, grateful for having been considerably dealt with.³

By Edwin M. Stanton's accession as Secretary of War Pennsylvania was still nominally represented in the Cabinet, though the new incumbent had chiefly resided of late years in Washington, where he practised law and had a

¹ McClellan, 152.

² McClellan (ib.) says that the New York bankers urged Cameron's removal. Cf. 5 N. & H. c. 8; McClure's Lincoln, 150-152; Dawes in 73 *Atlantic*, 163. There were other strong reasons for a change; the general desire that the loyal element outside the Republican party should have a voice in the Cabinet, and that McClellan, of whom Republicans were growing censorious, might not seem the victim of party persecution. Cameron was distasteful to Governor Curtin and other leaders in his own State. As to fraudulent or careless purchases, see Chittenden, c. 24; McClure (Dana), November, 1897.

³ 5 N. & H. c. 8; Warden's Chase, 400; 1 Gorham, c. 35; 3 Seward, c. 5; McClure's Lincoln, 140-152.

wide acquaintance in political circles. This new Secretary became the Carnot of our present conflict; a man of flaming patriotism, of tremendous vigor and energy, who welcomed burdens however odious or difficult, provided it should be said of him that he bore them for his country's good. No American war minister ever equalled or approached him in intensity or magnitude of achievement; and yet no public man of his times made for himself such bitter personal enemies. Stanton, summoned as a party Democrat for one of Buchanan's final advisers, is seen to have given his impulsive energy to save the Government.¹ In doing so he secretly concerted with senatorial friends of the President-elect that treason might be baffled. Union was the paramount object of those confidences, just as disunion most probably inspired corresponding disclosures on the side of the South.² But after Lincoln was inaugurated Stanton's old antipathies to the Whigs returned, and, bereft of influence and authority, he watched events as they moved, a free and unsparing critic. Inclining to despondency, and that vent of despondency, vituperation, he denounced Lincoln in confidential speech and letters as a coward and a fool. McClellan gave Stanton his intimacy by listening to such abuse, and all too credulous of a violent mood, believed Stanton his friend and refuge against the administration.³

Lincoln, not unlikely, had learned something of Stanton's vilifying comments, but knew the combination which unlocked that wayward and vehement nature, and wanted the service it was capable of giving. Stanton, in truth, was strongly emotional; his love of the Union and its integrity amounted to a passion, and he feared that from want of abrupt and efficient energy all would be lost. Such souls are not to be judged by their impetuous utterances; to individuals they may be friends or enemies, but measures to them are beyond men, and, despite all moods, principle

¹ Vol. V, 483.

² *Galaxy*, June, 1870; 5 N. & H. 132.

³ He has charged Stanton with duplicity in changing his entire attitude towards him. McClellan, 152, etc.; 5 N. & H. 135, and citations.

keeps them consistent. The impulsion of strong feeling makes passionate men unjustly severe in their comment. Stanton neither sought nor expected his present appointment; but when it came he was aroused once more to action, and, accepting the call, felt bound by whatever sacrifice to help the salvation of the Union or perish with it. Of the sincerity of those convictions we entertain no question; nor that Lincoln, by so generous a sign of confidence, touched the depths of Stanton's heart. This nomination was politically a surprise and a new departure; but Stanton was readily confirmed, the loyal Democratic press hailing the selection as auspicious of a more cordial alliance of parties than before, in the great work of sustaining the Union.¹

Stanton was of moderate height, burly and thickset. His large head was decked with a mass of black hair, and a long and heavy black beard. His dark eyes darted through the glasses of thin-rimmed spectacles, with a quick and searching glance. His movements, like his thoughts, were rapid and alert; and his absorption in the immediate work and his energy in prosecuting it seemed almost superhuman in intensity. He would work at his desk late at night, while a carriage waited outside to take him home. Robust in health and less than fifty years of age when he first took Cameron's place, four years of prodigious toil utterly wrecked him, and he died prematurely. A natural tendency to cerebral excitement increased greatly under the exhausting pressure of his cares and the novel sense of power. He firmly believed that the Lord directed the cause he was serving, yet his nature was not buoyant on the whole, and he dwelt less upon what had been done well than upon what might have been done better. Parsimonious of praise, he did not spare harsh censure. Stanton was blunt, and often offensively so, rude of speech, and lacking much in suavity and delicacy of feeling; but sincerity or preoccupation accounted much for it. He had strong passions,

¹ See Mss. cited 5 N. & H. 137; George C. Gorham to the author (1898); Dawes in 73 *Atl. Monthly*, 162; 1 Gorham's Stanton, cs. 31, 32.

strong antipathies towards those who would not work with him. When he once disliked a man the desire swelled in his heart to get rid of him; and as no friendship could be strong enough to overcome his sense of public duty, rancor would set in whenever one who had lost his confidence resisted.¹ Above all else, he wanted men uncorrupt in public dealings, and where he suspected fraud, he would watch his prey like a basilisk, with venomous imagination, imparting to others his suspicion before the proofs were ready. It has been said that while Lincoln never fully trusted any man, Stanton trusted no man;² yet the Secretary had his likings, was even genial and kind in his best moods, showing tenderness of feeling. But sycophancy he detested, and praise put him instantly on his guard.

Stanton had quick intelligence, and, valuing his time, comprehended all he cared for before half was told him. This made his judgment swift and often too hasty; and a caller who did not speak clearly and briefly might be impatiently and even rudely interrupted. Congressmen and the patronage brokers found him a difficult man to deal with. He stood sternly at his high desk at the hour for visitors, and when the whole throng were ushered in compelled each applicant, high or low, to state audibly his request, which a stenographer at his elbow recorded together with his abrupt answer.³ He was too strained to be of judicial temper, and once deciding a point he refused to reconsider. Great virtues were thus hedged in among glaring faults; and though wholly without thirst for popularity, he made himself more unpopular than he might have done. Enemies will spring up like weeds, while friends are made and kept only by watchful effort.

From the moment that this new Secretary took possession of his plain, uncarpeted quarters in the old war building, things military moved with system and vehemence.

¹ This, rather than perfidy, may explain his changed attitude towards McClellan.

² McClure, 155.

³ 4 N. & H. c. 8; 73 *Atl.* 166-168.

"The armies seemed to grow," an assistant has expressed it, "and they certainly gained in force and thoroughness."¹ His rare organizing power was felt at once, combined with a will which compelled obedience. Laggards experienced his righteous wrath. He banished self-seeking officers anxious for promotion, and sent absentees back to their posts. He expanded and put vigor into his various bureaus. He took the telegraphs under immediate supervision, that military news might not leak out, to the public injury. He developed a secret service force, and, to Seward's great relief, took the whole odious burden of political arrests upon his own stalwart shoulders, as a military incident.² He not only forced army contractors to observe strict rules for the future, but detained the excessive claims already accumulating until they could be searchingly audited.³ No oral contracts, as heretofore, were regarded good, nor could contractors fix their own prices. Determined to have no taint of corruption about his department, he summoned the heads of bureaus, the day he assumed his official charge, and asked to be informed whether any of their clerks lay under suspicion.⁴ From every subordinate he expected something of his own ungrudging sacrifice of time and labor to the government.

Dismissing that censorious spirit which the unemployed fall into, Stanton from henceforth joined heartily in supporting all the great measures of this administration. He agreed mainly with his colleagues of the Cabinet, stating opinions in conference with forcefulness, and viewing public policy on its practical side. His relations with the President soon grew intimate, and with better opportunity to measure one whom he had known professionally earlier, came a truer intellectual estimate. Lincoln gave his Secretary an ample range over the matters committed to his charge; which were of such mutual concern that Stanton

¹ *McClure*, March, 1898 (C. A. Dana).

² *3 Seward*, c. 9; *1 Gorham*, 263.

³ *Chittenden*, 186-190.

⁴ *73 Atl. Monthly*, 163.

visited the White House at all hours for consultation; while the President, quite as informally, would come over into the rear of the war building, and pass hour after hour with him, reading telegrams from the front, of some important movement. Stanton's quickness to decide and despatch, and his positiveness, gave him great headway; but his cast was concrete, and, as in his practice as a patent lawyer, some rule of mechanics governed all things. He did not generalize broadly nor admit the humanity of exceptions. In that respect Lincoln was far his superior, as also in the touch of expediency; and hence, though permitting Stanton to close somewhat roughly the gate of clemency, so that, as he sometimes jestingly observed, he himself had no influence with this administration, he kept a delicate direction. The Secretary might allege official rules with savage obstinacy; sternness might defeat the petitioner when Lincoln concluded not to interfere; but the President kept many tactful resources for carrying his point, and when collision was inevitable he showed himself master.¹

McClellan, on recovering from his unfortunate illness, found the atmosphere of the administration congealing rapidly.² Stanton, when Secretary of War, could brook no military shortcomings. He put searching inquiries to the general before the Committee on the Conduct of the War — a joint inquest of Congress, lately established.³ McClellan's

¹ See 5 N. & H. 143 for anecdotes; also 73 *Atl.* 165.

Mr. Dawes blames Stanton for the "brutal and unexplained" imprisonment, without court martial, of General Stone. 73 *Atl.* 168. But President Lincoln, in a message to the Senate, took upon himself the whole responsibility for that act. 4 Moore, 99. See 2 B. & L. 123-134.

² Own Story, 152. Stanton had been appointed Secretary of War without his advice, but with the assumption that he was McClellan's personal friend, and such McClellan then believed him. See *supra*, p. 159.

³ The mass of *post factum* testimony on the various battles collected by this Committee has been of much historical service, though its proceedings had somewhat of a partisan direction.

easy intercourse with Lincoln ceased, as though some one had interposed.¹ Stanton stirred the President to assert himself as the real commander-in-chief — a rôle which the latter had essayed already; for, worried and distrustful over the autumn's inaction, Lincoln had in December broached a campaign plan which McClellan treated with contempt.² After the general fell ill, and the paralysis of operations had lasted for weeks of fine campaign weather, Lincoln anxiously conferred with McDowell and Franklin, to see whether, as he expressed himself, he might not borrow the army and make some use of it. A joint conference of generals and Cabinet officers, called on the 13th of 1862, January. January, McClellan brought purposely to naught by attending in person and refusing to disclose his plans.³ By the time Stanton was installed as Secretary, the public desire for an immediate movement had taken possession of the government, and good military advice favored it. But McClellan stood upon his military rights, made his own issue with public opinion, and secreted his purpose.

On the 27th of January the Executive⁴ issued his "General War Order, No. 1," which directed an advance of all the Union forces on the 22d of the following month. And pursuant thereto he specially directed McClellan to move the Army of the Potomac forward by that date in the direction of Manassas Junction. This meant the campaign plan which Lincoln had vainly broached in December, and which McDowell and other generals now indorsed. But McClellan

¹ McClellan imputes this separation to Stanton, which is possible. But a more natural reason is suggested (4 N. & H. 468), in the young general's presumptuous incivility, as though bored by the President's visits.

A pleasing incident of their earlier intercourse is recalled by McClellan, where Lincoln, when parting with him on the doorstep at night, cautioned him not to expose his person; "for they would probably give more at Richmond for your scalp than for mine." See Own Story, 176, 195.

² 5 N. & H. c. 9.

³ Ib. McClellan (Story, 155) assumed unfairly that this was a marplot of radicals and military rivals.

⁴ "Without consultation with any one." 5 N. & H. 160.

preferred the Urbana route up the Rappahannock, and showed that his plan was to operate from Chesapeake Bay. Eight generals out of twelve supporting McClellan's plan at a council of war, the President yielded, and the War Department prepared with great energy to transport the vast Army of the Potomac to its distant base.¹ Meanwhile, however, the 22d of February passed, and except at the West there was no military advance whatever.

On the 8th of March the President, as commander-in-chief, issued two more general orders. One directed McClellan to compose his immediate column of army corps, and named at once their several commanders.² The other required him, as a prerequisite of his campaign, to clear away the enemy's batteries which had obstructed the Potomac, and to leave, moreover, a sufficient force in and about the Federal capital to make it entirely secure.³ The criticism has been fairly made that a commander who required such close hampering should have been relieved altogether. But Lincoln was as yet only half distrustful of McClellan, and such was the latter's skill in training and handling, and his knowledge of the art of war, as well as the enthusiasm he inspired, that notwithstanding all shortcomings it was believed that, once started, the momentum of his splendid army would carry him to victory.⁴

McClellan's despondent estimates of comparative strength were absurdly inaccurate.⁵ From October, 1861, Joseph E. Johnston commanded at Manassas the Confederate depart-

¹ 5 N. & H. c. 9. Assistant Secretary Tucker transported.

² McClellan had wished this delayed until after a campaign. 5 N. & H. 170. But here the council of war had sided with the President's wish for army corps. 1 Gorham, 349. Three out of the four commanders selected by the President were generals who had preferred his plan to McClellan's; but they were the ranking generals. Ib. 351.

³ 5 N. & H. 170.

⁴ 5 N. & H. c. 9; 2 B. & L. 113. By all accounts, McClellan's aggregate must have far outnumbered the forces opposed to him. But in his Own Story (77, etc.) he ciphers it down amazingly. Thus, for nearly 153,000 reported present for duty, November 4th, he substitutes 60,000 for active operations.

⁵ 6 N. & H. 152; 5 W. R. 9, 10.

ment of North Virginia, with Beauregard and Jackson as subordinates. Though consulted much at Richmond, Lee served at unobtrusive points without much reputation. Albert Sidney Johnston, as we have seen, went to the West, whither, about the last of January, 1862, Beauregard was sent to join him. While thus the Fabian of Confederates, the Virginian Johnston, watched McClellan all winter, his force of scarce 44,000 strong opposed defiance to a mighty host twice as great and ever increasing. At an October council of war on the field, a further Southern force, sufficient to take the offensive, was asked of President Davis, but refused.¹ Finding McClellan inactive all through the fine weather of autumn and early winter, Johnston went mud-bound with his army into winter quarters; but towards the close of February, as his government desired, he prepared to retreat from the line of Manassas, knowing it untenable whenever the adversary should advance. Had McClellan taken the line that Lincoln desired, about the 22d of February, when the Union advance was ordered, he might have gained a victory, or at least the semblance of one, at little cost, and captured, if not an army, large spoils of supplies.²

The provisional Confederate Congress had met in Richmond, on the 18th of November, for a last secret conclave.

1861-1862. It went through the mockery of accepting Missouri under compact as a seceded and sovereign State; and with Kentucky nominally admitted later, the Confederate States of America reached its pretentious maximum of thirteen States. Electoral votes for President and Vice-President under the permanent constitution were duly counted; and all having been cast for the present incumbents, Davis and Stephens, they were installed anew for a six years' term. Davis took the oath of office at noon, February 22d, at the base of the great Washington's statue on

¹ Hughes's Johnston, c. 7; Johnston, 98, 99.

² 5 N. & H. 165.

the public square of Richmond. The day was dark and dismal; a deluge of rain flooded the city and drenched the crowd that met under umbrellas to see the "permanent government" ushered in.¹ The first regular Congress of two Houses, chosen as under the old Union, dated likewise from Washington's birthday, being organized, however, on the 18th for convenience. Among Senators once national in fame were R. M. T. Hunter and William B. Preston of Virginia; Barnwell and Orr of South Carolina; Benjamin H. Hill of Georgia; Yancey of Alabama, who presently died, and Wigfall of Texas. Thomas S. Bocock of Virginia was chosen Speaker of the House. Davis's new Cabinet list named Benjamin Secretary of State, in place of Hunter; with George W. Randolph of Virginia as Secretary of War, who later in the year gave place to James A. Seddon. Benjamin as Secretary of War had been unpopular, but his President promoted him; Memminger remained longer the head of the Treasury, while Mallory and Reagan in their respective posts served the Confederacy to the last. Thomas H. Watts of Alabama was the new Attorney-General in place of Thomas Bragg.²

At length securely seated, so far as he could sit secure at all, Davis gave himself to the relentless exercise of his supreme authority. Already autocrat over an inefficient Cabinet, and the dictator of his Congress, he held the Southern people spell-bound, despite their growing discontent, by his loftiness of mien and unbending purpose. For States or State rights the mask of solicitude was no longer worn; secession as a theory had fulfilled its part; "traitors" and "rebels" were terms for one nation to apply as well as the other.³ On the 1st of March, at the President's instigation, the Confederate Congress suspended *habeas corpus*, and on the next morning John Minor Botts, a steadfast Unionist, was arrested at Richmond and sent to a filthy jail for solitary confinement; others of kindred sentiment languished,

¹ De Leon, 163.

² 1 B. & L. 6; Am. Cycl. 1862, 250; De Leon, c. 19.

³ 5 N. & H. 76.

or died, or went crazy in the prison pen of Salisbury.¹ And next began a conscription which forced into the Southern ranks men of every State in confederation, by a widening reach which, as well described later, "robbed the cradle and the grave." The first of these conscription acts, passed on the 16th of April, agreeably to the President's wishes, initiated a new and simple system of raising Confederate armies, which put the State quite aside. All white male persons whatever in the Confederacy between eighteen and thirty-five years of age were made subject to military service and conscription. Former contracts of enlistment, which had been for a year, were annulled so far as they conflicted, so that volunteers not yet thirty-five whose term was about expiring found themselves retained in service regardless of consent. State organizations, except of militia, were turned over as a whole to the Richmond government, whose form of muster became for three years or the war. Another act, in September of this year, extended the conscript limit ten years, to the age of forty-five. For military purposes, each citizen was withdrawn from State interference and placed at the immediate disposal of the Confederacy.²

In finance the Confederate States of America rode already on the crest of a paper money inflation. Practically, though not by direct expression, a legal tender, the Confederate Treasury notes, whose tenor made them payable six months after peace, circulated as a forced currency. Confederate credit was based on the silver lining of a cloud that hung darker, until it burst. Gold and silver had suddenly disappeared, as at the North; there came a scarcity of small change, and next a deluge of foul and wretched paper tokens. Boxes of coin and family silver were buried secretly on the plantations, when families began to scatter, and treasures turned up years later with the chest decayed.

¹ Botts's Rebellion, 279, 280.

² Am. Cycl. 1862, 243-245; De Leon, c. 21. In some States, and particularly in Georgia, under Governor Joseph Brown, great opposition was made to such conscription as unconstitutional. But Confederate courts sustained it.

In vain did mass-meetings supplicate and presses denounce the growing prices; a bread riot might ruin the baker, but it could not bring down the market price of flour. The planter was crippled by the loss of his crop; and the unutilized cotton piled high in warehouses, for the torch of military retreat or for an enemy's booty. Stephens and other leaders would early have relieved the planting interest by inducing the Confederacy to purchase such produce from individuals and offer it as a security on public bonds placed abroad; but this the Davis administration disapproved. The Union blockade now cut off both imports and exports, like the pressure without bloodshed of a besieging host; pledges of customs furnished worthless security for the bonds; and for the long and wasteful strife of ill-success, the only real resource lay in loans and taxation impoverishing this people, aided by a currency which impoverished the more. Already to the South had come the days of depression and discontent by the time the misnamed "permanent government" was ushered in; yet through the gloom stalked the Confederacy's chosen despot whose incarnate will bent as little to clamor as it could break under adversity.¹

SECTION IX.

THE MISSISSIPPI CAMPAIGN.

The grand victory of the opening spring for the Union arms, and one of the most brilliant and significant triumphs, indeed, of the whole civil war, was the capture of New Orleans. This was the best fruition of those naval expeditions along our Southern coast already described, which gave to rebellion its first forecast of defeat.

In the middle of November a council, convened at Washington at the instance of the Navy Department, gave the present enterprise a formal sanction.² Earlier still, General

¹ De Leon, 165; 1 B. & L. 110; Am. Cycl. 1861, 144-153; ib. 1862, 250.

² This council consisted of the President, Secretary Welles and Assistant Secretary Fox of the Navy, Commander Porter, and General McClellan, at whose house the conference was held. 5 N. & H. 255.

Butler had sent part of a land force to Ship Island, midway between New Orleans and Mobile, for the purpose of aiding such naval operations as might eventually commence in either direction. Ship Island was likewise the chief rendezvous of the Union fleet in the Gulf, where Commander David D. Porter, while on blockading duty, gleaned some important facts concerning New Orleans and its defences which he laid in confidence before Secretary Welles, receiving the latter's confidence in return.¹ Both desired that an expedition to take New Orleans should be fitted out; which scheme McClellan indorsed, on the understanding that no heavy draft should be made upon his armies.² It had been shown at Hatteras and Port Royal that ships, though wooden, could strongly engage shore batteries if well manœuvred. A similar hazard on a greater scale was for a fleet of vessels to pass two considerable forts under fire; and on such a risk depended this new expedition, which the President heartily approved.

The choice of flag-officer for so daring an enterprise was happily made. David G. Farragut, now a captain ranking at the age of sixty among the highest, had spent an honorable life in the naval service, beginning with a midshipman's appointment when only eleven years old. Talent in the sea service since the War of 1812 had far outrun the chance for distinction; but though so advanced in years Farragut was as active and alert as a man of fifty.³ He was a typical sailor, bluff, hearty, courageous, honest as the day, and of jovial manners. The doubt rose rather from his Southern connections; for he was born in Tennessee and strongly allied by marriage with Virginian families, among whom he resided when secession broke out. Determined,

¹ Cf. Welles, in *Galaxy*, 1871, cited 5 N. & H. 253, and Porter in 2 B. & L. 24.

² 2 B. & L. 25.

³ He prided himself on his agility, and always (so he said) turned a handspring on his birthday. 2 B. & L. 57.

however, "to stick to the flag," he escaped North, and his wife forsook her relatives to follow him. Modestly reporting himself at Washington as ready for duty, Farragut cheerfully performed such routine work as the Secretary might assign him, biding his time until prejudice should soften. But tendered now a command which befitted only one of the highest rank on the naval list, his reply was worthy of a patriot. He accepted with a zealous confidence that he should succeed; he might not himself come back, — so he intimated, — but New Orleans would be won. Porter, pleased with his own junior detail, organized a flotilla to assist in the expedition.¹

Appointed under secret instructions early in the new year to command the Gulf blockading squadron, Farragut sailed from Hampton Roads on the 3d of February, in the model screw steamer *Hartford*, of twenty-five guns, which he made his flag-ship. Imparting his own buoyant energy to all his subordinates, he prepared his expedition at Ship Island with a practised eye for the minutest details, and with his fleet entered by mid-April the mouth of the Mississippi, sailing up to a bend, near where the critical passage must be made. There, about seventy-five miles below New Orleans, and twenty-five from the sea, stood Forts St. Philip and Jackson, nearly opposite one another, formidable works of old-fashioned masonry, of which the Union had been dispossessed when Louisiana seceded. Fort Jackson, star-shaped, lay on the west bank of the river; while Fort St. Philip was half a mile farther up on the east bank. Together these forts had an armament of over one hundred guns, and garrisons each of nearly seven hundred men. Below them both a raft of logs had been placed across the Mississippi as a barrier to be closed in danger. Besides these stationary defences the Confederates, aware by this time of an ap-

1862,
January-
February.

April.

¹ Welles in *Galaxy*, November, 1871; 5 N. & H. c. 15; 2 B. & L. 26, 70. Porter, who lived to enjoy the highest distinction in the navy after Farragut's death, claims to have "found out" Farragut for the chief command. 2 B. & L. 70.

proach, had collected at New Orleans some sixteen gun-boats, armed with iron prows, one of them, the *Manassas*, being an iron-plated ram. Another ironclad, scarcely completed, lay anchored as a stationary battery near Fort St. Philip. Long flat-boats, filled with resinous and inflammable pine knots (a Southern product), were ready to be launched into the midst of our wooden vessels, to ignite and disperse them. On Farragut's side were seventeen men-of-war and one hundred and seventy-seven guns, and Porter with his mortar-boat flotilla and towing steamships; while in the rear Butler's army contingent of 6000 men tossed in transports.¹

On the 18th of April Porter's mortar-boats opened a furious bombardment on Fort Jackson. This failed of full effect, and Farragut then decided to run the gauntlet with his ships, as he had all along expected to do, and take his chances. For, once taking a flag in the Gulf, as he wrote his wife, "the rest depends on myself."² Two of his gun-boats having first cut an opening in the log barrier for his fleet to pass through, the hero, at two in the morning of the 24th, made signal to sail. It was a quiet starlight night with a waning moon; all raft obstructions had been washed away, but the adverse current was strong. Farragut had prepared his ships for action by having their hulls painted dark, and hanging chain cables over the sides of each to protect its engine. Two naval columns were formed; the first following the east bank in advance, the second and heavier keeping behind by the west bank. Farragut had meant to lead off with the *Hartford*, which, as the conflict shaped, might have been his safer course. But he was induced not to run the exposure, and Captain Theodorus Bailey conducted the advance instead. Cool and intrepid, the latter swept all before him as his lighter and swifter column headed up the river, passing the gauntlet of the forts successfully and

¹ 5 N. & H. c. 15; 6 W. R. 708; 2 B. & L. 28-35.

² Farragut's Life, 208.

engaging the Confederate flotilla beyond. But the brunt of resistance had to be borne by the second column and by the *Hartford* most of all; Farragut, who watched intently from the shrouds, engaging Fort Jackson at close quarters as he approached. But now came down the fire-rafts, lighting up a scene of confusion with strong glare, and the *Hartford*, getting aground, was in a moment enveloped in flames, which darted up the rigging. With rare discipline, however, and presence of mind, the fire was quenched, and, backing out in good time, the flag-ship proceeded on her way, struck thirty-two times in the hull and rigging before Fort St. Philip was run, whose guns Farragut silenced. Brave deeds were performed upon other wooden vessels, Lee, Boggs, Wainwright, and Craven in particular distinguishing themselves. Some of the Union gunboats were disabled, and one, the *Varuna*, was sunk. The Confederate flotilla mostly perished at the first collision, and the ram *Manassas*, after failing to inflict the injury expected from her in the fight, was chased into shore, the next morning, and burned. There was noise and tumult enough while the passage lasted; each vessel groping for itself up-stream through canopies of smoke, in alternate gloom and blaze of light, while Porter's "bummers," as they were called, contributed to the incessant roar which had broken the profound silence of the night. But when Farragut's larger vessels had passed the two forts the affair was virtually over, and the conflict ended as suddenly as it had commenced, lasting but little more than an hour.¹

Making with his vessels a short halt above the second fort to repair their damage, Farragut pushed unopposed over the remaining distance until, on the forenoon of April 25th, his fleet came round the bend of New Orleans, having silenced in ten minutes the feeble batteries which guarded the southern approach not far from the land site of Jackson's old battle-ground. The Confederate general, Lovell, with only three thousand troops and a scarcity in powder and provisions to endure a siege, had hastily evacu-

¹ 2 B. & L. 39-47 (Porter); 5 N. & H. c. 15.

ated, leaving all other defences disregarded. Immense piles of cotton, coal, and timber were blazing on the levee—a mighty sacrifice—and belched their thick smoke upward, as the Union fleet turned the crescent in full sight and trained its guns upon the helpless city, swarming at the river's edge with angry but impotent spectators. Men cursed, and cocked their pistols when Farragut's detail walked presently from the landing to the City Hall to demand a formal surrender. There the mayor parleyed, hopeful of a rescue; and not until the 29th did a marine guard replace the floating emblem of defiance over that building by the stars and stripes. Meanwhile a Union flag which one of Farragut's officers had hoisted over the mint was cut down by rebellious rioters, who paraded with it through the streets in defiance and then tore it into shreds.¹ Porter, down the river, with the aid of Butler's infantry, compelled a surrender of the two forts by the 28th; and on the 1st of May, Butler, arriving at the city, received from Farragut full military possession.²

Farragut's achievement, nearly bloodless, but full of peril, was the prime naval exploit of the whole war. Gaining at a single blow the lower gateway of the Mississippi, and opening the opportunity of severing the artery of rebellion, he deprived the Confederacy of its most populous city, where centred workshops, shipbuilding, and commerce. This hostile population of one hundred and fifty thousand souls came safely through the furnace of affliction, and loyalty was renewed. Farragut's brilliant exploits did not end with the capture of New Orleans, but the running of the forts was his passport to fame immortal. Congress presently established the grade of rear-admiral to reward other gallant naval officers with himself, but to him was accorded later the supreme distinction of vice-admiral and admiral.

¹ Mumford, the ringleader, was hanged later for the offence by General Butler's order.

² 2 B. & L. 69, 95-99; 5 N. & H. c. 25; De Leon, 170.

Turning to military operations far up the Mississippi, we perceive new Union advances southward following the fall of Fort Donelson. The evacuation of Columbus marked the first receding step of the enemy, the ^{March.} next withdrawal being at Island No. 10, near the town of New Madrid in Missouri, opposite Tennessee, and at a point where the Mississippi among impassable swamps makes two large bends. To the island Halleck sent Pope with about 20,000 men, Foote, with his gunboats, coöperating. By cutting a canal to New Madrid at the upper bend,¹ the island was brought under such complete control that ^{April.} Foote received its surrender, April 7, without a fight, while Pope, intercepting the Confederate garrison on its retreat the next day, took over 6000 prisoners.² Farther progress down the Mississippi was now suspended, and Pope with almost his whole command soon steamed in the other direction, by way of Cairo and Paducah, until at Pittsburg Landing, far up the Tennessee river, his forces disembarked on the 22d of April.

The important operations which Grant's victories of February had opened up on that inland river line of the Tennessee and Cumberland, parallel with the Mississippi, claim attention. Fort Donelson's surrender, with its garrison, brought the ambitious and well-laid schemes of Southern strategy in the West to naught. The whole Confederate line, from Columbus to Bowling Green, was swept apart, and a hostile march threatened into the very heart of the Mississippi region. The disunited forces of Albert Sidney Johnston, all too meagre for the initiative, now sought separate flight. He himself retreated to the southeast, ^{February-} abandoning Nashville and Tennessee, while Beaure- ^{March.} gard, after hurriedly evacuating Columbus, hastened down the Mississippi. Had one capable commander on the Union side combined the military strength and resources of the West, and used this splendid opportunity with skill and

¹ First suggested by General Schuyler Hamilton. 8 W. R. 86; 5 N. & H. 296; 1 B. & L. 460.

² 1 B. & L. 430-463; 5 N. & H. c. 17.

energy, the Confederacy might have been split in twain, with Farragut's assistance, and the war shortened by at least a year. But while Johnston had full direction on his side, three generals divided the Union forces opposed to him. Halleck caught eagerly the import of the situation. "Give me command in the West,"¹ he telegraphed to Washington the day after Fort Donelson's capture, claiming this as his well-earned reward, while proposing, with politic intent, that Buell should be a major-general. But Buell preferred his separate department; nor was it until the 11th of March, when the President relieved McClellan of all duties of general-in-chief, that Halleck gained his coveted command at the West. Buell, in the meantime, taking no orders except from McClellan, reached the river bank opposite Nashville, nine days after the fall of Fort Donelson, in time to see that city peacefully surrendered to the division of troops loaned by him, which Grant now sent back by way of the Cumberland in rich repayment. Grant, in fact, occupied Nashville, simply reporting his advance, while his superiors were discussing plans by wire without once mentioning his name.²

Buell was too set, and withal too slow, to have taken full command; he was one who, despising personal inspiration, made it his pet theory of war to have always the heaviest battalions.³ Halleck, for comprehensive plans and the combining faculty, was by far his superior, and his fame at this time reached high-water mark. He had brought order out of chaos at St. Louis, had corrected abuses, and pushed a winter campaign with foresight and vigor. Grant, Curtis, and Pope, in their respective fields, had brought him great renown. But Halleck had limitations, as we shall see, and he was unjust to the greatest soldier now under him, whose resentment, though soberly expressed, has hurt him with posterity. It may have been mere personal unacquaintance, or jealousy, or prejudice arising from misreports to Grant's

¹ 7 W. R. 628 (February 17). Hunter commanded at Kansas.

² See 5 N. & H. 310, 311; 1 Grant, 319.

³ See Buell, 1 B. & L. 550.

injury,¹ or intentness upon cultivating more influential officers for his own advancement. It was Fremont who had given Grant the post of opportunity, and Fremont's successor only sent forward the man he found there. Halleck's generosity over Forts Henry and Donelson was chiefly for himself; he proposed promoting Grant, with two others who had taken no part in their capture; in published orders he coupled Grant and Foote together for honors, and that was his only recognition. But to McClellan he praised Charles F. Smith, Grant's subordinate, for "turning the tide" at Donelson, and in a fulsome strain he thanked Hunter for sending troops which enabled him "to win the victory." One would not have thought from such despatches that Halleck himself was in far St. Louis when those forts were won.² Pope he personally congratulated, a few weeks later, in a fervent strain, for Island No. 10; and Sherman, too, found him always kind.

Grant had gone on, as we have seen, with his river operations, and Halleck, feeling perhaps that he was getting too far away, began sending inquiries over a faulty telegraph line. Vexed at receiving no reply, he complained to McClellan that Grant had left his post for Nashville without permission, thus breaking a disparaging silence by harsh and secret accusation.³ McClellan in response authorizing him to act at his discretion, Halleck ordered Grant peremptorily to remain under arrest at Fort Henry and turn his expedition over to Smith. Grant obeyed, but explained, with laudable control of temper, that he had not been at fault. In ten days, and after Grant had repeatedly asked to be relieved, Halleck restored him to command, partly because March 8-13.

¹ When some one complained later to the President that this rising officer at the West was too fond of whiskey, Lincoln replied that he wished other generals would use some of the same brand. Carpenter, 247; 7 N. & H. 154.

² See 7 W. R. *passim*; 5 N. & H. c. 18; 1 Grant, c. 23.

³ "Satisfied with his victory, he sits down and enjoys it without any regard to the future. I am worn out and tired with this neglect and inefficiency. C. F. Smith is almost the only officer equal to the emergency." 7 W. R. 1860.

convinced of his own error, but partly, we may apprehend, because of Smith's extreme illness. That admirable general, whose personal relations with Grant were always free from rivalry, died the next month in camp. Halleck continued uncandid enough to give Grant the impression that McClellan had originated the order for arrest, which he himself had virtually asked for.¹

Upon resuming command, Grant found his invading column divided between Savannah, on the east bank of the Tennessee, and Pittsburg Landing, about nine miles farther south. The objective point sought was Corinth, some twenty miles distant, a town between the Tennessee and Mississippi rivers, at the junction of important railroads running east and south. Grant kept his headquarters at Savannah, as Smith had done, visiting Pittsburg Landing every day by boat, Sherman, who had now gone to the front with his division, being somewhat in the advance. Albert Sidney Johnston strengthened himself once more at Corinth, where Beauregard joined him with a new army, recruited with surprising speed, and containing the flower of New Orleans, that city not yet having fallen. The combined forces fortified, and Grant, assuming that all initiative was his own, resolved to move forward and attack the enemy in its intrenchments as soon as reënforced by Buell, whose arrival he now daily expected. For Halleck, on assuming command of the combined departments, had on the 16th of March ordered Buell to leave Nashville, where his army lay idle, and move with all speed to join Grant at Savannah.²

Wise in conception as this combined advance undoubtedly was, and with a great battle in prospect whose location alone was unforeseen, Halleck, Grant, and Buell were all somewhat to blame for what followed. Buell was in rather a ruffled mood; Grant held but a recent outranking commission, and, fresh besides from indignities which he supposed Buell's

¹ Cf. 5 N. & H. 312; 1 Sherman, 253, 257; 1 Grant, 318-328. It was not until after the war that Grant learned of the charges that Halleck had preferred against him at Washington.

² 1 Grant, c. 24; 5 N. & H. c. 18; 10 W. R. 42.

friend had placed upon him, exerted no pressure to hasten; Halleck, politic as possible to pacify the rival whom he had just deprived of a department, relaxed his original orders and permitted Buell to march leisurely to where Grant was massing.¹ Unfortunately, as it now happened, the enemy had resolved to move forward and fall upon Grant's army before Buell could arrive. The reunited Confederate forces which left Corinth, April 2d, now numbered strong, and Johnston was so eager to wipe out the stain of recent defeat by winning a great battle, that he ran imprudent risks against Beauregard's advice. Scarcely had Confederate infantry been detected in front at all, though cavalry skirmishing made Grant anxious, when, on early Sunday morning, the 6th, after some picket firing, Johnston's whole line of battle was seen bearing down on the Union camp.²

Two or three miles southward from Pittsburg Landing stood a little log meeting-house known as Shiloh, which shares with the river pier the name of that memorable battle which now raged through Sunday and Monday. It was for the Mississippi Valley the bloodiest fight April 6, 7. of the war, and few battles elsewhere equalled it in desperation. Shiloh, the key to the Union position at the landing, was held by Sherman, who, with McClellan's veterans on his left, bore the brunt of Johnston's impetuous onset and fought splendidly, winning new renown. The Confederate columns, aggregating 40,000 when the engagement commenced, with Bragg, Polk, and Hardee, those eminent generals, in important commands, made onward rush against the Union columns, hurled in mass now here, now there. The Union force on Sunday numbered not more than 33,000; and Prentiss's division, in the front, was made up mostly of raw troops recently arrived who had hardly handled a gun at all. The ground of battle was uneven and heavily timbered,

¹ 10 W. R. pt. 2, 70, 72; 5 N. & H. 318.

² 10 W. R. 94; 5 N. & H. 322.

protecting either side for close bush fighting; but precautions to intrench had been omitted, and from first to last the fight might fairly be called an open one.

Grant had passed the previous night at Savannah, where advance brigades of Buell's army reached him; and, hearing the firing on Sunday morning, he left by steamboat for Pittsburg Landing, directing General Lew Wallace, at Crump's Landing, an intermediate point, to be ready to move at once; but, owing to a misunderstanding of his marching orders sent later, Wallace did not report until the day's fight was over. After reaching the scene, Grant passed with his staff from one part of the battle-field to another, giving such orders as the situation suggested; but the fight, which had begun without him, raged with little system. On either side new positions were improvised in forest or ravine by division commanders, as each exigency required. The enemy pushed straight forward, with wild energy but immense loss, intending to gain possession of the landing-place and cut off all retreat. Sherman, repeatedly assaulted at the right, withstood every attempt to turn his flank; shot twice, and having several horses shot under him, he inspired all day by his courage and constancy the division he next supported, while his own men, though under fire for the first time, fought worthy of veterans. Directly in front, however, the Union troops were forced back repeatedly towards the river pier; and when firing ceased at sundown Grant's line was a mile in rear of the position it occupied in the morning, drawn closely to the shelter of two gunboats at the river front. In that situation, which lasted until Monday's dawn, Confederates rested near the river at the fork of a creek, and the gunboats dropped shells upon them all night at intervals.

About five in the afternoon, during one of the backward movements of the Union line, Generals Prentiss and W. H. L. Wallace were enveloped and surrounded with their divisions while trying to hold firm. Wallace, a brave and estimable officer who had taken the place of C. F. Smith, now sick at Savannah, fell, mortally wounded; while Prentiss was taken prisoner with 2200 officers and men of the two

divisions. Some two hours earlier the Confederate commander, Johnston, lost his life from a Minié ball in the leg, received while exposing his person as he rallied for a charge. Under Beauregard, next in command, the battle went on as it had begun. On the Union side thousands of new soldiers, panic-stricken and demoralized at the first fire, sought shelter of the gunboats; and Buell, who arrived personally in the afternoon, saw them cowering under the high river bank at Pittsburg Landing,¹ and tried in vain to shame them to their duty. Meanwhile the Confederates, from whom Johnston's death had been hidden, made strenuous effort at the left to sweep over the high ridge, down which was a clear descent to the river; but here Grant's artillery had been planted, which the gunboats aided on one side, while Sherman, McClelland, and Hurlbut stood impact on the other. At this critical juncture, and while the tremendous tumult, nearer and nearer at each moment, told Grant of this heroic struggle to cut off his retreat, he sat on his horse, silent, sober, almost stolid of countenance. "Does not the prospect begin to look gloomy?" asked one of him. "Not at all," was his quiet reply; "it is too late to force our lines around these batteries to-night. Delay counts everything with us. To-morrow we shall attack with fresh troops and drive them, of course."²

Grant's belief was right. His reënforcements had come at last. Beauregard at six o'clock ordered the battle to cease, after a terrible fight of eleven hours; and while his order was being executed, the first brigade of Buell's vanguard mounted the bank from Pittsburg Landing, led by Buell himself, and deployed at dusk in line of battle. Twilight succeeded, with forces in close proximity, and night, with a rain which fell in torrents; but for the Confederates,

¹ "The distant rear of an army engaged in battle," as Grant pertinently remarks by way of comment, "is not the best place from which to judge what is going on in front." 1 Memoirs, 345. And see *supra*, p. 79.

² 5 N. & H. 331, citing Whitelaw Reid, then a war correspondent, who heard this conversation, and dated from it the beginning of his own belief in Grant's greatness.

who had no reënforcements to expect, the drawn battle so well fought was precursor of the next day's utter defeat.¹

Lew Wallace, too, arrived, and his 5000 fresh troops relieved Sherman. Over night other welcome forces of Buell from Savannah were ferried across the river, and posted in superb condition under his direction. Grant made his headquarters under a tree, suffering from a swollen ankle, and unable to sleep with the wounded moaning near him; but before dark he had visited each division commander with reassuring words.² The tide now turned. On Monday morning, the 7th, Grant and Buell, as agreed upon, pushed forward jointly, with their respective forces. Buell, whose troops were 20,000 strong, fresh and well equipped, commanded on the left; Grant led the right with his decimated divisions partly reorganized. The plan, simply to advance together and drive the enemy back, was carried out with entire success; so that by early afternoon all the ground to Shiloh was recovered from which the Union army had been forced the day before, while the Confederates, sullen and worn out, retreated towards Corinth. Buell with cold civility awaited further orders, but Grant did not direct a pursuit. Of horrid carnage there was enough, indeed, to satiate on either side. Beauregard on the 8th sent back a flag of truce, asking permission to return and bury his dead; but under Grant's orders the corpses of both armies had already been interred.³

This ghastly battle-field preserves some notable incidents. It was from here that Sherman's fame took its second and steadier flight, while Grant's sank low. The discussions on either side to which those two days gave rise have scarcely yet ceased. Lew Wallace's tardiness should not be judged harshly; and Grant made later a splendid atone-

¹ 5 N. & H. c. 18; 1 Grant, c. 24; 1 B. & L. 465 *et seq.*; 1 Sherman, c. 10.

² 1 Grant, 348; 1 Sherman, 273.

³ The opposing forces at Shiloh are estimated: Union, 33,000 on the morning of the 6th, with 5000 of Lew Wallace and 20,000 to 25,000 of Buell as fresh troops for the next day; Confederate, not far from 40,000. Total Union loss, 13,047; total Confederate loss, 10,699. 1 B. & L. 538.

ment for any shortcomings on his part. Shiloh preceded those holocausts of the Peninsular campaign which taught the North the real horrors of war, and the public temper was still keenly sensitive and exacting. Many were the Western rural homes that lost some dear one in this conflict whose farewell pressure was scarcely cold; and why, people asked, was such instant sacrifice? It was the first day's loss they dwelt upon, disregarding the next day's victory. Grant made no official report of this battle. Charges most false and damaging were cast about, as to which that commander maintained an impenetrable silence. Buell's testimony has been constantly against him; and there is some force in his criticism, that, with a large hostile army known to be lying little more than a day's march away, headquarters at night should have been so far distant, with neither a line or order of battle formed, nor outposts, nor defences, nor even a hasty intrenchment with the spade to protect the front.¹ Grant bore in his heart the lesson of this battle as long as he lived, and happily the chance to profit by it was not denied him; for, through all storm of present obloquy, the President's appreciation remained his rock of safety. "I cannot spare this man; he fights," was Lincoln's earnest reply to an Eastern man of influence who made remonstrance at the White House against keeping him in command.²

Equally interesting discussions over Shiloh have arisen on the Southern side. Beauregard has been blamed for ending the first day's fight when he did; but military opinion sustains him. With Buell at hand, and his own troops worn out, the fates were by sunset against him; though the bitterest of defeats is that which was almost a success.³ Here, too, at Shiloh, in the thickest of the fight, fell that intrepid Confederate who had forced a battle on the hazardous chance of crushing first one Union army and then

¹ Buell in 1 B. & L. 487. Cf. *ib.* 465, etc.; 1 Grant, c. 23; 5 N. & H. c. 18; 1 Sherman, c. 10. It should be observed that the utility of hasty intrenchment in the field was not recognized on the Northern or Southern side thus early; by another year it was otherwise.

² McClure, 180.

³ 1 B. & L. 483, 588.

another. The slight wound he received was not likely to have killed him, had he not kept on in impatient zeal till he slid from his saddle to expire. Probably in his state of mind he would rather have died thus, than to return in defeat to Corinth. A tenderness touches the memory of Albert Sidney Johnston, that chevalier of Confederates, from whom the Davis government had expected the most. His very portrait seems a sad and haunting one, more like a hero remote from his times and country, and perhaps more remarkable of aspect, than that of any other general of our Civil War. With high cheek-bones there was a Scotch look about the face; clear steady eyes, kind but penetrating, flashed to a steel-gray under excitement, in proof of superiority; tall and well-built, active and hardy when the war broke out, he was yet of mature years, grave and thoughtful. He was sensitive on the point of personal honor and success; his pathetic letter to Jefferson Davis, after the fall of Donelson, shows how deeply he took to heart the passing censure of his fellow-citizens.¹ Of Johnston's personal daring there can be no question; and he died early in the self-sacrificing effort to redeem his fame from reproach. Yet we may doubt whether he could have become the formidable or supreme opponent he was expected to prove. Steadiness seemed wanting in his military judgment; he took risks without due precaution; and after all, in his brief career, high character and purpose are all that fame can safely accord him.² To the Southwest the results of Shiloh's battle were dispiriting and saddening, and New Orleans surrendered while the depression felt was deepest.

Halleck reached Pittsburg Landing on the 11th of April to assume for the first time command in the field. The information he gained of the late battle confirmed his belief

¹ 1 B. & L. 542 (by his son).

² 10 W. R. 98, 99. Grant's opinion (1 B. & L. 483) was modified in 1 Memoirs, 360.

of Grant's unfitness, and he telegraphed to Washington that the first day was saved by Sherman's good fighting alone. Pope's compact force of twenty thousand now joined him by water, flushed with the signal victory at Island No. 10, whose surrender was on the very day that Shiloh's fight concluded. With 100,000 choice troops at command Halleck on the 30th proceeded to reorganize, making the Army of the Ohio under Buell the centre, and Pope's Army of the Mississippi the left wing. Grant's Army of the Tennessee, which constituted the right wing, he placed under Thomas, who was detached from Buell for convenience. To Grant was assigned the nominal place of second in command; but, as Halleck ignored him, issuing all orders in person and keeping headquarters with the right wing, Grant found himself for the next two months a mere cipher.¹

The march for Corinth was now taken up, with only about some twenty short miles to traverse. But excellent for bringing together so vast an army, Halleck soon showed himself quite out of his element in conducting it to conquest. Having the lesson of Pittsburg Landing fresh in mind, he advanced with the very opposite to Grant's alleged temerity. With about treble the force that could possibly have been brought against him, he fortified against surprise instead of pushing confidently on; advancing May. as it were by parallels. The President had put no such restraint upon him as upon McClellan, but had given him free range, anticipating a brilliant advance.² Bridge-building, road-making, and intrenching were the order of the day; and, as Sherman picturesquely described it, an army carrying a hundred thousand bayonets moved upon Corinth with pick and shovel. "It was a siege," says Grant, "from the start to the close."³ Accomplishing without bloodshed in more than a month a march which had taken Johnston's army two days, and need have occupied him scarcely longer,

¹ 5 N. & H. c. 19; 1 Grant, c. 26.

² "I have no instructions to give you; go ahead, and all success attend you." 10 W. R. pt. 2, 99 (Stanton, April 9th).

³ 1 Grant, 376.

Halleck entered Corinth, May 30th, only to find that Beauregard's army had abandoned its intrenchments, and was retreating leisurely to points fifty miles farther south. Instead of capturing, or at least using his chance to cripple and harass an army, he had simply manœuvred it out of a strong position.¹

But Halleck's military judgment is impugned still more by what next followed. Magnifying what the country accepted too credulously as a grand victory, he "sat down to enjoy it," as he had once charged his junior with doing. Civil discipline seemed to interest him more than conducting his splendid host to Atlanta or Vicksburg, so as to finish the long-purposed task of severing the Confederacy. Before leaving Pittsburg Landing he had been apprised that Farragut had captured New Orleans and was pushing up the Mississippi River; and never was the time so fit for their coöperation. For, as a gain in taking Corinth, Halleck turned the last Confederate strongholds on the upper Mississippi, compelling their evacuation down to Memphis. Cut off from succor by land, Memphis itself fell on the 6th of June, after a dramatic naval combat on the river, which was witnessed from its high bluff by the anxious inhabitants.² But with this naval victory won by Flag-Officer Davis as Foote's successor, the great Tennessee campaign begun by Grant's reconnoissance from Cairo five months earlier came to a premature end; for Vicksburg still blocked the highway of the Mississippi, and the remnant of Confederate resistance centred in its strong defences, which every month made more impregnable. Farragut, after running the enemy's batteries at Vicksburg in defiance, had to drop below when the river fell, all hope of coöperation vanishing.

Confederates at the West were now reduced, for communication with Richmond, to the single line of railroad running east from Vicksburg. Hence the possession of Corinth as a railroad centre was important; far less so, however,

¹ 5 N. & H. c. 19; 1 Grant, c. 26; 1 Sherman, c. 11.

² See 5 N. & H. c. 19; 1 B. & L. 451-459.

than Halleck seemed to regard it. Here he began fortifying on an immense scale, as though, to use his own words, Richmond and Corinth were "the great strategical points of war."¹ And instead of keeping as a unit the splendid army which with so much skill he had fashioned together, he now broke it up, dispersing the fragmentary bodies in all directions for the mechanical toil of repairing railroads, which were destroyed by Confederates almost as fast as put in order. Buell's army he permanently detached and sent east to Chattanooga by a like toilsome means of approach, when a rapid march might have prevented ills which later befell him. Resuming at his Corinth headquarters the congenial task of administration, he issued orders against disloyalists of the neighborhood, threatening hemp to the burners of bridges and cotton bales,² and excusing himself from aiding either Farragut or McClellan because of his diminished forces. Meantime, toward his junior, who viewed these proceedings with repressed disgust, he maintained a stern demeanor, and Grant's position became so unendurable that he repeatedly asked to be relieved. But when permission was given, Sherman urged him so strongly to remain in the department, citing his own vicissitudes to comfort him, that Grant changed his mind, and simply removed to Memphis, as Halleck permitted him to do.³

All this turned out most fortunately; for on the 11th of July Halleck received telegraphic orders appointing him to command all the armies of the Union, with headquarters in Washington; and Grant, as next in rank, was summoned back to Corinth.⁴ Halleck left here a budget of unfinished

¹ 10 W. R. pt. 1, 667.

² 16 W. R. pt. 2, 14.

³ 1 Grant, c. 27; 1 Sherman, 283.

⁴ 1 Grant, 393. Halleck had wired Stanton to learn whether he should turn his command over to his next in rank, or expect some other successor. 17 W. R. pt. 2, 90, 91. He was uncommunicative with Grant on his departure, though Buell and Pope were already detached. Halleck's order under which Grant chafed so greatly, was probably intended for reproof. So Sherman always understood it; and of Halleck's personal dislike of Grant there can be no question. But cf. McClure, 181, who asserts that the President planned this "junior" arrangement so as to shield Grant from censure.

plans, such as hindered the Western campaign another year. With those errors not yet revealed, his actual achievements placed him foremost in the country for his higher distinction. Put to full proof, however, Halleck's genius fell far short of the grand requirements of general-in-chief. Though the best technical scholar of his profession and a good fighter by the chessboard, he never really mastered the practical art of war; and while a competent adviser at Washington in many ways, he would thrust the decision upon the President. He did not personally take the field again, but, overshadowed more and more by others, he cloistered himself in the War Department, where he soon became in reality, what technical orders came to style him, the President's chief of staff.¹

SECTION X.

McCLELLAN'S PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

We have seen McClellan antagonizing President Lincoln as between making a forward or oblique movement upon Richmond for his long-deferred campaign. While the stubborn young commander gained his way for his own plan, which he was reluctant in disclosing at all, he strained relations at Washington and increased the dissatisfaction in high circles which had developed because of his inaction. In early spring an important circumstance made distrust of him all the greater. Joseph E. Johnston, who had kept his splendid army at bay all the winter with a third to a half the force, retreated stealthily from Manassas Junction, and in a way that covered the Rappahannock River and deprived McClellan of the Urbana route he had most desired to take.² The preparations to retire began, with Davis's

¹ 5 N. & H. c. 19.

² Hughes, 107. The route to Centreville which Lincoln favored was the one Johnston thought most difficult to oppose. 5 N. & H. 175. He had considered the various routes by which McClellan might approach the Confederate capital, and dropped backward accordingly; not, however, supposing that McClellan intended to operate by Urbana.

approval, on the 22d of February; on the 5th of March he issued final orders, and on the 7th began to move. He marched deliberately, writing, on the 15th, "McClellan seems not to value time especially."¹

Whatever the merits as between the President's plan and McClellan's, — neither of which could have dispensed with hard fighting, — McClellan's reputation was much damaged when Johnston's withdrawal revealed March. "Quaker guns" placed for a bold appearance, and other signs of inferior strength. The long blockade of the Potomac, now relieved, and an annoying situation at Harper's Ferry had also exposed McClellan to censure.² Taken wholly unawares by this new and mortifying incident, our commander used Johnston's retreat to give his men some exercise.³ He marched his army down to Centreville and Manassas, and then marched it back again; roads seemed no longer impassable; yet, so far from yielding aught under the changed circumstances to the President's wishes, he prepared with complacency, Urbana failing him, to make Fortress Monroe and the peninsula his Chesapeake base of operations. Lincoln, in the meantime, assuming that McClellan had at length taken the field, asserted his higher prerogative, March 11th, by a new Executive order which relieved him of all commands other than that of his immediate army.⁴ McClellan accepted this curtailment without open offence; and it was agreed in a council of war that, with a force sufficient left behind to guard Manassas and leave Washington entirely secure, he should be free to descend the Potomac and locate at his sole discretion. By the 5th of April, 121,500 men, with horses and an enormous quantity of equipage suitable for so large an invading army, had been admirably transported by water to Fortress April. Monroe, in compliance with the peninsular plans.⁵

¹ 5 W. R. 1101; 5 N. & H. c. 10.

² 2 B. & L. 164.

³ Own Story, 22.

⁴ This order, which gave Halleck the full command at the West he had so much desired, Lincoln prepared himself, and issued it over his own signature with the full approval of his Cabinet. 5 N. & H. c. 10.

⁵ 5 N. & H. c. 10; 5 W. R. 46-50.

But McClellan left far fewer troops to cover Washington than had been agreed upon; on proof of which disobedience, McClellan having already departed, the President withheld McDowell's corps from joining him until further orders.¹

On the same day that Johnston's retreat from Manassas was made known at the White House, a sea encounter occurred at Hampton Roads, off Fortress Monroe, which revolutionized in effect the naval warfare of the civilized world.

March. This was the ironclad combat of the *Monitor* and *Merrimac*. On both sides American inventive genius had been at work over armor-plated vessels and the use of the ram, public appropriation having been made for experiments.² At the Tredegar works in Richmond, the *Merrimac*, rescued by its captors when Gosport navy yard burned, was converted into an ironclad. A wedge-shaped prow of cast iron projected about two feet in front of this vessel; while a wooden roof, sloping to the water's edge, was covered with two iron plates of armor, inside of which was placed a battery of ten guns.³ On the Union side the Navy Department, from the plans submitted, chose that of John Ericsson, of New York, a man of scientific acquirements, Swedish by birth but an American by adoption. His *Monitor*, a craft of careful model and superior workmanship, seemed almost providentially constructed to engage the clumsier *Merrimac* at the right moment. For sea service it was defective; but in light draft and nimbleness of motion it was well suited for shoal harbors and rivers. Like a "cheese-box on a raft," as well described by the Union press, this ironclad presented only a thin edge of surface above and below the water line, while an iron turret revolved in sight from which two large guns might be rapidly trained and fired.

Three wooden Union frigates of the older pattern lay at

¹ 5 N. & H. c. 10. Cf. 2 B. & L. 68, where McClellan claims that he left a sufficient force to defend Washington, but does not deny his disregard of arrangements. Sumner had thought 40,000 requisite; the other corps generals called it 25,000. McClellan left 19,000.

² 1 B. & L. 631.

³ 1 B. & L. 692.

anchor under the guns of Fortress Monroe, and two others near Newport News, farther within the bay, when about noon on Saturday, March 8th, this reconstructed *Merrimac* plowed suddenly towards them from the mouth of the James River near Norfolk, under an armed convoy. The three nearest frigates slipped their cables at once, expecting an easy encounter; but, being all of deep draft, they soon ran aground in low water. From Newport News the two other frigates, with shore batteries besides, opened fire upon this strange craft which looked like some huge, half-submerged crocodile; but, to their amazement, the iron hail bounded from the sloping back of the dark leviathan like rubber balls. On came the monster, and crashed her iron prow into the *Cumberland*, which sank in forty-five minutes, carrying down officers and crew; and the colors still floated at her mast-head as the *Merrimac*, hovering about her, sent shot into the defenceless hull. Next turning upon the *Congress*, which had made for shore, the *Merrimac* took up a raking position and riddled her with hot shot and shells, until after fearful carnage that vessel burned until midnight, when explosion of the magazine made an end of her. Drawing off at dusk, the iron champion returned with its convoy to the Norfolk side and anchored under the guns of Confederate batteries until morning.

The day's news carried consternation to Washington. This strange and terrible engine of war, impervious to our heaviest shot, what irreparable damage might it not inflict? Two of the three frigates that had run aground were with difficulty drawn off; but the *Minnesota*¹ stuck fast, the first probable victim of the next daylight. Deliverance was providentially at hand, neither summoned nor sent for. By the light of the burning *Congress* the puny *Monitor* from New York was towed into Hampton Roads late that very evening, and, under the brave Lieutenant John L. Worden, took station near the stranded frigate. On Sunday morning the *Merrimac* approached, like a Goliath, sure of the prey; but the pygmy, like David, advanced to meet her. A single

¹ Twin-frigate to the original *Merrimac*.

combat of three hours ensued, which spectators lining both shores viewed with prolonged wonder and eagerness. It began a duel of the invulnerables, and ended with no obvious impression made on either adversary; but the lighter craft, by forcing the heavier to withdraw, gained the essential victory. The *Merrimac* was twice the *Monitor's* length and breadth, and carried five times as many guns. Her great draft compelled her to manœuvre in deep water, while the Ericsson craft, drawing only ten feet, could run where she pleased and bring her guns to bear upon an iron target far broader than her own. The *Merrimac* began leaking, and there was danger of penetrating the joints of her armor; she rushed in vain to sink the agile foe, having lost her iron prow the day before; and, just as the second in command on the *Monitor* relieved Worden, who had received a slight injury while in the pilot-house, the *Merrimac* started on her retreat, refusing further fight.¹

Wooden walls, however, won the victory at New Orleans; and gunboats on our Western rivers, only partially protected with iron chains or plates, did good service against the more imposing, but ill-built Confederate rams and armor-plated craft, which never did such deadly work again nor caused such terror as on this first occasion. The valiant *Monitor* soon lent her name to a whole Union fleet, built after the turreted model, which operated before Charleston and Richmond; and, the world over, naval ingenuity entered upon a new era of invention, which has hardly yet, at this late day, perfected its experiments.²

McClellan's peninsular campaign began on the 2d of April, under auspices of failure. Congress and the administration more than half disbelieved in his capacity to fight; and the route he had insisted upon taking

¹ For full descriptions of this fight from each adversary's point of view, see 5 N. & H. c. 13; 1 B. & L. 692-703. The *Merrimac's* engines were poor, and fear was felt of a falling tide. The pilot-house arrangement of the original *Monitor* was afterwards improved.

² 5 N. & H. c. 13.

vexed the administration greatly.¹ From proud contempt for his political rulers, he had now come to hate them intensely; and a morbid belief seized possession of his mind that they were intent upon crushing him instead of the Confederacy.² This was a monstrous injustice to both Lincoln and Stanton, for they earnestly and sincerely wished the war waged to good purpose, and aided him with single-minded effort for the public welfare. One of two things he should have done, however, if fixed in such an opinion: he should have thrown up the task as too full of risk, or else taken the splendid means at command and won good will by deeds of prompt and desperate valor. Taylor, in the Mexican War, won Buena Vista, his most brilliant field of fame, under some such sense of wrong; and with that sting at heart, Lyon would have conquered at Wilson's Creek, had his force approached the enemy's in numbers. But McClellan chose neither alternative. With a noble and overwhelming army devoted to him, he was as slow, unready, and timorous as before. The same disposition to await reinforcements was visible as in the months already wasted; the same stubborn determination to have his way in things small or great; the same petulant faultfinding which was embittering relations at the capital and goading Stanton into fury against him. Not a sign seems to have escaped him that he possibly had erred, or that deeds and not words must reinstate him fully in public confidence. In his sublime egotism he viewed himself as the sole preserver of the people, not in a military sense alone, but against what he deemed the political infatuation of the party and men in power.³

¹ On his own retrospect he concedes that from its political importance abroad and at home, Washington ought not to have been endangered. Own Story, 97.

² See private letters of early April about "the wretches and their rascality," etc. Own Story, 310.

³ He even made it a personal offence that Stanton ordered all recruiting stopped, which had been done in pursuance of the wishes of Congress, without personal reference to himself; though doubtless it was done unwisely. Am. Cycl. 1862, 203.

McClellan's long survival of the Civil War enabled him to make the amplest excuses for his military ill-success. Even his official report of the present campaign, written a year later, when a prospective Presidential candidate, made good avail of the afterthought. Lincoln and Stanton were dead long before his "Own Story" was published,¹ with those current letters which betray his passionate antagonism while he commanded. His propensity to figure down his own numerical strength, and figure up that of the enemy, was almost a monomania. Under any showing, his force greatly exceeded that opposed to him; and for a critical part of this campaign it was about twice as great. Grant's campaign at the West might have taught him that on the Southern side the precious months after Bull Run had not been utilized as at the North, hence the coming conscription.² McClellan charges that there was a conspiracy at Washington to conduct the war for abolition, and not for Union, and hence to ruin him because he was not in favor of that policy. The idea of attempting to ruin him by ruining his campaign is preposterous; but a problem was developing through the stubbornness of the South, which no serious President could ignore. McClellan, conservative in politics, was already in the toils of politicians opposed to the Government in dealing with that difficult problem. This best explains his long despatch to the President, dated July 7th, from Harrison's Landing, but probably composed much earlier. In it he adjured Lincoln not to look to the subjugation of the people of the Southern States nor do more than conquer their opposing armies; it advised him to discourage military arrests and the plunder of Southern property; it warned him solemnly that "a declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies."³ This letter the President

¹ And see his narrative, 2 B. & L. 168, etc. For official report, see 11 W. R. pt. 1, 5-105, made August 4, 1863.

² De Leon, 175. Southern conscription was not until April 16 and later. *Supra*, p. 168.

³ 5 N. & H. 449. In the military arrests of 1861 McClellan had borne his approving part.

received into his hands in silence; he must have felt convinced, however, that some things in heaven and earth were hidden from a military philosophy.¹

Of Lincoln's ability McClellan had no high opinion; though thinking him fair-minded, of easy disposition, and a capital story-teller, but too much swayed, at the present time, by his Secretary of War. Upon the latter his hatred chiefly fastened, as a double-faced friend and a mischievous marplot against the country's good. Stanton may be heard in his own defence. "When I entered the Cabinet," he confidentially wrote a friend, May 18th, "I was, and for months had been, the sincere and devoted friend of General McClellan; and to support him and, so far as I might, aid and assist him in bringing the war to a close, was a chief inducement for me to sacrifice my personal happiness to a sense of public duty." He had held in the winter very many earnest conversations with McClellan, "to impress him with the absolute necessity of active operations, or that the government would fail because of foreign intervention and enormous debt." Until, by the President's express direction, he detained McDowell's army corps, and troops that McClellan did not need and could not have employed, there had never been, he thought, a shadow of difference between McClellan and himself. "It is true that I thought his plan of operations objectionable, as the most expensive, the most hazardous, and most protracted that he could have chosen; but I was not a military man, and, while he was in command, I would not interfere with his plan, and gave him every aid to execute it." "The official records will, at the proper time, fully prove that I have employed the whole power of the government unsparingly to support his operations in preference to every other general; that I have not interfered or thwarted them in any particular."²

¹ 5 N. & H. c. 24; Own Story, 444, 487. A copy of this McClellan sent to his wife to be carefully preserved. In 1864 the document served for a Presidential campaign.

² 19 W. R. pt. 2, 725-728. Concerning the political motives imputed to himself, Stanton said: "I am not now, never have been, and never

The President had made at least one wise observation over the conflicting plans: That going down the Chesapeake would shift rather than surmount the difficulty of a campaign—that there would be found the same enemy, with the same or equal intrenchments.¹ Yet McClellan's arrival by the peninsula route was a surprise to the enemy, and hence an advantage to be quickly improved. Reaching Fortress Monroe on the 2d of April, he had ready for march the next day fifty-eight thousand men, the flower of our soldiery; and by the 5th more than twice that number had been transported to him.² In artillery he was far superior to his adversary. The first obstacle was Yorktown, the seat of Cornwallis's famous surrender in the previous century. Here the Confederate General Magruder, with a force of eleven thousand men, of whom more than half manned the forts, held a thin line of thirteen miles across the peninsula. To break this line was McClellan's easy task, while Wool, at Fortress Monroe, protected the rear. Instead of this, McClellan settled down for a regular siege. "With five thousand men, exclusive of the garrisons," boasted Magruder, in his official report, "we stopped and held in check over one hundred thousand of the enemy"; "to my utter surprise he permitted day after day to elapse without an assault."³ That the Confederate lines could easily have been pierced within a week is now certain; in which case Yorktown must have quickly fallen.⁴ But McClellan toiled for weeks in constructing formidable bat-

will be a candidate for any office. . . . If I wanted to be a politician or a candidate for any office, would I stand between the Treasury and the robbers that are howling around me? Would I provoke and stand against the whole newspaper gang in this country, of every party, who, to *sell news*, would imperil a battle? I was never taken for a fool, but there could be no greater madness than for a man to encounter what I do for anything else than motives that overleap time and look forward to eternity. I believe that God Almighty founded this government, and for my acts in the effort to maintain it I expect to stand before Him in judgment." *Ib.* 727.

¹ 11 W. R. pt. 1, 15.

² 5 W. R. 46.

³ 11 W. R. pt. 1, 406.

⁴ Webb's Peninsula, 59; 5 N. & H. 367.

teries and siege-works, permitting not a cannon to be fired until all was ready. With Parrott guns, mortars, and howitzers brought up; with redoubts and parallels, incessant toil in the trenches, and a depressing activity, unrelieved by the excitement of combat, some four weeks passed. Reënforcements meanwhile poured in on the Confederate side, until Joseph E. Johnston, who came to the rescue with a force nearly half that of McClellan's, watched these prodigious preparations behind guns so old-fashioned as to be quite out of range. On the night before the 4th of May, just as McClellan's batteries were ready to open together, he evacuated, playing the game May. with which Beauregard baffled Halleck this same month at Corinth. Yorktown was won without a fight; but the Confederate army, intact and in good spirits, had yet to be conquered, and a precious month was wasted.¹ Few lives had been lost in the siege, but McClellan did not carry forward as good an army as he took to Yorktown.

At the same time with this tedious and faint-hearted initiative, began that acrimonious arraignment of the Government which McClellan continued while he remained in service, or, indeed, as long as he lived. A first grievance was that Wool, the veteran general at Fortress Monroe, was allowed an independent command; and hence, with Dix substituted, those ten thousand troops were placed under his control. Next, the navy had not actively assisted in reducing Yorktown; but this was duly explained, and the navy, in fact, stood ready to give, and gave him, all the assistance suitable. Jealously insistent upon disliking the corps commanders that the President appointed without his consent, — so that he would not consult them, — he was at length allowed to make two more provisional corps, over which he appointed Fitz-John Porter and Franklin.² He treated with contempt the President's admonition that he and his favorites were provoking enemies in Congress by an arro-

¹ 5 N. & H. c. 20; report of General Barnard, McClellan's chief of engineers, 11 W. R. pt. 1, 129, 130.

² 11 W. R. pt. 3, 154; 5 N. & H. 382.

gant demeanor such as the President himself might not safely assume.¹ But, most of all, McClellan fought stubbornly the retention at Washington of McDowell's corps, and raised such clamor and remonstrance, that the President yielded far to his wishes.² First, against Stanton's advice, he sent on Franklin's splendid division; which, reaching the peninsula on the 20th of April, was kept idle in transports for over two weeks. For McClellan had always more troops on hand than he knew how to utilize, yet he was always calling for more still. Before the middle of June McCall's fine division of ten thousand was sent in addition, with a like superfluity as the result; and, finally, McDowell himself started with the lesser remnant of his corps and other reënforcements, and only a sudden and unforeseen emergency, to be later mentioned, compelled his change of orders.

No congratulation or encouragement from Washington could now avail anything. Struggling with a command and a responsibility for the initiative much too vast for him, McClellan subsided speedily into a despondent state of mind, which made energetic invasion impossible. He seemed to regard himself as his country's last hope, in a strait almost hopeless. While Lincoln bore his reproaches like an indulgent father, and Stanton, though hardening against him, coöperated all he could, his diatribes in confidence ceased not against the "abolitionists and other scoundrels," and against Washington, "that sink of iniquity," where he verily believed he had not a single friend.³ Such depression did not augur well for this distant campaign; and there were other causes for it. His confident

¹ *Ib.*

² McClellan's official reports showed that prior to June 15th, reënforcements to the extent of 39,441 reached him. 5 N. & H. 415. "I have raised an awful row about McDowell's corps. The President coolly telegraphed me yesterday that he thought I had better break the enemy's lines at once. I was much tempted to reply that he had better come and do it himself." *Own Story*, 308 (April 8th). Cf. Stanton's letter, 17 W. R. pt. 2, 726.

³ *Own Story*, 313, 317.

forecast of the advantages to be gained by the flank approach was not wholly realized, nor did he seize such opportunities as offered. Near Richmond, to be sure, he yet found the same army of Johnston's to be overcome; the same wretched roads to be traversed, and impediments to progress; the same heavy rains which, as Lincoln used to say, he seemed to think God sent upon the just alone and not the unjust. Maps of the region, too, were so imperfect that his armies had to grope their way in ignorance.¹ And, as the difficulty least brought into calculation, unhealthy and malarious swamps, which partly defended the enemy, caused fever and sickness to take such fearful hold of his troops as to enfeeble them from their arrival. Yet, for all this, he had got very close to the Confederate capital, and his army much exceeded that opposed to him.

Johnston, on retreating from Yorktown, posted his command at Williamsburg, the old colonial capital. Here, on the 5th of May, was fought a bloody battle as our Union vanguards came up, McClellan being behind at Yorktown most of the day, and no one clearly directing. This fight, McClellan says, was an accident due to the rapidity of pursuit. Hooker contended at odds the whole forenoon, when reënforcements near at hand might easily have been despatched to him; the heroism of Heintzelman and Hancock was much wasted; Longstreet, on the Confederate side, inflicted heavy loss. But Johnston was driven farther back on the retreat. By this time Norfolk had been evacuated by the enemy and the *Merrimac* was destroyed;² and on the 15th Johnston's army crossed the Chickahominy River and encamped three miles from Richmond in front of redoubts. It was a time of great anxiety at the Confederate capital; Congress adjourned hastily, President Davis sent his family to a place of safety, and Confederate

¹ 11 W. R. pt. 3, 151.

² Ordered by the Confederate government, but carried out as a Union exploit (May 10th, 11th) while President Lincoln with Secretaries Chase and Stanton were on a hasty visit at Fortress Monroe. 5 N. & H. 233-238.

archives were packed for removal. A gloomy sense of insecurity settled upon the city like a pall. McClellan pursued his march deliberately to the south bank of the Pamunkey, and on the 16th made White House Landing his headquarters and depot for supplies. His army was presently drawn in line far up on the Chickahominy, the right wing within about seven miles from Richmond. After throwing bridges across the latter stream he sent the corps of Keyes and Heintzelman over to the south side, retaining those of Sumner, Franklin, and Porter on the north.¹ On the 26th of May he informed the President that he was "quietly closing in upon the enemy preparatory to the last struggle."²

The Virginia peninsula lies between the York and James rivers, both of which flow into Chesapeake Bay. The Pamunkey River, as a tributary of the former, gave water access up to White House Landing. This line of the York River McClellan naturally chose for operations when he first arrived, because of the *Merrimac* and other obstructions at the entrance of the James to oppose him. But here the Chickahominy River was a disconcerting element, flowing finally into the James; for through the peninsula, where the Union troops were encamped, it wound about McClellan's base and separated Richmond and its environs.³ Worse than this, where the invading army operated there was a border of marshy land, swollen with water in rains, hard to bridge over securely, and deadly in its exhalations. McClellan's first choice of that route was natural under all the circumstances; but with the *Merrimac* destroyed and the James River opened quickly by our gunboats, as was done in compliance with his wishes by the 11th, a better approach to Richmond was presented, though that, too, had its difficulties. Yet he marched on to White

¹ 5 N. & H. c. 21 ; De Leon, c. 22.

² 11 W. R. pt. 1, 33.

³ The Chickahominy rises some fifteen miles northwest of Richmond and flows into the James about forty miles below that city. 2 B. & L. 174.

House steadily without change of plan. The President, accepting his selection, sent him word on the 18th that McDowell would march down toward Richmond so as constantly to cover Washington, but otherwise coöperating with his own left wing towards McClellan's right.¹

McClellan, on the retrospect, has largely attributed the failure of his campaign to the necessity he now found of dividing his army at the Chickahominy.² Yet the enemy suffered a disadvantage by that same stream, which he fails to appreciate. In fact, wherever posted, with Richmond but a few miles away, the time had come for hard and continuous fighting, for steady pressure by the invading column, and alertness to seize each military advantage. Nor was McClellan's position of so much consequence after all, provided the Chickahominy were a mere incident of the march, and not a place for encampment.

Johnston entertained by this time so poor an opinion of McClellan's aggressive disposition, that he planned to attack him on both sides of the Chickahominy before McDowell could make a junction. Afterwards, on learning that McDowell had returned northward, he determined to assail at once the two corps that McClellan had kept isolated on the south bank of that stream, taking advantage of recent rains which had swollen it so suddenly as to endanger communication. At "Seven Pines" (or "Fair Oaks") was begun, accordingly, on the 31st of May, a bloody battle, which ended the following day with a Confederate repulse. That McClellan had capable general officers under him, and

¹ 11 W. R. pt. 1, 27. With a noticeable distrust of McClellan it was planned at Washington that McDowell should command his own forces; but McClellan opposed at once, with temper, such independent control, and the point was conceded to him. McClellan in his report the next year, and constantly after, availed himself of Lincoln's order to McDowell as the reason why he had chosen the York and Pamunkey line of operations; but on this point the evidence is clearly against him. See Webb, Fry, etc., cited 5 N. & H. 384. Cf. 2 B. & L. 173. The Urbana route, which McClellan had most desired, probably suggested that line to him.

² 2 B. & L. 173.

troops who welcomed fight and fought finely, had been shown by an incidental encounter of Porter's corps on the 27th, in clearing out the region of Hanover Court House on the north bank;¹ and now that valor was repeated. Of the two corps south of the Chickahominy under Heintzelman and Keyes, the latter was the more exposed. With Daniel H. Hill in advance and Gustavus W. Smith May 31- and himself in reserve, Johnston hurled nearly June 1. two-thirds of his entire force² against McClellan's left wing, but received more injury than he inflicted. Johnston himself was wounded and borne from the field at the close of the first day's fight. Sumner did nobly; for, anticipating his orders a full hour, he crossed on his bridges from the north bank, just before they were submerged or carried away, and marched with decision to the rescue.³ North of the river, following this fight, still lay inactive most of McClellan's right wing, having neither lost a man nor fired a gun. McClellan himself had not crossed nor sent an order. Instead of pursuing still closer to Richmond, he halted with a caution confirmed by the elements. Rains which now poured for nearly half a month made the ground soggy and soaked, so as to afford no sure standing-place for horse, foot, or artillery; most of the bridges were lost, and the invading army, still cut in two by the flooded river, gave itself to intrenchment and the toilsome use of the spade, until, toward the last of June, when all was clear weather again, a new Confederate attack, under a new leader and with a newly recruited army, brought on the fight again.⁴

¹ 1 B. & L. 319-321.

² Cf. 2 B. & L. 211; 5 N. & H. 387.

³ This splendid service was Sumner's only requital for the studied neglect with which McClellan had treated him ever since his appointment to an army corps. 5 N. & H. 389.

At this time the Union army had present for duty 98,000, of whom 5000 were on detached service. Johnston estimates his strength at 73,928, while other authorities make it 62,696. Of those engaged in the Fair Oaks fight, there were present for duty on the Union side 51,543; on the Confederate side about 39,000. 1 B. & L. 218, 219. The Union side lost in two days 5031, and the Confederates 6134.

⁴ 5 N. & H. c. 21; 2 B. & L. 178.

McDowell's force had been recalled by the President, May 24th, because of a menace to the capital, and from no indisposition to sustain McClellan, who received notice at once of the change. "Stonewall Jackson" was now campaigning through the Shenandoah, a valley which, walled between two lines of neighboring mountains, afforded eastern gaps for escape towards Richmond. The rapidity of Jackson's movements enhanced the impression of his genius; but, with all the romantic spell he exercised, he was not invincible. In March, ordered by Johnston to occupy the attention of Banks in the valley, he drove Shields rapidly to Winchester; Banks came down from Harper's Ferry the next day, and Jackson, repulsed by a superior force, was driven down the valley.¹ This was his first Shenandoah campaign. His second began in early May, more effectively and with a much larger force than opposed him. Banks was then at Strasburg with about sixty-five hundred men, Shields's division having been taken from him to swell McDowell's promised column, then on its way to McClellan. Jackson, joined by Ewell,² made a swift and stealthy march northward, and compelled Banks to retreat by the 25th toward Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, after an unsuccessful stand at Winchester. Thus was it that the President at once stopped McDowell in his southward march and, diverting twenty thousand of his column³ toward the Shenandoah, tried, by combining McDowell, Banks, and Fremont, to pen Jackson up in the valley; but the plan failed, as triple combinations are apt to do, and Jackson slipped through the gap at Strasburg and rejoined his main army. Jackson's unique and dramatic character was seen to best advantage on such independent forays; for, schoolmaster that he was, he liked to impress his personal example upon young officers and teach them to endure like himself. Quick-tempered, and a stickler for good discipline, he would not readily bear the

¹ 5 N. & H. 401; 12 W. R. pt. 1, 379.

² His force numbered about 19,000. 2 Ropes, 118.

³ Numbering in all about 35,000.

errors of those who ruled over him;¹ nor was he half himself when helping out, as presently, the plans of other men. One secret of his celerity in march was due to the fact that he measured carefully the strength of his soldiers and rested them fully at convenient stages; and in operations of his own he preferred the unexpected, for mystery and surprise with an enemy he treated as an essential factor in successful fighting.²

With Johnston disabled,³ Lee, who had counselled much at Richmond headquarters, now took the Virginia command for the rest of the war. Both Johnston and Lee were competent commanders, men well trained to arms, appreciative of a foe, and considerate of all under them. Johnston had been trusted and idolized by his officers as skilled and honorable; but Lee's social standing and influence fitted him better for precedence. He now took the place of Shiloh's dead leader as the favorite of Davis, and was sure, as Johnston never could have been, of his government's firm support. Lee combined gentle bearing with strong determination in the field. Of handsome figure and presence, he had an elastic step, though not youthful; and on most occasions he preserved an even balance of mind, commanding his temper and suppressing the deeper emotions. True to each undertaking he attempted, he was ready to bear his full share of responsibility, neither seeking a scapegoat nor making excuses. At the same time, he depended greatly upon subordinates for the execution of his plans.⁴ This new commander, during the long weeks of rain and repair,

¹ Offended, the past winter, because Secretary Benjamin had granted a favor to one of his juniors without consulting him, Jackson tendered his resignation; but through the intervention of Johnston and Governor Letcher he was appeased by a sort of apology, and remained in service. 1 B. & L. 283.

² 1 B. & L. 297.

³ *Supra*, p. 202. After full recovery he was, in November, 1862, sent to the West.

⁴ Longstreet in 2 B. & L. 405.

had organized a strong Confederate force, raised by conscription. Under him served Jackson, Longstreet, the two Hills, Ewell, and other generals of promise. But McClellan, besides his famous corps commanders, Sumner, Heintzelman, Keyes, Porter, and Franklin, had Hancock "the superb," Hooker (known as "fighting Joe"), Couch, Kearny, Casey, Meade, and Reynolds, all coming into prominence. The opposing armies for the first time approached equality; and yet, counting effectives, McClellan had twelve to fifteen thousand more than his adversary,¹ exclusive of ten regiments that awaited his orders at Fortress Monroe.

Bright sunshine now dried the roads, and yet McClellan procrastinated. He had conducted a siege, but not once offered battle. "Jeb" Stuart, with his Confederate cavalry, rode from Richmond to the Pamunkey, the entire circuit of the Union army, between the 13th and 15th of June, and returned, with his information, June. unmolested. No clearer contempt for the invader's fighting energy or for the Union army could have been shown than in Lee's plan for forcing the fight against such a superior force, while nominally defending Richmond from imminent danger. He sent two-thirds of his whole force, about June 24th, to the north side of the Chickahominy to strike McClellan's right wing, and then, pressing and closing upon this magnificent army, drive it down the peninsula toward Yorktown, like a frightened herd of cattle. In such an enterprise he deserved and courted defeat by leaving the bulk of McClellan's army south of that river interposed between himself and Richmond, with only a paltry number to defend the capital, under Magruder.²

McClellan was in no frame of mind to emulate Austerlitz, or he would have quickly thrown his heavy column at the enemy's weak point to gain what he had marched for.

¹ Accounts of different writers have varied, but the official estimate of 92,500 (Union) to 80,762 is probably correct. 5 N. & H. 421. Another careful comparison makes 105,445 against 80,000 to 90,000. 2 B. & L. 315.

² 2 Davis 132; 5 N. & H. c. 23.

Morbidly dejected over his isolation, ready to impute to treachery McDowell's non-arrival, almost insanely possessed with the false idea that Lee's army outnumbered him by two to one, and hating more than ever those in authority at Washington, his mind was absorbed in magnifying the ills of his present position and planning how he might escape elsewhere and begin his campaign anew. He forgot that an opportunity unimproved can seldom offer again. The naval gunboats had gone up the James River, and, on May 15th, opened fire on the Confederate forts at Drewry's Bluff, twelve miles below Richmond.¹ In an irresolute, wistful way, McClellan long considered, without deciding, how he might join for close coöperation at that river and change his base.² Meanwhile, with most of his army south of the Chickahominy, and Hooker and Kearny only about four miles from Richmond, almost in sight of its steeples, he was sure of being cut off by Lee from White House, his present base. Thursday, the 26th, the "seven days' battles" began, on the north bank of the river, when Lee's forces, in the afternoon, fell upon Fitz-John Porter's corps at Beaver Dam Creek, or Mechanicsville, and were splendidly repulsed. Porter's position was a strong one and he held it with little loss, while the slaughter of the enemy, as well as its disheartenment, was great. Here was McClellan's opportunity to do as Porter now advised him, and march next day rapidly from the south side of the river upon Richmond with his main force, leaving Porter to check the enemy. Here, too, was a chance to change his base quietly to the James River without further sacrifice or molestation, supposing that his preference.³ But

¹ 2 B. & L. 263, 268.

² As early as June 18th he sent vessels loaded with supplies to the James River, and in a letter to Commodore John Rodgers, who commanded the flotilla, indicated such a purpose. 2 B. & L. 325 ; 11 W. R. pt. 3, 250.

³ See Longstreet's comment, 2 B. & L. 398. It was now almost certain that communication with White House would be severed, in view of the suspension of McDowell's movement, well known already. 2 Ropes, 166, 217.

McClellan, still hesitating, ordered his friend to retire to a point about four miles east, and await a new assault. There at Gaines's Mill, or the Chickahominy, Porter, on the 27th, with less than one-third of the aggregate against him, fought nobly and held his own. Yet during all that sanguinary day's work, of doubtful recompense, McClellan gave no intimation of an ultimate purpose, nor even aided Porter until late in the day. What inspired this second great feat of arms was the renewed hope that McClellan would break through to Richmond with his main army. Absent all day from the scene, McClellan summoned his corps commanders at night, and made it known for the first time that he meant to transfer his base to the James. That purpose, now fully undertaken, was accomplished in a masterly manner, Porter destroying his bridges behind him as he crossed the Chickahominy, and leaving Lee too completely surprised to follow with effect. Glendale, midway on the march, saw hard fighting; and from July, the horrid slopes of Malvern Hill, close by the James, where the last bloody battle took place, July 1st, Lee's forces drew off, shattered and torn, with a better estimate of the army that held them discomfited. Once again, and for the last time, — since here the Confederate defeat was disastrous, — a daring Union leader would have made a rapid march by the flank and taken Richmond. But retreat and the cover of the naval gunboats was McClellan's object, and he retired down the James to Harrison's Landing, declining further encounter. By his own admission, Malvern Hill was a great victory, but in result it only placed his gallant army on a new base; there to begin anew what had thus far been a campaign of despair.¹

McClellan had made a great retreat, but he had lost his stake; and neither on the Northern nor the Southern side could that fact be ignored. Profound joyousness succeeded dread and sorrow in the South; Lee's lustre was all the brighter for the rashness that he had shown. Unhinged by such protracted fighting, and tender, as he always was,

¹ 2 B. & L. 186 ; 5 N. & H. c. 23 ; 2 Ropes, c. 2.

of the lives committed to him, McClellan, while conducting this movement, put all his bitterness of soul into a denunciatory message, addressed to Secretary Stanton, which charged that the Government had withheld from him reënforcements. "If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army."¹ No President but Lincoln would have tolerated such insulting language, which was evidently meant to reach him; but, after a soothing reply, he went to Harrison's Landing, on the 8th of July, to sift the truth of conflicting reports, and found not only far more of a force comfortably lodged than had been intimated, but an army still fairly sufficient, in the opinion of McClellan's chief subordinates, to have taken Richmond if handled suitably.² It was here that McClellan served upon the President that political document to which we have alluded, as from one "on the brink of eternity."³ Stanton, though maligned, gave assurances of friendliness, which McClellan doubtfully reciprocated.⁴ Reënforcements had certainly not been intentionally withheld by the Government, if withheld at all.⁵

¹ 11 W. R. pt. 1, 61 (June 28); cf. ib. 51, 52. The incoherency of this despatch is proof of McClellan's mental perturbation. "Large reënforcements" he demands; yet he adds and reiterates, that if he had but 10,000 fresh men he could take Richmond. On the 1st of July he asked 50,000; and by the 3d reënforcements of over 100,000. 5 N. & H. 224. He still believed Lee's army was double his own.

² See the President's searching questions of July 13th, and McClellan's unsatisfactory answers. Over 160,000 had gone into McClellan's peninsular campaign, of whom 86,500 were figured as remaining, leaving 73,500 to be accounted for. Twenty-three thousand would cover all the killed, wounded, and missing. McClellan's returns admitted 88,665 present for duty; 34,472 absent by authority; and 3778 absent without authority. 11 W. R. pt. 3, 319-321; 5 N. & H. c. 24.

The total Union loss of the "seven days' battles" in killed, wounded, and missing was 15,849; total Confederate loss about 20,135. 2 B. & L. 315.

³ *Supra*, p. 194.

⁴ 2 Gorham, 3.

⁵ It is seen that McClellan had received the best part of McDowell's corps, never used as essential to him.

A dangerous crisis dawned upon the country, a grave military situation such as induced the governors of loyal States to recommence recruiting, and promise to the President a new and enormous levy. By July 2d the President called for three hundred thousand volunteers.¹ "We are coming, Father Abraham, three hundred thousand more" was the responsive refrain of a new song heard in the land. But Lincoln felt it his duty by this time to make some new military experiment. It was not a mere question whether the James River base was the true one. It might have been wiser perhaps to leave the Army of the Potomac in the peninsula under some new commander; but the temper of the times forbade, at all events, that McClellan should be tried there a second time. Out of McDowell's accidental retention had, in fact, developed new operations on the line covering Washington, which the administration had most believed in. In early spring three military departments had been established in Virginia, all independent of McClellan: that west of the Shenandoah under Fremont, who was thus given a new opportunity for fame; that of the Shenandoah under Banks; and that of the Rappahannock under McDowell. Such subdivision had not worked well, and, on June 26, just as the "seven days' battles" began, Pope from the West was appointed to command the new Army of the Virginia, with the forces of Fremont, Banks, and McDowell united, and all these officers placed under his orders.² John Pope, a Ken-
tuckian, born in 1823, a West Point graduate, and now, by rapid promotion, a major-general of volunteers, had made a good record at Island No. 10; but his present transfer proved unfortunate. The selection of any Western general for Virginia was, at the present crisis, of doubtful policy,

June.

¹ This, through Seward, was arranged so as to follow the formal invitation of loyal State governors and thereby lessen the public alarm. See 3 Seward, c. 12; 11 W. R. pt. 3, 362.

² 6 N. & H. c. 1. Pope was unexpectedly offered this command, and took it with reluctance. 2 B. & L. 450. Fremont, relieved at his own request, rather than serve under a junior, ended here his active service; but McDowell and Banks submitted with patriotic readiness.

and McDowell would probably have been a better choice. Pope was loud spoken and of free manners, wanting that reserve of high breeding that had prevailed at the Potomac so much under McClellan. He was vigorous, sanguine, given somewhat to boasting, not heedful enough of the means essential to his operations.

President Lincoln had left the vexed disposition of McClellan's army for his new general-in-chief to decide, also from the West, and, like Pope, somewhat magnified in fame through exploits whose chief credit belonged to others. Halleck, reaching Washington and assuming command on the 23d of July, left at once for the peninsula, where he arrived on the 25th, to confer with McClellan. He found him strenuous for remaining where he was and making a new effort to take Richmond; wildly incoherent about the reënforcements requisite, but urging with all earnestness that to withdraw his army from its present base would be demoralizing. Halleck did not assent to this; and his decision was to bring McClellan's army northward. On the 30th of July, after returning to Washington, he ordered the sick sent from the peninsula. This drew from McClellan various protests, until Halleck, more and more peremptory in his orders, required him to despatch troops speedily to Pope's assistance.¹ McClellan at last, August. on the 14th of August, began to comply, and on the 17th left Harrison's Landing, reporting at Alexandria on the 27th, when Pope's campaign was in a most critical state. Though ordered by the 3d to bring back his army to the Potomac line, orders, entreaties, arguments, and reproaches all failed to transfer it thither in due season.

Pope was well aware of the obstacles in the way of McClellan's coöperation, and had felt misgivings that it would fail him. He took great pains to establish friendly relations with McClellan, but the latter showed a civil aversion to confidence.² An error of taste may do even a

¹ Pope had only forty thousand to cover Washington and operate with; McClellan had about ninety thousand; and thus divided the enemy might fall upon one army or the other.

² 11 W. R. pt. 3, 295, 306 (July 4-7).

soldier more harm than an error of conduct; and Pope began his active campaign with a general order so injudicious that he forfeited at once the hope of zealous aid from these peninsula troops that he had most at heart. "I have come to you from the West," he proclaimed on the 14th, "where we have always seen the backs of our enemies; from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary, and to beat him when he was found; whose policy has been attack and not defence." "I presume I have been called here to pursue the same system and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to do so, and that speedily." This and other boastful phrases made an unwise comparison with these veterans which Western exploits could not justify, and still less the share he had borne in them. The Army of the Potomac, almost to a man, disliked to serve under him and aspersed him bitterly, while Lee and his command made it their determined effort to give him that sight of an enemy which he claimed never to have had.¹

"Stonewall Jackson" had been sent, in July, on another of his meteoric raids northward, where "more men and no orders" was his reported request. At Cedar Mountain, August 9th, Banks fought him well, and he retired to the Rapidan. Lee, now convinced that McClellan's army would leave the peninsula, sent Longstreet to Jackson's assistance, intending to concentrate heavily upon Pope before the latter could be reënforced. With great difficulty Pope held, for more than a week, the north bank of the Rappahannock, preventing the foe from crossing, hopeful that reënforcements from the peninsula would soon arrive and enable him to take a vigorous offensive. Displaying audacity and swiftness, Jackson outflanked Pope's army and then stationed himself near the battle-ground of the year before, where Longstreet joined him. There near Groveton,

¹ 12 W. R. pt. 3, 474; 5 N. & H. 341. As published by the press, Pope's order was made more ridiculous by falsely dating it "head-quarters in the saddle." But this was merely a stale jest. 2 B. & L. 494.

on the 29th and 30th of August, and chiefly on the latter day, was fought the second fight of Bull Run, which Pope invited with somewhat incautious zeal, relying most upon the faithful McDowell, and upon Fitz-John Porter's corps, whose fighting capacity had made him sanguine. McDowell did his full duty; but Porter, listless and discontented, failed for some reason to coöperate, while Franklin's expected corps was despatched by McClellan to the front so tardily that it could not arrive and take part, and Sumner, besides, appears to have been held back. Pope fought, under very great disadvantage, a bloody and desperate battle, whose ill-success he mainly attributed to Porter for failing to execute his orders. Months later, McClellan's intimate, so illustrious in the "seven days' fight" and so promising, was court-martialled and dismissed the service, though persisting that he had obeyed all orders honorably.¹

Dejected at defeat, but most of all disheartened by the deep-rooted hostility shown towards him by the Army of the Potomac and McClellan, Pope now brought back ^{September.} his troops by way of Centreville to their intrenchments at Washington. "When there is no heart in their leaders," he wrote to Halleck, "and every disposition to hang back, much cannot be expected from the men."² McClellan's personal contempt for Pope was only less indiscreetly expressed than that of Porter, who bore later the transgression; for the course he inclined to take with his

¹ 6 N. & H. c. 1; 2 B. & L. 463, 695. Pope himself preferred no charges, though complaint was made in his report. Porter's sentence of January, 1863, stood unaltered for years after the war. Grant, while President, refused to reopen the case, though later he sided with Porter after examining all the testimony. A military board under President Hayes acquitted Porter of all blame except in unkind and indiscreet criticism of his superior officer. Later, a bill restoring Porter to the army was vetoed by President Arthur, but under President Cleveland (1886) and a Democratic administration, Porter was finally restored to the regular army and honorably retired. 6 N. & H. 12.

² Pope reported that about 20,500 in all — Heintzelman and Porter with Reynolds's division — were all of the 91,000 veterans from Harrison's Landing "that ever drew trigger" under him. 12 W. R. pt. 2, 46, 183. See further remonstrance, 12 W. R. pt. 3, 813-819.

troops after returning to the Potomac was not to coöperate, but to let Pope manage as best he might, while he himself should make the capital city safe against a Confederate invasion. Such was the purport of McClellan's despatch to the President himself on the 29th of August. Two days later, Halleck betrayed his own incompetency for the strain of chief direction, by asking McClellan to assist him in this crisis "with his ability and experience," for he was "utterly tired out." Washington was in danger; and "a total absence of brains and, I fear, the total destruction of the army," was McClellan's free-spoken opinion of the situation. On the 1st day of September, McClellan visited the President and promised his influence to correct the mutinous spirit now widely prevalent; and on ^{September.} the 2d the President committed to him the defence of Washington and the command of the troops from the front as fast as they should arrive.¹

There is no act of Lincoln's life for which he was so much criticised as this reinstatement of McClellan in military command; but it afforded convincing proof of his magnanimity and personal disinterestedness, and should have ended all complaint that McClellan was unfairly dealt with. This act was the President's own, fortified by Halleck; Stanton and Chase had reduced to writing, and induced two other Cabinet officers to sign with them, a remonstrance which they concluded to suppress;² but in the Cabinet there was a warm discussion over McClellan's recall to power. "He has acted badly towards Pope," Lincoln justly admitted to one in his confidence; "he really wanted him to fail." But he thought there was no one who could man our fortifications and shape our troops so well; "if he cannot fight himself, he excels in making others ready to fight."³ And

¹ Cf. 6 N. & H. 26, 27; Own Story, 535, 566.

² Mainly because Welles, while agreeing with them, thought it in bad taste to thus confront the President.

³ 6 N. & H. 23. Stanton in the Cabinet meeting made excited remonstrance, but the President said with emphasis that the order was his own and he would be responsible for it. The Secretary would not

so Pope and McDowell were banished from the activities of the war to distant posts, harshly dealt with, while "Little Mac" was restored once more to the supreme opportunity of military deliverer.¹ Failing again in the President's confidence, that failure must fairly have been conclusive of his incapacity. When we read McClellan's familiar letters of this date, wherein he unbosomed his strong and bitter feelings, the wonder grows that one who in sincerity of heart estimated his government so meanly, and his own importance to the country with such sublime conceit, should have turned out too prudent, instead of too bold a commander.²

SECTION XI.

EMANCIPATION PROCLAIMED.

The progress of antislavery sentiment in the United States down to the Civil War has been traced in our previous volumes. And it should be emphasized, in justice to our

permit it to issue in form as from himself, but required it to proceed rather as under Halleck's direction. 2 Gorham, 43, 44.

¹ 6 N. & H. c. 1. And see Pope in 2 B. & L. 449, describing his campaign. In an action, September 1st, with new forces, General Kearny lost his life. The opposing forces at the second Bull Run battle it is impossible to state with precision; but Pope had probably 63,000 and the Confederates 54,000, of all arms. This includes (exclusive of Banks who did not arrive) the Potomac reinforcements. Losses are estimated: Confederate, 9474; Union, 14,462. 2 B. & L. 500.

² See Own Story, c. 27, contemporaneous letters. "I owe no gratitude to any but my own soldiers here; none to the government or to the country;" "they are my debtors, not I theirs." If superseded he will resign. "There can be little natural confidence between the government and myself." Pope had given orders to subsist on the enemy's country, but he would strike square in the teeth of all Pope's infamous orders. So determined was McClellan, in spite of Halleck's directions, not to leave the peninsula, that he even thought, August 10th, of attacking Longstreet before Richmond; but Halleck's despatch, received at midnight, was so peremptory that he hesitated and then gave up the idea. Not the slightest perception appears of fault on his own part in conducting this peninsular campaign.

earlier statesmen of a philanthropic cast, that few, North or South, had believed emancipation a full solution of the dread problem presented by commingling so immense an alien race whose whole habits and history seemed to have stamped them for subjection and inferiority. Enfranchisement could not here, as in ancient Rome, make the individual slave the virtual equal of his master; but amalgamation was loathed, and those of ebony complexion were assumed unfitted to assert themselves as an independent race in the white man's presence. Hence the various schemes proposed for their benefit, for colonizing them elsewhere, or, at least, so as to deport and get rid of them. For in these United States, if freed, they would run to vagrancy and crime; while to vote and share self-government with white Americans was impracticable. In the narrow circle of Northern abolitionists men thought or professed differently; but such was the general opinion.

War, when protracted, changes society vastly in uprooting old beliefs and loosening the normal concession to precedent and authority. Free State sentiment, under the late political agitation which brought Abraham Lincoln into the Presidency, had kept closely to recognized constitutional limits. All that the torrent of Northern expression meant to accomplish was to stop the territorial propagation of slavery and save pure a virgin soil. Beyond that, and disdaining all active coöperation in catching runaway slaves for their masters, the great mass of people in the free States, the chief fraction of this entire Union, inclined to leave the institution as it then stood to the potency of time. This was not in derogation of the Federal compact, but according to what they believed its original spirit; slave States were not to be meddled with; but freedom was henceforth to be national and slavery sectional. Free States did not stand alone in the first heroic resolve to vindicate and maintain at all hazards the welfare and happiness of this western continent, but the more moderate of slave States and slaveholders drew sword with them. Civil war began, in Northern estimation, as "the struggle of the people to vindicate their own rights, to retain and invigorate the institu-

tions of their fathers.”¹ Scarcely had an American bard struck his lyre to another chord of patriotism, save the courageous Whittier, who, to the measures of Luther’s choral, fitted a poem prophetic of slavery’s doom.² The Union was to be saved by a loyal uprising, by that vast majority owning allegiance to the written Constitution. In the very forbearance that instrument inculcated, was felt an incentive to good citizenship. For to the mass of Americans the Constitution of the United States was no covenant with death; no scheme to be rashly cast aside; it had done far more for the welfare and happiness of the whole people than any partial and permitted injustice could outweigh; and without a compromise over slavery it could never have been set up to operate at all. To bring, then, this loyal American mind, this majority conscience, to the further conviction that negro emancipation must be wrought out as an incident of this armed struggle, time and circumstances, with Southern obstinacy, were needful. Indeed, the only true pathway to abolition of slavery lay, at all events, through fundamental law. From the smoke of conflict might emerge a new Union, or the old one as before, but it must be Union still.

Posterity, which finds the pathway cleared, must do justice to the humane generation of Americans that hesitated, while considering its honest legal duty. Most admirably did the President himself express the dominant loyal sentiment of his times, which forbade that emancipation should supplant the original cause for taking up arms instead of applying in furtherance of it. “My paramount object in this struggle,” as he declared in an oft-quoted letter to Horace Greeley, “is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could

¹ Andrew of Massachusetts, May 14, 1861.

² “We wait beneath the furnace blast
The pangs of transformation;
Not painlessly doth God recast
And mould anew the nation,” etc.

save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that."

But a year of desperate and indecisive conflict had shown to the North God's guidance towards new social conditions. Scarcely were Northern troops seen hastening to the defence of the capital, when John Quincy Adams's speech was recalled and reprinted in Northern presses, with that ominous threat that slaves might be lawfully freed by a constitutional exercise of the war power in case of disloyal rebellion.² It was impossible that the rebellious States should be invaded at all without making slavery omnipresent in its military aspects. And one point soon ^{1861.} became clear, that troops from the free and loyal States were not to be used at the seat of war as slave-catchers or the police of social oppression. Butler, who, though of Democratic and doughface antecedents, was a quick-witted politician, read those signs speedily. On reaching Maryland at the first call to arms, he offered the use of his regiments as a Massachusetts brigadier to put down any slave uprising which might occur there, and joined issue through the press with his governor on that subject;³ but a month later, when in Federal command at Fortress Monroe, he was of all generals zealous to formulate a policy which should compel slavery to endure its own disadvantage. Of slave insurrection there was never a serious danger; but these docile children of nature would come flocking into the Union lines like estrays, because the master's hold was loosened. Butler framed the ingenious plea that such fugitives were contraband of war, since the enemy used the able-bodied slave to build batteries and dig intrenchments. That expression was a happy one, and

¹ 6 N. & H. 153. This was written only a month before he issued the preliminary proclamation of emancipation.

² See vol. IV, 228.

³ Schouler's Massachusetts, 155-161; 2 W. R. 593, 594.

became immensely popular. "I'se contraband," the grinning runaway was supposed to say to the master who sought to reclaim him; and the idea of self-confiscation tickled so greatly the Northern sense of humor that the chattel was left unsurrendered. For negro freedom was popular enough with the North if only the Constitution were obeyed.¹

Strict confiscation had in law but a limited range; and in the practical denial of a surrender for such waifs of bondage our department generals found occasion to differ. Thus in 1861, while Butler in southeastern Virginia virtually freed the slaves who came to him, Sherman and Buell in Kentucky, Dix in Maryland, and Halleck in Missouri, slave regions less positively disloyal, took a more conservative attitude and ordered slaves kept out of their lines. This latter course avoided, were it possible, all implied obligation of surrendering to loyal masters, for, as Dix wrote, "we have nothing to do with slaves." In some rare instances orders issued that fugitives should be restored;² but the undercurrent of military practice strengthened in the direction of permitting freedom. The love of curiosity, of novelty, of vagrancy, and his own irrepressible longing for liberty, brought the slave into the Union camps, ragged and shiftless; and humanity enjoined that he should be fed and sheltered. Officers kept such negroes as servants or set them to work as cooks, teamsters, and laborers; and when campaigns of invasion began, whole families of slaves were found upon plantations, deserted by their owners and helpless. In the mildest sense of lost and abandoned property government might well have claimed reimbursement for its care and support of such creatures.³ Before

¹ The first confiscation act of Congress defined this new principle by a forfeiture of slaves employed in disloyal military labor. *Supra*, p. 87.

² Am. Cycl. 1862, 293. This course was potent in causing the ruin of General Stone. *Supra*, p. 135.

³ McClellan himself, with all his scrupulous disposition to leave slavery unharmed in prosecuting the war, felt compassion for the abandoned negroes at Beaufort who came flocking to the river when our gunboats arrived, and vowed that he would throw his sword in the

Congress met for its long session, the President had prepared a plan for employing all abandoned or escaping slaves at the seat of war in such pursuits, short of bearing arms to fight, as might render them self-supporting and useful in military operations, leaving the compensation of loyal masters for adjustment at the close of the war. At Beaufort under Treasury orders negroes were employed in preparing cotton and rice for market on the abandoned plantations.¹

Plainly, then, as things tended after the real struggle of civil war began, this Union could never have been restored to its previous condition, as concerned slavery, with that institution strong as before. The awakening of the Northern mind was shown in the second session, in which were debated long and earnestly the new and shifting aspects of this always perplexing problem. Had McClellan's spring campaign in Virginia ended in the speedy capture and downfall of Richmond, a practical, though somewhat negative, emancipation must in the nature of things 1862. have largely resulted from his military operations. Public opinion moved onward. A treaty with Great Britain for a joint suppression of the slave-trade, with a mutual right to search suspected merchant vessels, was concluded at Washington in April of the new year.² And of other practical measures tending in the same direction, passports were to be granted without distinction of color; Hayti and Liberia gained recognition for diplomatic intercourse;³ freedom was declared henceforth within all territories of the United States;⁴ slavery was eradicated in the District of Columbia

scale, when the day of adjustment came, and ameliorate the condition of the slave. *Own Story*, 175.

¹ *Am. Cycl.* 1861, 641-647.

² 12 *Stats.* 1225. "It is a work that ought to have been done fifty years ago. But the fears and prejudices of our people, and the opposition of the slave interest prevented." 3 *Seward*, 88.

³ 12 *Stats.* 421 (June 5).

⁴ *Ib.* 432. Polygamy was also declared abolished. *Ib.* 501.

by a measure such as Lincoln had proposed years earlier, while in Congress, and the curse was removed from the soil of the nation's capital.¹

Conscious that this philanthropic drift must continue, the President now procured the sanction of Congress to a general plan of compensated abolition for winning the loyal border States to freedom. A joint resolution of April 10th, which passed Congress at his suggestion, offered the coöperation of government to any State that might emancipate, whether gradually or at once, by giving pecuniary indemnity for the inconvenience, public and private, of changing the system.² Recompense, in other words, was offered to the loyal border States, on the principle just applied as of constitutional right in the District of Columbia. Lincoln's message of March 6th, solemnly commending such coöperation, was meant to avert more violent results, and to tender seasonably to slaveholders the olive branch.³

Lincoln was a man of expedients; and, impressed though he was by the moral aspects of the struggle forced upon him, he took anxious care not to foster dissensions among loyal States, nor suffer a strife for the integrity of the Union to lapse into a remorseless revolution. The immediate and practical aspects of administration he kept constantly in view. Yet slavery, with its ambitious rivalry and dissensions, had caused this bloody struggle; and a deep, though undefined, hope increased among the Northern people that somehow, in God's providence, slavery and rebellion would

¹ 12 Stats. 376 (April 16). Loyal masters were to be compensated for the loss of such service at \$300 per head. Money was appropriated to aid in colonizing negroes at their own desire in Hayti, Liberia, or some other foreign country. See also *ib.* 407, 538.

² 12 U. S. Stats. 617.

³ Before sending this message to Congress, Lincoln had tried in vain to induce Delaware to abolish slavery on such a compensation plan. 5 N. & H. c. 12. Moderate Republicans, and even Sumner and Lovejoy, assented to the President's compensation project as, at all events, an advance. The resolution passed House and Senate with its chief dissent from a few border State representatives and their friends. *ib.*

perish together.¹ Full abolition could only be secured by a constitutional amendment, and such amendment by the constitutional method was, in the present stage of sentiment, impossible. But emancipation by edict in aid of the war power against the rebellious and disloyal was held legitimate. In that respect Lincoln reserved strictly to himself the weighty initiation. His views varied, together with his policy, not because his purpose was fixed far in advance, but because his conscience advanced with that of the conservative people, whose gradual change of sentiment was like that which had brought their ancestors in 1776 to throw off allegiance to the king, when resistance to bad measures was the cause of taking up arms. Fremont, at Missouri, had announced military emancipation too early, and the President overruled him.² Hunter, a warm personal friend, issued, while commanding in South Carolina, a similar edict, which the President modified in 1862, publicly declaring that as commander-in-chief he reserved so momentous a decision to himself. While proclaiming this, he earnestly pressed his plan of compensated abolition upon the loyal slave States.³ On the 12th of July, at a conference held by his invitation at the White House, he once more, in a most impressive address, urged the border Representatives, now about to return home for the recess, to lay that plan before their several constituencies.⁴

There were signs this spring that a policy of emancipation would strengthen the Union cause in England. Weed wrote from abroad that Lord Palmerston's hostility to slavery was earnest and unchangeable.⁵ What with debates of the long session upon various phases of the slavery question, and the differing and often conflicting orders of the various commanders, some thought the government too fast, others too slow, in the new direction.⁶ In truth, the

¹ See 5 N. & H. 202.

² *Supra*, p. 102.

³ 12 Stats. 1264.

⁴ Am. Cycl. 1862, 721-725. The majority reply of these Representatives was unfavorable. An earlier conference at the White House had taken place in March. *Ib.* 720. See also 4 N. & H. c. 24.

⁵ 3 Seward, 77.

⁶ "Somebody," writes Seward, "must be in a position to mollify

disposition grew in Congress to compel the President to proclaim emancipation. Slaves of disloyal persons in the Confederate States were declared emancipated upon coming within the Federal lines; all persons in the army and navy were prohibited from passing judgment upon the claims of slave masters. Much, in short, was done before adjournment towards authorizing the Union armies to grind negro vassalage under foot as they went forward. Yet Northern opinion constrained Congress from compelling the President upon the direct issue of proclaiming freedom to the slave.¹

A gloom had come over military operations after the bright harbinger of spring. Upon McClellan's repulse on the peninsula, had been arranged, with State governors, the new levy of three hundred thousand men. Lincoln, now left unfettered by Congress, brooded over the great question of declaring general emancipation through the whole insurrectionary region. Five days after the adjournment of the legislative branch he reached his conclusion, impelled by

conscience and a military necessity. On Monday July.

was held a Cabinet meeting for considering various stringent military measures, such as subsisting troops in the hostile territory, and employing negroes in the army and navy — projects presently embodied in general orders. On the next eventful day, July 22d, the subject was resumed; after which Lincoln read to his Cabinet the draft of a proc-

and moderate;" and this he deemed the task of the President and himself. 2 Seward, 818.

¹ Am. Cycl. 1862; 12 U. S. Stats. *passim*; 6 N. & H. c. 5. A new confiscation act (July 17, 1862, c. 195) went beyond that of 1861, in making free not merely slaves actually employed in aid of rebellious military service, but the slaves of persons rebellious. It further authorized the President to employ as many people of African descent as he might deem proper for suppressing the rebellion, for which purpose they might be organized and used as he should judge best for the public welfare. This bill the President approved, as intending to apply forfeiture to disloyal masters alone.

lamation, declaring free the slaves of all States still in rebellion on the first of January ensuing; but commending once more to the loyal slave States his plan of compensated abolition. Brief memoranda of the occasion are extant; but all the President's advisers except Seward and Welles were taken by surprise, and bewilderment was shown at the magnitude of the project. This draft, which the President had prepared upon his own conviction and without the knowledge of his Cabinet, gave rise to various comments; the same hesitation and variance of views being visible here as among the people at large.¹ Blair, who alone positively objected, declared it would cost the approaching elections. "Nothing, however, was offered," as Lincoln related afterward, "that I had not already fully anticipated and settled in my own mind, until Secretary Seward spoke. He said in substance, 'Mr. President, I approve of the proclamation, but I question the expediency of its issue at this juncture; the depression of the public mind, following upon recent reverses, might make it viewed as the last measure, a cry for help, — the government stretching forth its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to the government.' Hence, he advised deferring its issue until supported by some military success." The wisdom of that view struck the President with very great force; it was an aspect that with all his thought he had entirely overlooked, and so he put the document away, waiting for victory.² Pope was defeated, we have seen, the last of August; but Antietam's victory, to be later described, furnished the occasion in September. After two months' intermission the President resumed the ^{September} subject with his Cabinet; stating reverently that ^{22.} he had made the promise to himself and his Maker, to issue that proclamation as soon as the rebel army was driven out

¹ To trust a fragmentary memorandum of Stanton, only he and Bates favored an immediate promulgation. 6 N. & H. 128. Cf. Warden's Chase, 440.

² Carpenter's "Six Months at the White House," 20-22. This scene makes the subject of a celebrated painting by that author. And see 6 N. & H. c. 6; 3 Seward, 118.

of Maryland, and test God's favor to the act he proposed.¹ The responsibility was now his own, and the Cabinet officers, though not voting, promised each in turn his support. With general approval a change or two was made in the original draft at Seward's suggestion; chiefly a promise to "maintain" the freedom which it recognized.² The Cabinet meeting over, the great seal was affixed to this document at the State Department. The President signed it the same afternoon, and the Northern press the next morning sent it broadcast through the land.³ Such were the circumstances that ushered in, with characteristic caution, and upon due notice, the social regeneration of America; and the 1st of January, 1863, the promise "to recognize and maintain" took effect.⁴ Posterity will agree that Lincoln chose the right time for this becoming act of mercy and showed consummate statesmanship both in his decision and the means for giving it effect.

Lincoln's faith in the colonization of the freedmen, — an old Whig and border State prepossession,⁵ — was des-

¹ Here Chase and Welles have each made a full diary. 6 N. & H. c. 8.

² Another slight change proposed colonization only with the consent of the colonists and of the States where colonies should be attempted.

³ 6 N. & H. c. 8. A meeting of loyal governors at Altoona, two days after, had no connection with this edict, as some have supposed, and the delay over Sunday after Antietam's battle has been rationally explained. Carpenter, 23. But the governors at Altoona indorsed the proclamation. 6 N. & H. 164. In this proclamation (which was preliminary and less solemn than that which followed in the new year) the ultimate date of freedom was fixed at the first of January ensuing, and the cardinal features of the document were (1) a renewal of the plan of compensated abolishment; (2) a continuance of the effort at voluntary colonization of negroes elsewhere; (3) the positive military emancipation forever of all slaves in States still rebellious when the warning notice should expire; (4) a promise to recommend ultimate compensation to loyal owners, after rebellion ended, which last was never carried out because of Lincoln's death.

⁴ 6 N. & H. c. 8.

⁵ Sumner thought the "colonization delusion" emanated from Blair. 4 Pierce, 106. But Lincoln had put forth such a plan in his Douglas debates. 6 N. & H. 355.

tined to disappointment. God's providence as thus far revealed requires the emancipated to share with their former masters this national domain, both races working out the new social problem together. Yet Congress had just legislated for colonizing negroes under the auspices of the United States, on condition of their own assent and that of the countries where asylum was sought.¹ On an island of the Haytian group, known as Isle a'Vache, an experiment was ventured in 1863 with some four hundred black freedmen, but it failed ignominiously, and Congress withdrew further countenance from such a policy.²

The new course which the Civil War was now taking brought into a closer unison all who could coöperate for the great end of emancipation, and gave political standing to the sect hitherto aloof from affairs in the free States, known as "abolitionists," a mere handful in point of numbers, identified with a few Atlantic cities, but compact and courageous in their convictions. Non-voters for the most part, non-combatants, critics, and unsparing ones, of passing events, their ground was reached by the Northern people and their responsible leaders through the process of dire experience. Advanced Republicanism came now to recognize that abolitionists were, after all, right in their moral convictions, whatever might be said of their practical methods, and to accept them as preachers and forerunners of the faith with a growing reverence. Garrison, Phillips, and their immediate followers had brought, not peace to the Union, but a sword; they had been, through past years, for preserving freedom, but not the government. Though great prophets, they were no politicians; and that public opinion which must be watched and guided they never regarded. They were the avowed disunionists on the Northern side of the line, and their plan for getting rid of

¹ 6 N. & H. c. 17; 12 Stats. (July 17, 1862).

² 6 N. & H. c. 17; 13 Stats. 352.

slavery was to leave its defiling company.¹ No wonder, then, that up to 1861 their own neighbors disliked them; for no progression of government can be satisfying which is not conservative of the good. Was slavery, then, the sum of all villanies, so that no man could for an hour hold a slave and not be a deadly sinner? Yet righteousness did not exist in the North alone; nor since slavery's downfall has public iniquity come to an end. These abolitionists, moreover, had grown to be extremely intolerant; half a loaf was nothing; half-friends and enemies they anathematized together, and long training in pen and speech made them pungent in personalities and exasperating to the last degree. All who could not come up to their ideal standard they lashed without mercy, which meant for years past every Republican leader from Lincoln down. Denunciation, long futile, subsides almost insensibly into a habit of scolding;² and the abolitionists had for thirty years been irrepressible critics of present politics. Long variance with prevailing modes of thought led them to upbraid the churches, to largely repudiate religious worship, to pronounce the society of the age false and accursed, to distrust even the Almighty for permitting wrong to flourish on earth. Yet it must be owned, and the now inevitable conflict deepened that impression, that they were persons of thorough earnestness, disposed for their cause to make worldly sacrifice, despisers of sham and self-seeking; that they had great moral courage, and for opinion's sake braved social ostracism, North, where the danger was threat and insult. They contributed of their worldly goods to the cause; they were plundered, were robbed, practised self-denial, bore all the martyrdom of menace; some went to jail, one was shot dead. There was much intellectual force

¹ "No union with the slaveholder" would have refused affiliation with Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, and Missouri, as well as the rebellious South. John Brown's armed crusade for freedom was an individual scheme of his own.

² Lowell's wife once said to him, "They do not modulate their words and voices. They are like people who live with the deaf or near waterfalls, and whose voices become high and harsh."

among them, especially as writers and speakers.¹ For all this, something in their narrow methods had repelled Lowell, Emerson, the Beechers, Greeley, and other practical champions of freedom; and even such antislavery statesmen as the two later Adamses, Sumner, and Thaddeus Stevens.

Down to our Civil War the abolitionists preached destruction of the Union; nor did free Kansas or free territory owe anything to their assistance. From national politics they kept apart; or rather they gloried in increasing the gaps of sectional schism. Garrison's *Liberator*, in early 1861, bade the free States organize their own independent government, and let the slave States depart in peace;² while Wendell Phillips, who had styled Lincoln "the slavehound of Illinois," denounced all appeal to arms so bitterly, when the test was made at Fort Sumter, that his audience cut him short with hisses and refused to listen to him.³ The great uprising of the North on that memorable Monday of April amazed these leaders and set them thinking anew.⁴ Henceforward to the Civil War was given an aim on their part, which tended for the first time to practical alliance with advanced Republicans. Of the two great foremost abolitionists, — Phillips in speech, Garrison with the pen and faculty to organize; the one a Boston patrician, the other a plebeian and man of the people, — the latter was much the wiser and more comprehensive in action. For the first few months their sect was quiescent. The intended May anniversary of the society in New York City was post-

¹ See in Monroe's Lectures, 8-26, the fair and discriminating tone of one who was himself an early abolitionist.

² 4 Garrison, 15. "To think of whipping the South into subjection and extorting allegiance from millions of people at the cannon's mouth is utterly chimerical."

³ 1 Schouler's Mass. 44.

⁴ Wendell Phillips, April 21st, before a Sunday congregation, recanted prophecies he had made of Northern cowardice, and proclaimed with satisfaction that out of the smoke of this conflict would come one of two things, "emancipation or disunion." 4 Garrison, 20; 1 Moore, 38, 125.

poned indefinitely, and meanwhile the *Liberator* studied omens, as Phillips had done. But the alternative of disunion was not to be tolerated by a responsible North. At length, with censure of the slow-moving President, the *Liberator* joined radical Republicans in advocating Union with military emancipation of the slave. Near the close of 1861, Garrison substituted for the old damnatory motto of his journal, the inscription on the liberty bell.¹ In early 1862 he appeared by invitation at Cooper Institute, while Phillips spoke at Washington. Kindlier in humanity than his eloquent associate, whose oil, to the last of his life, was the vitriol of oratory, Garrison yet blamed the President for not permitting Fremont and Hunter to set the pace for him; and even when Lincoln's proclamation appeared, after Antietam, he disliked it for its colonizing and compensating features, for giving to the armed South a hundred days of grace, and, indeed, because emancipation was not literally forced, besides, upon the loyal slave States.²

The connecting link, the fusing force between abolitionists and Republicans in this war period, was chiefly supplied by Charles Sumner, who was nearest the Garrisonian standard of all political partisans then prominent in public life, and who lived in the chief city of its strength. From the time when the Republican party gained the citadel of Congress and government, he became one of its strongest leaders in the Senate, where his scholarship, tastes, and attainments secured for him, throughout this whole period, the chairmanship of foreign relations. With his striking personality, his noble face and figure, his precision of dress and appearance, which had something of an English affectation, he was a marked man in this still distinguished body of able debaters. His ideal of Senator was high; punctual in Senate or committee hearings, he kept up systematically with his correspondence and the public business committed

¹ 4 Garrison, 30-40.

² 4 Garrison, 50-64. But he admitted it "an important step in the right direction."

to him, and was free from trick or indirection. As constant in this branch as ever John Quincy Adams had been in the Representatives' chamber, he opposed early adjournments and delays. "A Senator," he once said, "cannot leave his place more than a soldier."¹ Sumner aspired to high circles of thought and culture; the friends he chose were such as Longfellow and Motley, while the average American of commerce or politics was less to his taste; and yet for most of his life a bachelor, living among men, and towards women rather unsusceptible, as a sort of Sir Galahad, he could regulate acquaintance to please himself, and was not tied to a set for the sake of wife or children. With all his friendship for the negro, which had something of kindly condescension, he was choice in his intimacies at home or abroad, patterned after the English leaders in Parliament, and chiefly valued literary distinction for the civil service.² He labored with diligence and conscientiously to be an ideal statesman; and his great usefulness to the age came from his consecration to the cause which first gave him distinction. Others might guide the car of state, or adapt ends to the opportunity; but Sumner was constant for bettering the negro's condition, and, in season or out of season, shielded this race against its oppressors. His speeches, which he hoped to make as classical as Burke's, were carefully composed and profuse in the wealth of learning and illustration, from ancient or modern example. Yet something of that skill in carving epithets and of epigrammatic force that hurts he seemed to have derived from the rigid abolition school. His sense of moral rectitude was sublime; and, having an intense personality, a loftiness of manner, and withal some pedantry, his exposition offended at times his own party colleagues and those he would have persuaded to his views. With impatience and persistency of aim, moreover, he would overlook practical difficulties, so that, as once was said of him, some high administrative office such as he never held might have taught him how hard it is for

¹ 4 Pierce's Sumner, 86.

² His biographer considers him as going too far in such a preference.

4 Pierce, 28.

the servant of so many million masters to have his imperative way.

Sumner had been usually in advance of antislavery sentiment in his own State; yet in 1862, as previously, incidents aided his reelection, and liberty men who admired his constancy and courage carried the Massachusetts legislature against his foes. Henry Wilson, too, a self-made man and indefatigable as a worker, both in politics and military affairs, had a colleague's influence; and each helped the other in turn to reelection.¹ Sumner, though so considerate for the dumb and passive, had little toleration for differing shades of Republican opinion. Early in 1861 he forswore Seward and Charles Francis Adams because in Congress they spoke the soothing word for Union, when his own attitude was, as he expressed it, to "stand firm, firm," and not yield an inch.² They became part of Lincoln's administration; he remained in the Senate, Lincoln's incessant mentor on the use of the military arm to emancipate, author or advocate of all that might help the negro, or hurt his Southern master. As he used picturesquely to say, "Whenever you see slavery's head appear, strike at it." It was owing, perhaps, to his mental personification of slavery as a sort of devil or dragon, which he, like old St. George, was driving his good lance against, that this whole warfare seemed a simple enough issue, while in truth millions of precious souls, white and black, were tangled up together in the tissues of that failing, but long-inherited institution.³

Sumner's party antagonism was specially directed henceforward against Seward. The two men were able and

¹ Wilson held in the Senate through the war the important chairmanship of military affairs.

² 4 Pierce, 13, 17. But as for compensated emancipation, "A bridge of gold," he once said, "would be cheap, if demanded by the retreating fiend." *Ib.* 44.

³ Sumner from the very outset, and most urgently after the first Bull Run, pressed the President to declare emancipation under the war power; and he was pleasantly assured, in January, 1862, that he was only a few weeks in advance of the administration. The Senator wrote early to Garrison and John Bright that emancipation was coming,

honorable, but totally unlike in temperament. Sumner could not appreciate the latter's strong Unionism in sentiment; nor did Seward enter into the recesses of Sumner's racial philanthropy. Sumner had first thought that the Union would be broken up; and he expected, at least, a long war which ought never to be settled without complete emancipation. Seward's optimism had belittled the strife; "Abolitionists," he would remark, "have been chasing one idea until they have come to believe that their horizon absolutely bounds the earth."¹ While Sumner considered that a statesman's part was to lead and not follow, and to mount from height to height, Seward was content to take, if not the best possible, the best attainable, so long as it was a gain in the right direction. Sumner disparaged the Republican Secretary of State quite jealously, though holding a Senate chairmanship where confidential harmony was expected. To leading Englishmen he wrote of Seward as unfriendly to England; he contended dogmatically that instead of a blockade the Southern ports should have been closed; and upon the *Trent* affair he would have given Great Britain, undiplomatically, the whole case, in a speech that he was vain enough to deliver after all had been settled.² Seward's matter and manner of expression he freely criticised; he picked flaws in a voluminous mass of foreign correspondence which reflected passing moods of thought, and declared his belief that the Secretary was indiscreet and superficial.³ Seward's public views in those perilous times, but not his opinion of certain men, we may gather from the writings he has left behind. He, like

and tried prematurely, in October, 1861, to bring the Republican convention of Massachusetts to such a platform. 4 Pierce, 41-64.

As foreshadowing Sumner's later lead in a policy of Southern reconstruction, after Lincoln's death, the idea of "State suicide" is seen to have been promulgated by him in May, 1862, when in the Senate he proposed dividing up the lands of slaveholders as homes for the colored freedmen. 4 Pierce, 73.

¹ See Carpenter, 73.

² 4 Pierce, 30-32.

³ Once, in 1863, he went so far as to class Seward among "copper-heads," in a letter to John Bright. 4 Pierce, 143.

Sumner, had travelled in Europe, and had made some distinguished acquaintance. He had been governor of a large State and knew something of the asperities of rivals and the fitfulness of popular temper. He labored to unite, and his love of an unbroken Union was so great that all abolition crusade became secondary in his estimation. Two of his foreign despatches gave great offence to Sumner and the radical Republicans; that especially to Minister Adams, in July, 1862, which showed him far from apprehending what then passed in the President's mind. He wrote it under stress of irritation and in personal confidence.¹ But it is certain that in the practical antislavery measures of 1862 Seward coöperated loyally. As concerned the proclamation of emancipation, he not only showed full compliance when the proper time came, but, as Lincoln recognized, he made the document stronger against the President's doubts by pledging to "maintain" as well as to recognize the freedom accorded.²

SECTION XII.

OPERATIONS EAST AND WEST.

Antietam was the signal victory which determined the President to issue his edict of emancipation, and on Maryland soil the Confederate host was repulsed and driven when first it took the aggressive. McClellan's retreat from the peninsula, and Pope's disastrous rout at Manassas, made Lee and his generals eager to carry the war into the enemy's

¹ On the 22d of April, 1861, Seward wrote to Dayton that slavery in the United States would remain the same whether we succeeded or failed. This accorded with the general sentiment of that date. More bitterly he wrote Adams, July 5, 1862, that proslavery men and those most vehement of the antislavery type seemed almost in concert to precipitate a servile war, — the former by making the most desperate attempts to overthrow the Union, the latter by demanding an edict of universal emancipation, — "as a lawful and necessary, if not, as they say, the only legitimate way of saving the Union." 6 N. & H. 33, notes.

² *Supra*, p. 224. See, further, Carpenter, 74.

country. The prospects of the South were never more brilliant, and hopes were entertained of ravaging Pennsylvania and tearing Maryland from her oppressors for a Southern alliance, and of dictating a peace, with independence, at Washington city. "Drive the invader from your soil," was the appeal of President Davis in a recent order, "and wring from an unscrupulous foe the recognition of your birthright,—community and independence."¹

Lee crossed the Potomac near Leesburg, with his entire force, in early September, and camped in the immediate neighborhood of Frederick. But no Maryland uprising greeted his approach, nor did the Union officer in command at Harper's Ferry flee before him. ^{September.} Dividing his force, in consequence, and sending a large detachment, under Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, to surround and capture that arsenal of the Shenandoah, he withdrew westward to Boonsboro with the rest of his command, deferring his larger projects. This was dangerous strategy. His troops, numbering about 50,000, were ill equipped for invasion. Both transportation and material of war appeared inadequate to their needs; for food the supply was short; they were poorly clad, and thousands marched shoeless.²

Meanwhile McClellan, restored to ample direction on the Union side, measured tardily his approach from Washington, heedless, it would seem, that he was on a new probation, with a name to vindicate. Once more he magnified despondingly the Confederate strength and begged for reinforcements,³ representing Lee's inferior army as one-fourth greater than his own. Indulged in the request for another corps, he reached Frederick, September 13th, where, by marvellous good luck, he came upon a copy of Lee's special order of the 9th, which disclosed the entire plan of campaign. This showed the invading army already cut in two

¹ 25 Harper, 562; De Leon, 244. Lee's report (19 W. R. pt. 1, 144) shows how greatly magnified had been the Southern impression that Maryland was under military coercion and longed to make common cause with the Confederacy.

² 19 W. R. pt. 1, 144. See 2 Ropes, 326-333.

³ 19 W. R. pt. 2, 254.

between Boonsboro and Harper's Ferry; it showed, also, when and where they meant to reunite. "I have all the plans of the rebels," he telegraphed joyfully to Washington, "and will catch them in their own trap if my men are equal to the emergency."¹ But he failed of the vigor and confidence that such a discovery should have prompted; for he threw his troops forward, not at once, but at noon of the next day, to carry the mountain passes of the Blue Ridge, beyond which lay Lee's main army with the residue far separated. This delay redounded to his foe's advantage, and Franklin, who might otherwise have pushed through the valley beyond to relieve Harper's Ferry, was foiled of that purpose. On the morning of the 15th the beleaguered Union garrison surrendered to Jackson, who, with the Potomac to recross, after his capture of Harper's Ferry, made all possible speed by forced marches to join Lee's main body, as did also the other Confederates detached on that service. At South Mountain, on the 14th, Lee's army bore defeat, and the passes were opened.²

McClellan, on the 15th, placed his troops in position along Antietam Creek down the mountain slopes, and, riding the whole length of his line, was greeted by the soldiery with tumultuous applause in token of their joy that he was restored to them. But he put off fighting, all the while that Lee's swift lieutenants were hastening from Harper's Ferry; and at Sharpsburg, on the other side of the creek, Lee awaited his foe. The battle of Antietam or Sharpsburg was fought on the 17th, a day late for McClellan to profit by that diversion of opposing forces which chance had disclosed to him; for Confederate divisions arrived in course of the engagement, Lee's advantage of position being an offset, besides, to inferiority of numbers. From morn till after dark of that day the fight went on, and the artillery shook the sky. The situation of the ground, with two main armies separated by this sullen stream, forbade manœuvring, and

¹ 19 W. R. pt. 1, 141; 6 N. & H. c. 7.

² Longstreet thinks that Lee, after that discomfiture, should have at once retired beyond the Potomac. 2 B. & L. 667.

from beginning to end the fight was sheer, persistent slaughter, one of the bloodiest, fiercest, and most brutal encounters of the war. Hurling his masses against the dwindling Confederate line, McClellan strove to crush his adversary by superior strength; but the latter stood obstinately, and corps by corps, division by division, of the heroic and devoted Potomac army were shattered in terrible carnage. Among the first to be borne from the fight, severely wounded, was Hooker; the veteran Mansfield lost his life, while Sedgwick was twice shot. There was an ebb and flow of success and gallant fighting on either side of the stream. Brave officers and brave soldiers in blue or gray were piled in promiscuous butchery. When night stopped this cruel carnage of fourteen hours, the advantage was with the Union army; yet McClellan felt indisposed to renew the fight on the morrow. The chance of a second day's rout, as at Shiloh, he threw away. Humane by nature, loving his men as they loved him, and keenly sensitive to their present sufferings and sacrifice, he disregarded the advice of Burnside, Franklin, and others, and dallied after his habit for the Government to reënforce him.

Both armies, in truth, had suffered severely that day, and their losses must have been in figures nearly equal; but Lee's loss was more than one-fourth of an army, while McClellan's was only one-sixth.¹ Though putting a bold front upon his ill fortune, Lee well knew that he was too disabled to renew the fight, and conscious that his calculations had failed, so far as Maryland was concerned, he fell back rapidly and recrossed the Potomac with his sullen and shattered forces. McClellan let him go unmolested. "Our victory was complete," wired McClellan to Washington on the forenoon of the 19th; "the enemy is driven back into

¹ On the Union side over 12,000 were killed and wounded, and on the Confederate over 11,000. 6 N. & H. 141. Cf. 2 B. & L. 600-603. "We were so badly crushed," writes Longstreet, "that at the close of the day ten thousand fresh troops could have come in and taken Lee's army and everything it had." And McClellan might have thrown in more than twice that number of fresh troops, for he had them in reserve.

Virginia; Maryland and Pennsylvania are now safe.”¹ Maryland Heights were occupied by the Union forces on the 20th of September, and on the 22d Sumner recaptured Harper’s Ferry. To save seemed to McClellan a victory sufficient.²

President Lincoln received McClellan’s despatches with mingled joy and disappointment. Antietam, though a victory, was dearly bought; and for each hour’s delay in forcing that fight the Union cost had been immensely enhanced, since the foe, once scattered, reunited. The hope disappeared of capturing Lee’s crippled army before it could recross the Potomac, and in vain had Lincoln constantly enjoined it upon his general not to let the adversary “get off without being hurt.” When, to his chagrin, McClellan found inquiries from the War Department indicating some dissatisfaction, he excused his tardiness, his indisposition to fight a second day, or to follow, on the plea that his men were demoralized by overwork, fatigue, and hard fighting. He telegraphed to Halleck that his army ought to be reorganized and reënforced; and he expressed his fears that Lee would be reënforced and give him battle again.³ But the gloom that Lee’s miscarriage had cast over Richmond he failed to consider, for he could never look at operations from the standpoint of his enemy’s disadvantage, but seemed to think that all must be composure on the other side.⁴

In the retrospect of after years, as well as now, McClellan pleaded for his inaction that the fatigue and exhaustion of recent campaigns demanded that the Army of the Potomac should rest and recuperate. But had Lee thus acted with his own veteran troops? He complained, too, of demorali-

¹ 19 W. R. pt. 2, 330.

² 6 N. & H. c. 6; 19 W. R. pt. 1, 68, 151, etc.; ib. pt. 2, 322, 663. McClellan gained a good opinion of his own prowess at Antietam. He wrote privately on the 19th: “Those in whose judgment I rely tell me that I fought splendidly, and that it was a masterpiece of art.” And again on the 20th: “I feel that I have done all that can be asked in twice saving the country.” *Own Story*, 612.

³ 19 W. R. pt. 1, 68-71; 2 B. & L. 544.

⁴ So over-confident had Lee been when first setting out that, Sep-

zation, of the disheartening influence produced by Pope's campaign; yet no army could have responded more loyally and unitedly to a chief's direction than did this one of the Potomac the moment McClellan returned to command. It was inertia once more, slowness to take advantage, the chronic belief that his enemy was superior in numbers, that now revived discontent and the factional spirit, both in the field and at Washington. McClellan had at Antietam fought Lee's 40,000, or less, with 70,000 men, and yet, with the resulting advantage of battle on his side, allowed the adversary to slip away unopposed to Virginia.¹ At the close of September he reported as present for duty more than 100,000, exclusive of absentees and those on service elsewhere.² This immense multitude in arms President Lincoln visited in person early in October, to ascertain why its only apparent use was to police Maryland and recuperate.

Returning to Washington, he directed McClellan to resume the offensive, now while roads and weather favored, and, crossing the Potomac, either to give Lee battle or drive him southward.³ "The country is impatient October. at the want of activity of your army, and you must push it on," wrote Halleck on the 7th, still more pointedly.⁴ The Secretary of War was straining every nerve at this time to fill up the armies by volunteers in advance of a draft, and further reënforcements were promised when Virginia was once more occupied. But McClellan, who had resumed the old strain of complaint, called for men, for more horses, for camp equipage, as though to round to perfection what never can be perfect, and involved himself in an angry controversy over the waste and destruction of what had been sent him already. Stuart's Confederate cavalry crossed the Potomac, rode entirely round this mo-

tember 8th, he urged the Confederate President to propose formally to the United States the recognition of Southern independence. 19 W. R. pt. 2, 600.

¹ 6 N. & H. 46; 2 Ropes, 377.

² 6 N. & H. 174; 19 W. R. pt. 2, 374. The aggregate reported was 303,959; of whom 101,756 were absent, 28,458 on special duty, and 73,601 under Banks's command.

³ 19 W. R. pt. 1, 72 (October 6).

⁴ 19 W. R. pt. 2, 395.

tionless army, and recrossed at a lower ford, without stinging McClellan into pursuit.¹ On the 13th of the month, his peremptory order to move having produced no effect, the President wrote a long and significant letter, gently rebuking the young general for excess of cautiousness, and suggesting a plan for pressing and harassing the enemy. This plan McClellan virtually approved, and having by the

1st of November got his army at last across the

November. Potomac, he posted his forces on the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge, holding the interior approach to Richmond.²

Lincoln's patience with this commander was now giving way. He had sustained him for months against the earnest opposition of men powerful in Republican councils, and reappointed him to command, after Pope's disaster, when most of his Cabinet strenuously dissented. In his intense dislike of the administration party and its tendencies on the negro question, McClellan had, willingly or unwillingly, made himself the attracting centre for such hostile or conservative political influences as opposed its ascendancy. He had even gone so far as to formulate for Lincoln's guidance the political policy which he thought desirable. Fortunately for himself, Congress, most of whose Republican Senators and members of the House had become his decided enemies, was taking its recess. When the preliminary edict of emancipation was issued, just after Antietam, McClellan's first impulse was to protest or throw up his commission, vexed already, as he shows us, that Stanton and Halleck could not for his own sake be swept aside.³ But Democratic politicians with whom he took counsel advised him to submit, and instead he issued in October a complacent order counselling his soldiery to abstain from comment upon public civil measures and leave political errors, if any, to be corrected at the polls.⁴ His motive in doing so was patriotic,

¹ 6 N. & H. c. 9 ; 19 W. R. pt. 2, 421, etc. It is certain, says Halleck, that McClellan's army had been much much better supplied, as a rule, than the Army of the West.

² 6 N. & H. c. 9.

³ Own Story, 615, 655 ; 6 N. & H. c. 19.

⁴ 19 W. R. pt. 2, 395.

on the whole, and he gave himself full credit for his self-abstinence. Not so, however, with staff favorites, the tone of whose converse became factious and obstructive in the highest degree, while some gave out that the military game now playing was to tire out both armies and compel a compromise.¹

The President's despatches had taken on an austerity of tone which gave McClellan warning. Worried over the unpromising outlook of the elections, Lincoln began to conceive something of that personal distrust by this time almost universal among his political supporters, and to think with them that McClellan had no real desire to conquer. He fixed in his own mind the limit of his forbearance towards this dilatory general, and framed a test.² If McClellan should offer Lee battle and do him damage, well and welcome; but if he should suffer the latter to cross the Blue Ridge and place himself between Richmond and the Army of the Potomac, he would be removed from command. When, therefore, the report reached Washington that Lee and Longstreet were at Culpeper Court House, President Lincoln sent an order to McClellan, dated November 5th, which directed him to report for further orders at Trenton, New Jersey, and to turn over his command at once to Burnside. McClellan received this missive on the 7th, with perfect composure; but, as his Memoirs tell us, when left by Burnside alone in his tent, he broke out in heartfelt ejaculation, "Alas for my poor country!"³ He claimed in his report of 1863 that when displaced he had his army perfectly in hand, in admirable condition and spirits, and was expecting a battle and a brilliant victory; but no such expectation or alacrity had been visible in current despatches. And with amazing egotism he concluded, on the retrospect, that all trouble in his plans arose from bad counsels interposed between so amiable a President and himself, and that the proper use of our Union army was to

¹ 6 N. & H. 189.

² Such tests Lincoln is known to have framed on other occasions.

³ Own Story, 660; 19 W. R. pt. 2, 545; 3 B. & L. 105.

bring a permanent reunion of the country, "by which the rights of both sections shall be preserved."¹

Recognizing McClellan's patriotism and devotion to the Union cause, notwithstanding the inflexible attitude he maintained, we may conclude that the time had fully come for removing him from command of the Potomac army, and posterity may rest upon the deliberate conclusion which President Lincoln, with an official forbearance almost unparalleled, reached reluctantly. The reasons for McClellan's displacement were both civil and military. In the former aspect it mattered little what conservative tenets a loyal Union officer might have cherished, so long as he pursued the line of military duty and left civil responsibility where it belonged. But McClellan, in his mental exaltation, whether as imagining himself the indispensable dictator and preserver, or, through some vanity less lofty, made much too earnest an effort to intrude himself upon the political conduct of the war. This led to inevitable turmoil, so that on political grounds alone his displacement would have been justified, considering his morbid hatred of those in power and the dangerous military idolatry he had permitted. We see him giving himself credit for not refusing to obey the order which displaced him, and marching his army upon Washington to take possession, as some had advised him to do.² In the military sense, furthermore, McClellan had reached his full limit of trial. Could he but have conducted a single brilliant campaign, or won a decisive victory, after leaving western Virginia, the full meed of popular gratitude would have been his, and Lincoln would doubtless have welcomed him as a presumptive successor in the Presidency. But in his too rapid elevation he had failed repeatedly to make the best of opportunity and use the splendid advantages which were bestowed upon him. Drawn encounters, with honors easy, seemed to him victory enough; and the boldest of his conquests were always the prospective ones. He made costly and even wasteful preparation, yet was always unready, dissatisfied, wanting some-

¹ 19 W. R. pt. 1, 88, 89.

² Own Story, 652.

thing more, and seemed unwilling to play the game of war at all unless his dice were loaded. Then, too, his petulance against superiors over unessential points, his ceaseless bickering and complaints, were sophomoric, injudicious in the extreme; they worried Halleck and the bureau officers, goaded Stanton to fury, and disturbed even the equanimity of the President, whose real kindness towards him he never half appreciated. His waste of men and war material, without a corresponding gain, was enormous; baggage and supply trains he projected on much too great a scale; but the waste and danger he inflicted by keeping his army idle was greater by far. And yet McClellan had some fine traits obscured by an overweening conceit. He loved the Union sincerely, as he conceived the Union ought to be; he was thoughtful for the lives and welfare of those he commanded, even to the humblest. He was skilful in the science of war, an accomplished writer, a man whose private character was pure and upright, and his integrity without a stain. He did his best, so far as in him lay, to do the country sincere and honest service, and never would have lent himself to false and traitorous designs. Many of the faults now exhibited may be ascribed to youth and inexperience, too rapid a promotion, an imaginative disposition, and the excessive adulation bestowed upon him by his susceptible fellow-men. He was a marvellous organizer and moulder of the raw material of an army, and, though feeble in handling armed masses for action, could inspire those under him to fight. As safe conductor of a retreat, Malvern Hill gives him permanent renown. It has been fairly argued that such a general on the Southern side might have been invaluable, for when it came to strict defence and preservation McClellan had grand qualities. And yet, after all, the defensive changes suddenly to offensive, and McClellan was unfitted to take the initiative, both because of temperament and his exaggeration of obstacles. Another year of such unreadiness on the Union side would have given the Southern Confederacy its freedom, or forced the North to make such compromise as it might. Reunion of North and South by this time could only be effected by dashing armed rebellion

in pieces like a potter's vessel; by overwhelming, compelling, pulverizing into submission. For such work the true leader was to come later; it needed a much stronger nerve than McClellan's, a sterner energy.¹

The choice of Burnside for McClellan's successor did not prove a happy one, and yet there were strong reasons for making it. One of "Little Mac's" closest friends, he had kept, notwithstanding, out of the hot range of controversy, and was stanch and steadfast to the administration. His corps had joined the Army of the Potomac after a great prestige of success in North Carolina, where his name was still a talisman of strength. He now stood next in actual rank to McClellan, and had not a personal enemy; no one could have been less obnoxious to the adherents of the displaced commander, nor more likely to assuage any mutinous spirit possibly to be engendered by the displacement. For Burnside himself, if not a man to be worshipped, had lived at least in the sunshine of constant popularity. He was

¹ Southern public opinion has strongly favored McClellan, but this, we may surmise, largely from sympathetic feeling towards his policy and for the disparagement of other Northern generals who humiliated the Confederacy. Joseph E. Johnston saw and announced that McClellan made little account of time; Lee and his subordinates unquestionably counted upon a want of boldness and speed in his movements. 2 B. & L. 606. Longstreet says, with discrimination, that McClellan's plans were laid according to strict rules of strategy, but he was not quick or forcible in handling troops. Longstreet, 180. The following lampoon in verse (De Leon, 303) indicates that the Southern mind apprehended McClellan's prime military defect:—

"Little McClellan sat eating a melon,
The Chickahominy by,
He stuck in his spade, then a long time delayed,
And cried 'What a brave general am I.'"

For one so worshipped by his troops it is singular how little this leader figured personally in the great fights of the Potomac army. When his troops cheered him as he rode up and down the lines, it was during some parade; he was never to be seen charging or directing gloriously in battle, but kept at some secluded occupation.

honorable, chivalrous, kind-hearted, modest of his own merits, and such men fame seeks out occasionally, hoping against likelihood to adapt them to a stern crisis. That genial companionship which suited Burnside so admirably made solitary state a hard condition in which to maintain due mental equilibrium; he had not that imperturbable temper which cloaks mistakes and still holds confidence; and sensitive while bent on doing his best, he attempted a task beyond his military ability, which he made all the harder by an unnatural effort to seem equal to it. The keen and accomplished officers brought now to serve under him doubted his capacity for the command, but resolved to serve him faithfully, and so did the rank and file, who were moved to tears when McClellan took leave of them. Burnside accepted this promotion precipitately, having to decide in haste, and from the hour he did so, in the midst of a blinding snowstorm, until in gloom and despair he laid down the unwelcome honor, he felt no happiness.¹

But Burnside was clearly resolved not to shirk fighting, nor to fail, as McClellan had done, from extreme caution; his prime mistake as commander was rather in disregarding advice, where an opposite result of diffidence would have been looked for. At this time scarcely thirty miles separated the two hostile commands, both south of the Potomac. The Union army lay encamped around ^{November.} Warrenton, close to the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge; while Lee's line, on the other side of the upper Rappahannock, stretched from Culpeper Court House, where Longstreet's corps was stationed, across the Blue Ridge to Winchester, Jackson now commanding at Chester Gap. McClellan left his forces in a good strategic position, and Burnside's best fighting chance lay in keeping Jackson behind the mountains, while throwing himself in front upon Longstreet.² By all accounts the Army of the Potomac

¹ Couch, who was intimate, relates that Burnside accepted for fear that another whom he thought unfit (Hooker ?) would be chosen if he declined. 3 B. & L. 106.

² Such is Longstreet's opinion. 3 B. & L. 85.

was now splendidly equipped and eager for action, and Burnside himself acknowledged that he had troops enough for his operations, and quite as many as he could handle. But to the chagrin of the President, this new commander dismissed the plan prepared at Washington, which McClellan had adopted, and announced his decision to march his army eastward towards Fredericksburg and the lower Rappahannock, hoping thereby, as it would seem, to get between Lee's army and Richmond, and so operate against the Confederate capital. This change of position necessitated a change in the line of supplies and involved much trouble and delay. In vain did Halleck, in a personal visit, try to keep operations on their present base; Burnside insisted upon that first of prerogatives, to have his own way, and Halleck returned to Washington, hardly comprehending what new movement might be intended, but clearly persuaded that it would be hard to meet promptly the new requirements. At Burnside's request, moreover, the several army corps were arranged in three grand divisions, which Sumner, Franklin, and Hooker respectively commanded.¹

Sumner led the Union advance to Falmouth and the Stafford Heights, which overlook Fredericksburg beyond the river Rappahannock, and by November 21st demanded that city's surrender. This was refused, and Sumner did not attempt to cross the river; but non-combatants fled to the woods for shelter, when the hostile armies began massing presently on the opposite bank. All seemed, however, to go wrong with these Union preparations. For want of pontoon bridges to cross the Rappahannock so far down stream, Burnside was seriously delayed; and an angry and voluminous correspondence ensued with Halleck, each trying to throw the blame upon the other for a blunder to which both had contributed. The bridges did not arrive until the 25th, and it was another half-month before Burnside was ready for the perilous passage, with his whole

¹ 6 N. & H. 199, 200; 3 B. & L. 70, 107. The same order which superseded McClellan had relieved Fitz-John Porter from his corps. 19 W. R. pt. 2, 545.

army concentrated for that purpose opposite Fredericksburg.¹

Lee, who had been waiting and watching south of the Rappahannock all the weeks that McClellan lingered, and profiting by the return of his stragglers and new supplies,² was not to be baffled by this new change of base. Perceiving the objective point, and convinced in mind that Burnside would persevere in the forward movement he had chosen, he prepared to resist at the outset and throw every obstacle in his way.³ With the winding river, still, to shelter him as he moved, he advanced his right wing to Fredericksburg, thus easily covering Richmond while disputing Burnside's passage. By the end of November the two entire armies had changed their relative ground, until rearranged closer and more compactly than before, with the same Rappahannock to divide them in its deeper channel; but Lee, vastly outnumbered, could do nothing but wait, and, when the time came, resist; while, with Burnside, the problem became one of applying sheer strength towards a feat of tremendous difficulty, which every day's delay made harder.

On the southern bank of the Rappahannock lay Fredericksburg, nestled in a range of hills, crescent in shape, with fertile bottom lands intervening, whose crops had just been gathered. Of three high hills, densely wooded, in the background, over which stretched Lee's army, two with lower receding heights formed natural bastions, while the third, of more gradual slope, known as Marye's Hill, fairly bristled all the way up with cannon and artificial barriers, which twenty days of unmolested possession gave Lee ample opportunity to place. Earthworks, skilfully thrown up, together with stone walls, protected his infantry; and at convenient points on the heights Lee massed his artillery so as to sweep the whole plain where the enemy must form for assault. North of the river lay Falmouth, near which

¹ 21 W. R. 87; 6 N. & H. 199; 3 B. & L. 121.

² 19 W. R. pt. 2, 644, 721; 2 B. & L. 673.

³ Lee to Davis, 21 W. R. 1029 (November 25th). Lee deferred to Jackson, and the latter did not arrive until the 30th. 2 Ropes, 451-454.

were the Stafford Heights, which Burnside's army occupied; but though Fredericksburg lay thus exposed, this amphitheatre of Confederate soldiery in the rear was beyond the effective range of Union artillery.¹

Burnside could hardly have realized the hopelessness of taking those distant heights, which, after all, could be of little consequence to him when captured, if Lee withdrew his army in good order. President Lincoln, who had visited Burnside the last of November, became impressed with other great risks of such an enterprise.² But Burnside resolved to throw his pontoons across the river and risk all upon a

storming assault. Many of his best officers disliked the task, and, conscious of their criticism, he gave his orders with some vagueness and confusion of mind, which caused Franklin, in particular, to misunderstand. Longstreet's sharpshooters, under cover of houses in Fredericksburg, harassed the laying of the pontoons, but a furious bombardment from Stafford Heights dislodged them, and, that hindrance overcome by some gallant fighting, Burnside's bridges were placed, and the whole Union army crossed the Rappahannock in safety, and by night of December 12th was in position, in the commander's presence.

Saturday, the 13th, was the fateful day of battle. Upon ambiguous orders, which reached him after full sunrise, Franklin fought all day with great spirit, charging upon the enemy's right with six successive divisions, and yet gaining no positive advantage. Meade, conspicuous among subordinates for gallantry, once penetrated the Confederate line, but after putting A. P. Hill's division to rout was forced to retreat under a galling fire. An hour before noon, the morning fog having lifted, Sumner was ordered to push his troops out through the town and attack the formidable heights in the rear, Marye's Hill, so amply fortified, being the declivity aimed at. The grim Confederates, with soiled

¹ 3 B. & L. 72, 73.

² 6 N. & H. 200. The President proposed changing the whole plan into a flanking operation, but both Halleck and Burnside rejected the advice. *Ib.*

hats and tattered uniforms, crouched behind a stone wall, shoulder high, at a sunken road, to give these well-dressed Unionists a bloody welcome. Forming on the plain in dark blue masses, the assailants with full ranks went manfully forward, not cheering, but with determination to obey orders.¹ This stone wall made the death line of approach, while from stern and wooded heights beyond projected cannon in safe reserve. As Lee's artillery and musket fire broke their formation when within range, they mixed, then closed, and brigade after brigade sank away over the open plain. Sumner's storming column, under French and Hancock, approached so absolutely without shelter under the withering fire, that when within assaulting distance there were not enough left to be rallied; the commands of Sturgis, Carroll, and Griffin suffered a like fate. Hooker, so famous in fight, was summoned at length to bring up his reserve and scale those heights. But he, for the first time, lost eagerness, seeing the bristling cannon before him, and, spurring his horse, rode two miles to headquarters to beg that his men might not be ordered to sure destruction. Burnside was inexorable, and "fighting Joe," returning to his column, led it bravely to murderous death. Butterfield, Griffin, Sykes, and Humphreys did their part nobly, the last heading a desperate charge with fixed bayonets, while the stone wall, now closely reached, was a sheet of flame from pointed gun-barrels. But this gallant act, which cost over a thousand men in a few minutes, was all in vain, and his remnant fell back like the rest. It was now growing dark, and Hooker withdrew, with the smoke in blinding clouds, having found, as he testified afterwards with sarcasm, that he had lost as many men as his orders required.² Truly, this was murder and not warfare, and, advantage of position gave to the Confederates, with a force far inferior, perhaps their amplest victory. "I never think of this ground but with a shudder," said Hooker, visiting this spot in after years.³

¹ As to this historic stone wall, see 3 B. & L. 79-81.

² 6 N. & H. 208; 3 B. & L. 82, 109, 127.

³ 3 B. & L. 215.

That night was a fearful one, both for Burnside's front line, which hugged the hollows, and the wounded and dying that could not be reached. The corpses of dead soldiers stiffening in the crisp air were rolled forward with carcasses of horses, as protection for the living, while Lee's artillery, through a dense darkness, swept the exposed field in all directions. The Union reserve that bivouacked in Fredericksburg dared not build fires, lest a mark should be made for the hostile cannon.¹ Burnside passed a gloomy night, without sleep or food, trying to exhibit composure, but finding little to encourage him in the words or manner of those about him. Brave at all times, his bravery now came near the point of sheer recklessness. Early the next day he renewed his orders that the heights should be taken, and purposed leading his devoted 9th Corps in person to the deadly enterprise. But here the advice of his chief subordinates restrained him. Sumner, that gallant veteran who in loyalty would have attempted anything short of an impossibility, stated with hesitation and great delicacy why the assault ought not to be renewed; and Hooker sustaining him in the frankest and most decided manner, as also did Franklin, Burnside called all the corps and division commanders into council, and finding them unanimous against his plan, cancelled it.² He still thought of holding Fredericksburg under cover of his guns, but changed his mind, and on the evening of the 15th resolved to return on his pontoons to Falmouth. This, under cover of the darkness and a driving storm, was successfully accomplished. "As far as can be ascertained this stormy morning," Lee telegraphed to Richmond early on the 16th, "the enemy has disappeared in our immediate front, and has recrossed the

¹ Couch in 3 B. & L. 116.

² The Union aggregate engaged at Fredericksburg was 113,000; of Confederates there were some 58,000 in effective strength. The Confederate loss in killed, wounded, and missing was about 5377; that on the Union side, 12,653. 3 B. & L. 145-147. General Cobb, who directed the Confederates behind the stone wall, was killed towards sunset.

Rappahannock. I presume he is meditating a passage at some other point.”¹

Burnside was not wanting in manly and generous feeling. In his report to Washington he assumed entire responsibility for the whole disaster, and praised those under him for the gallantry, courage, and endurance with which they had given or risked their lives. He acknowledged that he had changed his line from Warrenton against the wishes of the President, Halleck, and Stanton, who had left the whole management in his hands without interference.² All this went far in mitigating reproach for his errors of judgment. The President, in a well-written despatch, praised the army for the courage and skill of its operations, whatever the measure of success. Kind and encouraging letters reached Burnside from both Halleck and the Secretary of War.³ But the morale could not thus be restored to an army which now, almost to a man, distrusted the general who led it. At camp-fire and in officers' quarters it was said that Burnside had certified to his own unfitness for his place, and that whatever he undertook would surely fail. Desertions increased to an alarming extent; officers sent in their resignations, with harsh criticism upon the conduct of the war. The kind-hearted commander himself seemed stricken with grief over the brave comrades he had sacrificed. “Oh, those men over there!” he would say, as he paced up and down in his tent; “I am thinking of them all the time.”⁴

Recovering in a measure from his first depression of spirits, but still in no normal state of mind, Burnside resolved to make another movement across the river just after Christmas, and marching orders were issued accordingly. This time he meant to strike the enemy about six miles below Fredericksburg. But just as the expedition was starting, he received a telegram from Washington, which directed him to make no movement without letting the President know. Lincoln had just been called upon by two

¹ 21 W. R. 548; 6 N. & H. 208, 209.

² 21 W. R. 66.

³ 6 N. & H. 211.

⁴ 3 B. & L. 119, 138; 6 N. & H. c. 10.

generals from the camp, who earnestly declared that in the present condition of this army any such movement would turn out disastrously.¹ Burnside at once went to the capital to seek an explanation, and the President, withholding the names of his informants, stated frankly what he had heard.

1863, New Year's Day gave Lincoln much perplexity.
January. In a letter to Halleck he had betrayed some impatience over the growing tendency of the latter to shift the burden of deciding military points, and Halleck, offended, asked to be relieved. This trouble was smoothed out; but Burnside, on the same day, wrote the President a long letter, confiding his dislike of Halleck and Stanton, and strongly hinting his wish to turn over his command and retire to private life. On the 8th of January, upon a letter from Halleck which somewhat cautiously sanctioned Burnside's new plans, Lincoln indorsed his assent, soothing Burnside, who on the 5th had written him again.² The famous "mud march" followed, which that commander, now in a depressed and sullen mood, began on the 21st, against the foreboding advice of Hooker and Franklin. But the elements themselves seemed to have conspired against him. A cold, drizzling rain set in; the wheels of baggage and artillery wagons stuck fast in deep ruts, and horses floundered helplessly in the red mire, hundreds of them dying in harness. Burnside persisted, but the persistency of the bad weather was greater; and his army slumped and struggled back to camp, the edge of its mutinous spirit taken off by the high good humor of so ludicrous an experience.³ With this discomfiture ended Burnside's luckless command of the Army of the Potomac; for, forcing now an issue between himself and the chief of his incorrigible critics, he prepared an order dismissing Hooker

¹ 6 N. & H. 213.

² 6 N. & H. 215-221; 21 W. R. 941-954.

³ "I came to the conclusion that Burnside was fast losing his mind," wrote Franklin to Halleck; "so I look upon the rain which stopped his second attempt to cross the river as almost a Providential interference in our behalf." 21 W. R. 1010. See also 3 B. & L. 119; 6 N. & H. 218.

from the army, and the two generals who had visited the White House to complain of him, besides relieving from duty Franklin and W. F. Smith,¹ with some others of lesser rank. Armed with this order, and his own letter of resignation, he waited upon the President, and on the 24th demanded that one or the other be accepted.

The experiment of placing Burnside over this famous army had notably failed, and no hope remained of restoring confidence and good discipline by the harsh punishment proposed. Lincoln, casting about for a successor, chose, but not judiciously, the general against whom Burnside was embittered the most. He announced the next day that he had determined to replace him by Hooker; but as Burnside's honorable service could not be lightly esteemed, his resignation was refused, and, after a month's leave of absence, he was sent in fact to command at the Ohio River.² Sumner and Franklin, both of whom outranked Hooker, were assigned to other remote commands,—the one at Missouri and the other on the Southern coast,—and neither of those admirable generals found further opportunity to distinguish himself. Franklin's reputation suffered from political controversies and a severe judgment passed upon him by the joint inquisition of Congress. As for Sumner, he never lived to reach his new post of duty, but died in New York State, revered by all who could appreciate his perfect type of the old-school soldier,—true as steel, cheerful and obedient to orders, valorous in performance, and loyal to superiors who might have been pronounced inferior to himself. Months of rest and recuperation were now necessary for an army whose tone and prestige had suffered much by late vicissitudes.³

¹ 21 W. R. 868, shows that Franklin and Smith had, December 20th, sent to the President a joint memorial, proposing in detail that operations be transferred to the line of the James River.

² 21 W. R. 998; 6 N. & H. c. 10. Halleck wrote that Burnside's removal and the appointment of Hooker were the President's sole act. 21 W. R. 1009. Burnside, in taking leave of the Army of the Potomac, bespoke for his "brave and skilful" successor "cordial support and coöperation."

³ See 3 B. & L. 119, etc.; 6 N. & H. c. 10.

To turn to operations at the West. Halleck's failings as a field commander were far from realized when he was summoned East for advancement. That splendid column of 100,000, with which he entered Corinth unopposed, was broken up by his orders after that bloodless conquest. Instead of marching it unitedly onward, instead of operating against Vicksburg or Mobile, he dispersed it in various directions to repair railways and discipline guerillas; "stringing it along," to use Sherman's phrase, through a thinly settled and hostile country, with a frontage

1862.

of three hundred miles.¹ Buell's fine army of the Ohio, which had scarcely scented blood, was restored to its former autonomy.² Grant, who normally succeeded to full command when Halleck left, waited until late in October for a formal assignment which confined his department to the west of the Tennessee, and from his army reënforcements were repeatedly drawn to aid Buell, who alone in Halleck's former area might be considered still capable of the aggressive in point of numbers.³

Meanwhile the Confederates here, as eastward, during the midsummer of 1862, showed an energy for the initiative as scarcely ever again. Beauregard, whose health was much impaired, turned over his command when Halleck's advance was seen to have ended, and at Tupelo, a Mississippi town about fifty miles south of Corinth, where the Southern army was encamped, Bragg, on the 27th of June, succeeded him.⁴ Bragg, who was a favorite of President Davis, entered upon his work with great vigor, and with the idea of pushing, like Lee, a programme of invasion northward. Having reorganized his army, he carried it rapidly and skilfully towards Chattanooga, whence he quickly assumed the offensive against Buell, his immediate adversary, heading for Nashville and Louisville. Buell had started for Chattanooga seventeen days in advance, and would have reached that point first, had not Halleck's orders constrained him

¹ 1 Sherman, 288.

² 3 B. & L. 34.

³ 1 Grant, 398-401.

⁴ 2 B. & L. 722.

to repair the railroad as he advanced.¹ Bragg had the advantage of marching through a friendly country, while Buell had to keep his communications carefully guarded.²

Bragg's swift and stealthy march diverted Buell from Chattanooga, and forced him back to the defence of Kentucky and his old line of the Ohio. Bragg moved northward through Tennessee in the early part of September, not operating against Nashville, as he more safely might have done, but purposing to liberate Kentucky from August-September. "Lincoln's yoke" and bring her into the Confederacy. Hence he had sent General Kirby Smith with 12,000 troops through Cumberland Gap into eastern Kentucky. On the 29th of August, the very day that Pope, far away in Virginia, was fighting in desperate straits the second Bull Run, Smith met and defeated on his advance an inferior force under William Nelson; next, pressing on to Lexington, 6000 of his troops, under Heth, were in early September a few miles south of Covington, Cincinnati's suburb on the Kentucky side of the Ohio, and both Louisville and Cincinnati were threatened. Great consternation and excitement prevailed; for Cincinnati was at this time the western granary and arsenal of the Union armies. Kirby Smith, on the 4th of October, reported with full force to Bragg at Frankfort. But Nelson, with great energy, gathered Union volunteers at Louisville.³ Buell had concentrated at Murfreesboro in Tennessee, October. believing that Nashville was Bragg's objective point; but, when convinced of the real situation, he raced with Bragg for Louisville. Bragg by a false move gave Buell the advantage, and the latter arrived before the close of September. Here he found an order relieving him from command and appointing Thomas in his place; but Thomas,

¹ 1 Grant, 401; 3 B. & L. 35 (Buell). No benefit came from thus hindering Buell.

² 3 B. & L. 34, 38; 6 N. & H. 274. Buell was thought to march too slowly. 16 W. R. pt. 2, 104, 122.

³ 6 N. & H. c. 13; 3 B. & L. 42, 61. Nelson lost his life in a personal quarrel with another Union officer a few days later. *Ib.*

full of confidence in his superior, had the order cancelled.¹ Buell on the 1st of October pushed southward to find his foe, and the hostile armies came into collision on the 8th at the village of Perrysville. The battle was a fierce one, and with a numerical advantage in favor of the enemy; but Sheridan, a young cavalry officer, who had already started upon his career of fame, fought with great distinction and effect. Buell was about to renew the uncertain fight at daybreak, but Bragg withdrew over night and retreated from Kentucky, shrinking from further contest.²

Buell, his fine army presently increased by arrivals from Grant so as to equal the enemy, proposed to follow towards western Tennessee; but he was now relieved of command, the President on the 24th taking him promptly at his word on a disrespectful hint. Aside from excessive slowness, Buell had repeatedly offended those in civil authority by his superb disdain and want of complaisance. Journalists disliked him; he made of Stanton an inveterate enemy; he provoked the governors of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois to unite in requesting his removal. Even the patient President felt deeply vexed by his bland and persistent indifference to the problem of relieving eastern Tennessee.³ Such, too, were the irritations of politics this fall, that McClellan's personal sympathizers in the army were too readily suspected of disloyal intent. All this operated to Buell's disadvantage, for, with McClellan's fall from grace, the keystone of his arch of influence fell out; McClellan had given him this responsible post, and neither by prowess nor by making friends had he made his claims more solid. But, in spite of a haughty and unyielding mood, Buell was a good soldier, and present delays were not all of his creation. He claimed truly, when bidding farewell to his troops, that he had converted them "from raw levies into

¹ 3 B. & L. 44; 6 N. & H. 277.

² 6 N. & H. 278, 279; 3 B. & L. 8. Buell's army at Bardstown was 58,000, while that of Bragg, with Kirby Smith, was 68,000; but after this battle, when Sill arrived, the Union and Confederate forces were about equal. *Ib.*

³ 16 W. R. pt. 2, 637-652. See Buell in defence, 3 B. & L. 42.

a powerful army." Rosecrans, his successor, assured him of personal sympathy. "I, like yourself," he wrote, "am neither an intriguer nor newspaper soldier."¹

Rosecrans assumed command at Louisville on the 30th of October, with his department styled "the Cumberland," and separated by the Tennessee River from that assigned to Grant. Halleck ordered him to drive the enemy vigorously from his front, and then take and hold eastern Tennessee.² Proceeding with vigor to execute the first trust, he massed his army about Nashville, strengthening his line of communication, and then, late in December, moved upon Bragg, who had gone into winter quarters at Murfreesboro, a short distance to the south. Here and among the cedar brakes of Stone's River was fought a famous battle on the final day of the year. It happened that Bragg and Rosecrans had matured a plan of fight, each the counterpart of the other. The battle raged from dawn to twilight, with forces about equally matched, and in forming and reforming his shattered lines Rosecrans showed high courage and good generalship; aided splendidly by Thomas at the critical point; by McCook, whose corps bore the first assault; and by junior officers, among whom young Sheridan was again the most conspicuous. Night closed on what seemed a drawn battle, but in distressing rain and flood Bragg beat a disorderly retreat.³

Bragg, never popular with the South as a commander, was execrated for the failure of his aggressive campaign, so nearly successful when initiated. But he, like Lee in Maryland, was deceived in his estimate of Kentucky's readiness to join the Confederate cause, and any

¹ 6 N. & H. c. 13; 16 W. R. pt. 2, 637-652.

² "I need not urge upon you the necessity of giving active employment to your forces. Neither the country nor the Government will much longer put up with the inactivity of some of our armies and generals." 16 W. R. pt. 2, 641.

³ 6 N. & H. c. 13. About 43,000 were engaged on each side, and the Confederate loss stood at about 10,200 to the Union 13,200. 20 W. R. pt. 1, 215, 674.

invasion which the inhabitants opposed instead of supporting must eventually have failed.¹

While Bragg pursued the offensive, Van Dorn and Price combined to hold Grant's army in check in western Tennessee. Crossing to the eastern bank of the Mississippi, they gathered near Holly Springs an army of about 40,000 men, bold and sanguine. Grant's headquarters were at Corinth, where Rosecrans then held, as Pope's successor, the immediate command of the left wing, Sherman and the right wing being at Memphis, and Ord with the centre at an intermediate point, McClellan having gone to Washington on leave. After reinforcements were ordered to Buell, Grant's entire army numbered less than 50,000, with an immense frontage to guard south of Cairo and bounded between the Tennessee and Mississippi rivers. Grant wasted no time in complaints or presage of disaster, but to Halleck he telegraphed presently that his position was precarious, though he hoped to get out all right.

About the 13th of September Van Dorn threatened Corinth, while Price audaciously seized the little railway town of Iuka, not far east of Corinth. Grant, when informed of Price's position, took immediate steps to dislodge him and cut him off from Van Dorn. The battle of Iuka, fought with this purpose on the 19th, failed of full effect, because the combination of Ord and Rosecrans miscarried;² and Price by a circuitous route joined Van Dorn, while Grant, with another detachment ordered to strengthen Buell, found himself in more defensive straits than ever. Still on the alert, and finding, when October opened, that Corinth was his

¹ 3 B. & L. 13, 22, by General Wheeler, who gained renown in this campaign on the Southern side. At Frankfort the invaders had pretended to induct a Confederate governor of Kentucky. 6 N. & H. 278. Both Bragg and Kirby Smith clearly admitted their disappointment at Kentucky sentiment, and the want of absolute authority in the one or the other was a further obstacle, though they coöperated heartily, and both were brave, and devoted to their cause.

² 2 B. & L. 756; 1 Grant, 414-421; 1 Sherman, 289-292.

enemy's objective point, Grant, now at Jackson, despatched McPherson thence to Rosecrans, directing Ord and Hurlbut to strike the flank. In bristling array, Van Dorn appeared before Corinth on the 4th, and made a ^{October.} reckless and ill-considered assault upon its works, probably hoping, after driving out the Union garrison, to make it his own stronghold. Reënforcements had not arrived, but Rosecrans met the enemy gallantly under cover of the parapets, and Van Dorn's exhausted troops drew off, just as McPherson arrived to increase their dismay. Foreseeing that result, Grant had sent Rosecrans specific orders to pursue at once, and he repeated them; but Rosecrans waited till another day and then went contrary to directions. Afar off the lustre of Rosecrans was heroic, and it was because of Corinth that he superseded Buell.¹ Corinth was a disaster from which this region never recovered, and the whole Confederate advance, in fact, brought gloomy disappointment.

When Halleck, in April, 1862, took the field, he left in charge of Missouri General John M. Schofield, a safe subordinate, whose command was later made an independent one. But Schofield's task was difficult; for political disorders continued here, fomented by a malignant secession minority, whose schemes provoked the aggressive of antislavery views to a like intolerance; so that between the two factions of the State conservative Unionists who were moderate proslavery men could scarcely maintain their poise and keep society secure. On Missouri's borders and over the thinly populated space where police protection was scant, lawlessness took the phase of loyal or disloyal outrage, as chance might serve. On the remote western frontier, "jayhawkers"

¹ 1 Sherman, 289-292; 1 Grant, 414-421. Rosecrans has since defended himself in 2 B. & L. 754, 755. This battle of Corinth should be distinguished from Halleck's capture, *supra*, p. 186. Grant, whose eye was keen for the mistakes of Rosecrans, says he would have relieved him, had not Government sent him to the department of the Cumberland.

and "red legs" from Kansas repaid the border ruffianism of former years by plundering forays made under pretence of military service to the United States. Confederate officers, on the other hand, pursuing a fierce policy which the government at Richmond did not fully countenance, authorized guerilla bands, both in Missouri and Arkansas, to maltreat Union non-combatants, after a fashion unrecognized by the laws of war. With the aid of an enrolled State militia, raised under a compact between Governor Gamble and the President, these latter foes of good government were suppressed and dispersed, after a hundred or more engagements, great and small, with numbers varying from forty to a few thousand on either side.¹

1862,

April-

December.

When military commands were rearranged, General Curtis, with St. Louis as headquarters, was placed in charge of a department which added Kansas and Arkansas to Missouri, while Schofield, campaigning to the southward, fought battles near Pea Ridge, where Curtis had won renown, and drove the enemy beyond the mountains.² Civil self-government in Missouri thus became fairly reestablished on the side of loyalty to the Union.

At New Orleans Butler ruled rigorously a disloyal community for nearly eight months, under a plan of martial law embracing minute regulations. His civic administration had some strong points of merit. He first averted starvation, a danger imminent when he arrived, and next warded off yellow fever by a strict quarantine in the unhealthy season; he maintained good order; with great energy he kept the streets clean and neat as never before, repairing the ravages he had found at the levee. He received little or no coöperation from governor, mayor, or leading citizens, whom he kept suppressed. If severe towards disloyal transgressors, no blame should attach, where justice permeated his action. But no Union general bred in so short a space of time such intense hatred

¹ 13 W. R. 14; 6 N. & H. c. 18.

² *Ib.*

and disrespect, and the epithets which clung to him for many years showed that New Orleans was sceptical, not only of his sense of justice, but of his personal honesty. In one way or another Butler laid here the foundation of wealth which subserved his later ambition in politics, and those he attached to himself were chiefly such as sought material success in life or enjoyed punishing the prostrate. Cynical in his own standard of measuring mankind, he would mortify convention, and set the low against the high, rather than give every one, high or low, his due. Ill fitted for conqueror, he posed as avenger. He assessed for the poor of Louisiana rich citizens who had subscribed towards the Confederacy. He armed the negro and sought his good-will, while threatening white recusants of respectability with the ball and chain. He closed certain churches where prayers were not offered up for the true President. When his officers complained of New Orleans ladies who played secession tunes on the piano and feigned nausea on the streets when Union shoulder-straps passed by, he issued an order, saturnine in humor and yet exasperating, which in a double entendre threatened for such misconduct a scandalous penalty.¹ By these and other manifestations of martial discipline he made New Orleans more hateful of the Union than he found it. The Confederate Davis, by a proclamation which specified current complaints, denounced him as a common enemy of mankind, while Lord Palmerston and the British House of Commons made remonstrance. On the 15th of December, Banks, who knew something of the gentler art of government, relieved him in this department; and Butler, in a pungent address for the newspapers, claimed that his clemency had been greater than that of the English in China and India,—since treason being an offence punishable with death, all short of it was clear gain to the offender.²

¹ "She shall be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her vocation." 15 W. R. 426.

² 5 N. & H. c. 16; Am. Cycl. 1862, 653; 15 W. R. 906, 908. As to forced sales of property in the name of the United States, which Banks suspended, see 15 W. R. 611.

President Lincoln, in a letter to Curtis¹ about this time, reflected unfavorably upon civil arrests and forcible assessments by his generals, and the abuses to which they were liable when instigated by private malice, revenge, or dishonest, honest pecuniary interest. He now desired that a system liable to such abuses should be confined, in January. Missouri at least, to cases of stern necessity.² Some Western commanders were more scrupulous than others about "handling the rebels without gloves."³ As for guerillas, however, and those hostile citizens of the South who wore uniforms upon opportunity, it was another matter. Illicit trading, moreover, had been a fruitful subject of military embarrassment, following the capture of New Orleans, the emporium of river commerce. Secretary Chase was very anxious to promote the purchase of cotton, because each bale was worth some three hundred dollars in gold, and answered the purpose of coin in foreign exchange. Hence hundreds of hungry speculators from the North flocked into the lines at trading-points like Memphis and New Orleans, soliciting favors from commanding officers, and resorting to corrupt devices to draw out cotton from the interior, often purchasing it from negroes who did not own but could tell where it was hidden. All this induced temptations to high officers, some of whom were drawn into secret operations for sharing profits in return for military facilities. More than this, the commercial enterprise thus connived at induced a contraband trade with the enemy, and opened up a supply of salt, bacon, percussion caps, and the like, which the Confederacy much needed. So corrupting was found this whole intercourse, that by March of the new year it was placed by the President under the sole direction of the Treasury, and prohibited to the army altogether.⁴

¹ It was to Missouri and St. Louis that General Sumner would now have gone, had not death removed that gallant officer. *Supra*, p. 251.

² 6 N. & H. 387.

³ "I do not," says Grant, "recollect having arrested and confined a citizen not a soldier during the entire rebellion." 1 Grant, 398.

⁴ 1 Sherman, 294; 15 W. R. 624; 1 Grant, 399; *McClure*, November, 1897 (C. A. Dana).

SECTION XIII.

FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN.

The crafty scheme of Louis Napoleon to gain an imperial foothold in North America, while the dominant race that opposed such projects was distracted in bloody strife, furnishes an instructive episode of these years. Mexico, at the outbreak of Southern insurrection, was in an exhausted condition after a long war of factions. The administration of President Juarez, which was legitimate under the liberal constitution of 1857, had neither force nor hold upon the public confidence, as yet, to maintain internal order. Bandits infested the mountain passes; the transportation of the mails was irregular and uncertain; highway robberies were of frequent occurrence; and a member of the American legation, journeying from the capital to Vera Cruz,—cities not yet connected by rail,—had been waylaid and murdered. So long and serious had been the chaos in affairs that the establishment of a protectorate of some sort in Mexico was a matter of correspondence on both sides of the Atlantic, when President Buchanan surrendered the reins of office.¹

President Lincoln favored neither intervention nor the peaceable annexation of Mexico. His policy was humane, generous, and disinterested. Recognizing the duty which rested upon the United States, in common 1861. with the Spanish-American republics, of establishing constitutional liberty on this continent,—aware, too, that the task of President Juarez paralleled his own,—he desired that Mexico should retain unimpaired her integrity of soil, and by a prudent course of conduct avert, if possible, all danger of foreign aggression. Corwin was instructed, before setting out for his post, to keep this object in view, to cultivate friendly relations with the Juarez government, to gain the confidence of the Mexican people, and to show his

¹ Dipl. Corr. (1861).

mission characterized by a spirit "earnestly American, in the continental sense of the word, and fraternal in no affected or mere diplomatic meaning."¹

But the impending storm was ready to burst upon this unhappy people, and an error of policy hastened the calamity. On the 17th of July, the Congress of Mexico (which then consisted of a single house) passed a law which suspended for two years the payment of interest on the foreign debt, owed chiefly to Spain and Great Britain.² A protest and rupture of relations immediately followed. France and Great Britain took down their flags, broke off all intercourse with the Mexican republic, and negotiated a joint expedition, Spain becoming a party to their agreement. On the 31st of October a treaty, ratified at London, bound these three powers to send a naval and military force to Mexico, ostensibly to demand more efficient protection for persons and property and the fulfilment of public obligations. A clause, inserted against the Emperor's wishes through the persistent efforts of Great Britain, as though some sinister design were suspected on his part, declared that the allied powers should not seek "any acquisition of territory nor special advantage," and that no effort should be exerted "of a nature to prejudice the right of the Mexican nation to choose and constitute freely the form of its government."³

President Lincoln was notified of this alliance, and by way of courtesy invited to join it, no delay being made, however, for his reply. He declined to do so; and, conceding that these joint powers had a right to judge for themselves the propriety of war, he expressed the hope that their own solemn disclaimer would be observed, and no attempt made in Mexico to subvert existing institutions. He submitted a plan, besides, under Corwin's suggestion, whereby the United States should advance all overdue interest, upon proper security arranged with Mexico, so as to avert the

¹ Mexican Affairs, 1862, 5.

² France had sought her chance for a quarrel, by purchasing at nominal rates bonds issued by the Miramon reactionists for supplies, while usurping authority, and these Napoleon pressed for their face value.

³ Mexican Affairs, 1862, 136.

crisis. That plan the allies rejected; and although a loan was actually negotiated with Mexico on such a basis, our Senate objected on general grounds, and the project dropped.¹

Spain took the initiative in Mexican invasion, eager for military glory and chafing under the delay of concluding the preliminaries. Rubalcava, the Spanish admiral, under orders which reached him at Havana, sailed into the Gulf, and about the middle of December captured Vera Cruz and the castle of San Juan d'Ulloa without firing a gun, in the name of the allies. Fearful of losing the control he had purposed, the French Emperor despatched a larger contingent of French troops than originally planned, as an offset to the Spanish. Great Britain, lukewarm, suspicious, and not over sanguine as to results, sent only 700 marines, who were soon recalled.² Juarez sought a peaceful adjustment with these allies. That obnoxious law of repudiation, which only the general impoverishment of the country could have wrung from the Mexican Congress, had already been repealed. The commissioners of the allies were received with courtesy and allowed to advance towards the interior. At Soledad, on the 19th of February, preliminaries were signed which recognized the sovereignty of Mexico's exist-
1862,
February-
April.
ing government and pledged the invaders to observe good faith. The latter had, on landing, studiously proclaimed to the Mexican people the honesty of their intentions, which rumor impugned.³ Orizaba, with its healthy hill-country, was fixed upon as the place of conference for adjustment of grievances, and thither the allies were allowed

¹ Mexican Affairs, 1862, 187; *ib.* 1863, 8, etc. Earl Russell stated that France acceded, *but not without hesitation*, to his proposal for making the United States a party to the alliance. M. Thouvenel, on the other hand, insisted that France first suggested the invitation. Correspondence with Spain seems to confirm the British statement.

² *North American Review*, April, 1866, 460, etc. (by author); 3 Seward, cs. 10-12.

³ "They deceive you who would make you believe that behind our pretensions, as just as they are legitimate, come enveloped plans of conquest and restorations and of interfering in your politics and government." Mexican Affairs, 1862, 177.

to advance, upon a solemn promise to take no military advantage. The 1st, afterwards the 15th, of April was the day named for a formal opening. But in the meantime a controversy had sprung up. Almonte, a refugee of the Mexican reactionists, picked up in Europe by Louis Napoleon and used as a tool for his perfidious designs, landed at Vera Cruz, and, claiming the protection of the French flag, began concerting with the enemies of the republic. Juarez demanded that he should leave the country. This seemed righteous to the English and Spanish commissioners, but those of France refused. So gross and wanton a violation of the treaty of London, not to add of the Soledad preliminaries, could not be countenanced. The triple allies dissolved partnership; Great Britain and Spain withdrew their forces; and France was left, as the Spanish General Prim declared when parting, to erect an imperial throne for the Archduke Maximilian.¹

On the 9th of April the mask was thrown off. The French commissioners, pretending that fresh insults had been offered them, joined cause with the Almonte revolutionists and proclaimed war upon the constituted authorities of Mexico. They appealed to the people to shake off the yoke of an oppressive minority, as they termed this Juarez administration, and to institute a government for themselves. "The banner of France has been planted on the Mexican soil," was their new appeal, "and that banner will not retreat. Let all honest men receive it as a friendly banner; let only madmen dare attack it." Almonte, in fulfilment of his part, praised his French master in a pronunciamiento of his own, and commended the French invaders, now penetrating, under General Lorencez, into the interior, to the prayers of his fellow-countrymen.

England had doubtless joined the expedition simply to secure her own material interests. She took care to hamper her wily colleagues with written constraints, and extricated herself from embroilment as soon as possible. Spain in all likelihood had meditated a reconquest; but, perceiving that

¹ Mexican Affairs, 1863, 42, etc.

scheme impracticable, swung to the side of Great Britain, through jealousy of Napoleon. But with France's infatuated ruler the design from the outset was to supplant the Mexican republic by an exotic establishment of his own. War was the object and the necessary result of French policy.¹

The bold words of the French invaders were not borne out by their earliest acts. Lorencez advanced with his forces to Puebla, but was badly repulsed, May 5th, and forced to retire. Already had President Juarez ^{May-} taken prompt military measures, while his foreign ^{December.} foe perfidiously retained Orizaba as a base of supplies. The common people heeded his appeal to preserve their constitution and liberty, and Puebla's victory remains in Mexican annals another Marathon. Almonte's Mexican uprising was a failure, and, covered by the guns of the French frigates, this pretender took the customs at Vera Cruz, while all the Mexican states, and all the national area not occupied by the French army, supported the republic. France could not resume the initiative without fresh troops; Mexican guerillas cut off connection with the seacoast, and the situation of the invading army became

¹ The whole dealing of France with Mexico had tended to force a rupture. A random shot fired in the streets of its capital was magnified into the attempted assassination of Saligny, the French minister. While the treaty of London was under consideration, a Mexican ambassador sought an interview at Paris with the French government, and tendered overtures for an amicable adjustment. Thouvenel interrupted him rudely: "We will not allow any explanation. We have given our orders in concert with England; and you will know through our minister and our admiral what are the demands of France." When, after arriving in Mexico, the allies made up their ultimatum together, Spain's claims were found indisputable, and England's were based upon liquidated matters; but those of France were beyond all reason or proportion. Twelve million dollars in the mass were demanded by way of a general indemnity, besides the face value of discredited bonds bought as worthless. When the allies protested against such estimates, the reply was that "each nation is the sole umpire of its demands." In the correspondence between the Powers which followed, Earl Russell declared it impossible that claims so excessive could have been made with the hope of being entertained.

perilous. In Europe these gloomy news strengthened the impression that this foolhardy enterprise would be abandoned. Not such was Napoleon's intention. He determined to send reënforcements, and asked of his legislative corps an additional credit of fifteen million francs, which was voted. General Forey, a soldier of blood and iron, inexorable as fate and ambitious of a marshalship, was appointed to the chief command and invested with full power for war or diplomacy. Upon arriving at Vera Cruz, he proclaimed that the object of his Emperor was to liberate the Mexican people, and then allow them to select freely their form of government. Almonte's puppet show was closed. With flattering courtesy Forey ordered the flag of Mexico to be replaced over the custom-house where he landed, and he artfully gained the submission of a conservative element in the country. Before November had ended, over 35,000 French reënforcements had landed on the Gulf coast, and Forey, taking up the line of march for Puebla, proclaimed that France would persevere in the work undertaken.¹

The famous autograph letter of Napoleon to Forey, written before the latter left France, throws strong light upon his designs in America.² The plan of establishing a strong government of the Latin race in Mexico, to counterpoise our great Republic,—that government to be, if possible, a monarchy of his own placing,—is herein set forth in unmistakable terms. It is not for the interests of France, argues the Emperor, that the United States should seize all the Mexican Gulf, and thence command the Antilles, as well as South America, and dispense the products of the New World. "If, on the other hand, Mexico maintains her independence and the integrity of her territory, if a stable government be there constituted with the assistance of France, we shall have restored to the Latin race on the other side of the Atlantic all its strength and its prestige; we shall have guaranteed security to our West India colonies

¹ Mexican Affairs, 1863, 194, 341.

² July 3d, 1862; Mexican Affairs, 1865, 190.

and to those of Spain; we shall have established our friendly influence in the centre of America; and that influence, by creating immense markets for our commerce, will procure us the raw materials indispensable for our manufactures."¹ Such was the brilliant picture conjured up by a mind far penetrating, and yet from its absorption in schemes of gilded unrealities most prone to be led astray. This document is perhaps the most positive extant of Napoleon's ultimate plans, such as he seldom reduced to plain writing or suffered to be divulged.

The new conquest of Mexico was thus the primary object of the Emperor's policy on this continent, the dismemberment of the American Union being secondary, yet most essential. So far as this country was concerned, France (to use the language of her ministers) waited on events. Suspicion was aroused early at Washington, and the progress of French designs on this distant border carefully watched. As early as September, 1861, Dayton at Paris had been instructed to ascertain Napoleon's intentions and to acquaint him with our express desire that Mexico should remain independent. To this Thouvenel, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, replied with emphasis, that France and England meant merely to realize their money debts.² The same assurances were given repeatedly, as Dayton's despatches show, while the triple alliance lasted. The Emperor had no desire, it was said, to interfere in any way with the internal government of Mexico. Even when reinforcements under Forey were sent forward, so earnest was the French government in disclaiming sinister designs, that no issue

¹ *Ib.* That such a project had occupied his mind before our Civil War, see 6 N. & H. 34.

² And yet at this time, as appears from a despatch of Thouvenel, dated October 11th, 1861, he was urging upon Earl Russell the Emperor's preconceived desire to set up Maximilian in Mexico. *Mexican Affairs*, 1865, 170. And in this despatch the likelihood of a final rupture of the American Union aids the argument.

could fairly be made without raising an issue of veracity. "If we must err at all," wrote Seward in consequence, "it is safest to err on the side of sincere faith." The situation of Lincoln's administration was truly perplexing. Prudence forbade a foreign war while domestic insurrection was so all-absorbing for suppression; and in Mexico, besides, the Juarez government had not yet shown such proof of skill or resources as to encourage the hope that our open interference in its behalf would result favorably. The only true course, therefore, was to watch the situation for ourselves and discreetly bide our time. France was plainly informed that the sympathies of this Union were with Mexico; that we believed no monarchical government founded by European intervention would have any prospect of security or permanency; that we were opposed to all schemes which threatened to overthrow Juarez and the Mexican republic; but that, in reliance on these repeated assurances of the Emperor, we should pursue a policy of strict neutrality until change and a notice to the contrary.¹

We may now understand why Louis Napoleon was so anxious to become pacificator in the struggle between North and South. That ill-favored apparition of a friendly mediation, which stalked upon the stage at intervals, as if to intimidate the United States into compliance, was part of his Mexican drama. Preoccupied by dazzling designs on this continent, the Emperor became excessively anxious for some settlement of the American conflict other than by the full reestablishment of constitutional authority. His offi-

1861. cious services were first tendered just after belligerent rights had been accorded to the South. Next, in October, 1862, he invited England and Russia to join him in exerting an influence with the two belligerents of America for a six months' armistice; but both
1862. powers declined to sanction such a step.² Failing

¹ Mexican Affairs, 1862, 216, etc.; ib. 1863, 530, etc. And see 6 N. & H. c. 2.

² See 6 N. & H. 63-67. In Spencer Walpole's Lord John Russell 344, it is related that this Secretary proposed in October, 1861, a some

in that triple alliance, he made direct overtures to the Lincoln government through his ministers, deploring this devastating strife, and proposing that commissioners should be appointed from the contending sections to ascertain whether separation was an extreme to be no longer avoided.¹ This last proposal, which under all circumstances was a covert threat, reached Washington in February, and at a dark period of the war. Seward's despatch in reply, one of the best State papers of the Civil War, met the insidious offer with dignity, good temper, and unshaken courage; it positively declined all mediation at once and forever. Congress, too, declared before adjournment, by large majorities in each branch, that foreign intervention was unreasonable and inadmissible, and that any further attempt in such direction would be regarded as an unfriendly act.²

1863,
February-
March.

England might well have won our gratitude for discouraging Napoleon's darker projects. The insincerity and self-delusion of the Emperor were apprehended by the Palmerston ministry. But downright surliness and pride in this quarter forbade the growth of a kindly sentiment, and the day of reckoning came. Disinterested by comparison, and bound to the United States by the strongest

what peremptory summons to North and South to make up their quarrel; but that Lord Palmerston disapproved such a course. In September, 1862, Lord Palmerston acceded; but colleagues in the Cabinet restrained the two, and the next month this proposal from the Emperor was rejected.

¹ Drouyn de l'Huys to Mercier, January 9th, 1863. "The sentiment to which we have yielded is too sincere for indifference to find a place in our thoughts, and that we should cease to be painfully affected whilst the war continues to rage." Yet humane sentiment had not prevented the Emperor from despatching Forey to pour ruin and desolation into Mexico. And see 6 N. & H. c. 4.

² *Globe*, 1863, 1497, 1541; *Am. Cycl.* 1862, 738-740; 6 N. & H. c. 4. Napoleon, thus rebuffed, left the subject, but he was soon seen informing leaders of the secession cause in Parliament that he was ready to recognize the South if Great Britain took the first step.

natural ligaments, Great Britain chose, nevertheless, to make herself the most conspicuous among European nations that expected and desired the downfall of the great Republic. Confederate cruisers found shelter in her colonial ports, while other nations excluded them. The influential of the British press subserved secession interests; blockade-running was almost altogether a British diversion, with risks taken by British insurance companies; British capitalists invested in the Southern loans; British agents in the United States served as Confederate agents and emissaries; British merchants supplied to the Confederate army ammunition and supplies.¹ And more than all this, Great Britain's isle was for two years the naval base of Confederate operations. Privateering Southern cruisers, built and equipped to all intents in British ports, and manned with British gunners, issued forth one by one, and roamed the ocean at large to prey upon the merchant marine of the Union, seldom anchoring in a Southern harbor, since blockade sealed up approach, and never bringing in their captures for regular judicial proceedings. Whether in all this the Palmerston ministry was actuated by feelings positively hostile to the United States, and not rather by mere heedlessness to results, supposing a breach irreparable, one need not now inquire; but it stood convicted, years later, of neglect, at the least, to enforce even the neutrality proclaimed. "The British nation sympathizes with the insurgents," wrote Seward in August, 1862; "the British government either sympathizes or allows itself to seem to sympathize with them." But under all circumstances, our ministers abroad were, like the old Roman generals, charged, even when defeated, "never to despair of the Republic;"² and Minister Adams, with a vigilance that never slept, collected and preserved facts which in time brought reparation.

Repeatedly in early 1862 did Minister Adams inform Earl Russell that an armed steamer, known as the *Oreto*, was preparing to sail from Liverpool to make war upon the commerce of the United States. The British Secretary in-

¹ 3 Seward, cs. 6, 7.

² 3 Seward, 123, 145.

sisted, upon perfunctory reports made to him, that the vessel in question was an innocent trading vessel, notwithstanding its true destination was of common notoriety. Permitted to sail, this vessel arrived ^{1862.} at Nassau, where, taking on board her Confederate commander, she proceeded, as the *Florida*, upon her career of devastation under the flag of the Confederacy.¹ At Liverpool, that haven of cupidity for the Southern cause,² a breach still more palpable was committed the same year. A vessel, known first by her dock number of "290," was in process of construction and outfit under circumstances which left no doubt of her intended mission, an ostensible owner being Laird, a member of Parliament who had made himself conspicuous as an advocate of the Confederate cause. Minister Adams brought these facts to the notice of Earl Russell on the 23d of June; but here, too, upon a report of British officials, it was decided that there was not sufficient proof to warrant the vessel's detention. Unable to secure the attention of the government, Adams next adduced the testimony which our consul at Liverpool had gathered with great fulness of detail, but still it was insisted that no *prima facie* case had been made out. Undaunted by rebuffs, our minister still plied the Foreign Office with proofs of the most convincing character, adding on the 24th of July the written opinion of an eminent English barrister, which last made, probably, more impression than all the testimony together.³ But the law officers of the crown dallied, as did also the ministry, and before the latter could receive report advising a detention, the "290," which had left her moorings and anchored in the Mersey, sailed away without register or clearance beyond all reach of the futile injunctions

¹ 6 N. & H. c. 3; 3 Seward, c. 17.

² Here Bulloch, the Confederate agent, disbursed millions for vessels and supplies. Davis, 240.

³ "It appears difficult to make out a stronger case of infringement of the Foreign Enlistment Act, which, if not enforced on this occasion, is little better than a dead letter." (Mr. Collier.) See 2 Walpole's Russell, 353-355. "There was no secrecy about the building of the *Alabama*," says Jefferson Davis. Davis, 241.

sent out to stop her. And thus, when rechristened, did the *Alabama*, under Raphael Semmes, once an officer of the American navy, launch out on her career of robbery and destruction,—a unique one in the annals of civilized warfare, to receive a better name than piracy; for as no port existed into which Semmes could carry a prize, he destroyed every defenceless merchant vessel he could overhaul which sailed under the national flag he had been taught to protect, despoiling it of whatever portable articles he could take on board, and maltreating crew and passengers at his own arbitrary pleasure.¹

It is unfair to contend, as did Earl Russell with apathy, that a nation cannot go behind the letter of its law to enforce belligerent neutrality. The whole essence of international obligation lies, not in written text, but in the just and considerate spirit to avoid offence to other sovereignties. It is the duty of a neutral nation to honorably uphold its good faith against the efforts of all ill-disposed and partisan inhabitants within the realm; and even though the statute should itself be inadequate, so that conviction might not follow, prompt legal prosecution will vindicate the public faith and check individual wrong.² The relief to this picture of stolid indifference was in the grand treaty between Great Britain and the United States for joint extirpation of the African slave-trade.³ It was an omen of encouragement through the darkest days of our national peril, that whenever freedom for the oppressed became a positive issue, British philanthropy would come to our aid and offset aristocratic enmity.⁴

Russia, as we have said, was the real European power

¹ 6 N. & H. c. 3; 3 Seward, c. 17. See p. 138.

² Earl Russell himself conceded that he saw no reason why Parliament should be called upon to amend an act which in his opinion was sufficient already. 6 N. & H. c. 3.

³ *Supra*, p. 219.

⁴ Of this joint compact, which gave the death-blow to the vilest traffic of the century, Seward was justly proud. "If I have done nothing else worthy of self-congratulation," he wrote home, "I deem this treaty sufficient to have lived for." 3 Seward, 85.

that befriended the United States with strong effect, and the Czar throughout this weary struggle remained our constant friend.¹ When Cameron reached St. Petersburg, early in the summer of 1862, he found many proofs of cordial sympathy. Alexander held with him a long and earnest conversation, seeming plain and unostentatious in discourse, and sincere without affectation. He frankly declared that his sympathies had always been cordially with the United States; that he was very anxious our nation should suffer no decrease of power or influence; that he regarded American and Russian interests as in many respects identical, and hoped to draw the two nations into closer communication.²

The blockade of the Southern coast was by this time so effective that its stringency was severely felt in France and England. Welles, our Secretary of the Navy, though somewhat ancient and unprepossessing in personal appearance, was wise and strong in performing his task, and ably assisted.³ New vessels were equipped every month, to keep up the patrol, painted not black and white,—the old hues,—but a dull bluish drab, so that blockade-runners could less easily catch sight of them. In England, most especially, government interference was sought upon every possible pretext; at one time the blockade was complained of as inefficient and unworthy of British respect; at another, as too efficient, because some British ship or subject had fallen a prey to American vigilance; now was pressed the cotton famine, which made mills idle, and then the imagined barbarity of obstructing Charleston harbor. Yet, despite all pressure, the French Emperor refrained from the severest comments expected of him in the speech to his Legislative Corps; while Earl Russell, in the debates of Parliament, when motions were pressed for Confederate

¹ *Supra*, p. 117.

² 3 Seward, 49.

³ "Welles was a curious-looking man," writes Dana; "he wore a wig which was parted in the middle, the hair falling down on each side; and it was from his peculiar appearance, I have always thought, that the idea that he was an old fogey originated." *McClure*, April, 1898.

recognition and mediation, advocated fair play to the United States Government in its efforts for restored supremacy. Meanwhile, though all in vain, our Washington administration urged Great Britain and France to withdraw their hasty belligerent recognition, inasmuch as neutrality and the abuses of neutrality were the source of ceaseless mischief and irritation.¹

SECTION XIV.

THE NEW POLITICAL SITUATION.

With reverses in the field and European unfriendliness to dishearten this administration, the autumn elections of 1862 showed, as a new source of discouragement, that the tide of popular support in loyal States was receding. The strongest Republican States, such as Vermont, Maine, Massachusetts, and Michigan, showed majorities greatly reduced, while elsewhere the opposition elected numerous candidates. In New York, where a State executive was to be chosen, Horatio Seymour, a former governor and a rural Democrat of great influence, carried the polls against General James S. Wadsworth by a majority of about ten thousand. In New Jersey, too, a governor was chosen by the opposition. For Representatives in the next Congress, the Republicans lost twenty-five districts in New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania alone; in the President's own State of Illinois, opponents chosen to the next House outnumbered his friends by more than two to one. Yet, fortunately, a working majority was promised in both branches of the succeeding Congress, with the Senate still strongly Republican.²

The causes of such temporary reaction were not far to seek. The people murmured in their discouragement over ill success, as did the Israelites of old in the wilderness. Weariness of military inaction and failure, impatience for

¹ 3 Seward, cs. 6-9, *passim*; 25 Harper, 563, etc.

² 26 Harper; 7 N. & H. 361.

victories, discontent growing out of these hot disputes over the merits of leading generals, bitterness over the arbitrary civil arrests and other extreme measures, dissatisfaction with Congress and its harsh and costly legislation, with accumulating taxes, irredeemable paper money, and the turmoil of conservative and radical opinion to subdivide the dominant force that conducted the war,—all this, to say nothing of that desire for change inherent in free government, found popular expression at the polls. Prominent among such causes of dissension was, of course, the President's emancipation edict, but lately issued and prospective still in its proclaimed operation; and such antagonism did this provoke among men loyal to the cause of Union, that it seemed as though, unretracted, this new policy would indeed unite the South and divide the North. But the surges of dissatisfaction which now came rolling in, spent their force against this steadfast administration in one political shock, to disperse in spray. Democrats had of late been strongly induced to recombine for party advantage. Even sturdy war Democrats were disposed to rebuke the dominant set for perverting, as they deemed it, a lawful war for the Union into an unlawful one for the negro. Yet thousands fighting in the field, democratic by former affiliation, were drawing toward Lincoln's new policy, as they faced a practical problem and felt that nothing short of carrying the citadel of slavery would bring this stubborn contest to a close; while thousands more, of that former faith, who were identified with the civil service, or influential as good citizens, sustained the new course of affairs unfaltering. This forced stubborn Democrats who engineered for political success, to combine all elements of party opposition, even to foes latent and lurking, who, as trucklers from habit, demanding peace at any price, were now styled "copperheads"¹ by those who battled for reunion, as it was or as it should be.

Again the flags were seen streaming at the two wings of the Capitol, as Congress reassembled on Monday, December

¹ From the venomous American snake which bore that name.

1st, for a final session, which closed on the 4th of March following.

Not a sign of retreat or hesitation because of these adverse elections could be traced in the President's message.

Neither vigorous war, nor freedom under his proclamation of September 22d, was to be stayed or hindered in consequence. But with his usual clear logic, and more than his usual warmth and pathos of expression, Lincoln pressed the necessity of keeping still this physical expanse of country the abode of one country and of one homogeneous people. Slavery, he argued, was the cause of this present conflict; without it rebellion could never have begun and could not now continue. Some believed slavery to be right, and that it should be extended; others held the contrary; but it was easier to settle the issue by law as friends than by treaty as aliens. Hence he recommended that Congress should propose to the legislatures of the several States a constitutional amendment embracing three articles: (1) providing public compensation for every slave State which should abolish local slavery before the year 1900; (2) securing freedom to all slaves who during the rebellion had enjoyed actual freedom by the chances of war, with compensation, however, to loyal owners; (3) authorizing Congress to colonize free colored persons with their consent in some other country. With this just offer of indemnity, he believed the war would end sooner and with less sacrifice.¹

Secretary Stanton in his report defended the new policy of emancipation from the standpoint of military expediency. The enemy, he contended, ought to be attacked in his most vulnerable point,—at that system which kept the laborers at home supporting their masters, who were fighting against the Union. Rightly organized in recovered territory, as it had already been in the sea islands of South Carolina, this labor could be made useful to our armies in various ways. "So far from the Southern States being invincible, no

¹ Observe the eloquent exordium of this earnest message. *Am. Cycl.* 1862, 726-732; 6 N. & H. c. 19.

country was ever so vulnerable, if the means at hand are employed against them.”¹

On the 1st of January, 1863, was issued the full proclamation of emancipation, according to the preliminary warning of September, and with the moral support of the House of Representatives, which by a vote of more than two to one had laid aside a resolve of disapproval. In Cabinet conference no doubt or dissent had been manifest over this final action; a few verbal changes were proposed to smooth the President's expression, while Chase objected, though in vain, to exempting fractional parts of States from its operation.² Lincoln, who prepared the document, and then rewrote it entirely with his own hand, having notes of these suggestions before him, placed his final signature to the proclamation as soon as the New Year's reception at the White House was over. No ceremony attended an act one of the most comprehensive and beneficent in history; but in presence of less than a dozen witnesses he wrote his name, and the paper was taken to the Department of State, there to be countersigned and attested, and then deposited in the public archives. Deeds made good an expression of the pen, which historically might else have been made in vain; and, thus borne out, a manifesto, more momentous for civilization than a single ruler ever issued since Constantine proclaimed Christianity, induced all other constitutional agencies to broaden and make forever efficacious its enlightened purpose. “And upon this act, sincerely be-

¹ Message and documents ; 26 Harper, 269.

² Chase's criticism suited the advanced Republicans, with whom he was now in sympathy, in making military necessity the entering wedge to force general emancipation upon the loyal slave States. The President was careful not to offend border sentiment in that respect. The fractional parts of States thus excepted were portions of Louisiana and Virginia already under full submission to Union authority. New Orleans, Norfolk, and Portsmouth were included, and those loyal counties of Virginia about to be recognized as the new State of West Virginia.

lieved to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution, upon military necessity,¹ I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty God.”²

In Boston, Pittsburg, and Buffalo this proclamation was saluted with a hundred guns. Garrison's *Liberator*, though deriding all plans of recompensed emancipation, welcomed “the great historical event,” and with other abolitionists who had hitherto stood aloof from the conflict showed signs of sympathetic approval.³ But in general the President's new policy worked through a dense fog of popular prejudice and disaffection, and it took many soundings to demonstrate how greatly the Union cause had gained by it. At the South the two proclamations were thought an empty vaunt, though leaders accepted the announcement as the sign of a determined spirit. The oppressed race—and they, most of all, who had passed through the old crucible of submission and were no longer young—withheld clear token of gratitude; but Lincoln henceforth blended inseparably with Bible deliverers in the mazy worship of this simple folk, and in negro watch-meetings of New Year's Eve the morning star had been invoked and prayed for. Northerners of the white race had not looked kindly on the free negroes settled among them, and to Irish laborers, in particular, their presence was offensive. What John Sherman had said of Ohio in the Senate was true doubtless of most other States in the North never polluted by slavery: that free negroes were looked upon as a class to be kept by themselves, always deprived of the ballot, always debarred from social intercourse with the whites and of all advantages which their own class could not enjoy in common.⁴

¹ These three qualifying words Lincoln scrupulously supplied in the draft of the above felicitous closing paragraph which Chase had supplied in Cabinet meeting.

² 6 N. & H. c. 19. It is estimated that 3,108,197 slaves were thus directly and immediately invested with freedom, while 832,259 elsewhere were exempted from such military operation. Am. Cycl. 1863, 835.

³ 4 Garrison, 70.

⁴ Am. Cycl. 1862, 753, 754. A vote in Illinois upon a proposed new constitution in 1862 illustrates this point strongly.

As for purchasing the freedom of this docile race or colonizing negroes abroad, as the President recommended, events foreclosed all hope in that direction, though his proposal of recompense evinced a sense of fairness. In the loyal border States, slaveowners stood upon a certain sense of honor and self-respect, and refused to sell out what seemed to them a fundamental right. Upon Missouri alone had the President's plan of compensated abolishment, proposed in 1862, made a favorable impression, and that ^{1862-1863.} chiefly because of the extreme antislavery views which prevailed among the influential Germans of that State.¹ The elections of November favoring such a course, Governor Gamble, in his message when the State legislature met in December, announced his official preference for a system of free labor, and counselled compliance with the President's wishes.² A bill had been introduced in Congress at its second session, authorizing compensation at the rate of three hundred dollars for each slave, to be given to any loyal border State adopting emancipation. And now at this third short session, to gratify the only border State that responded favorably, new bills in both branches proposed aiding Missouri to ransom her negro slaves. But what with loss of time through differences concerning a price, and the dilatory tactics of a stubborn opposition, the House bill, after amendment by the Senate, never reached a vote. Left in the drift of unfinished business when this Congress expired, emancipation by national purchase found never a chance again.³

The opposition effort in the autumn canvass to make this administration odious for its arbitrary arrests and severity roused hopes among Confederate leaders not destined to

¹ See Missouri convention of 1862, cited 6 N. & H. c. 18.

² Am. Cycl. 1862, 595.

³ 6 N. & H. c. 18; Am. Cycl. 1863, 313-321. A Senate bill originally proposed would have appropriated \$20,000,000. The House bill named \$10,000,000, which the Senate changed to \$15,000,000.

fulfilment.¹ When Congress reconvened, the Democrats of the present body, flushed by success, opened an attack upon the President. On the very first day of the session, Samuel S. Cox, then of Ohio, and William A. Richardson of Illinois² offered resolutions of inquiry in the House concerning civilian arrests and confinement, but these were laid on the table. Presently, in resolutions artfully drawn, which declared hostility to all foreign intervention, Vallandigham denounced the idea of a dictatorship or of perverting this civil conflict from its original purpose into one for subjugating the South or abolishing slavery. Bayard and other Democrats of the Senate contended that the President had no constitutional right to suspend the *habeas corpus* writ, without the express permission of Congress. In both branches of Congress all such resolutions of hostile purport were promptly put aside, and "Trust the Executive" was the firm conclusion of the Republican majority.³

On the 8th of December, Thaddeus Stevens, foremost among the thoroughs in the House, and a strong emancipationist, introduced, in that branch, a bill to indemnify the President and all acting under his orders for suspending the writ of *habeas corpus*, and it expressly authorized him, furthermore, to suspend the privilege at discretion while the present rebellion lasted. After a brief debate the bill passed the House by two to one. In another form the Senate passed such a measure by nearly five to one; and all differences being adjusted in conference, the bill on the 3d of March became a law.⁴ In granting indemnity to the

¹ What with the recent military proclamations, "and civil liberty so completely trodden under foot," Lee wrote in October to Davis, soon after Antietam, "I have strong hopes that the conservative portion of that people, unless dead to the feelings of liberty, will rise and depose the party now in power." 19 W. R. pt. 2, 644.

² The latter was presently chosen to the Senate, to serve for the unexpired term of his deceased friend, Douglas.

³ Cong. Globe, *passim*; Am. Cycl. 1863, 241.

⁴ Am. Cycl. 1863, 241-256; 12 U. S. Stats. 755. Political prisoners were here brought under the supervision of Federal courts. In September, 1863, at a time of obstructions to the draft, the President ordered a further suspension. 7 N. & H. c. 2.

Executive, the time-honored precedents of Parliament were followed, except in confessing illegality; for Lincoln still contended that a President's suspension of the writ in emergencies like the present was warranted by the Constitution. Henceforward President and Congress concurred in a policy which the former always exercised with moderation and reserve.

On the 31st of December, 1862, a new State was authorized, consisting of the loyal western counties of Virginia. "Kanawha" had once been proposed for a name, but that finally chosen by the people was "West Virginia."¹ To meet the constitutional requirement that the consent of the legislatures of both States concerned should be obtained, as well as that of Congress, the legislature of the restored or Peirpoint government of Virginia, sitting at Wheeling, gave formal consent, in May, 1862, to the formation of a new State within the jurisdiction of the old; and these proceedings being laid before Congress, the Senate had passed, in July, the bill in which the House now concurred. There had been divergence of views in Congress, but nothing was insisted upon except the condition precedent of racial freedom. The new State constitution, as submitted to that body, had simply forbidden slaves to be brought within the State, but the present act made gradual emancipation, beginning on the 4th of next July, a prerequisite of admission to the Union.²

¹ The constitution of this new State, framed in convention, was adopted by the people, April 3d, 1862, by the overwhelming vote of 18,862 to 514. See Act December 31st, 1862; 12 Stats. 633; *supra*, p. 84.

² This condition the convention of West Virginia accepted, and the voters approved the amendment by a majority of about 17,000. The President, April 20th, 1863, issued his formal proclamation of admission accordingly. Various constitutional doubts had been discussed by President and Cabinet, before the bill was signed which passed Congress. The Supreme Court of the United States has since pronounced the severance of Virginia constitutionally valid in all respects. See 6 N. & H. c. 14; Am. Cycl. 1862, 800. The "Peirpoint government," which now moved to Alexandria, was recognized as the loyal and original Virginia, while civil war lasted.

The financial legislation of this session was of permanent importance. Already had the loyal people submitted to the feverish spell of paper money. In place of silver change, fractional postal notes, issued by Government,¹ supplanted private tokens and supplied many a petty business conducted through the mails. Gold was still required for the customs and foreign exchange, and was paid out for interest on the bonds. It had become the favorite commodity of Wall Street speculators, its value quoted from day to day at a premium for which intrinsic causes could not fully account, though military gain or loss had much to do with it. It sold in February, 1863, at 72 above par, but there were days in 1864 when the premium rose to 185.² Chase had used with remarkable success the gigantic resources for borrowing which Congress had committed to him; "all these measures," he reported in December, "worked well." The new legal-tender currency was in full circulation. But one immense scheme he had proposed which it remained for Congress to sanction; and this was to reorganize upon a national scale the banking capital of the Union, so long dispersed among State jurisdictions, independent of one another. A plan which had hitherto found few supporters was now fully matured, with the aid of Samuel Hooper and Elbridge G. Spaulding, of the House Ways and Means Committee, Sherman introducing the bill in the Senate. The short month of February, 1863, saw this bill with its amendments reported and passed in the Senate by 1863. a narrow vote, concurred in more favorably by the Representatives, and on the 25th of the month approved by the President, who had earnestly advised the measure, and in later messages commended its practical operation.³ The details of the system were committed to a new officer in the Treasury Department, designated as Comptroller of the Currency. Under his permit banking associations were to be organized, one-third of whose capital should be in

¹ See 12 Stats. 592.

² 6 N. & H. 239. See Am. Cycl. 1863, 408.

³ Am. Cycl. 1863, 290-304; 6 N. & H. 211. This bill passed the Senate, by a vote of 23 to 21; and the House concurred by 78 to 64.

United States bonds, deposited at the Treasury by way of pledge for currency notes, which in the name of each separate bank the Comptroller should prepare and supply within a certain margin of security.¹ Under another act of this same session State-bank circulation was taxed out of competition with the new projected currency.²

The feat, in short, accomplished under Republican auspices, was to reestablish, under highly favoring conditions, something like that United States Bank of the fathers, which had twice been chartered, but twice failed of re-charter because of an odious monopoly. A national institution, shorn of such powers, was now no corporate monster, as Jackson saw it, but a cluster of State and local banks, created liberally and without dangerous favoritism. Many of the new national banks of limited capital thus permitted were the previous State banks reorganized, bearing with "national" the same general name as before. The main public advantage was that for which Clay, Webster, and the old Whig party had striven through an earlier era in vain,—to give to this broad country a stable, permanent, and uniform currency, available everywhere; an object unattainable under the condition superseded, with its many States, many systems, and many banks of good, bad, and indifferent credit. For with counterfeits and confusion, and with discounts to pay between one State and another, State banks had come far short of the Union's growing wants, and the evils of variety had been much aggravated by war. Besides all this, such a new banking system created a powerful and permanent influence to sustain the national credit under all trials, for it was built upon the national debt, and bound people and government together in financial efforts. Moreover was added a convenient assistance to the operations and policy of the Government, and hence the rigid

¹ 12 Stats. 665. By organizing these institutions, about \$300,000,-000 of United States notes were brought back to the Treasury and funded in six per cent bonds of the public debt. Am. Cycl. 1863, 399; 6 N. & H. 242-245.

² Ib. 712; presently pronounced a constitutional tax by the Supreme Court.

Van Buren separation relaxed, and national banks became to some extent depositaries of public moneys. A further advantage already predicted was the strong aid afforded toward resuming specie payments when the war should end. The plan at first aroused strong prejudice, as though an invasion of State authority, an attempt to pour the banking capital of the Union into a tub without a bottom; but when the act was revised and repassed in 1864, with some improvements, the popular approval became decided.¹ That system has stood ever since, benign in its influence, and, so far as can be forecast, a permanent solution, with a uniform bank currency circulating as safe as the Government itself. This for Chase was the crowning achievement of his career as Secretary, the financial measure unquestionably wise.

By an act approved at the close of this session Congress enlarged the volume of loans already recognized, and gave the Treasury ample borrowing power until 1864.² The aggregate total of operations thus provided for, inclusive of bonds and interest-bearing Treasury notes, exceeded two billion dollars. Armed with such immense authority, besides the power to readjust the banking system of a continent, Chase now spread over the loyal States a network of agencies to advertise and invite a popular investment in the nation's securities.³ The response surpassed his most sanguine expectations. People of moderate means vied with the banks and large capitalists to become public creditors. Farmers and tradesmen brought the gains of their produce; wage-earners and young men rising in the liberal professions, their first savings; snug hoarders called in their money loaned out on mortgage or pledge security, to reinvest with the Government. The motive of pecuniary gain became sanctified, as it were, by a patriotic sentiment; for should the Union perish, all fortunes, all national wealth, must

¹ The original act attempted to equalize the currency among the States and limited the total to \$300,000,000. This was afterwards changed so as to permit bank organization more freely.

² 12 Stats. 709; Am. Cycl. 1863, 401.

³ The new and enterprising banking house of Jay Cooke & Co. took up these details with great energy on a moderate commission.

surely sink together. Of all loans thus offered by the United States, the famous "five-twenties," a six per cent bond, proved the most attractive of the war;¹ and other popular loans thus floated were certificates of indebtedness and the "seven-thirties," or Treasury notes bearing that rate of interest. Within two months after the present Congress adjourned, the deficit confronting it in December had disappeared, the brave defenders of the Union by sea and land received all arrears, and suspended requisitions at the Treasury were satisfied. It seemed as if the Prospero of finance had but waved his magic wand to disclose these inner resources; for henceforth faint-heartedness in the nation's fiscal operations was at an end, and at about six per cent the ravenous wants of a prodigious war were met to the very last, — a feat for which neither England nor America in past experience could afford a parallel.²

To maintain a national income for interest payments and those other annual needs of government which cannot be funded for the future, every private industry had to bear its exaction. A people that in this generation had never before paid a dollar to the general government, except indirectly through the customs, found now the pressure and espionage of the nation brought to their very doors, and that system of internal taxation, which Jefferson once stigmatized as "infernal," and which twice before in our history as a nation had been borne for a few years only of grave emergency, was reërected, this time to stay, buttressed and permanent as never before.

The act of July 1st, 1862, set up the new establishment of internal revenue, and George S. Boutwell, of Massachusetts, a future Secretary of the Treasury, was the earliest commissioner. That original act was amended at this final

¹ Redeemable in five years and payable in twenty years with semi-annual interest in gold. This loan popularized the use of coupons for interest payments, in securities public or private.

² 6 N. & H. c. 11; Am. Cycl. 1863, 400, 401.

session,¹ and four times again in course of the succeeding Congress, or while war lasted. A revenue, at first disappointing because of the difficulty of putting new machinery in motion, rose by 1866 to nearly \$311,000,000, or considerably in excess of the British revenue for that year from all sources combined.² Under this vast general establishment, States and Territories were divided into convenient districts, corresponding nearly to those for Congress, with an assessor and collector appointed for each, having large discretionary powers for inspection and seizures, while, following an old rule, liable to abuse, informers shared with the Union all penalties recovered for violations of the law. By far the largest tax was derived during the war from domestic manufactures and productions,—from distilled spirits and fermented liquors, first of all; from makers of tobacco, snuff, and cigars, and, with more burden, upon textile manufactures and products generally. This last-named tax, unscientific as first adjusted, was without precedent, and among its items were clothing, fabrics of wool and cotton, boots and shoes, petroleum, and iron. Wealthy citizens paid an income tax,³ with the solace of being listed in local newspapers as a sort of upper class. Licenses were imposed in almost every line of business pursuit, from wholesale dealers and bankers, graded by the extent of capital employed, to lawyers, petty brokers, and claim agents. Stamp taxes were imposed upon deeds, contracts, checks, receipts, and proprietary articles, and there were various special taxes, besides, upon the business of banks, common carriers, and auctioneers, upon legacies and successions, upon carriages and other articles of luxury. The influence of the national tax-gatherer was carried to every workshop and fireside in the land, to persons and employments as never before.

This historical Congress—the first without a Southern

¹ 12 Stats. 632 (March 3d, 1863).

² With a cost of about 2½ per cent for collection.

³ Levied in an unconstitutional manner, according to later judicial opinion.

representation, the earliest under control of the new Republican party,—did something to check abuses incident to war, as well as to create them. All pecuniary interest in public contracts was forbidden to legislators and to officers and agents of the Government;¹ penalties were denounced for presenting fraudulent claims or giving false military vouchers;² and by the act which turned over in trust all captured and abandoned cotton, sugar, rice, and tobacco, to the Treasury and its special agents, all analogy to maritime prize was discountenanced.³ Practice acts were amended so as to expedite the work of the Federal courts, now vastly enlarged by the war; yet through all this difficult era Federal Supreme Court justices did circuit duty as before, district judges completing the establishment.⁴ The Court of Claims was reorganized as a judicial tribunal, and one of the two new judges appointed was Wilmot, who in the fierce strife of Pennsylvania politics had lost a reelection to the Senate.

Through liberal appropriations, the creation of high subordinates, and various measures of Congress for promoting civil efficiency, our Executive departments expanded to meet increasing tasks, and yet on their present lines. Caleb B. Smith, in January, 1863, made the first vacancy among the President's official advisers, appointed a United States district judge for Indiana, in which station he died a year later; and to him succeeded by promotion as Secretary of the Interior, John P. Usher, of the same State. Another change, which would have rent this Cabinet asunder, the President averted with consummate tact and wisdom. The adverse November elections had brought Republican Senators back to their desks in a fretful state of mind,

¹ 12 Stats. 577, 696.

² *Ib.* 696.

³ *Ib.* 820 (March 3d, 1863).

⁴ *Ib.* 768. The number of associates was increased in 1863 to nine, by the appointment of Stephen J. Field for California; it decreased to eight, and then to seven, in the deaths respectively of James Catron and James M. Wayne, Southern loyalists; in 1870 the number was made eight.

and some scapegoat was sought for a propitiating sacrifice. Seward, who was always somewhat of an enigma to the radical of his party, was by that faction selected. He had specially offended by some inopportune comments in a confidential despatch to Adams, while the emancipation policy was in suspense,¹ and many regarded him as a Mordecai in the gate, whose malign influence kept the President irresolute in pushing the war to decisive results. To such discontent, ripening into personal hostility, Chase had contributed by his own peevish hints and reflections upon the conduct of the war. For with all his energy and capacity for the colossal task assigned to him, our financier was a bad calculator in politics, and susceptible to the seeming friendliness of those whose motives were sinister. Though too high-minded himself to practise base arts, Chase could not divest himself of the impression that he was superior to the President, whose foes he cultivated, and upon whose supposed deficiencies he commented imprudently, in letters, diaries, or conversation, with a ponderous gravity characteristic of him. Lincoln was not unaware of the currents of disaffection which his minister had kept in motion, and when, in December, 1862, at a secret caucus of Republican Senators, resolutions were passed urging the President to reconstruct his Cabinet, and appointing a committee of nine to wait upon him, he took his own sagacious course to produce a result not intended. Seward, knowing he was aimed at, had tendered his resignation at once, as did his son, and in that posture of the case the Senate committee waited upon the President on the morning of the 19th. After some conversation over the Secretary of State, and the lukewarm indifference he manifested on certain party questions,² an evening call was appointed, at which, under Lincoln's

¹ See *supra*, p. 232; a despatch of July 5th, 1862, against "obstructionists" who were demanding a policy of emancipation. 6 N. & H. 263.

² "While they seemed to believe in my honesty," the President reported to his Cabinet, "they also appeared to think that when I had in me any good purpose or intention Seward contrived to suck it out of me unperceived." 6 N. & H. 265.

instructions, all the Cabinet but Seward were present, and the controversy was resumed with a more general drift. The fire of discussion had burnt itself out, the President's advisers defending their absent colleague, when Lincoln took the formal vote of the Senate committee, and found four only of the nine — Grimes, Trumbull, Sumner, and Pomeroy — positively against Seward, and the meeting broke up late at night, in a milder spirit than it met. Chase alone of the Cabinet had found himself in an awkward situation, confronted unexpectedly with opinions he had expressed to some of these very Senators as to both President and premier.¹ With embarrassment he tendered his own resignation the next morning, which was what the President had desired.² Armed thus with full and not partial means of reconstructing his Cabinet, if need be, to suit himself, Lincoln at once despatched identical notes to Seward and Chase, requesting each to resume his duties. The former did so with cheerful alacrity, but the latter more tardily, after real perplexity of mind, and with a final reservation, ominous of later differences. This incident gave the President the masterful control of his administration more strongly than ever, and without open offence he frustrated a dangerous cabal in the Senate, and checked the thirst for a victim.³

¹ See Warden's Chase, 453, 491; 6 N. & H. c. 12.

² "Now I can ride," said the President in his quaint jocular phrase to a friend, the same morning; "I have got a pumpkin in each end of my bag." 6 N. & H. 271.

³ See 6 N. & H. c. 12; 3 Seward, 146.

CHAPTER II.

FIRST ADMINISTRATION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

PERIOD OF THIRTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS.

MARCH 4, 1863 — MARCH 4, 1865.

SECTION I.

THE SOLDIER OF THE CIVIL WAR.

AMERICANS as foes of one household fought out the great Civil War with force, devotion, and a terrible persistency of purpose; the one side, determined to destroy the historical Union, the other, to maintain that Union at all hazards. It mattered little to the South, in her deadly earnestness, that slavery, the vital cause of difference, was being wiped out as the result of hostile encounter; her people still fought on, until utterly subdued and exhausted by a smothering superiority in men, money, all the resources, all the sinews of war, which superiority settled at length the results. Neither section fully comprehended the other when that armed struggle commenced. The South, accustomed to think that a people industrious for themselves were mercenary and mean, widely indulged the fond conceit that "one Southerner could whip five Yankees." The North believed that slavery had enervated a master race, whose course of life had much, after all, of Spartan simplicity, and whose conscience was clear. But there were leaders on either side who cherished no such illusions. Joseph E. Johnston, among Confederate commanders, predicted that Northern soldiers would prove, when disciplined, foes worthy of Southern steel.¹ Abraham Lincoln, who knew

¹ Hughes, 39.

much of the people of both sections, checked the too sanguine impulse on the Union side. "We must make up our minds," he said at once, "that man for man the soldier from the South will be a match for the soldier from the North, and *vice versa*."¹ And why should it have been otherwise? There were families, distracted by the present issue, which furnished fighting stock for both armies;² Americans from slave and free States had fought side by side in the bloody fields of former wars; and the youth of both sections shared always alike the graduating honors of West Point and Annapolis.

Aside, however, from that vast disparity of loyal and disloyal States in money and fighting men, which settled this issue of arms, each contending section had advantages which were counterbalanced by advantages on the other side. The North had the prestige of established government, of order, of legitimacy, which with the outer world carried great weight; the flag and other recognized emblems of historical sovereignty. It had, too, the well-defined purpose of preserving unimpaired a national integrity and a lawful succession. Free soil and free labor were its familiar preference. When to all this was added, in the fulness of time, emancipation of the negro, European philanthropy gave its good will. Holding fast and developing the navy of the Union, it blockaded promptly and effectively the whole seacoast of insurrection, and penetrated Southern rivers with death-dealing gunboats and ironclads. The advantage gained by that one master-stroke of policy is incalculable, and all the depredations by Confederate cruisers went for little in comparison. Then, once more, the diversity and extent of Northern industries, manufac-

¹ 4 N. & H. 79.

² Kentucky suffered in this respect a remarkable division, for the three most prominent families of the State — Breckinridge, Clay, and Crittenden — had representatives in both armies. 3 B. & L. 13. Scott, Farragut, and Thomas, among the illustrious on the Union side, were Southern-born; Cooper and Pemberton, of disunion generals, were Northern.

turing and mechanical, gave the Union Government an immense start in providing military supplies and offering resources for taxation. That diversity told, too, in the practical service of the troops, wherever mechanics and special experts were wanted. Volunteers stepped forward from the ranks when skill was called for to mend a locomotive or tow a transport. But Southern people, too, despite their former inexperience, showed something of that ready ingenuity and adaptiveness which characterizes the whole Anglo-American race. Cut off from the Northern factories and workshops on which they had formerly depended, and from European imports besides, they set up establishments of their own; fair shoes and clothing they soon learned to make; powder-mills were built and operated, cannon and bullets cast, components searched out, and rifles supplied of excellent quality.

The South had the obvious advantage of fighting on interior lines, and for home and a native land, with whose devious and difficult roads, dense tangled woods and fordable streams, their people alone were familiar. While Confederate troops could concentrate at convenient points, the Union armies had to surround the whole vast area, penetrate, subdue, and occupy, with all the perilous risks of taking the offensive in a region intensely hostile for the most part, and while imperfectly informed whether of topography or the enemy's numbers and designs. Negroes guided our Union generals to good purpose, but far from their own plantations they were not to be relied upon; and the local maps of the South were singularly inaccurate. Another advantage lay at the start in the free out-of-door life to which all Southerners were addicted, with plantations far apart and few large cities or centres of population; incidental to which were skilled horsemanship and acquaintance with foraging and the use of firearms. Throughout this extensive section men took largely the preservation of life and property into their own hands; here duelling lingered longest, and negro subjection had been made a careful study. Then, again, the true Southerner was passionately fond of hunting and the horse-race. Except for the remote borders

towards the Rocky range, weapons for self-defence were little carried at the North when war broke out; and where the older civilization prevailed, Northern men were far less free-spoken than at the South, acted less upon individual impulse, and felt much more the curb of convention and authority. It might be thought that the habit of venting the feelings of the moment and fighting when opposed in speech, would disqualify for military discipline and obedience; but all American citizens are capable of intelligent submission to a paramount duty; and in this great conflict it so happened that on the Southern side, with its peculiar class democracy, the mean white went cheerfully into the ranks, as conscript or volunteer, while his social superior wore usually the sword. When volunteers were raised at the North, those capable of rallying and inducing to enlist became naturally the officers; so that, whether with a governor to appoint or soldiers to elect, political management, and not trained merit alone, influenced the award of commissions. But in the South at this era political leaders were usually the social ones; and the whole tendency of the Confederacy, moreover, while it lasted, was to instal military rule of the martinet kind and bend to its will the civil body politic. Such was the effect of the Confederate conscript act, so quickly set up in 1862, and so sweepingly extended; of the military departments and martial law, whose stern and steady encroachment upon State rights and civil liberty led Stephens, in 1864, to avow that the Southern people were living "under a complete despotism, worse than Lincoln's."¹ That evil of choosing generals by their politics, which Washington had deplored so greatly in the days of Revolution and the Continental Congress, had little scope in the South; though, as events now tended, the chief commissions went almost invariably to those haughty and high-spirited families of the landed gentry that had ruled so long, socially and politically, their millions of subservient whites. Young men of this Southern aristocracy were impulsive and frank, which aided greatly their personal

¹ Johnston's Stephens, 473.

influence; they sowed their wild oats, and were either naturally improvident in money matters or made so by custom; they liked the touch and go of life, and were prone to dissipation.

The usual formation of Southern State volunteers appears to have been by companies, with little regard for battalions or regiments; thus enlarging at once the opportunity of the Davis government for appointing field officers. In the first dread of conscription, so Southern writers tell us, when the death-knell was rung to State recruiting, a certain time was allowed for any man liable to the draft to volunteer and choose his branch of the service, and, if practicable, his regiment; and regiments were then allowed to choose officers by election, being also brigaded largely by States, as a popular concession.¹ In this respect the experience of the North was very different. State militia, called temporarily into service for short periods, might elect officers under State law, but good discipline was thought hindered by it; and for all mustered into service on the usual footing, officers were appointed. The loyal governor, recognized throughout the war as the raising and recruiting agent of his State, both for companies and regiments, appointed all such officers, being notified through Washington channels whenever a vacancy occurred. But general field officers, whether of corps, divisions, or brigades, were detailed and commissioned by the President of the United States. Civilians and West Pointers shared distinction, moving upward from the lower grades; and the capacity for rousing others to enlist received ample, and sometimes too ample, recognition. Yet, good judgment led our best war governors to invite trained regular officers repeatedly to take command of a State regiment. It was thus, only, that the supreme hero of this war found an opportunity to regain active service; and several of the best corps commanders, in the Union army, made a similar reëntrance into professional life, while young subalterns in the regular army often made the short step to field service in this manner.

¹ De Leon, 178, 179.

President Lincoln, however, himself a civilian and a masterful manager of political forces, was not the Executive, especially when war was new to him, to give the whole military direction to West Point.¹ When first increasing the regular army in the spring of 1861, to put down insurrection, half the new officers he appointed from the regular army and the other half from civil life; and throughout the war unprofessional officers gained advancement through the rapid education of experience. But Union regulars, in the ranks, during these four years, bore but a slight proportion to the hundreds of thousands who constituted the volunteer soldiery from the several States. When, as time went on, the North had to submit to a draft, Lincoln treated the susceptibilities of State pride as gently as possible, and the draft proved, in practice, more than anything else, a stimulus to State volunteering. The ablest and best of professional commanders on the Union side appreciated the distinction between citizen soldiers, addicted to the arts of peace, who risked here their lives, in sacrifice, from a sense of duty — men, often, of high social standing at home, of competence, capacity, and independence of character — and those who enlist and take the pay of the nation, in peace or war, because, most commonly, they have failed in the ordinary pursuits of life. "We tried almost every system known to modern nations," says Sherman, "all with more or less success — voluntary enlistments, the draft, and bought substitutes — and I think that all officers of experience will confirm my assertion, that the men who enlisted at the outbreak of the war were the best; better than the conscript, and far better than the bought substitute."²

The Union was liberal, with its proffered bounties and pensions, to augment the pay of common soldiers, twice

¹ "At the close of our Civil War," relates Sherman, "some of our best corps and division generals, as well as staff officers, were from civil life." 2 Sherman, 386. Yet he recalls none of the most successful of these, who did not express regret at not having received elementary instruction in the art of war before experience forced its lessons upon them. *Ib.*

² 2 Sherman, 386.

increased; but the liberality of loyal State and of town or city, intent on fulfilling its quota, was, with cash bounty and family aid, far greater. They who stayed at home taxed themselves unstintingly for those they sent to the front. We should not severely judge the Northern State practice of raising new regiments and companies, newly officered, leaving the old and experienced organizations at the front to waste away; for volunteering, unless dropped for a draft, needed this, and many expedients besides, to warm up enthusiasm when it began to flag. They who rally others wish shoulder straps, and they who are rallied, some warrants; most seek association, and the chance, at least, of promotion. Executives of the great Northern States certainly tried their best to recruit volunteers, by one expedient and another, for the older decimated regiments at the front; but the work lagged, like recruiting for the regular army which eliminates State pride, and scarcely a State but Wisconsin, with two or three regiments and a small quota to supply, could make headway in the experiment. When quotas were filled however, at the last, by draft or the dread of it, and the promiscuous herd appeared, of conscripts, substitutes, and bounty hirelings, together with negro waifs, gleaned on State account with State bounties at the seat of war, distribution at discretion among existing regiments followed naturally. Wholesale conscription of the able-bodied, and a rigid, central compulsion, made the Southern task, on the other hand, a simple one by comparison; for draft is a despotism.

As in all the wars of modern civilized countries, the three great divisions of our opposing armies were infantry, cavalry, and artillery, to which, perhaps, engineer troops might be specially added for field works and other constructions requiring especial skill. Infantry, or foot soldiers, constituted, as they have always done, the great bulk of a mobile force: to march compactly or in portions, to camp, guard, or fight anywhere, and give chief glory or shame to each battle encounter. Following the style of our regular army, which at no time from Sumter to Appomattox reached an aggre-

gate strength of 25,000 men, while volunteers numbered hundreds of thousands, each Union regiment comprised ten companies, and each company, when full, a captain, two lieutenants, and ninety-eight enlisted men. States whose militia had varied somewhat from such a standard before the war conformed when sending the three years' volunteers. This infantry regiment, which bore to the front the colors bestowed by friends and neighbors, each State would organize with a number as its own, the governor commissioning all its officers.¹ A cavalry regiment, on the other hand, with its mounted troopers, was composed of twelve companies, easy for combination or to subdivide into squadrons of two companies or battalions of three, as occasion might require. Here, too, a State would raise, organize, and commission, when a volunteer regiment of this branch was sanctioned. In the artillery arm — "light" or "heavy" according to the ponderousness of the cannon handled — single volunteer companies or "batteries" were raised in States; each battery acting separately, as ordered, or massed with others so as to concert with infantry and cavalry; though for a regular and permanent establishment, so as to man our heavy sea-coast forts in time of peace, twelve companies, once more comprising a regiment, became the convenient standard.

The aggregate of infantry raised at the North was far greater, of necessity, than in the South; and yet pitched battles rarely took place at any given point where the forces of each section were not fairly matched in point of numbers. In the cavalry arm the North was at first inferior, for the Southerner felt always at home in the saddle and could bring to the rendezvous his own horse; but after 1862 the North gave earnest attention to this branch of the service, and in means and equipment soon overmatched the adversary; Stuart died and Sheridan blazed

¹ Ten companies make somewhat of an anomaly for battalion subdivision, in the lesser operations of peace; and the origin of this number may be imputed to an organization which made eight battalion companies, adding two others, the first and tenth, for flank and skirmishing movements. 2 Sherman, 384.

forth in glory. In artillery, on the other hand, the North, with surpassing facilities for procuring the newest guns with long range and improved workmanship, had first and always the advantage, and of that disadvantage to contend against Southern commanders wrote repeatedly. Infantry was of course the main reliance for operations on either side; cavalry proved a good auxiliary for dash and swiftness and to make reconnoissance; with artillery, fighting could be maintained at a distance and the infantry protected. But artillery was hard to transport and could not always secure its range in battle, and its proportion was far less at the close than the beginning of the war.

Three infantry regiments composed usually a brigade, three brigades a division, and three divisions an army corps; the first commanded by an acting or commissioned brigadier-general, the second by a major-general, the third, technically speaking, by a lieutenant-general. On the Confederate side, where all was military precision, several officers bore the rank last named; but the Union was more chary of such honors, and some major-general, specially assigned, conducted commonly a corps, or even, in the operations of a department, several corps united. Line and staff — the one set of officers for practical soldiery, the other to furnish supplies — was a distinction of which McClellan made much; but Grant set later the example of a small and simple staff, exerting that personal supervision of details that no commander can safely dispense with.¹

Bands at permanent posts or for the leisurely pomp of peace are delightful adjuncts of the martial life, as most will admit. With burnished and sonorous brass many a State militia regiment was loaded that hastened to Washington at the President's first call, expecting a brief bivouac. But this could not last. At the first riotous collision in Baltimore the Sixth Massachusetts had to leave its musicians behind; nor could war be long prosecuted in earnest

¹ "A bulky staff," wrote Sherman, as a military lesson of the war, "implies a division of responsibility, slowness of action, and indecision." 2 Sherman, 402.

before the cost and incumbrance of regimental bands caused their discontinuance. Volunteer bands, however, were often composed of musical men detailed from the ranks, whose instruments were supplied by subscription; and brigades, divisions, or posts might fare even better. The company drummer still figured at the front, with sometimes the piercing fife to make melody to his beat; but fife and drum were blood-stirrers of the olden times, and our practised fifer fingered his holes less, perhaps, afield than at the head of raw recruits at home. Indeed, it soon became the fashion for soldiers, when marching, to keep step to the simple patter upon the snare drum; and regimental drum corps were formed to use the sticks in exact time on rim or parchment for rolls and tattoos of variety. Southern writers tell us that Confederate bands were poor, and that the only real music was the quick tap of the timing drum.

State flags were to be seen in this war on either side; but "old glory" was the proud ensign of brotherhood for all Union soldiers—its regimental folds, as the fight went on, inscribed in historic gilt with the names of battles or crimsoned with the blood of the valiant who bore it. Nor had secession the ingenuity to design a substitute, wholly different, wholly admirable, or wholly convenient for its purpose. Four times did the Confederate States of America essay a flag for an independent power on earth. First came the "stars and bars," hoisted over the capitol at Montgomery on the 4th of March, 1861; with its seven stars and three stripes, it looked amid dust and smoke so much like the old repudiated colors that something more original was sought for. Next, Beauregard designed a battle-flag which was borne continually after the first Bull Run, under public sanction, its red field crossed by two blue bars, each bearing six gilt stars besides a large one in the centre.¹ In May, 1863, the Congress at Richmond voted a new Confederate

¹ South Carolina's "State sovereignty" flag, which floated while Sumter was threatened, may have suggested this pattern.

flag, which used the Beauregard emblem as the upper inner corner or union, adding a plain white fly; but this once more so resembled on its staff a flag of truce, when fallen limp, that in March, 1865, the Confederate Congress gave to the fly a broad red edge; and then came truce in earnest.¹

The dress of the citizen soldier, North or South, changed with the character of the conflict. There was uniform before the first Bull Run, but not uniformity; armed bodies from either section hastened to the front in State militia dress or such other costume as pleased, and in that portentous battle were worn colors of a peacock variety such as never were worn again. For in no respect, before the war, had our holiday militia taken more pride than in the contrasting uniforms—gray, green, blue, buff, or scarlet—which, with muffs or plumed hats contrasting for head-gear, and pet battalion names, made of pageant processions a shifting picture.² There were Northern regiments, and possibly Southern also, that sported thus early the Garibaldi shirts of red flannel with waistbands, or, like “red-legged devils,” made theatrical display in the Bashi-Bazouk costume of Zouaves, a fad of the times. All such eccentricity toned down when war proved more than a passing exhibition. Sober uniforms came in to distinguish clearly the belligerents. To protect against sudden changes of the weather, give free use of the limbs, and make unobscured target for an enemy, plain flannels or woollens of blue or gray were pronounced desirable; and blue accordingly prevailed on the Union side, while the Confederates chose gray or butternut—the latter a domestic dye poorly applied to coarse fabric and of a somewhat variable shade. The Union soldier, always better clad, began service with military frock coat and blouse issued to him for a change; but the former, brushed up for dress parade with polished metal

¹ Confed. Soldier, 5 (1895).

² Regular army blue was affected by South Carolinians, and at Manassas Southern officers who had left the Union service directed on their side, wearing their former uniform. “Stonewall Jackson” drilled his men in the dingy dress of his military institute. 1 B. & L. 112.

buttons, was cast aside when campaigning began, and only the sky-blue trousers remained indispensable. Nor did officers keep up, while work was warm, the pomp and circumstance of dress. Gold lace, epaulettes, the imposing chapeau with white waving plume, such as gave Scott his majestic dignity, were little seen anywhere after insurrection settled into war. Our highest commanders set the example of unpretentious dress — McClellan to a considerable degree, Grant most notably. Even sword-belts were usually worn by the field and line officers unadorned with sashes. A fatigue cap, not unlike that of the common soldier, served for headgear, or, in readier distinction, a dark felt hat, soft, dashed down at the top to relieve its primness, and adorned with simple cord and tassel. Shoulder-straps were the usual insignia of officers in the Union army; but on the Confederate side generals often wore their stars embroidered on the coat-collar; and rank was denoted, too, to some extent by flourishes of silk braid on the right sleeve of a Confederate coat or Union overcoat. For parade occasions the patent paper collars of this period were much worn by Northern officers; and as "boiled linen" was always a luxury, the plain woolen shirt with leathern stock served well enough for high dress.

Our civil war was fought with muzzle-loading guns, of which the Springfield arsenal rifle was the best in make and pattern and the most sought after. It was of moderate weight, easily borne and used. When Sumter fell the supply of these rifles fell far short of immediate wants, and many an early regiment was started for the front equipped with smooth-bore or other muskets of obsolete pattern, some of which were as dangerous to the handler as the person aimed at. Enfield rifles, scarcely different from the arsenal weapon, State and Confederate agents bought abroad in zealous competition and contracted for during this early period. The captured arsenals at Harper's Ferry and elsewhere gave the South for its earliest campaign eight thousand good rifles and eight times as many muskets, inferior but effective; the captured machinery of Harper's Ferry, moreover, was turned to impor-

tant use. Yet Confederate dependence was very great, at first, upon the purchase of guns and military stores abroad. Many volunteers brought to camp with them their own firearms, and Southern authorities appealed to the people for the loan of rifles and double-barrelled shotguns. Church and plantation bells were also called for, to be cast as cannon metal.¹ Massachusetts advanced to the loyalists of Western Virginia two thousand muskets, and General Lyon's timely disposal of arms at the St. Louis arsenal² had great permanent effect upon the loyal status of Missouri. In Virginia the great scarcity of ammunition, of bullet moulds, cartridge paper, and percussion caps made Johnston "very timid," as he wrote from headquarters, while his first campaign was pending. But the spoils of victory at Bull Run gave the South much aid, especially in artillery. Repeating and breech-loading improvements were applied ingeniously and constantly during the war to guns and cannon; but habit and the old manual kept infantry in the field to the gun they first handled, with bayonet, rammer, and simple cartridge, and the supply of government accorded. Yet breech-loading rifles and carbines of the Sharp or Spencer pattern, with metallic cartridge, came into favor for the cavalry, and in rare instances an infantry brigade was armed with them.³ The jacketed cavalry, South and North, wore sabres and revolvers; and Colt's revolver, for officers and others who carried no gun, was in immense demand.

Soldiers' monuments, North and South, preserve in enduring bronze the military dress and equipments of this sanguinary period. None of them commemorates the private warrior on the Union side with more artistic grace or fidelity than that by Martin Milmore at Forest Hills Cemetery,⁴ one

¹ See 4 N. & H. 265; Am. Cycl. 1861.

² *Supra*, p. 92.

³ The Spencer repeating rifle was used by Union troops with deadly effect at Gettysburg and Chickamauga. Am. Cycl. 1864, 641.

⁴ Within Boston's present limits, at what was then West Roxbury.

of the earliest in design of them all. A soldier, meditating over the turf of his fallen comrades, holds with both hands as he stands at rest his rifled gun of a single barrel, whose butt is on the ground. His cap, with round flat top tilting toward the glazed visor, might have marked in front the regiment to which he belonged. His overcoat, with customary cape, shows half-opened the collar of his inner coat or blouse; the clasped belt about the waist sustains his leather percussion pouch, his cartridge box, and the sheath for that bayonet which was seldom fixed. Of Union generals, mounted or on foot, bronze statues abound in Washington city. Monuments at Richmond, Charleston, and other Southern cities preserve the corresponding type of Confederate private or officer, supplying, on the whole, a less studied attire in the common soldier, whose rakish hat and half-civilian uniform were largely the compulsion of poverty. Photographs and tinctypes in myriads, on either side, suggest a like comparison.

A dark, coarse blanket made part of each Union soldier's outfit, with a rubber blanket besides, precious for reliance, which might be variously used or worn to protect from rain and dampness. Rags and bits of carpet served often, instead, for Confederates. On the march, a japanned canvas haversack, worn at one side, held several days' rations, while crosswise depended by its tape the shoddy-covered tin canteen, indispensable for water or other drink. Tin plates and dippers abounded. Knapsacks were worn considerably; but where every pound's weight increased a burden, soldiers learned to use twine deftly, and folding extra garments into their blankets, they would wear these rather on the tramp, like a huge scarf from shoulder to side. A flannel band worn constantly next to the abdomen was a great preventive of dysentery and kindred complaints. Other articles, daintily made up, would be sent by overthoughtful friends at home, — havelocks, for instance, which one used in burnishing his gun and then threw away; but needle wallets were handy, especially for the company tailors. Our soldier had a native conservatism, did not take quickly to novelties; army trousers were cut loose and full, as they should have been, for

marching, but linen and leather gaiters, though good to support the legs, did not come into fashion.

Doubtless, during the first summer of 1861, officers and men indulged in superfluous luxuries, which taste and stern necessity discarded. On the first march to Manassas, says Sherman, the baggage to be moved was so great as to require from twenty-five to fifty wagons to transport the camp of a single regiment, while some of the camp bakeries and cooking establishments would have done credit to Delmonico.¹ More than one unseasoned company took along a sheet-iron stove. To reduce such heavy trains, and teach men and officers to move expeditiously and as light-armed as possible, was a slow but essential lesson, scarcely half-taught in McClellan's day.² "I do not believe," writes Sherman, in the retrospect, "a soldier should be loaded down too much, but, including his clothing, arms, and equipment, he can carry about fifty pounds without impairing his health or activity." And he calculates that by such a distribution a single corps may carry the equivalent of five hundred wagon-loads — an immense relief to army trains.³ The opposite extreme, however, had also to be guarded against; for raw soldiers on the march will cast away or leave behind what, in common prudence, ought to have been taken, placing too much dependence upon comrades, like the virgins of the parable.

Large Sibley and bell tents were used much at first, which accommodated a dozen or more men lying with their feet toward the centre pole; and the tendency being to overcrowd and place tents too close together, sickness was increased in consequence. The usual officer's tent faced the company streets, square in shape, with canvas wall and a flap or fly in front. But officers shared often the privations

¹ 1 Sherman, 206.

² Army regulations of 1863, reducing former facilities in that respect, limited the baggage of an officer to blankets and one small valise, and required soldiers to carry their own blankets and shelter tents, reducing the contents of their knapsacks to the lowest possible limit.

³ 2 Sherman, 390.

of their men, and some of the ablest commanders came to believe that, except for regimental headquarters and division hospitals, a tent fly with improvised poles and a shelter among the bushes was enough in warm weather. The small portable shelter tent of canvas came into use the second summer, to replace the Sibleys, and by "buttoning the muslin" — an enlargement to keep out the rain — it would serve well for three-fourths of the year. Two men slept under it, and it was put up by cutting two crotched sticks and inserting a pole between. Many, indeed, during mild weather, learned to like a bivouac in the open air. Huts and barracks served for the winter quarters or at a long-continued post, while field and staff of rank quartered in private houses, as occasion offered. The hygiene of camps was studied as the war progressed, and precautions for health and cleanliness increased.

The ration — an allowance, like clothing and equipments, wholly independent of a private's pay¹ — was ample and of good quality on the Union side, and by far the best furnished in those days to any army in the world. It consisted of bread or flour, fresh or salt beef, pork and bacon, potatoes, salt, coffee, sugar, beans, vinegar, and candles, all in liberal measure. Companies often sold to the commissary or sutler the excess saved by economy, and procured milk, fruit, or other luxuries with the savings. As active campaigning gave soldiers little opportunity to bake their own bread, biscuit was largely issued, in lieu of flour, and this "hard-tack" (as the men called it) with "salt horse" (or salted beef) gave solid nourishment. Flapjacks, served with commissary syrup or molasses, made a delicious variety to such fare. Wherever the camp might be set up, men scurried for fence-rails, made their fire, boiled their coffee in the big iron kettle, and were cheerful, ready for any fate. Many a savory soup or stew could the company cook prepare, converting mere hard-tack remnants into a savory "lobscouse"; triumphant still more when haply a fresh chicken or a young

¹ A private's pay was usually \$13 a month on the Union side, but an act of 1864 increased it to \$16.

pig came to his sacrificial knife, — not stolen, it was said, but “hived” in the neighborhood. Scurvy was an epidemic to be warded off by fresh vegetables or fruit. Ice, lemons, oranges, pickles, potatoes, and onions were supplied to some extent by the Sanitary Commission, and soldiers would forage eagerly about for green corn or dandelions. Blackberries, such as were picked by besieging troops about Vicksburg, or brought into camp by the peddlers at Hampton, made, when mashed with commissary sugar in a tin dipper, a dessert fit for a general. Among new patent compounds of this period were meats, desiccated vegetables, and concentrated milk, sealed up in cans; but army prejudice was strong against these tin-clad substitutes.¹ Naval officers in their ward-room mess made some use of canned meats while waiting for the supply vessel that brought fresh food; but they who awaited supplies by land, whether commissioned or non-commissioned, lived with much greater privation. In the field, from the highest in rank downward, officers ate common rations with a relish; they seldom knew the luxury of table linen, and the knife, fork, and spoon one carried for his personal use were cleaned by stabbing into the sandy soil on which his camp-chair rested. After repast tobacco was the familiar solace, and brier wood came into camp fashion as perhaps the favorite pipe, since cigars or meerschaums were scarce and costly, and clay pipes too brittle. Much use was made in camp of quinine and whiskey, the one for alleviating sickness, the other to prevent it. Fine constitutions, North and South, were ruined by the enemy’s bullets and shells; yet quite as many, on each side, there is reason to fear, by the immoderate use of such stimulants, the one upon medical advice, the other following malign example. On the Confederate side scurvy broke out for want of varied or sufficient rations; and in place of genuine coffee, which became very scarce, Indian corn or sweet potato furnished a substitute drink. Sallow, hatchet-faced, deprived of flour, the poor, pinched Southern conscript

¹ “Desecrated vegetables and consecrated milk” was the camp vernacular for such articles.

lived often for days upon corn meal alone, or stews of rank bacon and mouldy biscuit; and bad transportation furnished a not unfrequent excuse for a poor commissary. Indeed, the Confederate ration was far inferior to that on the Union side, as actually provided.¹

In ordnance and projectiles progress was constant on the Union side as this conflict deepened. When Fort Sumter fell, there was not in the Federal service a single rifled cannon; but by orders issued early smooth-bores were changed to conform to that desired pattern. Among inventors who had already applied to cannon the rifling principle was Captain Parrott of the West Point foundry, whose new gun and projectile combined great strength with simplicity.² Rodman, Dahlgren, and Parrott guns proved highly useful for siege or naval purposes; but those of the largest caliber were liable to burst. Steel hardened by the Knipp or Bessemer process was the favorite metal employed for such manufacture. Armstrong and Whitworth guns were much in demand, the former a 70-pounder, breech-loading and rifled. One effect of the increased force in heavy missiles was to change opinion as to fortifying work. The solid masonry of Sumter crumbled into dust under the concentrated fire of these rifled guns; while well-shaped earthworks like McAllister stood bombardment well.³ The "cotton bale rampart" of Andrew Jackson, which some have thought a myth, was a certain success in 1863.⁴ Torpedoes, as a harbor defence, were ingeniously applied in these years as never before; yet few of them exploded at the right moment, and the war, on the whole, left this topic, with that of revolving turrets, for further study and experiment.

¹ De Leon, 281. "To be strong, healthy, and capable of the largest measure of physical effort, the soldier needs about three pounds gross of food per day, and the horse or mule about twenty pounds." 2 Sherman, 389.

² The terrible effectiveness of rifled cannon was shown in April, 1862, at Fort Pulaski; and Gillmore's "swamp angel" battery did deadly execution the next year at Morris Island. 5 N. & H. 250.

³ Am. Cycl. 1864, 379.

⁴ 3 B. & L. 484.

Deep were the impressions made by this soldiering life upon the gentle civilian who left home pursuits, dear to him, at his country's call. While the monotonous routine went on, and white army tents spread over the sandy isle or peaceful hillside, the silence of ruddy daybreak on a bright and balmy morning was broken by the sunrise gun; next was heard the familiar call of cavalry bugles, followed by the reveille beat of a hundred drums, widely scattered and yet making almost the same parchment cadence, as men, with slumber broken, hurried from their tents in the smokeless atmosphere to form and jostle together for company roll-call. Other bugle orders called the cavalry to special duties. Regimental guard-mounting, the battalion drill, and dress parade were ceremonies in due order to break later the listless day. There was washing at the tin hand-basin, polishing brasses and buttons, and cleaning up guns and equipments for inspection, besides the modicum of drill. But when hard marching began and battle impended, routine yielded, and all was excitement and carelessness for mere appearance. Who that recalls his first and freshest march does not bring to mind the host of burnished muskets whose metal glinted in the sunlight, or that long caravan of white-topped baggage wagons? At the East, for most of the war, the raw or short-term volunteer was gently dealt with; but dire emergency at the West put many a new comrade into perilous fight, who had bade farewell but a few days before to his home now distant. Though loyal and steadfast when duty summoned, the volunteer's heart sank for a moment as his regiment passed the picket bounds and entered a region hostile on every hand.

Very seldom, as war went on, were battles fought in the open plain, where armies could manœuvre and mass in full sight, or where some dashing charge of mounted troopers or an infantry assault with fixed bayonets won the day. Though deployed by tactics, armies were compelled to fight at last in strong skirmish lines, taking such advantage as they might from the shape of the ground and the chance to cover. Seldom in fierce fighting was the foe seen at long range in large bodies; seldom did opposing lines approach

in compact order. Many a battle was waged, instead, by the pressure of advance bodies which came accidentally in contact, in the course of whose confused and hidden encounter the general in command too often left subordinates to fight as they could, failing to afford relief or to throw reserves at the right place and moment. With natural obstacles to encounter and entanglements skilfully prepared by the enemy, disintegration began often with the first shot, and all regularity of formation and movement was lost. The crisis of struggle would come in holding or gaining possession of some advantageous point, wounded men crawling back to the nearest shelter; and when hostile lines became thus commingled, the men on either side fought apart like tigers, either clubbing with the musket or clinching in a death grapple. We may talk of glorious war when savages, rudely armed, are mowed down like stubble by the implements of a more ingenious civilization; but when men of equally civilized race and antecedents bring equal implements to bear, war is terrible, and slaughter follows slaughter, sparing one army as little as the other, and commonly with scarcely a palpable advantage to show on either side, save in repulsing what was attempted. Americans were not organized machines, in the present warfare, but a combination of intelligences, not always skilfully directed.

One marked change over old battle methods consisted, as years progressed, in improvising or adapting a defence. A casual railroad embankment or sunken road served well that purpose, as at Fredericksburg, and it was found that a barricade even of the rudest kind might ward off many swift missiles of death. Shiloh impressed it upon the commanders to shelter their men, and by 1864, whether in operations East or West, soldiers, Northern and Southern, would, at every halt for the night or even for a few hours only, run up a tolerable line of rails, covered with earth, in ten minutes. Where no instant assault followed, this work was further perfected by digging a trench within, whose earth piled up outside;¹ by felling trees and undergrowth in front and

¹ Am. Cycl. 1864, 380; 2 Grant, 205.

arranging them as an abatis; and finally by placing heavy logs on top of the earthwork, as a cover against sharpshooters.¹ The expert skill and rapidity with which such constructions were made was a novelty in the art of war; and both axe and spade proved useful weapons. With battles fought so much as behind some wooded screen or other visual barrier, pursuit after a battle was made difficult, which is one reason why the full advantage of a victory was so seldom taken, even when a victory was decisive.

McClellan divided soldiers engaged at the seat of war into two classes—those who stood firmly by their colors and those inclined to straggle or run; and he considered that good discipline increased the one class to the lessening of the other.² To “skedaddle”³ meant, in colloquial comment, that panic-stricken flight from the battle-field of which both armies gave instances. Soldiers, says Sherman, are quick to catch the general drift and purpose of a campaign and the spirit with which they are led; they are sensible when they are well commanded and well cared for; and once impressed thus, and with the fact that they are making progress, they will bear any amount of privation and labor. As the Comte de Paris has remarked, our volunteer soldier was all the more critical of his several generals because his criticism could not compel. In camp and in active presence of the enemy, it is easier to maintain discipline than in barracks or while danger is distant; and many a wise officer in consequence let the frolicsome turbulence of the last day at rendezvous go uncorrected, knowing that he would start his men for the front on the morrow.

It has been remarked that Southern localities differently impressed those used and those unused to them; so that for almost every great battle-ground South and North have found different names, the conventional title being pre-

¹ Where an enemy intrenches, such precautions are doubly proper; but those on the offensive must take special risks, and too much intrenching makes troops timid. 2 Sherman, 394-397.

² Own Story, 481.

³ Senator Wade in debate gave this word currency.

ferred on the one side, and that of river, mountain, or other impressive object, on the other—a consequence, in part, of imperfect maps for invasion. Southerners, again, with readier vocal expression of what they felt, would keep up in fight a barbaric sound, memorable as “the rebel yell”—not, like the Northern cheer, proceeding from deep hearts in unison after some desperate struggle and advantage, but a high, shrill yelp, without concert, which increased as the climax approached to induce further effort.

Railroads were found, for the first time in our experience, extremely useful for warfare. But while Northern transportation to the theatre of war was well maintained and a vast area of country remained wholly exempt from ravage, that in the South shrunk and wore away, through repeated raids, and for want of skill and capital to replace what had never been adequate in rails or rolling stock. On the Union side especially, railways were fully utilized.¹ At the seat of war they were frequently torn up or repaired during the changes of military occupation, and strong guards and garrisons in block houses had to be maintained at each important bridge or trestle; but destruction, especially by hostile cavalry, could be quickly made good.² Telegraph lines were of great service, both for keeping Government and the people well informed, and, under Grant and Sherman, for conducting direct operations in the field, by running insulated wires along stakes or trees. A signal corps of detailed officers and men also did good service on stations, sending messages by day with flags and by night with turpentine torches. Field telegraphy would properly have come under such direction; but this corps, on the Union side, was organized too late and disbanded too

¹ Sherman's Atlanta campaign would have been impossible but for a line of single track, aggregating near five hundred miles, which connected with Louisville; and Hooker's huge detachment was transferred by rail, in 1863, about twelve hundred miles within a week.

² See *post*, as to Sherman's “twisted” treatment of rails in Georgia, which was to some purpose.

early to be as efficient as it should have been. The Confederates employed such a corps, using the same signal code. McClellan used balloons for observation, but his successors seem to have dispensed with them. Both belligerents organized a spy and detective system, under the immediate control of the War Department.

For drill manuals Hardee was the standard and Scott old-fashioned; but Grant, by rule of the thumb, found early how the one system of tactics merged into the other. Volunteer subalterns of a few weeks' training studied "Army Regulations" or discussed Jomini's "Art of War" and kindred books of high strategy, in the intervals of euchre, through idle weeks of which there were many. Letters from the stuffed mail-bags helped over this otherwise irksome and homesick period; and Government, by dispensing with prepaid postage, and in various other ways, showed consideration for "the boys," whose full discipline needed something of an epistolary home influence. Newspapers, too, were always welcome; but more even than the whisper of fame—or that perversion more likely, to be killed in action and have one's name spelt wrong by the reporter—did the goodies that arrived by mail or express, the tin-types, ambrotypes, photographs, and sweetheart tokens, gladden the warrior's heart.

That bright and cheery disposition, typical of our modern America, which alleviates hard toil and privation and impels good comradeship, shone out in both Union and Confederate armies to the last, and made bearable the long intensity of conflict. Whether in "pulling red mud" on the tramp over Virginia's shocking roads, or when suffering rude weather, or while bearing that harder mishap of short rations,—nay, even after due seasoning, while under fire and confronting the danger of sudden death,—the joke over ill-luck and the ludicrous side of disaster was unailing; volunteers chaffed one another, called nicknames, and had some pleasant perversion and mimicry for the passing spectacle. In the refrain of a song much sung in those days—

"Then let the world wag round as it will,
We'll be gay and happy still."

Both "Yanks" and the "Johnny Rebs" showed this cheerfulness, spiced with genial or sardonic humor, as the case might be; and the "we 'uns and you 'uns" for a boastful comparison on this side was offset on that by a dialect slang, sure to add "or any other man." On repeated occasions towards the close of the war "butternuts" and the "boys in blue" would carry on a neighborly talk or barter across the lines, while pickets respected as neutral ground a spring of mutual convenience. At more than one famous surrender the conquering soldiers fraternized with the conquered, and, instead of exulting, fed the hungry from their haversacks. Who will deny that long before Appomattox there was felt a sub-consciousness of defeat among this Southern rank and file and a disposition to be reconciled to the old flag?¹ But Americans stand stubbornly by a cause they have espoused, even when feeling that the war is not their war. Grim, muddy, shoeless, ragged, unwashed, unkempt, and unfed, they foot it through, obedient to orders. It was the volunteer or veteran element on either side that gave spirit and character to such a soldiery; for the sheepish conscript, too poor to purchase his exemption, or the "bounty-jumper," usually from the dregs of society and vicious by habit, mingled with the better metal somewhat as a base alloy.

Bureau martinets — those professionally reared to the red tape and red ink of peace and a regular military establishment — had to yield somewhat to a necessity unexampled. The army forms in duplicate, triplicate, and even quadruplicate; statistical reports; the army letter upon a single subject, written on regulation sheet with three folds, neatly engrossed by orderly, signed by officer, and then carefully folded, indorsed, and forwarded to final headquarters for final record and decision; the army invoices and receipts, so made out that one would sign in blank and leave clerks and officials to fill up with numerals as they chose, — these

¹ "Go it, cotton-tail," called a Confederate soldier from the rifle fire, as a rabbit darted by in fright; "I would run too if I hadn't a reputation." De Leon, 305; 3 B. & L. 609.

and other standing usages at Washington were imitated in the States. In those days stenography was rarely practised except for journalism, nor was typewriting invented; public orders and documents were multiplied either by printing or laborious penmanship, and the vast correspondence and official utterances of this period were scarcely facilitated by invention, except for carbon sheets or the letter-press book, with its imprint on wet tissue paper of the original sheet written in copying ink. Congress and the Executive at Washington yielded to States on various points of convenience; thus State volunteers at first kept long waiting for a general muster into the national service were presently accepted individually, and mustered in with pay to commence upon enlistment; and the Washington Government soon audited and settled the State bills incurred for war expenses, and reduced the raising of troops to a just and uniform system.¹

The hygiene of armies was studied closely on the Union side while this war progressed, and the death-rate in 1863 caused by sickness was found less than that of the British regular army in times of peace. Incompetent surgeons and nurses, such as first found employment, were weeded out; army hospitals improved in temperature and ventilation; an ambulance service was organized; and for a volunteer army of more than half a million, called so suddenly into existence, the lurking diseases of camp exposure were much reduced by wise and intelligent prevention. In working out such salutary changes, as also in ministering to the comfort of the sick and wounded, the Surgeon-General's bureau was much aided by the Sanitary Commission, a voluntary enterprise begun by civilians, with the sanction of the President and Secretary of War, in the summer of 1861; Dr. Bellows, an eminent preacher of New York City, heading the list of experts and philanthropists in that work of mercy, whose organizing spirit was Frederick Law Olmsted. On the Confederate side, or at least in Richmond's vicinity, an ambu-

¹ The old unpaid claim of Massachusetts for the war of 1812 was now settled.

lance corps supplied the corresponding want in a partial sense.¹ Other worthy associations were organized for relief and Christian influence. Military surgery gained proficiency in checking the fatal hemorrhage, as also in transporting the wounded from the field by litters and stretchers. With the new kinds of deadly missiles, surgery found wounds novel for treatment and more difficult for the knife.²

Not only did men grow callous to the sight of wounds, sickness, and death in their midst, but learned to regard their own lighter injuries with a jesting indifference. All humankind, however, as Sherman well remarks, shrink naturally from pain and danger, and only incur their risk from some higher motive or from habit, and courage itself implies not insensibility to danger so much as a perfect sensibility with a mental willingness to incur the risk.³ "It is well," once said Lee, "that war is so terrible, as otherwise we should grow too fond of it."⁴

Probably no civilized country in the modern world ever poured out in an equal period so much of its blood and treasure as did these United States during four agonizing years, in one section or the other. And that thus far in its history the American Union as a whole never bore defeat in any external war is matter for rejoicing, if, at all events, such good fortune does not foster the foolish idea that a nation can be invincible, reckless of the justice of its cause, and if our people are not tempted to ambitious exploits beyond their strength. Bitter enough for one section of Americans was the final humiliation of this period; but the bitterest recollections are now over, and the generations that respon-

¹ Am. Cycl. 1864, 32; De Leon, 99. Sherman and some other commanders found fault with agents of the Sanitary Commission for coming to the front with local gifts to distribute, and refused them entrance unless they would divide their good things among all the troops; but in the hospitals and among the convalescent their delicate stores were always welcome.

² Am. Cycl. 1864, 536.

³ 2 Sherman, 395.

⁴ 3 B. & L. 251.

sibly opposed have nearly passed away. Civil war need not exclude perfect reconciliation as a reunited and homogeneous people, and what rankles longest in memory is less likely to be the lost fight than the political feud that caused it. The military prowess of America's Civil War on either side is the glory of the race. For those who won, to have conquered such foes is applause enough; and for those who failed, it is a consolation, as one of their best fighters has manfully expressed it, that they were beaten, not by an external foe, but by those of their own flesh and blood.¹

SECTION II.

GENERAL TRAITS AND INDUSTRIES.

It has long been characteristic of Americans to take the drift, when passion runs strong, rather than be bruised and baffled in endeavoring to beat back the flood. Their convictions are stronger than the courage of them; they dread that coarse vituperation and ridicule which all must prepare to suffer who choose to withstand the wishes of the hour; they like to work with others, to be on the winning side, or at least with that set which to-day or to-morrow has good prospect of succeeding. Hence we shall never know the real strength of an opposition, prudently latent, to the issue of arms joined in the memorable April of 1861, with apparently such enthusiastic concert North or South. But the visible distraction of sentiment in our border slave States makes it probable that love of Union, however latent, shaded Southern sentiment still farther toward the Gulf.

It is not easy to conceive how undeveloped, how dependent upon others, the economic system of these cotton States, prosperous though they seemed, had made them in 1861, while they cherished the patriarchal incident of their industry, and believed with their leaders that free trade preferences and the cupidity for their staple product would make Europe itself an appanage to their kingdom. Com-

merce, manufactures, skilled artisans, and the flood of white immigration from the Old World their people had willingly seen diverted to the North. The mineral wealth of coal, iron, and the precious metals in this section lay buried in the ground, and external capital had not been sought for this or any other development. Independence, in fact, was boldly invoked, while the South depended upon the outer world for most food products except hog and hominy and for the commonest necessities of life—for beef and flour, for garments, coarse or fine, and for every implement of manufacture for peace or war. The planter had been a free customer and a generous one to Yankee or Britisher, paying a very good price when money was in hand; while in his own State and neighborhood, the pursuits of factor, trader, and even banker, had fallen chiefly to dwellers of other nationalities, such as German Jews, the Scotch or Irish, who found in the dross they could rake out some recompense for a social denial. The mean white native copied the style of the great proprietor, anxious not to be deemed among life's mudsills. But necessity, as we have shown, spurred invention, and war with its prolonged privations taught this capable people arts and varied industries they had too much despised. The new Confederate States of America started upon its career with apparently abundant money and credit. When war commenced in earnest, Southern newspapers advertised in every quarter for skilled mechanics; Southern factories started into existence, to make boots and shoes, lamps, glass, steam-engines, gunpowder, and clothing; and a new industrial set, known as contractors, shadowed the land like locusts.¹ But hope and buoyancy were crushed out under a four years' terrible pressure; and, what with blockade along the coast and invading armies closing at the frontiers, the hoarded resources of the South were gradually drained to exhaustion and its present credit ruined. Cotton was piled up, only to be despoiled by the conquerors or utterly wasted. Lands, landed products, and negroes had limits of reliance for

¹ 2 Russell, 39.

incessant taxation; but before the Richmond government would yield, in its direst straits, the rich were impoverished and the poor made penniless, scarcely a treasure or a trust fund escaping the ravenous vigilance which transmuted them into worthless paper.

When we recall that the Presidential result for 1860 was largely owing to the perverse division of the Democratic party which Jefferson Davis and his set had forced at the Charleston convention; that, notwithstanding Lincoln's election, the popular vote showed scarcely more than two-fifths of the American people so hostile yet to slavery as to combine to prevent its spread; that of those two-fifths the immense majority would have willingly pledged themselves, for the sake of harmony, never to meddle with the institution where it already existed; and that slaveholders and the South had sufficient influence still in both branches of Congress, and especially in the Senate, to compel respect for their normal rights under the Constitution, posterity cannot but wonder at that passion and precipitancy of the slaveholders which forced an unequal fight, whose almost certain consequence must have been to impair if not destroy the institution they were bent upon preserving. There was fatalism in such blindness, in such belief that the Northern people were cowards. And so, too, on the Southern side there must have been some lingering love for the old flag and the old history which such infatuation could not wholly quench. For the latent affection felt by Americans for their historic Union triumphs over time and fate; its sources are immensely deep in the heart of the whole people.

It was not strange that in that generation sections misjudged one another, but the North had the chief disadvantage in this respect. Few from the free States travelled into the remote South to study closely its people or its peculiar institution, while any suspected of abolition leanings who did so in those days carried their lives in their hands. Of Northern delineators of plantation life since 1850 only Olmsted and Harriet Beecher Stowe had discoursed intelligently. Yancey was politely heard at Faneuil Hall in the political campaign of 1860, but not a Republican orator was asked

South to return the compliment. Rich slaveholders with their families had explored for years the fashionable winter and summer resorts of the North, many of their children receiving education in Northern schools or colleges; and this, once more, gave opportunities for studying local life and sentiment which were not enjoyed in return. The common people of the two sections remained almost as total strangers to one another as though an ocean divided them, while planters and their scions cared little to compare institutions while travelling. Perhaps the deference often paid such visitors by Northern men of wealth and learning fostered the contempt of free States so generally and so unjustly entertained at the South.

Manners on the plantation and among a master race conduce to the assertion of personal freedom in expression and to a scornful demeanor, mitigated only by the Christian and conventional courtesies. To speak more especially of those civil leaders in our cotton belt, whose destiny was to light the torch of unprosperous revolution, they were frank and free-spoken in their sentiments, often with a touch of passionate exaggeration, such as makes eloquence brilliant and effective; while, on the contrary, temperament and the training of the North produced compression rather, constraining one to express himself moderately or to demur in silence. Brought up in the open air, trained early to horsemanship and the use of firearms, unstinted in hospitality among congenial acquaintance, our Southerners were of good material for fight or negotiation, or to hold an inferior race submissive. They loved nature and could manage human nature; reading little, and without earnestness in establishing public libraries or schemes of popular education and culture, the book they read was life, at the open page before them. Not only were they open to hearty and unreserved companionship, where congenial at all points, but their sexual susceptibility was great. For men and women in this whole region strongly influenced one another, and here once more, in the reciprocal tendency to pair and live domestic lives, nature

asserted itself powerfully. Agricultural life in a warm climate tended, as among the patriarchs, to a prolific progeny. Towards women of his own rank and race the Southern gentleman was strongly chivalrous, and woman in return loved fondly and passionately, laying great store by her beauty and personal graces. That stronger enthusiasm with which woman threw herself into this struggle of masters, to inflame and encourage their efforts, has been well understood; and the sex morally the most outraged by slave institutions seems to have been the most uncompromisingly eager to uphold them, since compromise is alien to a woman's nature. Southern women inspired the cause of Southern secession, and scarcely an order was seen emanating from Confederate generals for exciting hatred of the North that did not allude to the softer sex. Indeed, to this very day, the sensitiveness of the Southern-born to the chastity of wife, mother, or daughter leads him to track and shoot down the guilty seducer, rather than take recourse to legal redress.¹

Invasion dispelled all Northern romance touching the imagined luxury of this Southern plantation life. No intelligent yeoman or mechanic from New England or the Middle States, volunteering for the Union, could penetrate on a campaign this region of another civilization without feeling impressed by the obvious contrast which it bore to his own. States stretching downward on the Atlantic coast had been nearly contemporaneous in point of actual settlement, but those North had progressed in outward condition within a hundred years, while those South bore still the old colonial aspect. Here were execrable roads, little improved or cared for, with wretched tavern or grog-shop at the crossing; ill-cultivated farms, elbowing one another for

¹ Summary punishments inflicted upon real or supposed negro ravishers, of recent years, are in point. "The man who dares tamper with the chastity of a white woman knows what to expect," said prominent Southerners in 1861 in the course of table talk, priding themselves on that common sentiment. 1 Russell, 93. In Major Jones's *Chronicles* of much earlier date, the humble Georgia "cracker" warns male guests of his crowded cabin that he is ready to draw a bead upon "any mink who gets in among my pullets."

miles, to be relieved at rarest intervals by some ruinous church or by the pillared mansion, dowdy and dilapidated, yet not without peculiar grace, which belonged to some unthrifty lord of the manor. Little did all this consort with the snug little town at home, on whose green common patriots gathered, whose comfortable dwellings with modern appliances sought schoolhouse and church for close acquaintance, and whose every fenced enclosure showed individual taste and neatness. Here, on the other hand, were seen mean cabins, far apart, unpainted and out of repair, where the simplest sanitary comforts were wanting, and whose mean families huddled close to their pigs and poultry; for instruction, secular or religious, nothing æsthetic in aspect since the days of the fathers; while to lend variety to the shabby show of population, blacks and mulattoes of all the seven ages in life were in evidence among the whites, their miserable outhouses encroaching upon the most pretentious mansions of their masters. Travellers in early 1861 to Montgomery, that brief mecca of the Confederacy, describe its mean hotels as overcrowded, so that white men of all sorts and conditions tossed feverishly at night in the same chamber and sometimes in the same bed, while drinking and quarrelling went on below in the bar-room. No wonder that among such uncheerful surroundings for the common folk, the saloon, the corner grocery, or the race-course had given to Southern life of the passing era so much of its solace and recreation. For houses and lands together seemed lapsing to chaos, as in Hogarth's "finis" picture; and, even in the better class of towns, what was new in architecture seemed bald, and what was old ruinous. Between the newer Southwest and the rude frontiers of the distant Northwest the difference was of course less striking.

Through the whole sweep of this area of armed insurrection, as presently bounded, there was, in 1860, no large centre of wealth and population except New Orleans of the cosmopolites; a city of exotic flavor, ranking by the census of that year next after Boston. While among our free Northwestern States the stride of new cities had been

sure and rapid, old Charleston of the seventeenth century, stagnant in its aristocracy to this very day, stood twentieth in the list of populous centres of the United States, and that with the exceptional showing of loss instead of gain during the previous decade. Richmond, still lower in the list, — the capital city before 1862 in a double relation to State and Confederacy, — was outnumbered by New Haven, whose percentage of growth was twice as great; while Nashville, though rapidly increasing, ranked below Worcester. New Orleans, Charleston, Richmond, and Nashville were the only centres of populous life within the area of civil conflict worth listing that year at all.¹ Yet, for all this, the thinly populated Southern country had charms seductive to a casual traveller, who bound in attachment the natives. Illiterate and uncouth though he might appear, the white Unionist, whom Northern officers so often met, showed strong native sense, and, "right smart" or "right peart," he was fond of talk, friendly, and sociable, and seemed sincere. Nature, too, showed rare and attractive aspects in Southern scenery, which art had not sought to improve upon. The creeks, inlets, and smooth beaches, suitable for the hunt and for ambling exercise; the aromatic pine groves of the highlands, whose more remote mountain heights held loyal inhabitants; the sandy level plains and flat landscape of the lowlands, with scarce a stone, over whose roads, paved with oyster shells and fatiguing to pedestrian toil, the horseman galloped gayly; the grace of the live oak with its long and hanging mosses, the bloom of the fragrant magnolia, and that soft and delicious climate that makes winter towards the Gulf the better half of some prolonged summer season, — all these charms, and many more, made the "sunny South" grateful to its own settlers, as it has since been found, under more hospitable influence, to the Northern invalid. For, after all, it is not so much the surpassing beauty or grandeur of natural surroundings

¹ Among border States which remained loyal, Baltimore ranked in 1860 above Boston, and St. Louis followed New Orleans closely. Louisville also stood high in civic rank and progress.

that makes one love his native landscape and long for it when far removed, as that which is strongly typical in natural effect, and thus insensibly shapes and sways human character.

To turn now to the North. Not costly and stupendous erections, such as mark for posterity some rich civilization won through ancestral sacrifice, nor grand monumental shafts, commemorate most fitly the heroes and heroism of this life; but those simpler buildings, rather, wherein great work was wrought. The site of a culminating struggle is best preserved when preserved in its contemporaneous aspect. For the heroic age is, historically, the simpler one, and we look back upon it from a broader and more luxurious development, won through its hardships. Through all this unprecedented cost and waste of terrible war, neither State nor nation felt rich enough to enlarge, to stretch forth the curtains of its habitations; in fact, the prodigious work of direction went on at the old and crowded headquarters of a primitive peace, with such other accommodation added as could cheaply and hastily be made available. Those ample wings of painted brick fastened upon the Boston State House which Bulfinch built, Albany's sumptuous edifices, and the costly piles of other commonwealths, upon whose architecture our less scrupulous age lavishes and squanders the public money, have yet immortal memories to earn. Great minds are not circumscribed by narrow and confined chambers; nature herself, which cages a boundless soul within so delicate a human frame, teaches that lesson.

In Washington, the centre of a prodigious administration developed so suddenly, Government was housed much as before the war. An untidy and widely scattered city of about sixty-one thousand inhabitants, when South Carolina seceded, and ranking next to San Francisco, its wide and desolate avenues ran through half-settled lots and muddy, unpaved streets of parallel pattern, bounding public reservations unused and uncared for. With slaves and unas-

simulated factions of society, Northern and Southern, such a capital, when Sumter fell, seemed hardly worth defending; but war, which greatly increased its historical associations, brought a more homogeneous civic composition, through the Northern influx of troops and civilians, the flight of the secession element, and the abolition of district slavery. Yet, for all this, Washington was little more than the managing centre of the nation when Civil War ended; its social renovation and civic beauty did not commence until some five years later. At the era of this narrative, it was political or military business that chiefly kept people coming and going; the prevailing aspect of the city was warlike, and on the solemn circle of bastioned hills about it were substantial lines of fortification. To the unfinished aspect of the dome in the Capitol extension, begun before the war, we have alluded.¹ It was partly because of that dispiriting effect upon our soldiery that the external work of the edifice was resumed; and by the time the bronze statue of liberty crowned the apex, truth and allegory were as one. And thus, though the interior fresco work went slowly on, Congress legislated for the war in a commodious temple, fairly completed inside. But Executive quarters were not correspondingly spacious. The White House, as Lincoln occupied it, was that, to all intents, which it still remains, though less cramped in its natural surroundings. In its upper chambers, both for home and office life, dwelt Lincoln, like most of his predecessors; and his only summer variation was in using, with his family, a modest cottage at the Soldiers' Home on the northern suburb, towards which, by the main road, he might be seen riding in a barouche from the White House, on a bright September afternoon, with a few mounted cavalry for his escort. Of the four bluish-drab, brick buildings, with Grecian portico and more modest side entrance, which stood originally at the four respective corners of the White House reservation, the State, War, and Navy fulfilled the needs of this war period. But the fourth had been burned; and the present

¹ *Supra*, p. 6. See Washington Sketch Book (1864).

Treasury building, colonnaded in freestone and with its southern front of granite just completed, was destined to bound the whole eastern space upon Fifteenth Street. Corcoran's new art building was used by the quartermaster-general; and other important bureaus of the War or Treasury found temporary quarters outside the Executive reservation. The Interior Secretary and the Postmaster-General occupied the area on F Street, midway to the Capitol; the one quartered in the "Patent Office" Parthenon, whose pension business was becoming quite predominant; the other, across the street, furnishing, besides department needs, the facilities of a city post-office. At the Washington navy yard much foundry work was done.

New York City, with a population of more than 814,000 souls, shown by the recent census, had far outstripped Philadelphia as the metropolis of this new world; and her redundant people and industries had rapidly, within a decade, built up the opposing shores of Long Island and New Jersey, both reached by ferries, so as already to make Brooklyn the third city of the Union in point of numbers. The sceptre of Cincinnati, as queen of the West, now passed from her grasp; St. Louis, since 1850, had outstripped her in rank; while Chicago, with a prodigious rate of comparative increase, pressed emulous behind. Chicago grew greatly in wealth by handling the grain of the back country that went by way of the Great Lakes to the Atlantic seaboard; and Detroit, Milwaukee, and Cleveland all gained from a similar employment. Civic luxury made little show in any Northern city while the war went on; it needed peace, once more, to fairly convince our people of the vast changes in life, manners, and the standard of luxurious style, which a radical revolution carried in its train. While the old Southern aristocracy became impoverished altogether, old Northern families of respectability held hardly their former prestige amid the noisy swarm of the newly rich whose prospective fortunes were immense by comparison. These, honestly or dishonestly, had mounted well the opportunities of the war, and amassed while others lost. Army and navy contracts, gold gambling, shrewd

speculation in bank, railroad, or factory stocks, such as rose enormously while there was no specie basis, enterprises in shoddy or in confiscated cotton and sugar, or, honorably enough, the gain accruing from brokerage for the government, — such were the sources of shifting wealth to build upon, rocks of accumulation to some, to others quicksands, in these troublous years of transition which ushered in a new era of strong social contrasts between wealth and poverty. Elegance and expenditure, on this American continent, find their usual chief expression in its great metropolis; yet, externally, the New York City of April, 1861, and of April, 1865, were very much alike. Large stores for fashionable shopping in dry goods, or perhaps a tall newspaper structure, supplied the chief architectural novelty of the war period. Old down-town hotels, like the Astor, were largely patronized by military officers, going and coming; and whether hotel, store, business office, or private residence, buildings were rarely more than four stories high, and people climbed the staircase from bottom to top as a matter of course. For the sky-seeking edifices of this later age require elevators; and the use of passenger elevators had hardly yet begun.¹ Of clubs and club-houses during the war, the new *Union* or *Union League*, represented at Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and other populous centres, aided strongly in sentiment the loyal cause.

Agriculture was in 1861, as it had always been, the chief industry of the United States; and just before the war it was computed that farmers North and South contributed more than half the wealth and paid more than half the taxes of the Union.² In farming, as in all other industrial pursuits, Northern ingenuity tended to increase productiveness

¹ Perhaps the earliest passenger elevator in a public house was that which worked by a screw in the Fifth Avenue Hotel of this city, introduced about the time the war ended, and deemed a novelty in 1870. To foreign tourists our hotels had long seemed immense.

² Am. Cycl. 1861.

and reduce the cost by new appliances. Mowing-machines had come into general use, and threshing-machines were just taking the place of the flail and barnyard floor; the American exhibit of patent mowers and reapers at the World's Fair of 1862, in Great Britain, surpassed all competition. In local agricultural societies were discussed new problems of economy, and farmers were encouraged to grind old bones into phosphates for home use, instead of exporting them, as hitherto, to Europe. Three measures of the new Republican party upon acceding to national power attested its strong alliance with these Northern farmers: the homestead law, long agitated, which gave public land to the individual who had beneficially improved and occupied, by way of substituted consideration for a purchase price; the erection of an agricultural department at Washington, for general statistics, experiments, and the diffusion of information; and the direct encouragement of State agricultural colleges, by grants of large tracts of public land by way of endowment. All three measures were carried through Congress in 1861. That same year saw an immense demand in Europe for American breadstuffs, and great profit accrued to farmers and carriers; while in 1862 the crops of wheat and Indian corn reached their maximum for the war. Great armies had now to be fed, and hay for cavalry horses was in pressing demand. War tended to the waste of all live stock except sheep and milch cows. The profits on wool and the increasing use of mutton for the table encouraged native sheep-breeding, and good stock was imported from Europe, South Africa, and South America. For fattening and packing hogs, Cincinnati kept her undignified preëminence until Chicago outstripped her. States bordering on the Great Lakes vied with New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania in orchard products of variety; though Delaware, in the futile political effort to bring settlers for a free State, advertised her peach-raising advantages. Free California, extending far southward, with a dry climate and a rich and aromatic soil, promised already vineyard advantages when once an iron road could connect her with the East. The wine product of that remote State in 1864 exceeded four

million gallons; yet gold was still her staple export, and Ohio and New York were rivals in grape-raising. The high price of cane sugar in these years led to some crude experiments with sorghum and the sugar beet, besides stimulating the use of maple sugar. Except at points where armies ravaged, agriculture at the North continued large and profitable. Here were the grain-fields of this continent, in the heart of the Mississippi valley.

Calamity taught the South to plant less cotton and more corn and cereals, to save her people from starvation. With cotton completely cut off from the United States, the huge maw of European factories was fed for the time being from Brazil, Egypt, and the East Indies; while, for our Northern mills, experiments unsatisfactory were made to raise the plant on the banks of the Ohio and Missouri rivers. Flax cotton was also supplied as a substitute; and wool and shoddy were much woven into cloth fabrics. Tobacco, too, to some extent was raised in the Connecticut valley. Fortunately for the South, she regained the world's market for all her great staples after this strife was over, furnishing new economic proof that negro labor, even if desirable in cultivating, need not be slave labor. For Europe found its other cotton of inferior quality, and payment in money instead of goods was a disadvantage.¹

As for manufactures, their distribution over existing States and Territories was more general in 1860 than it had been half a century earlier. Yet more than three-fifths of the entire manufacturing and mechanical industry of the Union was located that year in New England and the Middle States, the region of its colonial origin. New York led in the value of manufactured goods, from her supreme advantage in population and market resources; Pennsyl-

¹ By 1860, the amount of cotton consumption in the United States reached \$191,806,555 in value, or 1,767,686,338 in pounds; while Great Britain, and Europe generally, had come to depend upon this country for the regular supply of a surplus product well kept up. Before the war the price averaged 6 to 12 cents per pound. By far the greater portion of the export in 1860 was to Great Britain. *Am. Cycl.* 1861, 252-254; Wright's *Industrial Evolution*.

vania came second, subordinate by this era in such advantages; while Massachusetts, though far disproportionate in numbers, stood third, maintaining her earlier rank. Fourth, and far behind, came Ohio, whose industries, half a century earlier, had been of no consequence. Of other States with manufacturing products for the year, Connecticut, New Jersey, California, and Illinois followed next in due order. Virginia, with little more than half a million dollars' worth of goods, led the whole slave section of the United States, which had thus fallen quite away from its relative concern in such pursuits early in the century.¹ American ingenuity in the invention of machines and processes for simplifying and saving cost has been conspicuous ever since the first settlement. With clipper vessels, the fastest sailing in the world, with sewing-machines, the application of rubber, air-heating stoves and furnaces, grand pianos, revolvers and breech-loading guns, and manifold printing-presses, American reputation in this war era was well maintained.² For every industry that rewards personal investigation, the American mind has devised improvements; and the study of public and political problems will yield like admirable results whenever our public service seeks out merit instead of yielding to ignoble pressure. Rapidly as manufactures

¹ Only New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts exceeded \$200,000,000 in value of annual product.

² The chief manufacturing industries of 1860 were the textiles, in which enterprises Massachusetts was working her way to the ranking State of the Union; ready-made clothing, by this time a highly important product; boots and shoes, likewise ready-made and turned out by machinery in factories; lumber and wooden products, the earliest of important American manufactures; iron and steel, flour and meal, sugar, paper, printing and publishing, foundry and machine shop products, liquors distilled and malt. A new industry had arisen, as yet in its infancy, in rubber and waterproof goods. Iron and steel were now among native manufacturing industries of the first magnitude in pig and rolled iron and steel, and the tendency was strongly to increase, in Pennsylvania especially. Wright, 139, 161. The United States census of 1860 reported the capital invested in mechanical and manufacturing industries as \$1,009,855,715, and the product as \$1,885,861,676, the various establishments being scattered throughout thirty-nine States and Territories.

had increased in the United States they had, nevertheless, hardly more than kept pace with the growth of a home market, while agricultural products had been immense by comparison; so that food products from the West and staples from the South remained the chief basis of our commerce.¹

No mineral product of America, since the gold discovery in California, had caused such widespread excitement as petroleum, which spouted from the depths of Pennsylvania's coal beds, a wonder still when Civil War began. At the desponding hour of illuminating resources, when the sperm whale had become almost extinct, and substitutes like lard or rosin oil and camphene seemed insufficient, a well was bored near modest Titusville, in August, 1859, from which, at a given depth, rock oil sprang to the surface to lighten and lubricate mankind. Wild purchasing followed at once, land speculation, the hurried formation of stock companies; and in a few months the wilderness of Oil Creek, Pennsylvania, became a community of workers with drills and derricks. Fortunes were struck in a day by striking oil. Petroleum has since been found in other States, but that original neighborhood has remained the region of its chief production and export. Kerosene oil, less odorous and liable to explode than when first refined, is the cheapest and most brilliant, still, of household lights; and naphtha, for the arts, is another chief product from the discovery. Invention was applied to the uses of petroleum, in this war period, and from that new resource the North derived much revenue.

Commerce during the Civil War was greatly shorn of its former national proportions. For the Southern section blockade served to annihilate it, nor did the reopening of New Orleans and other specified ports to trade by Union proclamation realize the advantages expected. Duties under a high tariff bore heavily upon Northern imports, while the improving harvests of Europe in 1863 checked that grain exportation which in the two preceding years had been so great. Other influences operated to depress American com-

¹ Am. Cycl. 1861, 106.

merce, and none more strongly than the ravage of Southern cruisers or privateers upon mid-ocean. That continual risk and the costly rates of marine insurance in consequence caused the transfer of many a Northern vessel to some European flag. Derangement of the currency and of foreign exchange was another cause of decline. In short, our loyal commerce was violently forced by civil war into new channels, and from 1862 onward its aggregate decline was steady, to the immediate gain of our European rivals, who turned against us the lesson of neutral advantage that we taught them sixty years earlier, when England and Napoleon were at war.¹

Railroads had been, since 1852, a mighty agency in opening up this broad Union to a ramified inland trade and intercourse. Its tonnage had gained permanently upon that of canals; and when this war began there was nearly twice as much mileage in the free as in slave States. Railroad capital for the most part had been handsomely returned by the products laid open for trade and commerce. During the war Northern railroads, though not extended, were fairly kept up in road-beds and rolling-stock, a source of private profit and ownership, while those in the South went to ruin under the stress of calamity and public seizure. No private enterprise was more zealously taken up by capitalists, when national supremacy had been restored, than railway expansion from Kansas to the Pacific coast, so as to span this entire continent.² Telegraph lines, requiring less outlay, had been extended with more ease and rapidity; for an overland line, by the fall of 1861, connected the cities of San Francisco and New York. But railroads in this era were still local and limited in their general control and extent, snugly managed under their original State char-

¹ American shipping engaged in foreign trade from the port of New York declined more than one-half from 1861 to 1865, while foreign tonnage gained nearly three and a half times upon the figures of 1858. *Am. Cycl.* 1865.

² *Am. Cycl.* 1861-65. In 1865, statistics showed 35,935 miles of railroads already completed, and 53,060 additional miles projected.

ters and independent of one another, though making convenient connections. The feverish lease and consolidation into long interstate track lines, the rival monopoly of through rates and traffic, were symptoms not visible until peace returned and loose capital poured like a torrent into railway investments. Nor did the traveller find palatial accommodations while journeying on the iron track thus early. A fifty-cent reclining chair, by night, between New York and Washington was the ultimate reach of luxury or class privilege; sleepers, dining cars, drawing-room seats, the comfortable appliances of pipes and regulated steam heat, in place of stoves, all were unknown; and the highest and humblest in the land shared by couples in this heroic age the seats of an ordinary passenger car, and made shy or easy discourse as they travelled.¹ On some roads, however, women and their escort had a privileged car, while negroes, as formerly, had to sit by themselves. For refec-tion, passengers darted to the counter of the depot restaurant when the train stopped ten minutes or more. In short, for travellers, palatial grandeur, beyond plain plush upholstery, and luxurious living were as yet found only in the sumptuous gilt and white saloons of that ambitious floating inn, the steamboat.

War, though waged for a moral principle, brings in its train immoral results: extravagance, waste, the greed of gain, an inordinate passion to expand, like the frog of the fable, lawlessness, a disdain of fundamental and salutary constraints. About the battlefield of slaughter and glory are seen the buzzards and foul beasts of prey. Happily for the present fraternal conflict, the moral good outweighed by far the immediate ills. North and South, as soon as issues of government paper became the compulsory basis of trade, the ills of inflation were perceptible. Prices took

¹ The writer recalls a rude sort of vestibuled train in use as early as 1858 on a railroad in Western Massachusetts, but such trains are virtually of very recent adoption.

an upward tendency, affected in fluctuation by special causes in special instances. Articles of food soon cost at the North one hundred per cent more than in 1860, and a salary which in that former year had supported a family comfortably would scarcely keep it from starvation four years later, unless paid, as one vainly wished it were, in gold.¹ House rents advanced, however, much more slowly, and in tenement houses of the largest cities, depleted by enlistments and the stoppage of immigration, landlords took whatever they could get, until, by 1863, rents rose again.² Workingmen, favored by the drain of labor from nearly all pursuits, and the breadwinners upon a salary, gained somewhat of an increase in pay during these four years. The violent upheaval of war and the cessation of an immense trade between the sections, caused many business failures at the North, with large liabilities, during the first twelve months; but after that, insolvency nearly ceased. Northern textile mills and the railroads made money, and good stocks rose steadily in Wall Street, whose financiers prophesied for every keen operator a fortune. Gold gambling and stock gambling resulted from protracted war and the new inflation, New York setting the example; and at Richmond, furthermore, the same gambling spirit developed with far more reckless consequences. Union bondholders, whose interest coupons were cashed at the sub-treasury as they stood in long line, would hasten to the broker and sell the gold from their wallets at its current premium; Northern banks, while arranging to convert their business from the State to the national system, sold gold in immense quantities; and the profits and labors of middlemen in all such transactions were enormous. When speculation reached its height in stocks and specie, all Wall Street went wild; women pawned their diamonds, and clergymen and teach-

¹ See Am. Cycl. 1865, 349.

² Am. Cycl. 1864, 377; Ib. 1865, 344; 30 Harper, 615. Congress, about August, 1863, passed a bill forbidding gold sales, but it produced such ill results that its repeal followed in a few days. Gold ranged in 1864, during July, from 235 to 285; in early January it was 152; but towards the end of the year it stood nearly always above 210.

ers staked their modest salaries. Bulls and bears made their successive scores upon information from Washington that the war went well or badly. Many popular stocks rose three hundred per cent in the course of three years. It was not until April, 1864, when Secretary Chase, by selling the surplus metal in the treasury for greenbacks, created an unexpected money panic which overwhelmed thousands of unlucky operators, that gold gambling received a heavy blow.

Patent invention, at first diverted by the passionate excitement of war, resumed gradually its wonted course. Congress, just before Lincoln's inauguration, had, in 1861, extended the original term of patents from fourteen to seventeen years, and forbidden all extensions in the future, save in the special exercise of its own discretion. The powerful magneto-electric light for lighthouses and signals was discussed by scientific men in these years, while astronomers studied the planet Mars for signs of human life; but the practical uses of electricity were yet to be multiplied. The art of photography, which had notably improved here since 1855, recorded permanently, as never before, the features of persons, things, and operations during this important period, — an aid invaluable to historical study.¹ For peaceful exploration, this Government finished the Mississippi and its tributaries in 1861, and in 1864 Captain Hall set out a second time for Arctic discovery. Abroad Du Chaillu revealed his novel studies of South Africa, while Baker and Dr. Livingston worked towards the source of the White Nile, seeking to penetrate that mystery of three thousand years which the latter, with Stanley's aid, revealed to the world years later.²

The American newspaper in these anxious and exciting years increased prodigiously its circulation and influence. Bulletin boards to attract the passing gaze now came into

¹ In the War Department more than 8000 photographs relating to the Civil War have been brought together as a Government collection. *McClure*, November, 1897. By act of March 3, 1865, the benefits of copyright were extended to photographs.

² *Am. Cycl.* 1861-65.

constant fashion in Northern cities, together with those headline extras issued from noon to night which have made our afternoon journals such a chaos of information. Though no cable as yet brought European news to the breakfast table, prompt intelligence from all quarters of the land was zealously spread by mail and telegraph, and readers a thousand miles away from the battle-field shared the emotions of headquarters, as the fight progressed, — a new experience. But news accompanied action so closely, with always the ambition to forestall, that the press came now to chronicle the varying mood, hopeful or despondent, better than the truth of events, and showed itself a more accurate barometer than reporter. The tale told breathlessly requires much sifting, for rumor mingles with truth, and facts themselves are colored by imagination and the immediate bias of the journalist. Sums unprecedented were spent by rival presses in the gathering of war news and the employment of correspondents in the field who could wield a graphic pen; it was the sensational more than the accurate that sold an edition; and while political generals liked to have such emissaries of fame within confiding distance, others, more intent upon their sober work, dreaded, but felt compelled, for public opinion's sake, to tolerate their presence.¹ The freedom of our loyal press suffered occasionally from lawless outbreaks, as during the draft riot of 1863; and more than once, as an offset, Union generals undertook to suppress some disloyal sheet. But instances of the kind occurred but seldom; and whenever a positive constituency dissented from the actual conduct of the war some organ spoke for it. The Southern press had able editors, but in the machinery of news and circulation it was far inferior, and only a few of the daily journals struggled bravely on through pecuniary embarrassment,

¹ "Newspaper correspondents with an army as a rule are mischievous. They are the world's gossips, pick up and retail the camp scandal, and generally drift to the headquarters of some general who finds it easier to make reputation at home than with his own corps or division. They are also tempted to prophesy events and state facts which, to an enemy, reveal a purpose in time to guard against it." 2 Sherman, 408.

while curtailed in size, and printed on dingy straw paper and from worn-out type.

Education had long been considered in the United States the handmaid of free government. More generally diffused by this era than in any other country of the world, except Prussia, its relative expense was yet very great. Of all these States, Illinois and Massachusetts spent now the most money upon common schools, considering the population; and the proportion of white children instructed stood by the census of 1860 nearly three to one, when loyal and disloyal sections were compared.¹ Common education was chiefly elementary — with geography and history added to writing, arithmetic, and a fair mastery of the English tongue. There were primary, grammar, and high schools, in the latter of which attention might be given to ancient or modern languages; but the kindergarten was yet unknown, and technical or industrial schools were very rare. Teaching by object-lessons in the primary school had interested of late the friends of education, and higher seminaries advanced slowly their standard. But the American college had not yet grown upward to the genuine rank of university, notwithstanding some use of that more imposing title. Harvard and Yale were the only institutions with four positive faculties of higher instruction,² — divinity, law, medicine, and science; and young men wishing to pursue a special course after graduating with the four years' baccalaureate degree, chose from the immortal three of bread-winning liberal professions or else went abroad. Electives had come into experimental use for part of a college course, and so had written, in place of oral, examinations. In short, European standards and methods of advanced education made now their earliest entrance into America, except for ideas that Jefferson had sown at the University of Virginia much earlier.

¹ Am. Cycl. 1862, 396.

² The University of Michigan, nobly planned and nobly endowed, was too new and remote to be well recognized; but here were outlined faculties of fine arts and physical science. Am. Cycl. 1862, 396.

For books and journalism, and for liberal education, besides, the South had largely depended upon the North, as well as for its food products and farming tools. When war broke out, Northern publishers lost a large market for their wares, and the public mind was for a long time too distracted to turn from the latest news to solid books and consecutive reading; nor could authors pursue their usual toil in the study. Besides this, the cost of paper, printing, and binding, before war ended, had fully doubled. Yet for all these drawbacks, the public resumed its reading habits and the author his pen; and by 1863 the literary output was once more very great and so continued while war lasted. But the paramount interest was in whatever bore, directly or remotely, upon the passing struggle. Works on tactics and military science were in great demand; Halleck and Lieber were studied for the international maxims of war, while biographies of the favorite fighters and descriptive books of battle or campaign found an eager market, spiced to suit different tastes. As campaigning taught civilians bred how to fight, so the civilian writer learned quickly the art of military criticism, and crutches were shouldered and battles fought over with sapient discussion. Chronicles, compiled with scissors and paste-pot, preserved the precious materials of passing events as clipped from leading newspapers. Newspapers themselves and the most prominent of their editors mirrored the war as it shaped its course, using, like Rupert drops, the facts red-hot. Horace Greeley, of the *Tribune*, historian from the Northern standpoint, sold, by subscription, in 1864, many thousand copies of his first volume. Pollard, of the *Richmond Examiner*, announced himself for a corresponding function on the Southern side. But for totally different topics to relieve such current thought, foreign authors did more for America in these years than those at home. True, Holland, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Trowbridge, and Bayard Taylor, all put forth efforts not their best; Parkman, of rising fame as historian, and Parton, the brilliant but ephemeral biographer, published new volumes; Hawthorne, who had returned at last from a long European sojourn, issued his

"Old Home" papers, descriptive of mother England, and died, despondent of his country, in 1864. Of our galaxy of great native poets, Whittier alone could forge fitly in such lurid flames. But solace and recreation came from across the sea to souls that could not feed on facts alone. Tennyson gave forth the "Idylls of the King"; while of the long familiar novelists Bulwer told his "Strange Story," Thackeray issued "Philip," and Dickens "Great Expectations." But novelists of the past lost lustre, and while the prolific Dickens with his rare creative and dramatic power worked on, not racy and spontaneous in humor as of old, Thackeray, so long his rival in the hearts of our college youth, died when the cis-Atlantic strife was but half fought out. And so, too, passed away, abroad, the gentler partner of that peerless literary pair, the Brownings. New names in English fiction rose high above the horizon; George Eliot, unconventional of her sex and heralded by a scandal; Wilkie Collins, with wondrous mechanism in his tantalizing plots; Charles Reade, whose fresh and robust heroes fought social wrong and oppression like athletes. The latest books of these were reprinted and read widely; and a fourth star dawned in Great Britain in that faithful portrayer of its middle class, Anthony Trollope. "Les Misérables," of Victor Hugo, circulated largely in a translation. And lastly, among theologians, the English "Essays and Reviews" provoked much earnest discussion here and abroad.¹

In lyric effusions this war produced good bards on the Confederate side; for home, the hearthstone and a country's independence are themes always inspiring for the lyric muse. Henry Timrod, who died soon after the war, deserves a poet's fame. On the Union side a few war incidents were put into spirited verse: "Sheridan's Ride," for instance, by T. Buchanan Read, a poem still popular. By far the best, however, of such war poetry, and the best worth enduring, is "Barbara Frietchie," both for theme and poetic rendering; and Whittier surely struck here a chord of pathos in

¹ Am. Cycl. 1861-65.

the Northern heart deeper than vainglorious boast could reach.¹ And so, for eloquent prose, although the air still vibrates in humming confusion with the patriotic oratory of this war period, Abraham Lincoln's few choice sentences read at Gettysburg ring down through the vista of years, the real and distinct utterance of loyalty which other Unionists of that age felt in their own souls, but could not adequately express. For grander eloquence, or for a better vindication of the national cause, at each new crisis of action, than the chosen leader of that cause embodied in public letters, speech, or message, the world must wait until a new century. Easier visible, however, and close to the surface, good-humor and cheerfulness to endure appeared the usual mood of our patriots; and in the campaigning songs most sung, sentiment and martial spirit showed plainer than intensity of feeling. "The battle-cry of freedom," "Tramp, tramp, tramp," or, as campaigns turned later, "Kingdom coming," possessed no grand musical or poetic merit; while "Johnny comes marching home" had a companion set of verses, more hilarious. Yet these were favorites at the camp-fire and with friends left at home. "Dixie," a popular air in 1860, our President claimed for the whole Union as among "the spoils of war." "Garibaldi's march" alternated, in the brass band music of 1861, with that good camp-meeting melody, "Marching along." The Civil War produced no real national anthem; but for that other camp-meeting melody, "Glory, hallelujah!" Julia Ward Howe, in her "Battle-Hymn of the Republic," wrote verses of becoming dignity to replace that doggerel of "John Brown's body," which soldiers had sung on the march, not earnestly, and yet with something of that same prophetic apprehension that slavery must perish. The elegiac strain was fitly sounded in Lowell's "Commemoration Ode" after the war ended; and again in Theodore O'Hara's "Bivouac of the Dead," whose noblest verse, though composed by a Confederate, serves for cemetery

¹ It is enough that the incident might have happened, and in a partial sense, at least, was true.

inscription at the entrance of Arlington, consecrated to the Union dead. The war lyrics of the South possessed, many of them, great literary merit.

The list of illustrious dead for these memorable four years is not confined to those who served in war. Among native civilians whose eyes closed upon an almost shattered Union were John J. Crittenden, faithful to the end, Petigru, the solitary Unionist of South Carolina, Houston, Douglas, and McLean. The errant Yancey, of the Confederates, died soon after Gettysburg; and, later still, Giddings, Caleb B. Smith, Minister Dayton, and Chief Justice Taney, not to add those men of early renown, Josiah Quincy, George M. Dallas, and Thomas F. Marshall. In 1865, but before hostilities ended, Edward Everett joined the majority, rich in honors and the public respect; Governor Hicks, who, in 1861, held Maryland fast to the Union; and that English friend of free labor, Richard Cobden, who prophesied truly, in his last hours, that in three months this Southern Confederacy would perish.

That which, after all, among an admirable soldiery of thirty-four States foreshadowed this ultimate result, was the vast preponderance of the North in fighting population and resources. The census of 1860 had just been taken, and the disparity of numbers which it discloses any reader may verify. Had the conflict been purely geographical, as between slave and free States (which it never became), the disparity in population would have stood about twelve to nineteen; and reckoning States rather as they adhered to one side or the other, the Northern preponderance was somewhat more than two to one.¹ That clemency which the

¹ See vol. V, 509. And this, too, reckoning nearly 4,000,000 slaves as part of the Southern strength, which they were not. Cf. Census Tables, 1860. Campbell wrote Jefferson Davis (April 28, 1861) in consternation that the male volunteers North, already offering to fight, were half the whole population of the seven States then composing the Confederacy. 4 N. & H. 262.

stronger party, when victorious, extends usually to the weaker in a life and death struggle, might not unfairly have been claimed, when resistance ended. In wealth, moreover, and industrial diversity and resources, the North had also an immense advantage.

SECTION III.

CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG.

The selection of Hooker to lead the Army of the Potomac, as Burnside's successor, was the President's own act; and it seemed as if Lincoln, in experimenting so many months to find the right commander, would ^{1863.} turn from one type and temperament to another, almost as much to test character, or from politic reasons, as to accomplish the military ends he had in view.¹ Lincoln himself professed that he needed success more than sympathy. He had certainly been dissatisfied with the slowness of Buell and McClellan, but to find successors to those men who would do better caused him abundant misgiving.²

^{MS} Pope had long since hailed Hooker as the rising and true man, when McClellan and his "pretorian faction" should be set aside.³ But, partisanship aside, the appointment, when made, though agreeable generally to the army, was displeasing to those few high officers who had studied Hooker carefully. "Fighting Joe" had some brilliant and highly serviceable qualities; few were more magnetic, tireless, or brilliant, better fitted for dashing boldly into action; but he lacked those moral attributes which give consistency and steadiness of purpose, and was a merciless,

¹ Halleck, who now had little voice in such selections, had written despairingly to a military friend, some months earlier: "Oh, the curse of political expediency! It has almost ruined the army, and if carried out will soon ruin the country." 13 W. R. 654.

² 7 N. & H. 364; Ms. letter, November 24, 1862.

³ 12 W. R. pt. 3, 816-819 (September 30th, 1862). Stanton is said to have preferred Meade to Hooker, knowing that the latter had "two persons in one."

if not mercurial, critic of the faults of others. His tendency was insubordinate, his confidence in his own powers overweening, and habitual use of stimulants made him uncertain for a great emergency. Both his two predecessors had suffered reproach at Washington, because of his free tongue and pen; Lincoln himself he had not spared; and but for the gravity of the situation one might almost imagine the President humoring Hooker in this new responsibility, to mortify and convince him that he, too, had shortcomings. "I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac," he wrote on the 26th of January, in a frank and magnanimous strain. "Of course I have done this upon what appear to me sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you." He liked Hooker, the President proceeded to state, because he believed him a brave and skilful soldier, who did not mix politics with his profession; one with self-confidence and an ambition which, if kept within reasonable bounds, would do good. But he did not like his treatment of Burnside, while the latter commanded, nor an opinion he had recently expressed that both the army and the government needed a dictator. He warned Hooker to beware of rashness. "What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down."¹

Hooker was deeply impressed by this letter, and its tone of mingled authority and kindness, notwithstanding its severity. "He talks to me like a father," he said to a friend; "I shall not answer this letter until I have won him a great victory."² And, unquestionably, he set about his work efficiently and with right good-will, as though to

dispel all uneasy feeling that he had not sufficient weight of character to command. Under his vigorous direction desertions ceased, the cavalry arm of the service was brought to a perfection highly desirable; the staff was judiciously improved, and troops that had long been idling were put to drill and field exercise. Hooker set aside Burnside's system of grand divisions and introduced the plan, which proved an admirable one, of giving to each army corps a distinct badge. In a wonderfully short time the Army of the Potomac regained its morale, and was brought from the lowest depression to a healthy fighting condition.¹ "The finest army on the planet," this new commander pronounced it; and from headquarters the daily press reported that "there would soon be a big fight or a big funeral."

In expectation of a new forward movement, which was arranged for the middle of April, President Lincoln visited Hooker's camp in person, and cheerfully discussed with him and his generals how to get the better of the enemy across the Rappahannock. Before going away, he left a parting injunction: "In the next battle put in all your men."² At this time Hooker had in all arms an effective strength of one hundred and thirty thousand; while that of Lee, beyond the opposing river and about Fredericksburg, had been diminished by Longstreet's departure for other scenes to some sixty thousand.³ The auspicious moment had arrived to cross the stream and take the offensive, and Hooker seized it with a boldness and celerity which presaged grand qualities for his new station.

The plan of campaign adopted was simple and practicable, Burnside's failure having solved some elements of the military problem. There were no practicable fords

¹ 3 B. & L. 119, 154; 7 N. & H. 89.

² "Which," adds Couch, who was with Hooker at this interview, "is exactly what we did not do at Chancellorsville." 3 B. & L. 120.

³ Or slightly more. 3 B. & L. 238; 7 N. & H. 89. Cf. 3 B. & L. 156.

below Fredericksburg for crossing the Rappahannock, and those above for about thirteen miles were strongly guarded. Opposite and just south of Banks's Ford, the nearest crossing-place above the town, were broad and open fields, highly suitable for a battle, and there Hooker meant to fight.¹ A large detour was requisite in reaching this position, for Hooker chose, and chose wisely, to get Lee's side of the river by ascending above its junction with the Rapidan. This involved the crossing of two rivers, but, in too easy reliance upon that natural impediment, the enemy had taken no pains to create further obstacles. Hooker's infantry now made preparation to move; a preliminary raid by Stoneman drew off Lee's cavalry; and, on the 27th of April, after some delay by heavy rains, three Union army corps started in rapid motion up the river bank, while Sedgwick, with three other corps, made a heavy demonstration a few miles below Fredericksburg, there to hold Lee occupied until the former force could descend and crush him.

This plan, whose details Hooker had kept secret from his corps commanders, worked out admirably for the first four days. The large detachment sent to turn Lee's left moved up the Rappahannock about twenty-five miles, crossed that river, April 28th, on a pontoon bridge, finding nothing but a small picket-guard of the Confederates to oppose them; next, crossing the Rapidan on the morning of the 30th, the advance uncovered an intermediate ford of the Rappahannock on the south bank, as Hooker had anticipated, and with that ford in armed possession and bridged, marched down to Chancellorsville, the point of concentration. Here the corps of Hooker's army encamped, exultant, that evening, only ten miles west of Fredericksburg, and on the same side of the river. This position took in reverse the entire system of Lee's river defences, and, more than this, roads led thence directly to his line of communication.² But, in

¹ 3 B. & L. 223.

² 7 N. & H. 90-92; 3 B. & L. 172. Sedgwick had the 3d, 4th, and 6th corps, numbering about 59,000, while the 5th, 11th, and 12th corps went up the river.

order to gain such advantage, Hooker had now separated his two wings twenty miles apart, with an enemy of no ordinary intelligence interposed. To shorten communications at once and gain Banks's Ford was consequently of the most pressing consequence. Now, however, Hooker's good fortune or strenuous will faltered, and the chance to fight one of the most signal and successful battles of the war slipped from a responsible grasp which had almost closed upon it.

Lee, whose attention had been drawn by Sedgwick's noisy demonstration down the river, knew nothing, before noon of the 30th, of the more formidable enemy which approached on his left, massing at Chancellorsville.

Hooker's right wing would have moved early May.
May 1st, but orders came slowly from his headquarters and precious hours were wasted. Chancellorsville was a little hamlet, clustering about a lordly mansion-house with pillared portico; it was the focus of diverging roads and a good strategic point for present movements. But for a pitched battle the site was disadvantageous, being unsuitable for manœuvring this large army, and affording too little play for artillery, in which Hooker excelled. Not until eleven in the forenoon did Hooker's advance begin, the march being by three several roads, while Sickles's corps, which had just arrived, was held in reserve. Except for rare clearings this march lay through a dense and tangled forest, where cavalry were found of but little use, and a soldier could scarcely make progress without trailing his musket. Troops deployed as skirmishers became lost to sight, and generals and their commands got separated. Yet onward, unopposed, the Union columns pushed their way, the axemen aiding artillery wagons; and the worst of the woods was through and Hooker's advance nearly in sight of the open plain of Banks's Ford, when Hooker sent directions to return. Couch, his second in command, Warren, Hancock, and other able subordinates, preferred to hold the ground gained and push on; but Hooker's orders were peremptory, and the troops, hitherto in high spirits, fell back to the positions near Chancellorsville which they

had left in the forenoon.¹ With the odds of victory nine to one in his favor twenty-four hours earlier, Hooker had thrown his chief chances aside, though still holding decidedly the advantage.

On the 2d of May Hooker prepared for a defensive battle, and strengthened his lines to resist Lee's now expected attack; but where Howard stood with the 11th corps was, unfortunately, a point of weakness; and Lee, emboldened by Hooker's retreat, had despatched his trusted Jackson, after a night council, to take his entire corps, with A. P. Hill and Stuart, to the right and rear of the adversary. A flank attack upon the Union right wing was Lee's favorite manœuvre, while to Jackson any swift and surprising enterprise for his own detached execution was all the more attractive when bold and perilous. That last impetuous assault cost "Stonewall" his life as he rode in the twilight fight of this day; and the most unique of all the Southern generals perished in a moment of hostile confusion, by a volley from his own Confederates, who would have died to rescue him.² But the first object of Jackson's exploit had been somewhat gained. Howard's position, too little guarded, gave way before a sudden irruption from the dense woods, late in the afternoon, and in a panic, as Jackson's column came in sight, the 11th corps fled and fell in upon Hooker's centre. A promiscuous fight disturbed the invading soldiery at their evening meal; but Pleasanton and his cavalry, and Sickles, whose corps had skirmished most of the day with Jackson's rear guard, kept back Lee's advancing lines. For Lee himself approached upon Hooker's left and centre, to baffle him in the dense forest, while Jackson's force operated at the right.³

Hooker, shaken much in confidence by the untoward course of the past twenty-four hours, now drew in closer his entire line about Chancellorsville, and took more purely the defensive. At nine o'clock in the evening, and again

¹ 7 N. & H. 97; 3 B. & L. 159, 218. See Pleasanton, 3 B. & L. 176.

² See description of Jackson's death in Dabney, 282; 3 B. & L. 203.

³ 7 N. & H. c. 4; 3 B. & L. 219. Cf. Hamlin's Chancellorsville.

at midnight, he sent urgent orders to Sedgwick, directing him to march with all speed towards Chancellorsville and fall upon the enemy's rear; but Sedgwick was already below Fredericksburg; and, operating through that town, he had to fight his way against the severest obstacles, from midnight until morn of the 3d, before he could gain the road to Chancellorsville at all. And there, in the vicinity of Banks's Ford and its intended battle-ground, a strong detachment from Lee's main army contested his progress so strongly that he fought this day until dark, and again on the 4th, giving and receiving about equal injury, until Hooker finally permitted him to recross the river and extricate himself and his force from a position which every hour made more perilous.¹

Had Hooker been fighting his best all this time with the rest of the Potomac army, Sedgwick's distant enterprise might have told with more effect. But he had not renewed the battle at Chancellorsville on the 3d with the energy and promptness that predicate success. The damage done to Howard's corps had been repaired over night, and Stuart, succeeding to the command of Jackson's force, abandoned the dangerous attempt to turn the Federal right and occupy the fords. Lee's army closed, accordingly, into a continuous mass from left to right, making violent assaults directly in front of the Union lines, and pointing their artillery towards Chancellor house, the Union commander's headquarters. There, as Hooker stood at the portico while the cannon roar was loudest, a solid shot struck one of the pillars, throwing it so violently against him that he fell senseless, and for some time was supposed to be fatally injured. He revived sufficiently to mount his horse and show himself, when the concussion of another shot rendered him again unconscious. For an hour he could give no intelligent direction, and his corps subordinates were much perplexed in consequence. The Union troops fought with

¹ 7 N. & H. 106; 3 B. & L. 225. Sedgwick fairly exonerated himself from blame for not doing all that Hooker had expected of him. Sedgwick's assault at all events checked Lee on the rear. De Leon, 250.

dogged energy and perseverance; but little could be done beyond punishing the enemy when attacked and then falling back pursuant to orders. Finally Hooker, who was now lying in a tent, told Couch, his second, to take command and bring the army into a designated position. Couch did so, and the three roads to Fredericksburg were yielded to the foe, leaving Sedgwick to his own resources. Hooker's new position was at once fortified by throwing up rifle-pits; it served for shelter and was held securely; but his army was now placed palpably on the defensive, and disheartenment was the consequence.¹

Hooker felt greatly depressed by the ill turn to these three days of May. Physical injury, added to his long mental strain of responsibility, left him feeble and paralyzed. Too sure, it would seem, of gaining a position where he could have forced Lee to retreat or fight under disadvantage, he had found himself outgeneralled and forced backward by that adversary's superior boldness. The President's first warning against rashness appears to have impressed him more than that later counsel, to put all his men into the fight; for while Sedgwick, under orders, was marching with a heavy column to his relief, or endeavoring to do so, he had put only half his own right wing into action, and that without even replenishing its ammunition as it gave out, before withdrawing wholly to cover.² Hooker's whole action on the 4th continued feeble and purposeless; but a sick man in great physical suffering should not be judged very harshly.³ When night came Hooker assembled his corps commanders in council. Couch, Meade, Sickles, Howard, and Reynolds were present; but Slocum could not arrive in time. He talked to them as one already compelled to retreat, and asked their vote. Sickles sus-

¹ 7 N. & H. c. 4; 1 B. & L. 170.

² 3 B. & L. 170 (Couch). The 1st and most of the 5th corps — 37,000 fresh troops, willing and anxious to bear their part — stood idle. Ib.

³ The calumnious report that Hooker was under the influence of liquor in this campaign is disproved by the strongest testimony. 7 N. & H. 107; 3 B. & L. 170.

tained him; and so did Couch, though only as the alternative to choosing some different point for attack. Meade and Reynolds voted emphatically to remain; and so did Howard, who wished a chance for his corps to redeem their fame. Upon this expression, Hooker gave orders to recross the river, planning, as Burnside had done before him, to begin some campaign anew, from the other side; but, unlike his predecessor, adopting the advice of a minority, against the majority wish of his chief officers to stay and fight this campaign out.¹ The Union army recrossed the Rappahannock safely, without further incident, and an advance, begun under the most brilliant auspices a few days earlier, came to an ignoble end.²

It was impossible that Hooker's reputation as responsible commander of this intelligent army could survive such a mortifying experience. Though the losses at Chancellorsville were large, unquestionably, on both sides, and in fair proportion to the forces in hostile array, the moral disadvantage was with that army which, numerically the stronger, had gone forward, and then, failing wholly of its purpose, made an ignominious retreat. Hooker, too downcast over his first obstacles, had thrown away superior chances, one by one, which even the stunning blow given by Jackson had not badly impaired. His sorrow and bewilderment lasted for days after this campaign was over; and in later life he bemoaned the luck that had deserted him just when he was ready to sweep the stakes.³ And now the poisoned chalice he had held to the lips of others was commended to his own; and deep distrust and censure darkened the remaining days of his command, so surely numbered.

¹ 7 N. & H. c. 4; 3 B. & L. 171. "What was the use," asked Reynolds testily, after the council had been dismissed, "of calling us together at this time of night, when he intended to retreat anyhow?" 3 B. & L. ib. (Couch).

² For the Union and Confederate forces of this campaign, see p. 343. The Union losses were about 17,287; the Confederate losses, 12,463. 3 B. & L. 237, 238.

³ 3 B. & L. 223 (1876).

Rallying from the worst shock of lassitude and despondency, Hooker now telegraphed to the President, on the 6th of May, that he was arranging a new movement across the river, which would bring his whole army into better play. But Lincoln, clearly apprehending the effect of his late encounter on the public mind, counselled him to do nothing in desperation or rashness. On the 13th Hooker wrote at some length, excusing inaction because the terms of certain volunteers were now expiring; he asked for twenty-five thousand more men, and showed great eagerness to recommence his work. The President, in reply, disclaimed all wish to restrain him if he clearly felt that a new attack could be made successfully; but his preference was that the enemy should be merely kept at bay for the present; and he intimated to Hooker that a disaffection brooded over his command, which would prove ruinous to him if reports were accurate.¹

By this time Lee, whose military enterprise had a tincture of rashness, prepared a new campaign of invasion against the North, like that of the summer previous. He felt great confidence in his own troops, and overrated the despondency produced upon the Union army by recent reverses. The defeat of Burnside in December, followed in May by Hooker's fruitless invasion, had raised the spirits of the Southern Confederacy to a pitch of exultation never reached again. Northern grief and depression were taken for despair. To the factious utterances of Northern peace Democrats, and to European despatches from Southern emissaries that full recognition by the great Powers would follow a few more such victories, the Richmond government gave too much credence. "On to Washington" was the boastful cry of those who now proclaimed the Southern military spirit invincible. The Davis government desired an offensive campaign, and Lee not unwillingly accepted the risks. It was not strange that his breast dilated when

¹ 25 W. R. pt. 2, 435, 438.

he saw under his orders, by the end of May, the finest army ever mustered under the Confederate ensign; numbering nearly eighty thousand men, seasoned by success and hardy endurance, — a force about equal to that with which he had repelled McClellan before Richmond, but actually superior to it in strength, through another year's discipline. Longstreet had now brought back his contingent from Suffolk to the Rappahannock line, and depleted regiments were filled with the select of Southern youth. Three corps, of three divisions each, constituted Lee's force for the new enterprise; and as reorganized and strengthened, — though the loss of Jackson was fully felt, — these corps were well commanded by Lieutenant-Generals Longstreet, Ewell, and A. P. Hill, all Virginians.¹ By the 10th of June Seddon, the Secretary of War, approved the invasion in due form and gave Lee full liberty of action.¹

In Lee's report of the following July are tersely stated the motives which induced his infatuous campaign. To drive the enemy from his line north of the Rappahannock was, of course, a first object; but a further execution of Lee's plan embraced the relief of the Shenandoah Valley, "and, if practicable, the transfer of the scene of hostilities north of the Potomac," and beyond Virginia. Finally, "it was hoped that other valuable results might be attained by military success;"² and in that brief phrase are buried audacious hopes never realized and never to be fully disclosed, though doubtless with the end in view to conquer for the Confederacy a complete independence.

Hooker, with keen military intuition, divined that his foe across the Rappahannock was on the eve of some aggressive movement, and predicted at once that the direction to be taken would be that of the last summer, "however desperate it may appear."³ And, sure enough, on the 3d of June, Lee's northward progress began, with Culpeper

¹ 3 B. & L. 245, 267. A Georgian, Lafayette McLaws, ranked next to these corps commanders.

² 27 W. R. pt. 2, 305.

³ 25 W. R. pt. 2, 543; 27 ib. pt. 1, 30.

Court House, towards the upper Rappahannock, for his first point of concentration. Not far from that June. rendezvous was fought an important cavalry battle, at Brandy Station, between ten thousand Union horsemen, sent thither under Pleasanton, and an equal force of Confederates.¹ Convinced by the information gained in this encounter that the drift of Lee's whole force was in that northwesterly direction, Hooker proposed by telegraph to the President, on the 10th of June, a bold and startling project. This was nothing less than to take advantage of Lee's new advance, by marching his own column directly upon Richmond, which was now obviously uncovered, brushing away such Confederate force as might still remain at Fredericksburg, and leaving Lee's main army on his right flank.² "I think Lee's army, and not Richmond, is your sure objective point," was Lincoln's immediate reply; in other words, to hang upon Lee's flank, with the inside lines in his own favor, and not go south of the Rappahannock while the enemy came north. "Fight him, too, when opportunity offers. If he stays where he is, fret him and fret him."³ Halleck, when shown the correspondence next day, telegraphed to Hooker his full concurrence in that advice;⁴ and doubtless it was the most judicious course to pursue under all the circumstances.

Lee had hoped, by carrying the war across the Potomac, to draw off the Union armies about Vicksburg, whose doom was otherwise so certain that it was useless to send his own troops thither. Nor did he mean to oppose force to force and make sheer contest of strength; for by this time it was admitted that the real hope of the South lay in superior management and not in numbers. Hence, as Longstreet states it, the new campaign was to be "offensive in strategy, but defensive in tactics."⁵ Forced, as it would appear, by the cavalry battle at Brandy Station to take his main force

¹ 7 N. & H. 206.

² 27 W. R. pt. 1, 34, 35. This project, under a prompt and steadfast commander, seems to have been feasible. 3 B. & L. 269.

³ 27 W. R. pt. 1, 35.

⁴ *Ib.*

⁵ 3 B. & L. 247.

through the Shenandoah Valley, instead of screening his march along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge, Lee sent Ewell forward to capture Winchester and Martinsburg, and so open the way to the upper Potomac. Both of these towns the Union force had occupied as mere outposts, neither place being susceptible of a good defence. But when Winchester was invested by Early on the 13th, Milroy, the Union defender, more headstrong than considerate, refused to evacuate or escape, but forced a fight at immense odds, which cost heavily. Great was the joy of this lean and hungry town, — a very shuttlecock of war for four years between the two armies, — when the gray jackets took possession; and greater yet was the thrill when, with Martinsburg also regained, the advance of Lee's army was seen crossing the Potomac to Williamsport, and once more climbing, unopposed, the Maryland bank.¹

Hooker felt now no doubt of the ultimate purpose of the adversary, and it is due his reputation to observe that his whole conduct at this intense crisis was marked with admirable vigilance and energy. His removal from command seems to have been already planned at Washington, in view of his late campaign, which the President had very carefully investigated. Stanton had opposed Hooker's appointment from the first, though loyally supporting him in his operations; Halleck, too, was against him. But so dangerous was the new emergency, and Hooker had met it with such renewed ardor and hopefulness, that stern measures were needful for forcing him from command, and the President felt embarrassed about using them.² Hooker himself, however, helped things to that pass by the morose reticence he pursued towards Halleck, their mutual dislike, which originated in a Californian acquaintance before the war, ripening now into strong antipathy. Hooker lost no opportunity to communicate directly with the President instead of through the usual military channels; and in such despatches he more than hinted that Halleck and he had no confidence in one another, and that one person to conduct

¹ 7 N. & H. c. 8; De Leon, 252.

² 3 B. & L. 240, 241.

operations in the field appeared enough.¹ Halleck, on his part, had shown a jealousy of Hooker's frequent correspondence with the President, regardless of official routine. "To remove all misunderstanding," the President telegraphed to Hooker, June 16th, in a tone of unusual sternness, "I now place you in the strict military relation to General Halleck of a commander of one of the armies to the general-in-chief of all the armies. I have not intended differently, but, as it seems to be differently understood, I shall direct him to give you orders, and you to obey them."²

The advance of Ewell with his command into Maryland and Pennsylvania spread panic and terror among the peaceful farmers of that region. But Hooker, with excellent strategy, had swung his army around on the inside of a parallel, so as to confront the adversary and yet hold his own base; and Lee, outgeneralled in his effort to move east of the Blue Ridge, had to send Longstreet through the Shenandoah Valley after Ewell, Hill having already preceded. Nor could Lee's cavalry longer render the efficient aid of earlier campaigns for concealing his infantry movements and gaining information. Union horsemen fought by this time on at least equal terms with the Confederate, and, under Pleasanton's skilful direction, beat off and baffled the foe at every point; so that Stuart, abandoning all hope of hindering or watching Hooker's moving host, crossed the Potomac with his cavalry and made a long and

¹ Hooker, June 5th, cautiously advised the President to have but one commander for all the troops whose operations could influence Lee's movements. "I trust that I may not be considered in the way to this arrangement," he added. 27 W. R. pt. 1, 30. On the 15th he sent a sullen despatch to Halleck, to the effect that he did not suppose his opinion wanted. Ib. 42. And on the 16th he addressed the President, making his issue with the general-in-chief very pointed, and predicting ill-success while the existing state of things continued. Ib. 45.

² 27 W. R. pt. 1, 47. To soften the language of this missive, Lincoln sent it by a confidential messenger, who bore likewise a private letter to Hooker, couched in gentle terms, which deprecated all unkind expression and feeling towards Halleck. 7 N. & H. 212.

fatiguing circuit, rejoining Lee's main body too late to be of positive service. Ignorant, therefore, of what Hooker was doing, Lee found himself forced, by the 24th, to hasten forward the columns of Hill and Longstreet, so as to bring them within supporting distance of Ewell, whose progress northward had made that course necessary.¹ With momentary misgiving lest his present strength should prove inadequate for an enterprise clearly audacious, he begged the Confederate President to send to his support every soldier who could possibly be spared; but Davis, who had done his best, had none to spare him.²

Near Chambersburg, on the 27th of June, after safely crossing the Potomac at two points and then resting at Hagerstown, Lee's main column encamped for the first time upon Northern free soil. Now in the State of Pennsylvania, Lee promptly pushed forward, threatening Harrisburg, its capital and an important centre of trade and railway traffic. Ewell he despatched eastward, not without the hope of decoying Hooker from his chosen base, and, with Carlisle and York occupied, a heavy contribution was exacted in cash, clothing, and provisions, while the peaceful farmers of that region had their crops seized and cattle impressed, with a pretentious payment made in Confederate paper.

Hooker, however, was not taken unawares. He had advanced correspondingly with the enemy, and, holding control of the whole Potomac River below Harper's Ferry, while Pleasanton's cavalry kept the Confederates westward, he could choose at leisure the time and place for crossing. He waited until Lee's whole army was upon the north side, and then crossed the Potomac at Edward's Ferry, towards the close of June. Next, with his army concentrated at Frederick, he determined to strike Lee upon the rear, where he was most sensitive to attack, by pushing a strong column directly west upon his line of communication, and then supporting the attack with the rest of his forces. As early as the 15th of June, President

¹ 7 N. & H. c. 8.

² 27 W. R. pt. 1, 76.

Lincoln had called out 100,000 militia from the States of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Maryland, and West Virginia, to repel Lee's new invasion, and a system of hasty defences guarded the Susquehanna approach near Harrisburg. That river, however, the Confederates never crossed, for collision threatened them daily, close to Pennsylvania's southern border.

Our commander had not abated in the least his zeal and activity because of animosity against Halleck, under whose strict orders he had been placed; but almost on the very eve of imminent battle an event occurred, unexpected by the Army of the Potomac, which brought his direction to a sudden end. Impressed with the magnitude of the task before him, he had, when crossing into Maryland, warned both Halleck and the President not to expect more of him than he had material to do with, since his whole enlisted force for duty numbered only one hundred and five thousand.¹ Stout-hearted though Hooker was, he felt, as the crisis approached, that perhaps too much was expected of him; and, in such a frame of mind, he wished every man within reach available at once for his possible needs. Halleck overruled him, this same 27th of June, by refusing to let him abandon Maryland Heights and use its garrison elsewhere; and, piqued to the quick, Hooker, after a brief discussion by wire, gave vent to his ill-smothered anger by asking to be relieved at once from his command.² Quite likely he thought that, at so dangerous a moment, the President would yield to his self-assertion; but the latter seems to have been intent rather upon finding a chance to relieve him; and, at all events, Hooker's resignation was accepted without parley or delay, and General George Gordon Meade, who commanded the 5th corps, was assigned to his place. Meade's instructions, despatched that very night by a confidential hand, gave him that ample latitude of discretion which from Hooker, despite all protest, had just been withheld.³ There seems reason, therefore, in what some have asserted, that Hooker's resignation was sought

¹ 27 W. R. pt. 1, 59 (June 27th).

² *Ib.*

³ 27 W. R. 61.

and even wrung from him, his eventual successor having already been fixed upon.¹ Aroused at midnight in his tent by the President's special messenger, Meade modestly accepted his new promotion, and Hooker, the next day, with a generous compliment to his successor in general orders, rode away from the Army of the Potomac, never to return to it.

Relieved at his own request, as the President made public announcement, Hooker had with faultless strategy brought his new campaign to the present point, and one cannot but think that, with his boldness and impetuosity of attack, results more splendid than now followed would have rewarded his efforts. But when we reflect upon Chancellorsville, and the doubt and feebleness which there at the critical stage paralyzed where all had begun so admirably, we must feel that, with Hooker's quarrelsome disposition, besides, to prejudice his direction, there was great risk of a second disappointment. It was that risk, doubtless, that Lincoln dared not take. Fortunately for the country's honor and his own, Hooker was assigned, later, to a more distant field, where, under safe supervision, he won new laurels.

This fifth change of commanders for eastern operations in less than a year was made at the perilous edge of battle; and had not Hooker angrily taken the first step, the President might have been blamed for making it. But it is proof of Meade's sterling worth and of the excellent disposition of this veteran army, that the change was accepted both by him and the soldiery without murmur or hesitation. It was like that casualty which may happen even in the midst of battle, where the chieftain falls and the next in

¹ 3 B. & L. 239-243. Couch had declined the offer of this place in May, asking rather to be relieved from the Army of the Potomac. When Burnside resigned the choice lay between Hooker, Reynolds, and Meade; but Reynolds, when sounded on the subject, made indiscreet reply and was dropped; hence Meade, with the good-will of both Couch and Reynolds, naturally succeeded Hooker. *Ib.* 240.

rank replaces him. Meade was tall and thin, nervous and somewhat irritable, very near-sighted, and with the careworn air of a student rather than a swordsman. He was a man of reserve, conservative by temperament and training. But this army knew him as an able and intrepid officer, of approved courage and experience; cool and thoughtful in time of danger, and indisposed to retreat. Here he had fought his way upward, distinguishing himself both at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. On, then, marched the Army of the Potomac under its new commander, without breaking step, without even a tremor.

Meade's announcement, on assuming command, was neither too bold nor too diffident. He rested his reliance upon the support of his comrades, and announced to the President that as a soldier he obeyed the order promoting him to command, and, as a soldier, would endeavor to execute it. Halleck was pleased by the moderation of his requests, and the War Department gave him resources in implicit confidence and bade him go forward. Meade moved on the 29th, meaning to proceed steadily northward against Lee's army, and oppose a strong front should Baltimore be threatened; but otherwise he relied upon Couch, who guarded the Susquehanna with the new militia levies, to hold the enemy in check while he himself fell upon the rear. His several corps were spread out like a fan upon the diverging roads as they proceeded into Pennsylvania; all, however, kept well in hand so as to concentrate in force at any point found needful.

Ignorant, as scarcely ever before, of his adversary's movements, and seriously hindered by the absence of his cavalry, Lee did not learn until the evening of the 28th that the Army of the Potomac had crossed into Maryland. Little more than this could he learn at all. He, as well as Meade, had prudently meant to avoid an open battle except under favorable conditions; yet, in spite of the precautions on either side, these two formidable armies rapidly approached one another like two thunder-clouds from different points of the compass, all through the last day of the month of June; Longstreet and Hill marching east that

day, through the mountains of Gettysburg, while Meade unconsciously headed towards them almost in a perpendicular direction. The most tremendous and the most significant open battle of the whole Civil War was historically the result of a collision of these two armies, simply accidental, while on the march. Neither Lee nor Meade made deliberate choice of the eventual fighting position.¹

Gettysburg — to the Southern cause “a glorious field of grief” — lies in a peaceful pastoral region, walled in on the west by the blue line of the South Mountain range, and studded throughout its landscape by lesser hills. Nearly of the same longitude as Washington, it is situated in Pennsylvania not far north of the Maryland border. Here the Chambersburg and Hagerstown roads cross one another and diverge; while a valley, highly cultivated, with grain fields and orchards, lies slumbering with thrifty farmhouses between two nearly parallel ranges of hills — Seminary Ridge on the west (near which stands a Lutheran seminary), and, on the southeast, Cemetery Ridge, one of whose hills is consecrated for burial purposes. This latter range begins in a bold and rocky cliff, called Culp’s Hill, at whose southerly extremity towers a conical and commanding rock, Round Top, crowned with a smaller spur called Little Round Top, which overlooks the surrounding country. Midway in the peaceful valley is a lower intermediate ridge, along which runs the road to Emmitsburg.² Upon this natural theatre was fought the desperate three days’ battle to be described, in the hot and exhausting weather of midsummer.

Learning from Couch that Lee’s army had turned away from the Susquehanna River, Meade, before the dawn of July 1st, arranged for a defensive line of battle along Pike Creek, there to await the enemy’s approach. But Reynolds had gone leisurely on in advance, to occupy the

¹ 3 B. & L. 251 ; Davis, 350 ; 7 N. & H. c. 9 ; Bache’s Meade, c. 15.

² 7 N. & H. c. 9,

obscure town of Gettysburg, having in command the 1st, 3d, and 11th corps, the left grand division of Meade's army.

July. Buford, who had taken possession of this town with his cavalry the day before, and thrown out pickets, encountered on the Chambersburg road a fragment of the enemy's advancing host. He despatched the tidings at once to Reynolds, who dashed forward on horseback, on that memorable morning, with his 1st corps following fast on foot, and sent word for the rest of his command, now miles in the rear, to hasten up quickly. After an anxious survey with Buford from the belfry of the Lutheran seminary, Reynolds resolved upon the morning's work. Here a battle might well be risked; here the instant duty was to keep back that oncoming wave until Meade could mass his host to break it. With a higher mandate plain before his eyes, the letter of his written directions seems to have been disregarded. Heth's Confederate division approached in force from the west; and while Reynolds held it watchfully in check on the Chambersburg road, that devoted officer was shot dead by a bullet through the brain. His glory on this field was first and greatest, yet others were to win glory there before the fight ended. Doubleday now took charge, with such of the 1st corps as had arrived, and the fighting began in earnest. From ten in the forenoon for three long hours the 1st corps alone, with Buford's cavalry, bore the brunt of the enemy's advance, and forced A. P. Hill to wait for Ewell. The Confederates, largely reënforced, were pressing hotly when, about two o'clock, Howard arrived with his 11th corps, and, by virtue of his rank, assumed direction. He deployed at once to hold the two western roads to the left, while on the right confronting Ewell's phalanx, which came into view on the road from Carlisle. But the Union line had extended too far; and Ewell, assailing it simultaneously in front and on the exposed flanks, won an easy victory; for in both numbers and position the Confederates had now the advantage. Howard's column was pressed back into the town and through it, closely pursued, and suffering much in wounded and captured. But before this misfortune, Howard had

taken the precaution to secure Cemetery Hill, which made a strong refuge place for posting anew his retreating troops as they poured southward. At this juncture, and towards four in the afternoon, Hancock arrived on the scene, sent thither by Meade to assume command in consequence of the death of Reynolds, whose tidings reached him. Hancock's splendid presence at this discouraging moment was like that of another army corps, and gave calmness and confidence to our exhausted soldiery. He checked the fighting and received the disorganized regiments as they arrived. Howard, though demurring at the authority given by Meade to one who was, in lineal rank, his junior, coöperated generously in restoring order. The two arranged together a new position on Cemetery Hill and along the Ridge, impregnable to further assault for the day, and covering Gettysburg and the roads from Baltimore and the South. Slocum now reached the scene with Sickles's dusty veterans of the 3d corps, who had been marching all day by the Emmitsburg road. To him, as ranking officer, the command was turned over, and Hancock galloped back to urge upon Meade the advantage of this new field of battle.¹

Meade, while taken unawares, had not hesitated what course to pursue; and, though but three days in command of this great army, he relinquished one plan to take up another, and moved his whole force promptly to the rescue. All night, and by every road of approach, the Union troops came swarming in from the southward, and marched to their positions under the light of the full moon. Meade himself came upon the field at one o'clock the next morning, pale, hollow-eyed, worn with toil and loss of sleep, yet rising to the measure of his responsibilities.²

Lee, at the opposite entrance to Gettysburg, had arrived on the 1st, in season to watch from Seminary Ridge the new position which his flying foe was taking. His mind was not yet made up to fight an offensive battle; for, impressed by the steadiness of this new alignment, he gave

¹ 7 N. & H. c. 9; 3 B. & L. 285, etc.; Bache's Meade, c. 15.

² 7 N. & H. c. 9.

no order of attack to break up the Union preparations, but merely sent Ewell the suggestion to carry Cemetery Hill if he thought it practicable. Ewell, however, spent the afternoon in waiting to be reënforced; and a great Confederate opportunity was neglected. Lee's suspense need not be wondered at; for Longstreet, his second and his ablest adviser, urged him at this point to keep to his original plan, and, avoiding a pitched battle, march aside by the flank down to Frederick. "No," was Lee's response, "the enemy is there, and there I mean to attack him;"¹ and, with signs of a great success in his grasp, the temptation to stay and fight the battle out proved irresistible. But as accident had lured him on to action, so action deferred lured him to a second day of loss, and that loss to a third day of irreparable slaughter. Possibly the danger of moving still farther to the southeast influenced his fatal decision.²

The sanguinary fight of the 2d did not commence until far into the afternoon. This July weather was hot and oppressive; many of the troops just arrived on either side had borne a long and exhausting march; and doubtless the opposing commanders felt the onerous burden of initiating battle. Both Meade and Lee had planned an attack for an early hour of the morning; but the one abandoned that intention, waiting for another corps to arrive; while the other, partly for a corresponding reason, but more because Longstreet did not share his sanguine hopes, deferred giving immediate orders.³ By afternoon Meade had posted three corps over Cemetery Ridge, under Slocum, Howard, and Hancock, the last named holding the crest with the 2d corps, while Sickles, with the 3d corps, gave support on

¹ 3 B. & L. 339 (Longstreet).

² Cf. 7 N. & H. 247. "In view of the valuable results," says Lee's dry report on this point, "that would ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack." 27 W. R. pt. 2, 308.

³ The delay was for Longstreet, who did not get McLaws's division until noon, nor had Pickett's yet arrived. See 3 B. & L. 366.

the left, and the 5th corps formed the reserve on the right. Sedgwick and the 6th corps, whom Meade had also waited for, came in sight when the battle had begun, after a long night's march. About a mile distant, Lee's army swept in a wide curve from hills on the northwest of Gettysburg to the high ground in front of the Round Tops; Ewell holding the Confederate left, Hill the centre, while Longstreet's troops, which were the last to arrive, were posted on the extreme right.

Little Round Top was the key to the Union position; and the enemy, concealing their movements in thick woods until the signal for assault was given, revealed themselves suddenly at four o'clock, with an outflanking line. Sickles held an advance position not intended by Meade, but too late to be rectified. Upon him, unsheltered, was made by Hood's division from Longstreet the first furious assault, Lee desiring that ground for his artillery in storming the higher crests beyond.¹ Here, for nearly two hours, raged a fierce and sanguinary conflict. Sickles, with one leg shot away, was borne from the field, and Birney fought desperately in his place; Humphreys was compelled by McLaws to retreat under a withering fire. But reinforcements which Meade sent in good season protected the withdrawal of that corps to a safer ground. Meantime came a close and bloody hand-to-hand fight for possession of Little Round Top, toward which Hood's troops had been stealthily climbing. Warren, chief of engineers, who was posted in this vicinity, pressed instantly to the scene of danger; and, after a fierce encounter, reinforced on either side, the enemy were driven down the precipitous slope and the crest was held securely. But this was done at a terrible sacrifice; and among young Union officers of promise who here gave their lives were Weed, Hazlitt, O'Rorke, and brave Strong Vincent, the first of all Union officers to reach the summit. As twilight gathered, Humphreys's division advanced and

¹ 27 W. R. pt. 2, 308. Sickles's true position had been intended for the extreme left near Hancock. He now stood near what was called the Peach Orchard, towards the Emmitsburg road.

recaptured the guns they had lost, and by nightfall the whole Union line from Round Top to Cemetery Ridge was held impregnable.¹

Lee had wished Ewell to assail the extreme Union right at Cemetery Hill while this contest went on, with Hill at the same time watching his chance to fall upon the centre. Ewell, in attempting to carry out his part of the plan, attacked the 11th corps with such energy that Howard was compelled to ask assistance, which Hancock rendered by despatching Carroll's brigade. The Confederates were driven from the hill; but later in the day, when the Union right was much depleted by the reinforcements hurried to Round Top, a line of intrenchments left here by Geary's division were carried by the Confederate General Johnson, who held the position all night. Artillery had taken part wherever it could, in a pell-mell fight which slackened and then ceased late in the evening.²

The full-orbed moon was shining when Meade summoned a council of his chief officers, after the action was over, to decide whether to stay or withdraw. There was but one voice in the conference; for all present were in favor of fighting out the battle where they stood, awaiting an attack; and Meade adopted that opinion as his own.³ On the Confederate side was reached the same conclusion; for, whatever his earlier misgivings, Lee felt himself too strongly committed by the day's partial triumphs to retreat ignominiously. At a bloody cost he had gained the Emmitsburg road and ridges for his artillery, on one side, and planted himself within Federal intrenchments on the other.⁴ Though not all the success he had hoped for, this was yet something; and, besides adding Pickett's strong division, newly arrived, to strengthen Longstreet, his centre was fresh and had scarcely as yet engaged at all. His army

¹ 7 N. & H. c. 19; Bache's Meade, c. 16; 3 B. & L. 290, etc.

² 3 B. & L. 360; 7 N. & H. c. 9.

³ 3 B. & L. 313.

⁴ Lee thought he had gained a success because he had taken ground from his foe and captured several field-pieces. *Ib.* 341 (Longstreet).

appeared in fine spirits, and the South Mountain defiles were close at hand, should retreat be necessary. The risks of manœuvring towards Baltimore and Washington, as Longstreet had advised, were greater now than on the day before; and so, putting aside with good humor the warning advice of his chief subordinate, he accepted the final gage of battle which Meade offered him.¹

Thursday, the 3d of July, dawned with that same bright summer weather, intensely hot, which invited inaction until the sun should pass its meridian. Meade, though uncertain of the issue, prepared for either fate with coolness and forethought. At sunrise he telegraphed to his general who commanded at Frederick, to harass and annoy the enemy should they be driven to retreat, but in case discomfiture came to the Union army, then to interpose his force so as to protect Washington.² Upon Meade rested the earliest renewal of the fight, for it was needful to dislodge Johnson's intruders from the intrenchments they had gained at the right near Culp's Hill, and towards the Baltimore turnpike.³ This was accomplished, after a desultory fight of several hours, beginning at early dawn; and then Geary's troops marched once more into their intrenchments to reoccupy them, and Lee's concert of plans was lost.⁴

No general battle had been drawn on by this morning's operation, and noon approached with intense stillness in the adversary camp. But Lee had employed his entire forenoon in preparing for a last assault upon the Union lines; this time making Cemetery Hill the crest to be carried, and masking his preparations as far as possible under cover of the woods and the crest of Seminary Ridge. To the faith-

¹ Longstreet expressed his hopelessness of the attempt, but Lee gave him orders. 3 B. & L. 343.

² And to be prepared for either contingency. 27 W. R. pt. 3, 501.

³ Had Lee thus penetrated and got across the Baltimore pike, there would have been danger.

⁴ Where Johnson was driven out a forest of dead trees marked the place later, killed like soldiers by the bullets. 3 B. & L. 360.

ful though unwilling Longstreet was committed a task not unlike that which Burnside had essayed at Fredericksburg; and Lee's proud disdain of Northern soldiery, as compared with his own, reached now its retribution. For this final onslaught the post of honor was given to Pickett's division of the Virginia chivalry, supported by Wilcox, Pettigrew, and Trimble, whose three fine divisions belonged to A. P. Hill's command. The midday silence was broken by a simultaneous discharge of 130 cannon planted on the Confederate ridge, to whose terrific uproar half the number responded on the Union side. Dense clouds of smoke settled over the valley, through which the shells went hissing and screaming to and fro. This tentative artillery duel, whose damage done was trifling in comparison with the prodigious noise and flame, occupied about an hour.¹ The Union lines stood firm as before, and even firmer, and no spot showed weakness for the foe to break. Obedient to Longstreet's orders,² as the black canopy rolled away, Pickett valiantly led forth his troops from behind a ridge, where they had lain concealed, and a column of some 17,000 men moved wedge-like over the green landscape of waving grain and stubble, irradiated by the beaming sun. On they came, in full sight from Cemetery Ridge, for nearly a mile; but before they had advanced halfway across the valley they bore off towards the centre and in the direction of Hancock's front. And now, while the Union artillery, which Lee had hoped to silence, opened from right to left upon the forlorn column with a terribly destructive fire, Pickett's assaulting force of five thousand, thinning in ranks at every step, approached the long and bristling Union line, which was drawn up firm on the heights. Pettigrew's division, supporting it on the left, was attacked by Alexander Hays, of Hancock's corps, with such fury that the ranks wavered and broke, and all courageous who were left alive mingled with the troops of Pickett. At an advanced point, where part of Webb's small force held a stone fence, that barrier was carried with yells of triumph;

¹ See 3 B. & L. 343.

² Given with a heavy heart. *Ib.*

but Webb fell back among his guns, and, aided from right and left by Union brigades and regiments, which rushed valorously to the scene, a din and confusion arose, men fighting and overturning one another like wild beasts, until, at a little clump of woods, where Cushing, a Union lieutenant of artillery, fired a shot as he dropped, and the Confederate General Armistead, foremost in this assault, fell while waving his hat upon his sword-point, the last invading surge expended itself. More than two thousand men had been killed or wounded in thirty minutes. Pickett now gave the order to retreat, and as his bleeding and shattered force receded in confusion, the Union soldiery sprang forward, enveloping on all sides the Confederate ranks, and swept in prisoners and battle ensigns. Wilcox, too, whose supporting column on the other side had become isolated, had to cut his way out in retreat, forced by a Union brigade, while batteries from above on Little Round Top rained down iron hail. Whilst this main battle raged, sharp cavalry combats took place upon both flanks of the hostile armies.

With the repulse of Pickett's splendid but impracticable charge, the third day's fight of Gettysburg, the briefest of all in duration, and yet in proportion the bloodiest, came to an end. Lee, shaken by the fearful consequences, took candidly the blame of this futile effort upon himself, and with soothing words drew off to save the remnant of his army.¹ Meade, from the opposite heights, made no counter charge, but comprehending quite slowly the magnitude of his victory, which he described in despatches as a "handsome repulse,"² refrained from pressing forcibly his advantage. For this there was prudent reason to one so new in command. The anxious strain of those hot summer days had been most severe; and Meade's own losses were so enormous that adequate thought could hardly be given to the corresponding harm inflicted upon the enemy. Of Union generals most tried and trusted, Reynolds lay dead, while Sickles, Hancock, Gibbon, Doubleday, Warren, and Webb

¹ 3 B. & L. 347, 367; 7 N. & H. c. 9.

² 27 W. R. pt. 1, 74.

were all wounded, unable to take part in a pursuit.¹

The 4th of July was passed in last offices to the ghastly heaps of dead; but Lee's request for a truce and exchange of prisoners Meade properly declined under the circumstances.² A violent rain-storm was further excuse for Meade's inaction, and, when night came, a military council advised him to remain where he was, keeping a close watch upon his adversary. On the morning of the 5th the Confederates were found to be in full retreat through the mountain passes, and Meade pursued southward to intercept their passage of the Potomac. Now came the most earnest injunctions from Washington to give the foe neither rest nor respite; and Lee's position was truly critical when, on reaching the Potomac, he found his pontoons partly destroyed and that river so swollen by rains as not to be fordable. While Lee intrenched, waiting for the river to fall, Meade, scarce a mile distant, prepared from the 10th to the 12th to fight him; but in another council of war, most unfortunately called, from which his best advisers were necessarily absent, Meade found his own opinion overborne and unhappily yielded. With nothing more than a reconnoissance meanwhile for annoyance, Lee crossed with his whole force after the Potomac had fallen so as to be fordable, and on the morning of the 14th he was safe once more upon the Virginia side.³

Meade's noble success at Gettysburg — where for the first time reserves in this army were put forward in battle at the right time and place — won him a promotion to brigadier-general in the regular army, and a public gratitude imperishable. But so keen was the administration's disappointment that the full harvest of victory had not been

¹ A large preponderance of military testimony, however, Union and Confederate, goes to show that Meade should have pushed his advantage at Gettysburg after Pickett's bloody repulse with more energy than he displayed. See 7 N. & H. 269, citing Hancock, Pleasanton, Doubleday, Longstreet, and others.

² 27 W. R. pt. 3, 514.

³ 7 N. & H. c. 9; 3 B. & L. 379.

reaped, that a dispatch from Halleck, harshly commenting on Lee's escape, provoked Meade to tender his recall. Such return for his inestimable service was not to be thought of, and Meade remained in command. But a phrase in his general order of the 4th, which announced the enemy "utterly baffled and defeated," had been to Lincoln a foreboding reminder of Antietam, for it spoke of "driving the invader from our soil" as the supreme effort requisite. "Will our generals," he inquired, "never get that idea out of their heads? The whole country is our soil." And he regretted that he had not himself gone to the front and issued personally an order to attack Lee vigorously on the retreat, regardless of all military councils. But time and reflection restored his confidence in Meade as brave and highly deserving, if not faultless.¹ For at Gettysburg, like Flodden's fatal field, the right arm of the South was broken, as all now concede; and that battle, one of the most destructive of modern times, portended the fate of this insurrection. In that first and only shock of arms upon free Northern soil, two leading generals on the Union side besides Meade himself fought for his native State,² and mighty feats of valor performed on either side marked the prolonged encounter.³

¹ 7 N. & H. 278, 279.

² Meade, Reynolds, and Hancock were all born in Pennsylvania.

³ At least 70,000, from first to last, fought under Lee at Gettysburg, and 90,000, or somewhat more, under Meade. The number varied from day to day. On the Union side were lost in killed, wounded, and missing, 23,003; on the Confederate side 20,451 — a nearly equal loss in proportion. But, with a diminishing military population, the South suffered by far the greater exhaustion. 3 B. & L. 437, 439; 7 N. & H. 279. This "may be regarded as the most eventful struggle of the war," says Jefferson Davis. *Short History*, 353.

SECTION IV.

FALL OF VICKSBURG.

This Fourth of July, 1863, could never be forgotten by Americans, at that time living, who were capable of comprehending the significance of events. To the North it showed dark heavens spanned at last by the bow of bright promise; to the South, and to the Southern Confederacy, it predicted the day of doom. For on that sacred anniversary a double victory was proclaimed through the land in the one direction, a double defeat in the other. Over the same electric wires that announced results at the East from the three days' fight of Gettysburg, flashed the thrilling intelligence from the West that Vicksburg had fallen. To the operations which secured that simultaneous triumph our narrative now turns.

After Van Dorn's unsuccessful attack upon Corinth,¹ Pemberton, a lieutenant-general, assumed Confederate command in Mississippi, on the 14th of October, 1862. In view of that repulse and of the good condition of his troops, now reënforced by new levies of the summer, Grant, on the Union side, turned his thoughts towards Vicksburg, and proposed to Halleck a plan, of which the latter approved, for moving upon the foe through the State of Mississippi, approaching that stronghold by the Yazoo River. Grant's available force at this time was about 30,000, comprising an army well seasoned, confident through past victory, and admirably officered. Pemberton's force was estimated at about the same number. Vicksburg was just now of prime importance to the Confederacy, because, with Port Hudson also fortified far below, an unbroken stretch of the broad Mississippi was controlled for some two hundred miles, thus shutting out the United States from free navigation through the whole river, while afford-

1862,
October-
December.

¹ *Supra*, p. 257.

ing to the Confederacy clear access to the beef-producing region of Texas and its other domains across the flood. Vicksburg, with its high bluffs now amply fortified, was the key to such control. Here rose the first high ground below Memphis, to relieve flat and monotonous river barriers; and here, too, one railroad ran east, while from the opposite side of the Mississippi another extended west as far as Shreveport.¹

Grant's preliminary campaign began on the 2d of November. By the 8th he occupied Grand Junction, and in less than a week later reached Holly Springs, near the northern border of Mississippi, where he established a depot of supplies and munitions, all of which at that time came by rail from Columbus, Kentucky, a long line to protect. For hitherto it had been a maxim of war that large bodies of troops must operate from some base of supplies, which must always be guarded during an advance. At Columbus he met Sherman by appointment, and arranged some preliminary operations on the Tallahatchie River, which Pemberton disconcerted by evacuating his position and falling back to another of those streams which form the head waters of the Yazoo. At Oxford, on the 8th of December, Grant held with Sherman another interview, and gave him explicit orders to return to Memphis, and, with a force of 40,000 men now at his own disposal, conduct an expedition down the Mississippi to capture Vicksburg, while he himself would coöperate from the rear to hold Pemberton in check and keep him from reënforcing Vicksburg's garrison. A despatch to Halleck, of the same date, announced this purpose. The Yazoo River was indicated as the most available point of approach for the reduction of Vicksburg, and Porter was asked to accompany the expedition with his gunboat fleet. Troops from the department of Missouri were among the reënforcements by this time ordered by the War Department to swell Grant's operating army.

Grant was by this time gaining favor at Washington, and Halleck, though never wholly cordial with him, gave to his

¹ 1 Grant, c. 30; 7 N. & H. c. 5.

plans a sound support. Grant's unobtrusive mien checked active enmity against him; yet he was still somewhat under a cloud, and closely watched. It so happened, besides, that McClelland, the next ranking officer of this department, had been in Washington seeking to have a separate and independent command, so as to secure the glory to himself of capturing Vicksburg. McClelland had well acquitted himself on the field of Shiloh. Like John A. Logan, he was a Democratic Congressman of Lincoln's State, whose influence had aided at the outbreak of the war, and who entered loyally the military service to battle for the cause of Union. But, unlike Logan, whose aptitude for military command increased daily in a subordinate place which suited him, McClelland was personally ambitious beyond his deserts and capacity, and, notwithstanding a certain energy of character, failed in soldierly obedience. When, in the fall of 1862, while volunteering went slowly, McClelland proposed to raise a large force at the Northwest for exploit on the Mississippi, the President thought it fair to reward his zealous fellow-citizen with a special command.¹ Grant, on learning of this through the newspapers, tried to forestall arrangements by sending forward Sherman, as the worthiest of subordinates for this difficult undertaking. For McClelland's selection neither of the two had much liking; nor had Porter, whose coöperation by water was needful. A despatch from Halleck in November assured Grant that he had command of all the troops sent to his department, and might fight the enemy where he pleased; and of this authority Grant promptly availed himself. Halleck approved also Grant's arrangement in December, placing Sherman in active charge of the new expedition.² Such energy and zeal were given to preliminaries that on

¹ See confidential order to McClelland, with Lincoln's personal indorsement, October 20th, 1862, which was shown to Western governors in aid of the expedition. 7 N. & H. 137.

² 17 W. R. pt. 1, 474. "The President may insist upon designating a separate commander; if not, assign such officers as you deem best. Sherman would be my choice as the chief under you." *Ib.* (Halleck, December 9th.)

the morning of the 19th Sherman began from Memphis his embarkation.¹

On the 18th of December came the dreaded despatch from Washington which informed Grant that the President wished McClernand's new corps to constitute a part of this expedition, and McClernand to have "the immediate command, under your direction." Vexed though he felt, Grant telegraphed at once to McClernand as desired, and sent a corresponding order to Sherman at Memphis to turn over his command. Neither despatch, however, reached its destination, because of a military disaster which changed at once the entire aspect of the campaign. Grant's intention had been to coöperate from the rear with the expedition, holding Pemberton in check if possible, but otherwise pursuing him to Vicksburg. But now, on the 20th, Van Dorn appeared at Holly Springs, Grant's secondary base of supplies, captured its garrison of 1500 men, and destroyed all the munitions of war, food, and forage collected there.² Forrest at the same time with his cavalry damaged the long line of Union communication. Grant's telegrams to Sherman and McClernand miscarried in consequence, besides which for more than a week connection with this base was wholly interrupted. But our commander gained a compensating military lesson, and put to demonstration a new maxim of war, that armies might operate without a base in an enemy's country, by simply scouring about for supplies. That plan both he and Sherman put to good use later; and meanwhile he directed his course towards Memphis and the Mississippi, abandoning altogether his present connections. Holly Springs was reached for headquarters on the 23d, the enemy having already disappeared. The rest of the

¹ 7 N. & H. c. 5; 1 Sherman, c. 12; 1 Grant, c. 29; 17 W. R. pt. 1, 425. Grant concedes the cause of his haste. "I doubted McClernand's fitness; and I had good reason to believe that in forestalling him I was by no means giving offence to those whose authority to command was above both him and me." 1 Grant, 430.

² The surrender of the place was disgraceful to the Union officer in command, who was dismissed from the service in consequence. 7 N. & H. 127; 1 Grant, 432.

month passed in repairing railroad connections to Memphis, which Grant reached finally early in the new year.

Sherman had begun, December 20th, his expedition down the Mississippi, ignorant of Grant's misadventure or of the new orders which placed McClernand in command. Starting down the river with 30,000 men, he took on board at Helena 12,000 from the Missouri department, and on the morning of Christmas Day reached Milliken's Bend, twenty miles above Vicksburg. Porter with his whole gunboat fleet accompanied the transports, to coöperate as he might. Of their operations on the Yazoo River and about Chickasaw Bluffs, in the course of which Frank P. Blair led in a gallant but hopeless assault, it is needless to relate particulars.¹ With Grant disabled from holding Pemberton in check, the latter had reached Vicksburg already, and all chance of surprising there a meagre garrison ended. So great, indeed, was the anxiety already felt by the Richmond government for this region, that Davis, after assigning Joseph E. Johnston² to the supreme command of these Western armies, set off in person for his State, and visited the works at Vicksburg, rousing his fellow-citizens by speeches on the way to assist in preserving their river, "that great artery of the country." On the very day that Sherman started down stream from Memphis, the Southern President was inspecting here the formidable works about the bluffs, advising with an expert's self-confidence how to make them stronger. Fortified and defended at all points of water approach above, this temporary Gibraltar was impregnable against the present expedition. Hence Sherman by the 4th of January 1863, turned with his transports and the naval contingent to Milliken's Bend, where he found McClernand waiting to take chief command, in pursuance of Grant's written orders, which had reached him without the telegram.

Learning now that Grant had withdrawn from the interior of Mississippi, Sherman and Porter proposed attacking a Confederate fort on the Arkansas River, known as Fort

¹ See 1 Sherman, c. 12, for a full description; 3 B. & L. 461.

² November 24th. See *supra*, p. 204.

Hindman, or Arkansas Post, about forty miles above its mouth, which was defended by about 5000 men. McClermand, Sherman tells us, approved this move reluctantly, but in approving took personal charge of the new enterprise. Army and gunboats proceeded together with intrepid energy. A joint assault on the 11th of January resulted in the capture of this fort, with 5000 prisoners and seventeen guns. The Union loss was slight as compared with the magnitude of the gain, for it put those troops in good spirits, and struck away a Confederate force from the distant rear which might in the operations now to be resumed have caused Grant annoyance. Nor this alone, for protection of the Arkansas Valley was now lost to the South, and all hope of invading Missouri was gone.¹

Such was the prelude to the grand Vicksburg campaign, now to commence in earnest. Grant had already worked his course by rail to Memphis, where on the 10th of January he established headquarters. On intimations from Sherman and Porter that the situation was not agreeable to them, Grant on the 17th visited the mouth of the Arkansas River, where the forces for the expedition had collected. Lincoln in December had placed McClermand under Grant's direction, and now that discontent appeared Grant received distinct authority to relieve that general, or assign any one else to command the Vicksburg enterprise, or assume that command himself.² Accordingly on the 30th Grant assumed personal command, as both Sherman and Porter had urged him to do. Great was McClermand's chagrin, and naturally, too, for he had zealously recruited in the West, in reliance upon the distinction intended for him; but he did not reflect that Sherman's reconnoissance had revealed a task more intricate by far than originally proposed.³

¹ 1 Sherman, c. 12; 1 Grant, 439, etc.; 7 N. & H. c. 5; 3 B. & L. 450.

² 17 W. R. pt. 2, 555.

³ "His correspondence with me on the subject," says Grant of McClermand's effort to rule him out of this campaign, "was more in

The real work of the Vicksburg campaign now began, the main problem being to secure a footing upon dry ground on the east side of the Mississippi from which Grant's troops might operate against the city. Four corps constituted the Union force of this department—the 13th, commanded by McClernand, the 15th by Sherman, the 16th by Hurlbut, and the 17th by McPherson. Grant lost no time in organizing his forces and moving them forward. Hurlbut was left in charge of the railroad line terminating at Memphis, while McPherson joined his corps to those of McClernand and Sherman, already at Milliken's Bend. With an irresistible column at hand for fighting upon an open field, Grant found that powerful natural forces aided the resources of military skill to oppose his advance, so that for three months he scarcely made progress at all. The topography of this region was remarkable. A vast sponge of bayou and marsh, which became absorbed at high water, filled up the intervening banks of the Mississippi between Memphis and Vicksburg, while the river itself took a crooked course with sinuous bends like some huge serpent. The Yazoo, its neighboring tributary on the east, was similarly guarded, while overhanging trees and narrow and tortuous outlets made these bayous all difficult to traverse by steamers of even the lightest draft. Marching across such a country in face of an enemy was impossible, navigating it was nearly so. The strategical approach to Vicksburg would have been, perhaps, to go back to Memphis, and thence reach by rail the Yazoo's head waters or Jackson, as a base of operations. But at this critical stage of the Union cause, and perhaps of his personal fortunes, Grant was much influenced by the disastrous impression sure to be produced should he return to Memphis. "There was nothing left to be done," he relates, "but to go forward to a decisive victory;"¹ and

the nature of a reprimand than a protest; it was highly insubordinate, but I overlooked it." 1 Grant, 441. See 24 W. R. pt. 1, 11; ib. pt. 3, 19. This breezy protest was forwarded by Grant to the War Department, and no further notice was taken of it.

¹ 1 Grant, 443.

this habit of mind not to turn back altogether, even seemingly, from an undertaking, was a personal characteristic worth remarking.

It was in January that the Union troops took their station opposite Vicksburg, when the river flood stood unusually high and the rains for the season were incessant. 1863, January.
Vicksburg, with its eagle nest built upon a plateau two hundred feet above the river level, the first bluff peering at the edge of that yellow flood after the high ground of Memphis, was surrounded by immense outlying works and batteries; fortifications on the south defending it, besides, six miles down stream to Warrenton, while Port Hudson in Louisiana frowned with its fortress, still unassailed, two hundred miles below. The blue highlands about Vicksburg margined the Yazoo for some distance; that river flowing by Haines Bluff, so called (which Sherman had attempted in vain to scale), and then emptying into the Mississippi among vast bayous nine miles above Vicksburg. The whole Confederate front, from thence down to Warrenton, was strongly fortified and intrenched, with batteries at suitable distances and rifle-pits connecting them. Below Milliken's Bend, where Grant had assumed command, the Mississippi took so abrupt a turn as to present before Vicksburg the form of a siphon, its stream turning northeasterly to a point just above the city, and thence southwesterly, resuming its former course.

From the moment of taking the personal charge, Grant felt satisfied that in a campaign like the present Vicksburg could only be turned from the south side.¹ Hence, with perhaps the prime object of keeping his men cheerful and occupied among these depressing surroundings, — and, as his narrative suggests, with some politic thought of diverting the public and keeping down its impatience, — Grant now commenced a series of rather unpromising experiments for diminishing the difficulties of his task. In the January-March first place, the peculiar effect of this siphon bend

¹ 24 W. R. pt. 1, 44, 45. Since the war the Mississippi has made a cut-off, leaving what was then the peninsula an island, in front of the city. 1 Grant, 445.

of the river was to leave vessels which might attempt to run past Vicksburg exposed to fire from the heights six miles below the city, before they could come within range of the upper batteries. A ditch or canal across the bend, for little more than a mile, would, if successfully opened, diminish this difficulty of approach; and that idea, which in 1862 had been partially executed,¹ impressed President Lincoln quite strongly. In fact, McClernand had ordered the work resumed on this canal before Grant's arrival. About four thousand soldiers were thus diligently employed, until on the 8th of March a sudden rise of the Mississippi broke a dam at the upper end and the water rushed through the excavation to interrupt and hinder. Moreover, the course of this canal being in a direction almost perpendicular to the bluffs on the east side of the river, the enemy, on discovering what was being done, planted a strong battery to rake the work and drive out Grant's dredgers; and hence this enterprise was abandoned, a confessed failure.² Soon after commencing this canal Grant caused a channel to be cut, besides, from the Mississippi into Lake Providence; and still another from that river into Coldwater, by way of Yazoo Pass. The possibility presented by the former enterprise, of which McPherson took charge, was that of connecting a series of bayous by a waterway, through which transports might find their way into the Washita and Red rivers, and thence down the Mississippi to coöperate with Banks at Port Hudson. By the latter scheme it was proposed at first simply to reach the Yazoo for a small foray upon the enemy's transports, but a larger enterprise grew out of it, in an expedition by one of McPherson's divisions, under cover of Porter's gunboats, which Sherman reënforced. This expedition failed, more from ignorance of what would sufficiently clear this Yazoo route, than from any impracticability in the route itself; and in course of a delay, through finding difficulties and then sending back for the

¹ By General T. Williams, when in June Farragut from below and a fleet from above threatened Vicksburg.

² 1 Grant, 446, 447; 24 W. R. pt. 1, 44.

means of removing them, the foe gained time to prevent farther progress, and Grant recalled the expedition when within a few hundred yards of opening up the Yazoo to unobstructed passage. Admiral Porter's fleet came into imminent peril while groping through this waterway, but Sherman by a romantic night march came to the rescue.¹

By the end of March, all these schemes came to an end, as also did a fourth which was spoiled by the recession of the river.² A long, wet, and dreary winter, almost unparalleled here for its flood, came to an end with nothing to show but apparent failure. Grant's troops had scarcely found dry ground through the rainy season on which to pitch their tents; and while fruitlessly digging they had fought off the turbid flood which threatened to drown them there. Malarial fever, measles, and smallpox broke out, which only the perfection of Grant's medical and hospital staff kept from spreading into an epidemic. Now was this commander's planet buried in the cloud; and just upon the eve of one of his grandest enterprises, the clamor for his removal grew so strong as to penetrate the inmost administration circles. Visitors at camp about this time went home with dismal stories to relate, and Northern newspapers came back to the soldiers with those stories exaggerated and editorial speculations upon the next probable commander. Rosecrans seemed the favorite of these Western journalists, some of whom denounced Grant in the bitterest terms, accusing him of intemperance and utter stupidity. Grant took no steps to answer these complaints, nor to fraternize with the press and divulge his plans, but he continued to do his best.³ He certainly had not idled, like some other generals, but sought work for himself and those under him as the best preventive of despondency. All this had impressed the President,

¹ 24 W. R. pt. 1, 45; 7 N. & H. c. 6; 1 Grant, c. 31; 1 Sherman, c. 13.

² 1 Grant, 457.

³ "Every one has his superstitions. One of mine is that in positions of great responsibility every one should do his duty to the best of his ability where assigned by competent authority, without application or the use of influence to change his position." 1 Grant, 459.

who stood by him, as also did Halleck, saying he should have his chance.¹ Yet such were the doubts and complaints lodged at Washington from various parts of the country, that Stanton sent out a confidential agent to Grant's headquarters, to report progress from time to time and to study this general closely.²

At last the saffron flood subsided, the roads which crossed this difficult peninsula behind river bulwarks began to appear; and at Milliken's Bend Grant massed his troops from distant points preparatory to a departure which was to crown this tedious and tiresome campaign with entire success. Sherman, whose busy brain had revolved the various chances, now pressed upon Grant the resumption of November's movement, by taking his main army to the rear of Vicksburg by way of Memphis, while the fleet and a minor land force threatened the heights from the front.³ Grant

April. had framed, however, a plan of his own; and reading his comrade's letter in silence, he made no comment, called no council of war, but quietly and steadily pursued a course which he had been maturing all winter. This, subject to the possible issue of his canal experiment, was to move his army below Vicksburg by land, and from that approach conduct operations.

The naval fleet was essential to the success and even to the hazard of such an enterprise; and happily, Porter, when sounded, was found at once favorable to the project. Under the latter's direction steamers were selected and prepared for running the long batteries, the fleet lying all this time on the east side of the Mississippi, above the mouth of the Yazoo, concealed by dense intervening forests. Bales of hay and cotton and sacks of grain were used to protect the boilers of these steamers in the difficult passage projected and to conceal their engine fires from view. By the 16th of April Porter was ready to proceed on his hazardous

¹ 7 N. & H. c. 6.

² Charles A. Dana. See *McClure*, November, 1897.

³ This plan he embodied in a letter which suggested that the corps commanders should be called into council.

trip and emulate the prowess of Farragut, who had passed and repassed these heights the preceding summer, before the river fell, when trying to induce Halleck to coöperate by land before Vicksburg's defences were formidable.¹ Indeed, within a few weeks a gunboat, under Colonel Ellet of the marines, had dropped down the river by Porter's order, followed presently by another, and both vessels ran the present gauntlet of Vicksburg successfully, Farragut himself crossing from below the works of Port Hudson for operations at the Red River. All this meant much to one of Porter's sanguine temperament. By night, with a fleet of seven ironclads in advance, his vessels swung into the stream and glided through dark shadows towards the height whose outline was as yet quite hidden. The flagship *Benton* led, Porter in person commanding, while three river transports, which towed barges filled with fuel, brought up the rear of the naval vessels, with a gunboat for final escort. All at once, after an alarm shot from one of the batteries, a terrific cannonade burst forth from Vicksburg heights, lighting up the river far and wide, and sending the rumbling echoes for miles in either direction. Cheap houses and heaps of combustibles were set on fire to illuminate and expose the location of these night intruders. Porter's fleet ran up close under the blazing bluffs, delivering broadsides, and then escaped one by one under cover of the smoke and tumult into the darkness far beyond. Little real damage was done them, though they were for two hours under heavy fire; but one steam transport was set in flames by the explosion of a shell and burned to the water's edge.² Porter's success was so perfect that six other transports, with numerous barges of hay, corn, and provisions, were sent past the batteries, a few nights later, with scarcely any loss; so that stores and boats abounded below for transporting the army across the river.³

¹ About June 26-28, 1862. See 3 B. & L. 483, 551-560; *supra*, p. 186.

² 1 Sherman, 345; 3 B. & L. 485.

³ 7 N. & H. c. 6; 1 Grant, c. 32; 1 Sherman, 345.

Already, on the 29th of March, Grant had sent McClellan, with his corps of four divisions, downward to New Carthage, by the muddy roads skirting the river bank, assisted at the overflowed places by boats, rafts, and improvised bridges. An unexpected breach in the levees near the terminus made a circuitous march needful in that wretched country. On the 20th of April McPherson's column was also despatched, Sherman's being ordered to follow, after a boisterous feint towards Haines Bluff to distract the enemy's attention. By the 24th Grant's headquarters were with his advance, which, five days later, occupied a point opposite Grand Gulf, far below Vicksburg. Porter's fleet in the river bombarded that stronghold with eight gunboats. For more than five hours the attack was kept up, while Grant watched the engagement from a tug, with ten thousand soldiers near him in transports, ready to attempt a landing. The gunboats drew off early in the afternoon, having failed of success; but, changing his tactics, Grant promptly marched his troops to a point of dry ground three miles below, where Porter rejoined him with transports and gunboats, having run the Grand Gulf batteries by night. A landing was effected upon the east bank of the Mississippi early on the 30th, at a place called Bruinsburg, from which, it was found, a good road led to Port Gibson, about twelve miles distant. Without opposition McClellan's troops were conveyed across, and those of McPherson followed closely. Despatching orders to Sherman to desist from his Haines Bluff attack, and follow at once with his corps, Grant put his army in instant motion for the rear of Vicksburg, convinced that his enterprise was more than half won, now that a lodgement was gained on the eastern side. He had passed the previous night in issuing minute and elaborate orders, written with his own hand, for rations, protection of the rear, and the like details, and now, hastening forward at daybreak with McClellan's advance, he reached Port Gibson at night, where a Confederate force was drawn up to dispute his passage.¹

¹ 24 W. R. pt. 1, 32. See 7 N. & H. c. 6; 1 Grant, c. 34.

The hopeless nature of most experiments of the preceding winter, at the same time that each in turn was tried, had convinced Grant's foe that he was in earnest and not easily disheartened.¹ A cavalry raid under General Grierson — one of the most famous of the kind during this whole war — had confirmed Grant in the belief that all the able-bodied of the South had by this time been pressed to the borders, leaving the Confederacy within a hollow shell. Starting simultaneously with Porter's passage of the Vicksburg batteries, Grierson, with his seventeen hundred men, a regiment of whom were detached for special duty, rode through the whole State of Mississippi, tearing up railways and telegraph poles, destroying military factories, and spreading terror and dismay, until, as the new month opened, he brought up at Baton Rouge, below Port Hudson.² Pemberton, whose headquarters were still at Jackson, had been much distracted by this, and by Sherman's recent feint in the Yazoo. He had, while more confident, sent troops away to aid Bragg in Tennessee, and these he asked in vain to have returned to him. No cavalry were at hand to give him clear knowledge of Grant's movements, and before he could tell which was the real attack and which the diversion, Grant and Porter had perfected their joint arrangements and passed below Grand Gulf. There was no great disparity of opposing forces, but Pemberton could not concentrate his scattered soldiery to withstand the hero who now poured forth his compact forces like a torrent from the unexpected quarter. While yet bewildered, Pemberton had, on the 23d of April, warned his commandant at Vicksburg to be ready to direct troops to the left. But while he watched Sherman's imposing move in one direction, he heard alarming news in the other from Grand Gulf, and hurriedly ordered brigades from Vicksburg and Port Hudson to that vicinity.

General Bowen's 8,000 men, including such reinforcements as could reach him, made, May 1st, before Port Gibson, a gallant stand; but all in vain, for the Union column

outnumbered them by more than two to one, McPherson coming up in season to support the advance.¹

May. The broken Confederate line now dispersing, to re-form at the Big Black River, Grand Gulf was evacuated in confusion, and Porter at once took possession. Into this town and beyond dashed McClernand's corps the next morning, until arrested in progress at the forks of Bayou Pierce, where the foe on its retreat had burnt the bridges. Rebuilding them in hot haste, or else fording and floundering in the water in their eagerness to get over, this corps pushed on through the 3d, reënforcements arriving all day; and with a skirmish here and there, and the capture of prisoners, drove the enemy to a point over the Big Black fifteen miles northeast of Port Gibson. Here McPherson followed the Confederates so close that he seized the bridge before they had time to fire it on their flight, and took firm possession. At this point, with the aid of the ferry-boat, a detachment was sent across several miles north on the road to Vicksburg. Grant, meanwhile, with a cavalry escort, rode on the 3d to Grand Gulf, now in naval possession, Porter himself having started farther downward to aid Farragut at the mouth of the Red River. Grant's blows had fallen so hard and so fast that the enemy had been unable to remove his heavy guns, and the works were found on inspection much more formidable than they had seemed from the river.²

Grant, like other generals of our war, planned movements which, from some obstacle unforeseen, could not work out as intended; but his preëminence appeared in the fertility of his resources and the ease and quickness with which he adapted himself to a new situation, while holding tenaciously to the main purpose. He did not in extremity call councils of war, — of whom it is proverbial that they advise and never fight, — but with impassive courage he would vary and modify, when needful, and still press on. All this inspired the men and officers under him. Hitherto he had intended to secure Grand Gulf as his base of supplies,

¹ 7 N. & H. c. 7.

² 1 Grant, c. 34; 7 N. & H. c. 7.

send McClernand's corps to Banks, whose department embraced Louisiana, and, effecting a junction with the latter, make against Port Hudson and Vicksburg a combined campaign, reducing first the lower and less formidable fortress.¹ But now, as Grant's Memoirs relate, the news from Banks forced upon him a different plan, for that general sent him word that he could not reach Port Hudson before the 10th of May, and then with only an aggregate of twelve thousand men. To wait was injurious, for the added strength of his enemy would have counterbalanced all gain in numbers to his present force.² Vicksburg, Grant now confessed to himself, must be his task, and his alone; and, resolving to cut loose from his present base, press upon Vicksburg's rear, and invest or capture that place, he proceeded to act with equal promptness. But to onlookers this campaign shone forth as continuous in design, without a break from the beginning.

In thus relinquishing the Mississippi as a base, Grant had to demonstrate a new rule of war, of which most army men were sceptical. Even Sherman, who afterwards, on his famous march through Georgia with twice the present army, ignored bases of food other than the surrounding region might furnish, expressed some anxiety from the Big Black, where he had now arrived. Grant's confident response showed that he meant to lose no time in constructing roads from Grand Gulf, to transport what the troops might live upon.³ His forecast was vindicated by results, in the present instance. Beef, mutton, poultry, and forage were found in abundance; bread product, too, from the mills; only that troops nearest such supply had the advantage until a new base was established on the Yazoo, above Vicksburg.

While issuing at Grand Gulf his marching orders, with

¹ 1 Grant, 491; 7 N. & H. c. 7; 24 W. R. pt. 1, 49. And see Dana's private letter of April 13, *McClure*, December, 1897.

² Another consideration may possibly have been that Banks in coöperation would have outranked him and taken command.

³ "What I do expect," he wrote, "is to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee, and salt we can, and make the country furnish the balance." 1 Grant, 492.

an astonishing grasp of minutiae as well as the chief matters, Grant lost not a moment in pushing on, when Sherman's corps had joined his column. On the morning of May 7th, his army, in high health and spirits, broke camp, cutting loose from the navy, and moved northward in good order; McPherson held the right towards Jackson, while McClellan and Sherman with the left and centre moved on the line of the Big Black River, nearly abreast, keeping a strict watch upon ferries to prevent a surprise. Cavalry reconnoitred in advance, to cover these movements and find out the roads. Early in the fifth day's progress, McPherson, on the 12th, met at Raymond brigades of the enemy under Gregg and Walker, and after a sharp action drove and dispersed them.¹ Grant, who was with Sherman, some seven miles west, on hearing of this engagement, and learning besides that reinforcements were reaching the capital of Mississippi, now modified his march so as to bring both Sherman and McClellan upon the right, while McPherson pursued his rapid course. From Raymond, McPherson pushed to the north, occupying the railroad town of Clinton, and interposing his corps between Johnston and Pemberton; while Sherman, with alertness, took the direct route towards Jackson, arriving south of the town, in a pouring rain, on the morning of the 14th, just as McPherson arrived on the north side. Here, after a severe fight, in which Confederates, hastily collected, tried in vain to resist this enthusiastic phalanx, wedged within supporting distance between their two wings, the enemy fled, scattering in every direction. Grant rode to the State House, followed by Sherman and McPherson, the latter of whom, having borne the burden of the battle, hoisted over that building the stars and stripes. Grant slept, at night, in the room that Johnston, the Confederate chief, was said to have occupied the night before. Not to rest, however, upon such honors, Grant now ordered McPherson to march back on the Clinton road and join McClellan, while Sherman remained a day longer, to tear up railroad tracks and destroy establishments which had

¹ 24 W. R. pt. 1, 50.

made this capital a centre for the South of military supplies.¹

Johnston's military capacity, though very great, did not shine here as in his other campaigns; but we should observe that he was placed in command of a long and weak line, confronting both Grant and Rosecrans, and without such reinforcements as he deemed indispensable. The complaint, indeed, was great that the Richmond government lavished all upon Lee, nor even was the Arkansas army transferred hither, as Johnston desired. Still suffering, moreover, from his wound received at Fair Oaks, when despatched hither, he reached Jackson on the 13th, after an exhausting four days' journey undertaken from his sick-room. How little real confidence he and President Davis felt for one another is shown by their bitter comments interchanged in later life.² Pemberton had left the State capital by the time Johnston arrived, and before a connection could be formed between forces quite seriously separated. Already had President Davis in alarm besought the Governor of Mississippi to get out every man and boy in the State, capable of aiding, whether mounted or on foot, and with whatever weapon might be at hand.³

Comprehending Grant's real objective, the enemy massed before the Vicksburg approaches in desperate array. But the impulse of invasion was by this time too strong for such ill-organized resistance. Grant, learning of the junction intended at his rear, had turned his troops westward so as to be beforehand. McClernand's corps, placed thereby in the lead, marched to Champion's Hill, where, May 16th, it was forced into an engagement, on finding Pemberton posted there in strong array. McPherson came upon the field near noon, and a battle, which had begun in skirmishing, was fought about four hours in deadly earnest. This was the

¹ 7 N. & H. c. 7; 1 Grant, c. 35.

² Davis, 333; 3 B. & L. 477, etc.

³ Davis, 331.

hardest fought battle of Grant's present progress. Of the Confederate forces finally routed, Loring, Bowen, and Stevenson held command at the wings and centre.¹ Loring's troops were cut off from the retreating army, and never reached Vicksburg again. Pemberton, with his remnant, fell back that night to the Big Black River, his troops keeping up the flight until midnight, and many of them, doubtless, returning to their homes.²

Assured now of a position between Johnston and Pemberton, which made their junction impossible, Grant, before sunrise of the 17th, renewed a pursuit which had lasted the previous day until after dark, and overtook the foe at an early hour in front of a bridge over the Big Black River. Here a sharp action took place, the Confederates being posted at the east bank within a long line of rifle-pits, which were defended by a bayou. They presented, upon the approach, a strong position; but Grant, perceiving that the rifle-pits could be flanked under cover of the river bank, deployed accordingly, and after a brilliant assault the enemy was routed. From the west bank fled other Confederates in a panic to the defences of Vicksburg, burning their bridge behind, and leaving those on the east side who could not escape by swimming to be made prisoners.³ The pursuers quickly built new bridges, three in number, with lumber, cotton bales, and trees partly severed, and early on the 18th, within twenty-four hours of the fight, Grant's troops passed over the river.

Sherman, in the meantime, on leaving Jackson, had

¹ 24 W. R. pt. 2, 167. The Union loss was 2441, mostly in killed and wounded; that of the Confederates was 3624, of whom 2195 were prisoners. The foe left on the field 24 pieces of artillery. 7 N. & H. 192. Pemberton had not obeyed Johnston's orders, sent with a view to making a junction elsewhere; and Davis seems to have been intent upon saving Vicksburg, while Johnston wished rather to save Pemberton's army. 3 B. & L. 487.

² 1 Grant, c. 35.

³ "But for the successful and complete destruction of the bridge, I have but little doubt that we should have followed the enemy so closely as to prevent his occupying his defences around Vicksburg." 1 Grant, 526; 7 N. & H. c. 7.

marched towards Vicksburg by an upper road, reaching Bridgeport, a few miles farther up, and crossing the Big Black by night on a rubber pontoon bridge. There Grant joined him in person, and the two, sitting together on a log, watched the troops passing over on that light and swaying structure, the whole scene illumined with fires of pitch-pine. Sherman's corps, once more in advance, and holding the right for all operations remaining, resumed the march to Vicksburg on the 18th, accompanied by Grant, and throwing skirmishers forward. By dark Blair's division had closed up against Vicksburg's defences, which were found strong and well manned, and Sherman sent another division down the bluffs to the right, so as to connect with the fleet and gain a new base of supplies by way of the Yazoo, as Grant anxiously desired. All that night McPherson's troops were arriving by the main Jackson road, and McClernand's by another at the left and near the railway. Grant's three corps were now posted close to the defensive works of Vicksburg, and occupied three roads, one to the north, one to the east, and one to the south-east of that city.¹

Pemberton, whom Johnston had failed all this time to reach, sent despatches to his superior, announcing that a council of war at Vicksburg had decided to hold that stronghold to the very last, hopeful of succor. Johnston had suggested evacuation, that at least this army might be saved for use elsewhere; but Pemberton, in no compliant mood, insisted that to withdraw meant demoralization, and that Vicksburg itself was worth defending, as, in fact, "the most important point in the Confederacy." The predicament was too distressing for argument; and Johnston, on the 19th, simply answered, "I am trying to gather a force which may attempt to relieve you; hold out." But ere this the trap was remorselessly sprung by Grant, and the doom of Vicksburg and its devoted garrison was sealed.²

¹ 1 Sherman, 351 ; 7 N. & H. c. 7 ; 1 Grant, c. 36.

² 7 N. & H. c. 7 ; 24 W. R. pt. 3, 888-892. "Unless a large force is sent at once to relieve it," so Pemberton notified Davis on the 19th, "Vicksburg must before long fall." *Ib.*

Grant's army spent May 19th and the two following days in crowding into choice positions and strengthening them, while the Confederates made covered approaches, and increased their own security as they might. The hostile lines were only eight hundred yards apart, and sharpshooters on either side picked off such of the soldiery as dared carelessly show their heads. Cheering his own men by issuing full rations with bread and coffee, of which the supply on the march had been scant, Grant, on the 22d, ordered an immediate assault, which opened on the moment with a furious cannonade from every battery then in position. Porter having already returned from the Red River, his gunboats moved within range of Vicksburg, and opened a further fire on the water front. The attack was gallant, and portions of the three Union corps succeeded in getting up to the very parapets of the town, and planting their battle-flags; at no place, however, could they gain an entrance, but were repulsed with heavy loss. McClernand sent word that he had carried the intrenchments at several points and needed reënforcements. Grant, who watched the attack from a hill on the Jackson road, saw no such results, but when the message was repeated, he sent a fresh division to McClernand's aid, and ordered Sherman and McPherson to assault anew. In vain did the invading soldiery spring once more towards the parapets; they were again repulsed, and the renewed attack only added largely to the day's casualties.¹

Grant now gave up all thought of carrying Vicksburg by storm and settled down to a regular siege—to "out-camp the enemy," as he has expressed it. With officers and men convinced, like himself, that this was the safer and less costly course, he sturdily developed his works and approaches. The navy was now in safe rendezvous at the mouth of the Yazoo, holding the whole river front; so the investment of these bluffs was complete. In supplies of food, men, and munitions, the advantage was in the besiegers' favor. The besieged themselves felt somewhat of that fra-

ternal spirit which stern conflict could not wholly quench; and during a truce for mercy to the dead and wounded, which was agreed upon for May 25th, officers of rank crossed the line on foot to exchange friendly greetings with one another, while peering about to discover, if possible, something of the hostile preparations going on.¹

This was already one of the proudest campaigns of American history, and, as Sherman has proclaimed with generous warmth, the praise was due to Grant from conception to finish, not only in the great whole, but in the thousand details.² At Washington the War Department made reparation for its former want of confidence by confirming his discretion and assuring him of a firm and hearty support. "General Grant has full and absolute authority," telegraphed Stanton to Dana, on the 5th of May, "to enforce his own commands, and to remove any person who interferes with or delays his operations." This message had special bearing upon the embarrassment still caused by McClelland's presence as second in command, which Dana had confidentially reported. Grant disliked McClelland, and considered himself hindered by a corps commander who, claiming a special assignment by the President, could not readily be disciplined. McClelland had valor, but his unmilitary eagerness brought presently its own consequences. He published through the press, to his troops and to distant fellow-citizens, a fulsome congratulatory order, concerning his exploits of the 22d, which did injustice to the other commands. Grant knew nothing of this proceeding until a distant newspaper, containing the order, reached camp about the 17th of June, and Sherman and McPherson made joint protest against their censorious colleague. McClelland was directed to send a copy of this order, which had not been transmitted before. He did so, and upon this self-evident breach of military duty, Grant relieved him at once and sent him home. A tried and trained officer, General

¹ 3 B. & L. 489.

² 1 Sherman, 362. "No commanding general of an army ever gave more of his own orders, reports, and letters." *Ib.*

Edward O. C. Ord, succeeded to the command of the corps.¹

Grant's column which had crossed the Mississippi and made the active campaign numbered less than 43,000; but as the siege went on it increased to nearly 75,000 men, more than half of whom guarded the rear between the Yazoo and Big Black against a possible relief from Johnston.² With

May- investment begun, and a line to protect more than
June. fifteen miles long, between Haines Bluff and Warrenton, the government had appreciated necessities, and forwarded reinforcements without being asked. It was needful to bring Grant's works as near as possible to Vicksburg's strong defences. There were no siege guns at hand, but Porter furnished from his fleet a battery of naval guns of large caliber, and with these and the field artillery used on the march the siege began. Grant meant first to arrange his artillery in commanding positions; next, to bring the camps up as close as possible while covering them from the enemy's fire; and finally, to construct rifle-pits and covered ways, so as to connect his entire command by the shortest route. The peculiar nature of the ground suggested some eccentric appliances. To protect soldiers, constantly within close range of the enemy, by something more than the ordinary parapet, Grant placed sand-bags above, bullet-proof, leaving loopholes between for musketry, and logs on the top, so that the men when off duty could walk erect. Wooden mortars were constructed to aid those of the vessels below, by boring out logs of the toughest fibre and binding iron bands about them. The labor of building the batteries and intrenchments was largely performed by pioneers, aided by negroes who came within the lines and were paid for their labor. With reliefs, of laborers or soldiers, detailed for work at fixed hours, all proceeded with system, and men off duty might be seen in the trenches, curled into grotesque positions.

¹ 1 Grant, c. 37; 7 N. & H. c. 10, at length. See for McClelland's later defence of his conduct, 24 W. R. pt. 1, 169. A court of inquiry was refused him.

² 1 Grant, 533, 546; 3 B. & L. 549.

Siege operations were thus pushed forward until, by the 30th of June, after weeks of patient and persevering toil, the besiegers' defences were correspondingly strong with those of the besieged.¹ Picked riflemen guarded on either side the interval that lessened constantly, and as the hostile armies drew closer together they were constantly within sound of each other's voices, and jocular conversations took place between soldiers who would have destroyed one another in a moment, obedient to duty, had they come into open sight.² Grant's troops were well placed as regarded health and comfort, for the high-wooded hills afforded pure air and shade, while the deep ravines abounded in springs of excellent water, with rivers accessible beyond, should these become exhausted. There was no excessive heat. Grant's line of supplies was beyond Confederate reach, and fruit grew about in such abundance that his soldiers gathered buckets full of mulberries, plums, and blackberries.³

One or two special exploits were attempted, on one side or the other, which did not much disturb the monotonous routine. In one of these, about the 27th of May, Blair's division with naval support made a foray up the Yazoo; in another, on the 7th of June, a feeble Confederate attack was made by troops from Arkansas upon the small Union garrison of white and colored troops at Milliken's Bend, which, however, with the aid of Porter's gunboats, was repelled.⁴ While Grant advanced his saps and mines, inch by inch, close up to the enemy's works, Johnston, at the eastward, was trying to collect a force to march to Pemberton's relief and raise the siege. The correspondence between the two Confederate generals shows that all expectation of holding Vicksburg successfully had passed from Johnston's mind,

¹ 1 Grant, c. 38.

² 7 N. & H. c. 10. Where the sap ran close they would also toss to and fro, bartering Union hard bread for Confederate tobacco. 1 Grant, 551.

³ *McClure*, December, 1897 (Dana).

⁴ 1 Grant, 543, 544; 7 N. & H. 292, 293.

and that all possibly to be hoped for was to set free the garrison. By the 4th of June, Loring's division, after devious wanderings since the action of Champion's Hill, had joined Johnston, as also had a division of infantry under General Breckinridge, and one of cavalry; all these, with other trifling detachments, increasing his effective force to about 24,000. Pemberton had moved into his ramparts with about 28,000; and could these all have combined — no easy task to accomplish — Grant might at that stage of the siege have found himself outnumbered. But fortune went against Johnston in spite of all effort. Heavy reinforcements were reaching the besieging army throughout the month. Before Johnston's despatch to Gardner, directing him to evacuate Port Hudson, could be received, that stronghold, too, was completely invested by another Union force. Pemberton, on the 21st of June, proposed in his despatches a desperate expedient for escaping south with his garrison while Johnston engaged Grant's army to the northward; but Johnston, with numbers insufficient, could only promise to try to combine with General Richard Taylor at Arkansas, west of the Mississippi. Grant kept well enough informed of Johnston's movements to checkmate with vigilance every effort in the direction wished. Wisely, in his opinion, Johnston abstained from a fierce assault, because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides without corresponding gain.¹ But Johnston's superiors at Richmond did not view his cautious abstinence from attack with favor. Though disposed neither to recall Lee from Pennsylvania nor to sacrifice Tennessee, so as to give this general all the troops he thought indispensable here, the Richmond rulers bestowed exhortation in abundance to induce him to take hazards he shrunk naturally from assuming.² Unable to resist this pressure, though

¹ 24 W. R. pt. 1, 242; 3 B. & L. 550. Cf. Seddon, who stated Johnston's present force as 32,000. ² Davis, 412. "We were strong enough," says Grant, "to have taken the offensive against him." 1 Grant, 549 (by June 22d). See 7 N. & H. 294.

² "Rely upon it," wrote Seddon, the new Secretary of War, in a strain of passionate persuasion for which President Davis had already

careful to undertake no expedition in the wild spirit that dictated the government despatches, Johnston marched towards the Big Black, and after devoting the first three days of July to an elaborate series of reconnoissances against the besieging army, he planned a rescue for the 7th, but before that date Vicksburg had fallen.¹ July.

The courage and good discipline of the beleaguered garrison through all these terrible weeks show that the soldiers were more serviceable for some other field than Pemberton thought when he led them precipitately into their prison walls. The last gloomy despatch which Johnston received from Pemberton was dated the 22d of June, when the latter's hopes had sunk so low that he asked Johnston himself to propose terms of surrender. He might, so he thought, hold out fifteen days longer, but the enemy's works had already come up within twenty-five feet of his redan; his men had been thirty-four days and nights in the trenches without relief, and all were living on reduced rations. To this Johnston replied that, in a last extremity, Pemberton ought himself to make the overtures to Grant.² But before the latter concluded to do so, every field and regimental officer under him had reported his men physically exhausted and unfit for manual labor. And so short had run the supply of provisions, that for days the besieged lived on quarter rations, and ate mule meat, rats, and young shoots of cane with the heartiest relish.³ June-July.

Grant's sap had now run up to the enemy's parapet at several points, and on the 25th of June, when all was ready, he exploded a heavy mine. The redan above was entirely

set the pitch, "the eyes and hopes of the whole Confederacy are upon you, with the full confidence that you will act, and with the sentiment that it were better to fail, nobly daring, than through prudence even to be inactive." 24 W. R. pt. 1, 228 (June 19).

¹ 24 W. R. pt. 1, 244, 245.

² Johnston, 196; 7 N. & H. 296.

³ 3 B. & L. 492.

destroyed, vast masses of earth were thrown in the air, and some Confederate soldiers who were hurled up bodily came down alive into the Union lines amid the flying rubbish. But while the top of the hill was thus blown off, leaving a deep crater, the breach was not large enough to pass through a column of attack. Grant's regiments held the breach against efforts most vigorous to expel them, and the defenders, retreating to closer cover, hurled hand grenades and prepared to countermine. A heavy cannonade had been kept up at intervals, by night as well as day, and Grant next prepared to make new explosions with an assault to follow. Intercepting a despatch from Johnston, which showed his desperate designs, he took precautions for his rear; and hearing next that Pemberton meditated a flight by transport to the Louisiana side, he notified Porter and kept the navy alert in that direction also. By the 1st of July the Union approaches had reached the enemy's ditch at various places, and orders were given preparatory to a grand assault on the 6th. But on the forenoon of

July. the 3d white flags were seen fluttering on the Confederate works, and Bowen, with one of Pemberton's staff, advanced under a flag of truce, bearing a message from Pemberton which proposed negotiating a surrender.¹ For, convinced that further resistance would be hopeless, — with his ruinous situation such, that a single dash from less than a minute's distance might precipitate upon him an overwhelming force, — the besieged commander had accepted the advice of a council, summoned the night before, to capitulate upon the best terms obtainable.²

Grant's written reply signified his willingness to meet Pemberton that day in person; and on a neighboring hill-side, where stood a stunted oak, Pemberton met the Union commander in the afternoon for a personal conference, an escort of officers attending on either side. The loud artillery was now mute, and swarms of soldiers gathered in eager expectation on the opposing parapets. Pemberton haughtily proposed to end the conference, when he found

¹ 1 Grant, c. 37.

² 3 B. & L. 492.

that Grant asked unqualified surrender, as he had written in the morning; but on Bowen's anxious suggestion that he and one of the Union generals present should discuss the subject aside, Grant permitted this to be done, yet nothing was gained by it. Rejecting emphatically Bowen's suggestion that the garrison be permitted to march out with all the honors of war, Grant ended the interview, promising to send a letter that night, stating his ultimatum. He now convoked such of his corps and division generals as were at hand, — some, however, being miles away, watching for Johnston, — and, stating to them the substance of this conference, asked their suggestions, while reserving the decision to himself.¹ Against their almost unanimous opinion, he despatched to Pemberton a letter, which proposed taking possession at eight the next morning; the officers and men of the garrison to march out on parole, the officers with side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff, and cavalry officers with one horse each; the rank and file to be allowed all their clothing but no other property. Soon after midnight came a response from Pemberton, proposing modifications, which Grant partly accepted without changing the substance of his conditions. The capitulation thus concluded, the long-beleaguered Confederate garrison marched out of its works the next morning, formed in front, stacked arms, and returned, while Logan's division, under the orders of Grant, marched into Vicksburg to hoist there the stars and stripes and receive formal possession. "Our whole army present," relates Grant, "witnessed this scene without cheering;" and, indeed, his earliest note had assured Pemberton that soldiers who had shown so much courage and endurance must always challenge the respect of an adversary. This was July 4th, the anniversary of that independence which originated an American brotherhood. The soldiery on both sides — fellow-citizens whose hearts had yielded even when in hostile array to one another — now fraternized like old companions in arms, resuming

¹ "This," he afterwards related, "was the nearest approach to a council of war I ever held." 3 B. & L. 492.

under far more favorable auspices that friendly interchange which had gone on for weeks behind the barricades. The late besiegers, well rationed as they had been ever since the siege commenced, gave bread from their haversacks to the wan and hungry Southerners whom siege had nearly starved out. All was not dejection in Vicksburg, now that hostilities had come to an end; for non-combatants had been living for weeks, burrowed in the bluff like cliff-dwellers, and suffering every privation of food and comfort.¹

This anniversary day, with its grand victories East and West, lifted the worst load of anxiety from minds loyal to the national cause; for, though much fighting remained and many precious lives were yet to be offered up, all prestige and moral confidence rested henceforth on the Union side. In this long Western campaign the South lost about fifty thousand men, from first to last, while the Union cost was less than ninety-four hundred in killed, wounded, and missing. Grant's complete success procured him just fame at home and abroad; the President conferred upon him the rank of major-general in the regular army, while Sherman and McPherson each received regular brigadier commissions.²

Less than a week following the fall of Vicksburg, and just as Grant was preparing to send troops down the Mississippi River to Banks's assistance, Port Hudson, on the 9th of July, surrendered unconditionally. After a demonstration from New Orleans against Galveston, which failed, and an April expedition up the Red River, victorious enough with the important aid of Farragut and Porter, and yet, it would seem, a needless diversion, Banks
April-
July. turned his attention to his main task, that of capturing Port Hudson—too late, however, for that coöperation with Grant which his Washington superiors had intended. Reaching that stronghold on the 24th of

¹ 1 Grant, c. 3; 24 W. R. pt. 1, 60, 61, 283; 8 N. & H. c. 10.

² Cf. 1 Grant, 572; 7 N. & H. 308; 3 B. & L. 550. At Vicksburg 31,600 prisoners were surrendered, together with 172 cannon, about 60,000 muskets of a superior quality, and a large amount of small arms.

May, he made two forcible assaults, one the day after his arrival, and another on the 14th of June. Repulsed each time with a heavy loss, he resorted, as Grant had done, to siege operations, and held Port Hudson with a tightening coil, soon rendering its investment complete. When came the news of Vicksburg's surrender, Major-General Frank Gardner, who commanded here the Confederate garrison, tendered the citadel, hopeless of holding out longer. And thus did Port Hudson, with some six thousand prisoners, fifty-one pieces of artillery, five thousand small arms, and other stores, come into Banks's control, by timely surrender. An expedition moreover, was frustrated, which the Confederate General Taylor had started towards New Orleans below, by way of Brashear City, hoping to draw off the besieging army and relieve the garrison.¹

A brilliant minor victory to the Union arms made this 4th of July more memorable still; for Holmes, another Confederate general, descending upon Helena, Arkansas, with nine thousand men, sustained there that day a bloody repulse from Prentiss, who held his own with less than half that number.² Sherman, we should add, as soon as Vicksburg surrendered, took the offensive against Johnston, under Grant's orders, and with a fine army in high spirits moved rapidly eastward. Johnston intrenched himself before Jackson, the State capital, by the 9th, and prepared to fight a battle; but after some vain manœuvres to get the better of his adversary, that circumspect commander, well aware that to save his soldiery was the chief object in such adverse times, slipped out of town by the rear, unseen and in perfect safety, leaving to Sherman the barren triumph of entering that capital a second time. But if Johnston's army could not be destroyed, it was driven to a far distance, and one of Grant's alternatives was gained.³

¹ 7 N. & H. c. 11; 1 Grant, c. 39; 3 B. & L. 586, etc., in detail. Banks in his official report says that his army captured in this whole campaign 10,584 prisoners — a force, he adds, equal to his own at the time of Gardner's surrender. 26 W. R. pt. 1, 17. But cf. 3 B. & L. 599.

² 7 N. & H. 323; 1 Grant, 565.

³ 7 N. & H. c. 11; 1 Grant, 566.

Meade's victory at Gettysburg had been gained on the defence, while Grant's campaign was strongly offensive from beginning to end, and crowned with a duplicate success. The Southern Confederacy was now permanently bisected; such trivial barriers as might still have obstructed the majestic flood between Vicksburg and Port Hudson melted away with scarce a sign; and Union gunboats patrolled up and down to keep this broad highway of inland commerce unobstructed. In short, the Mississippi, with all its ample tributaries, was laid open once more, never to be sectionally closed again, for the nineteenth century at least. The great arteries of the Union pulsated freely once more, as nature and our fundamental law intended.

SECTION V.

VOLUNTEERS, PRISONERS, AND DRAFTED MEN.

President Lincoln, when proclaiming freedom to the slaves within rebellious jurisdiction, had practical results in view. The idea of making military effectives out of the negro race had been cherished by him, and by other advanced statesmen of the day, who saw clearly, without prejudice; nor were the emancipated, stolid though they might appear on that first of January, unsusceptible of a sense that new duties attended the bestowal of a new birthright.¹ When Thaddeus Stevens, in early 1863, proposed authorizing the President at discretion to enroll, arm, equip, and receive into the service, soldiers of African descent, slaves
1862-1863. as well as freemen, the opposition raised an alarming cry that this would place the negro soldier on an equality with the white, and stamp an indelible stigma upon volunteering; that blacks were unfit to bear arms, and that a servile war would be the sure consequence of such an experiment. Yet they conceded that, for camp and fatigue duty, and for labor in the trenches, our negro contrabands had

¹ The author took personal cognizance, on this latter point, while serving at that date in North Carolina as a Union officer.

done valuable service; that they had shown themselves neither insubordinate nor cowardly, but were learning discipline every day.¹ Hence the new experiment was simply for those who had handled well the spade and pick-axe, to use a gun as directed, and wedge into the ranks. Much earlier, in the Confiscation act of 1862, had been inserted a provision which allowed an Executive latitude, at least, in this same experimental direction. "I think it proper," said President Lincoln in a message, long before he had brought his mind to proclaiming freedom, "for our military commanders to employ, as laborers, as many persons of African descent as can be used to advantage."² By April, 1862, Secretary Welles approved the enlistment of negro waifs for his naval vessels.³ And as for all persons born free in the United States, of whom so many were scattered through the North, Bates, the Attorney-General, pronounced his opinion, contrary to the Dred Scott precedent, that they were in legal effect citizens.

It was not strange, then, that when volunteering grew difficult and a draft impended on the Union side, the practical and penetrating Northern mind, of which our President partook, dismissed false prejudice in utilizing whatever might be within reach for recruiting and strengthening the Northern armies. With the Whig Lincoln in this respect stood the Democratic Stanton, his Secretary of War, who, in August, 1862, with the sanction of his chief, allowed General Saxton, in command at Port Royal, where the harvest of refugees was heaviest, to arm, equip, and drill 5000 negro volunteers for police and defensive duty.⁴ In the final proclamation of emancipation, — though nothing had been said on that point in the preliminary one, — Lincoln formally announced that suitable persons among those liberated would be received into the armed service

¹ Am. Cycl. 1863, 268-275.

² 6 N. & H. 103 (July 17th, 1862).

³ Am. Cycl. 1862, 753.

⁴ This was done under authority of the Confiscation act above noticed; and with cautious intent in the new direction, so as to guard and protect plantations and settlements in control of Union troops.

of the United States, "to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service." Here, finally, he planted himself upon a generous basis of experiment, which several of the State governors hailed eagerly, and none more so than the zealous Andrew of Massachusetts. To him, during the same January, 1863, at his own earnest request, Stanton gave authority to recruit a colored regiment of State volunteers. For this regiment, the 54th Massachusetts, and for another, the 55th, organized soon after, the governor selected white officers of recognized ability and experience, of the best social position and influence, who believed in the capacity of black men to make good soldiers. Scions of noted abolitionist families, among whom was Garrison's eldest son, promptly accepted commissions; and two sons of Frederick Douglass, the famous colored orator, went into the ranks of the 54th, to whose regimental command was assigned young Robert G. Shaw, already a Massachusetts captain at the front, a man of college education, high lineage, and unsullied honor. These two strange regiments were sent from Boston by transports, during May and June, the one to Hilton Head, and the other to the neighborhood of New Berne.¹

No volunteer colored regiments, except these two, were raised during the war under State authority; but efforts were made by leading Northern States to recruit negroes under national permission, so as to fill out locally their respective quotas. Border State prejudice was very strong, however, against such enlistments; and State sovereignty was strongly offended where those of this race were solicited by recruiting officers from some other loyal State.²

As for black regiments raised under Union auspices, experiments, not quite gratifying, had been made in 1862; one of the earliest at South Carolina by General Hunter, who, with a humor for picturesque effects, proposed dress-

¹ 1 Schouler's Massachusetts, 408; 6 N. & H. 462.

² See War Orders, October 13th, 1863, 6 N. & H. 463.

ing such soldiers in scarlet pantaloons, as the only uniform they would require; another, with more practical success and out of better material, by General Butler at New Orleans. Once fully committed to the emancipating policy, Lincoln, in early 1863, set his own energy at work to realize substantial benefits from it. Upon Dix at Fortress Monroe, Andrew Johnson¹ at Nashville, Banks, Hunter, and others of influential command where these new freedmen abounded, he impressed the importance of using this unshackled multitude of the able-bodied as "the great available and yet unavailed-of force for restoring the Union."² But scattered experiments in this direction had made it plain that to organize effectively the negro military strength for the present conflict would require more than the mere casual effort of a few enthusiastic followers, against the dense prejudice which so widely prevailed among army officers and citizens of conservative instincts, not to add the apathy and listlessness of the negro himself, unused to act from personal volition. Hence, in April, 1863, Adjutant-General Thomas was despatched to the West to make a positive beginning with colored troops. His mission was attended with great success. At Memphis and Milliken's Bend, and in Louisiana, he authorized colored regiments to be raised, and distributed commissions on behalf of the nation; he was empowered, at the same time, to cause the peremptory dismissal of any Union officer whom he found maltreating the freedman. So promising were the reports he made, notwithstanding the interruption of recruiting plans by Grant's expedition against Vicksburg, that Secretary Stanton, in May, established at Washington a special bureau in the War Department for organizing colored troops.³

Following the twin triumphs of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the President, on the 21st of July, requested Stanton to make a renewed and vigorous effort to raise colored forces along the Mississippi frontier, commending Thomas for his sagacious service in this respect. Grant, when con-

¹ Then military governor of Tennessee.

² 6 N. & H. 454.

³ *Ib.* 459-461.

sulted by letter, gave the weightiest sanction which could possibly come from the field. "I have given the subject of arming the negro," he responded, August 23, "my hearty support. This, with the emancipation of the negroes, is the heaviest blow yet given the Confederacy." And of the fighting capacity of such allies, he said, with the same sober emphasis, "They will make good soldiers, and taking them from the enemy weakens him in the same proportion they strengthen us."¹ From the moment such strong professional testimony came in aid of the President's purpose, Northern misgiving and prejudice began to wane, and what gave convincing force to the attempt was the necessity the North was now under, of applying conscription otherwise to keep its armies filled, just as the Southern adversary had long been doing. But while, on Confederate soil, prejudice or consistency kept the Richmond government almost inflexibly opposed to making soldiers of the race for whose assured bondage they had taken up arms, they who sustained the Union secured preëminence by acting in the light of calm reason. There was scarcely an enrolling district north of the hesitant border States in which the arms-bearing population did not willingly fill out its complement of volunteers, or reduce its quota under the draft, by accepting, and even soliciting, negroes. Congress, by an act
1864-1865. of 1864, provided that all able-bodied male colored persons, between the ages of twenty and forty-five years, resident in the United States, should be enrolled and form part of the national forces; and further, that the loyal masters of drafted slaves should receive the national bounty and compensation, while the slave who served should become personally free.²

¹ 6 N. & H. 466.

² 13 U. S. Stats. 11 (February 24th). As a final vindication of Lincoln's practical wisdom in pursuing this policy, it was officially announced in December, 1863, that about 50,000 late slaves were actually bearing arms in the ranks of the Union forces; in April, 1864, that this number had increased to 71,976; and at the close of the war, that the grand aggregate of colored troops, in infantry, cavalry, and artillery, then in service, amounted to 123,156 men and officers. The en-

Negroes had been considered non-combatant, both male and female; they quailed before the white-skinned master, and such undoubtedly was their manifestation as a race under unequal social conditions before the war.¹ But the alignment of men, shoulder to shoulder, in military discipline, stimulates heroism; and, under white officers, indispensable at the beginning of such service, the American negro bravely acquitted himself when under fire, showing something of that tremor of devotion which had gained respect formerly for our Mexican adversaries. Promotion from the ranks for courage and skill was the reward which promised a heartier recognition of this race, should war last long enough. From the shiftless vagabond who took step with the martial music of his liberators of a higher race, to the resourceful soldier, was a long mount. Not alone, however, in the camp and fatigue duty to which our rescued slave was at first assigned most naturally, did the negro perform good service; but when fighting came, he pulled his trigger manfully with the rest, and felt a child no longer. The bravery of colored troops was first made manifest in the Confederate attack of June, 1863, at Milliken's Bend, to which we have alluded,² where white and black regiments guarded a remote post together. Raw as these negroes were, all of them enlisted after Vicksburg's siege commenced, and all under fire for the first time in a hand-to-hand fight, "they behaved well," is Grant's encomium.³ And not long after, at Fort Wagner, South Carolina, the Northern freedmen of the Massachusetts 54th, a choicer set as civilians, headed that deadly assault which cost their peerless colonel his life.⁴

tire number thus commissioned and enlisted during the two last years of this novel and successful experiment, was 186,017. See 6 N. & H. 468.

¹ See 4 Moore, 36, for the negro conception of freedom, as described by white versifiers.

² *Supra*, p. 393. ³ 1 Grant, 545; *McClure*, January, 1898 (Dana).

⁴ Shaw's body among those humble corpses (July 18th) was never found; but a more imposing monument commemorates his name than probably any other regimental officer of this war ever received from grateful fellow-countrymen.

This nation may have advanced slowly in dealing, during four years, with the dread problem of the negro, yet no nation ever advanced faster in pursuing a task so arduous. As Madison had said in 1780, when advising the employment of black soldiers under the ransom of freedom in our earliest Revolution, the principle of liberty "ought never to be lost sight of in a contest for liberty." And throughout the present contest, the negro never fought like a savage, never assassinated for his own freedom, but waited for the white man to admit him to the ranks, and then fought as one civilized in warfare.

On the Confederate side, this new experiment of arming the blacks was watched with the keenest apprehension and anxiety. From the Richmond government orders issued, August 21st, 1862, which declared the first Union generals who experimented in this direction public enemies and outlaws, — prisoners, whenever caught, for close confinement and a felon's death.¹ By Confederate authorities, civil or in the field, the arming of slaves as soldiers on the 1862-1863. Union side was at once and repeatedly denounced as an attempt to inaugurate a servile war for the murder of white masters — an inhuman and atrocious warfare; and President Davis proclaimed, in December, 1862, that all negro slaves captured in arms, and their commissioned officers as well, should be delivered over to the Southern State Executives concerned, to be dealt with according to local law.² Some members of the Confederate Congress favored raising the black flag, asking and giving no quarter, when Lincoln's proclamation of January, 1863, committed the Union to its new policy; and that Congress passed a joint resolution, which Davis approved May 1st, 1863, declaring that all white officers of negro Union soldiers "shall, if captured, be put to death or be otherwise punished" at the discretion of a summary court-martial. A counter order by President Lincoln, issued July 30th, 1863, after the pronounced

¹ 14 W. R. 599.² Am. Cycl. 1862, 738; 6 N. & H. c. 21.

successes of the Union arms, promised the same government protection to soldiers of whatever class, color, or condition, and threatened retaliation in kind — death for death, life and imprisonment at hard labor for reënslavement — for every Union soldier who because of race and color should be treated in violation of the laws of civilized war. Happily the barbarous conduct threatened at Richmond stopped short of such righteous provocation; and one probable massacre alone, in 1864, stains a record on this issue, which otherwise, so far as history is aware, stopped at threats and angry denunciation.¹

But an opposite phase of the colored enlistment subject began to impress the Southern people as combined resistance to the Union narrowed to its most desperate straits. Many of the clearer-sighted leaders of this section proposed seriously to follow the Northern President's example, agreeably to the advice of some of their own military commanders, and arm negro slaves as soldiers, whether for their own perpetual bondage or for freedom by way of ransom, as opinion might determine. That strange conclusion, had it ever been reached, would perhaps have reunited North and South eventually in sentiment, by a different process from what history must record, by demonstrating at length the whole fallacy upon which the social difference of sections had so long rested. For, as a Confederate writer has well expressed it, "if a negro was fit to be a soldier he was not fit to be a slave."²

Something may here be said concerning prisoners and their exchange during our Civil War. There was obvious unwillingness at first, on the Union side, to concede anything like a belligerent status to armed insurgents and

¹ See 6 N. & H. c. 21, which recites the disputed facts of the massacre of negro defenders at Fort Pillow, Tennessee, on the 12th of April, 1864, when that place was captured by the Confederate General N. B. Forrest; also more doubtful evidence, in one or two other instances, 7 ib. 453.

² Pollard, 453, 454, See c. 3, *post*.

citizens. When President Davis called for privateers, in April, 1861, the response at Washington was to denounce the penalties of piracy against all who should ravage the seas under pretended letters of marque and reprisal from

1861. this pseudo-government. The earliest Union capture

was of the privateer *Jefferson Davis* and its crew, of whom several were convicted and sentenced to death. International convenience led the Confederate government presently to commission all engaged in privateering as public officers, making the vessels in effect cruisers of a Confederate navy. When Bull Run, in July, changed the aspect of advantage by giving to the South many military prisoners, Colonels Wilcox and Corcoran and other high officers on the Union side were selected as hostages at Richmond for Southern privateers held at Washington, to suffer a corresponding fate. Such was the temper of contending sections that no general policy could be agreed upon, during 1861, for an exchange of prisoners; yet casual exchanges were made by generals on either side without touching the vital points at issue. In January, 1862, Bishop Ames and Hamilton Fish were at the North appointed commissioners to visit prisoners at Richmond and minister to their wants and comforts;¹ but the Confederate govern-

1862.

ment, refusing admittance for such a purpose, attempted to negotiate with them, instead, for a general exchange. This the commissioners considered a repulse of their humane endeavors, and went back to Washington accordingly. The result was, however, that Lincoln, willing to sacrifice not only official dignity, but something of legitimate right, to relieve the sufferings of soldiers in the Libby prison, yielded what the Confederates desired. Generals Wool and Howell Cobb on either side undertook to settle the details; but difficulties, largely because of the Southern privateers, prolonged the business, until on the 22d of July, under new negotiators, Generals Dix and D. H. Hill, a cartel was agreed upon and signed in due form, under which, in course of a month, the general exchange of

¹ Stanton's first act as Secretary. 1 Gorham, c. 33.

prisoners began on the basis of man for man, the privateersmen in Northern custody included.¹

The practical enforcement of this cartel gave rise to much wrangling; for pretexts were sought, as military vicissitudes tempted one or another adversary to take advantage. Butler's execution of Mumford, the arbitrary civil arrests by Union generals, Pope's levy of military contributions during his brief command in Virginia—these and other matters, complained of as Southern grievances, the United States found full opportunity to offset or defend. But the greatest irritation grew out of Lincoln's emancipation policy and the arming of black soldiers, which we have just dwelt upon. Nevertheless, the year 1863 opened with the cartel of the previous July in full operation. The preponderance of prisoners on either side was not great before the summer, and exchanges proceeded steadily, notwithstanding an acrimonious correspondence and threats of retaliation, kept up like a sham cannonade. Commanders in the field began to parole and exchange at will, without the formality of sending to the rear and exchanging at specified points. A code of instructions from Washington, requiring that captures, to be valid, should be "reduced to possession," and reserving the right of Government to disapprove of a parole, was promulgated on the 3d of July. On that very day and before receiving notice, Lee on his retreat from Gettysburg released on parole his prisoners of the two former days, simply because he could not take them with him. Meade at once disavowed those paroles and ordered the men back to duty. Of this the Richmond government made complaint, and when Port Hudson fell, and Banks sent his paroled Confederates to Mobile, instead of Vicksburg or City Point, the formal points of exchange stipulated, Ould, the Confederate agent, released the men from their promise. Meanwhile a

1863.

¹ 7 N. & H. c. 16; Am. Cycl. 1862, 710; Davis, c. 73. Many details were set forth in this important instrument; officers and men taken on either side were to be exchanged by equivalents; those captured were to be paroled in ten days, and no parole should absolve until the equivalent prisoner had actually reached the line of his friends.

loose system of exchange had grown up, without specifying by name the persons commuted, and disputes of fact arose as to who were actually paroled prisoners. Believing that the enemy had sent good paroled men from Vicksburg, not yet exchanged, to Bragg's army at Chattanooga, the Northern agent retaliated by declaring that all Union officers and men captured and paroled before September 1st were duly exchanged. An angry correspondence followed, in the course of which, towards the close of this year, the cartel of 1862 was annulled and exchanges ceased.¹ The Confederate death menace to colored soldiers and their officers was to the Union side another outstanding grievance.

From the date of the cartel until July, 1863, the Confederates had usually the excess of prisoners; but after Vicksburg and Gettysburg the balance was often on the other side. When Grant came east, in the spring of 1864, after his appointment to the chief command of all the armies,^{1864.} he infused a stern spirit into the negotiations now partially resumed. He ordered that no more prisoners be given up until equivalents for Vicksburg and Port Hudson were received, and the Confederacy promised, furthermore, not to distinguish between white and colored prisoners. With this altered demeanor on the Union part, and the general course of victory in their favor, Confederates became in their turn the suitors for exchange. During the long suspension of arrangements, prisoners had rapidly accumulated on each side and increased the reciprocal ill-feeling.² To the South the pressure in consequence was all the greater, because they needed all the men that could be brought together, and found the care of Union prisoners a burden in their poverty and a terrible reproach. But Grant, with a keen eye to comparative numbers, had become convinced

¹ See Am. Cycl. 1863, 763, 764; Davis, c. 75. Ould denied bad faith, while Grant, Thomas, and Halleck have asserted it. 7 N. & H. 457. Under the original cartel, paroled prisoners could not rightfully be put into the ranks again before accounts were balanced and an exchange, man for man, effected.

² In Federal custody were between 60,000 and 70,000; in Confederate custody nearly as many. Am. Cycl. 1864, 684.

that the former system of exchange brought serious disadvantage to the Union side; and this the War Department corroborated, by estimating that it cost the United States a difference of 40,000 men in the campaign of 1864.¹ Arrangements were made, however, as winter approached, to furnish prisoners, North and South, with supplies for their greater comfort, and already had the exchange been arranged for thousands of sick and disabled prisoners. Heart-stricken by the accounts of shocking suffering and maltreatment that reached him from the prison pens of the South, President Lincoln now requested Grant to spare no efforts, consistent with public safety and honor, to effect the prompt release of all soldiers and loyal persons in captivity "as prisoners of war or on any other grounds." Yet so much of technical obstruction and delay still hindered the matter that 1865 opened before all the questions at issue were settled, and the new arrangements practically completed.^{1865.} When final exchanges were resumed, on the basis of officer for officer and man for man, the war was nearly over.²

The comparative treatment of prisoners during the Civil War admits of no discussion. On the Union side, whether at Fort Delaware, Point Lookout, or Johnson's Island, prisoners received wholesome and sufficient rations, the sick had special nourishment provided them, and all were treated with due regard to health and sanitary conditions. Prisoners, to be sure, had something to make life gloomy, as must always be the case; yet the Washington government looked forward to the time when all citizens, faithful or errant, should be reunited.³ But Union prisoners at the

¹ Canby's report, in 7 N. & H. c. 16.

² The South had resisted exchanging colored men, and late slaves especially, on the same footing as whites. 7 N. & H. 463; Am. Cycl. 1864, 686; Davis, c. 76.

³ 7 N. & H. c. 16, and citations. There was a Confederate plot in 1863 to liberate 2500 Southern prisoners who were confined at Johnson's Island in Sandusky Bay, not far from the Canadian border. The seat of the plot was in Canada. By early November Lord Lyons, the

South were not thus regarded, for those in authority steeled their hearts against them as aliens, then and always. That they were harshly and even inhumanly treated during the long interval while exchanges were suspended, is shown by conclusive testimony. Palliation should be admitted, from the fact that rations were short for Confederate soldiers, — to whose fare such prisoners were by law entitled,¹ — and that practical sanitation and the appliances of common comfort were less understood or regarded here than at the North. But, allowing for all this, the temper of a race of masters was hard towards white opponents, and as to the race in late oppression cruel, when it came to fighting. Orders such leaders issued, which perhaps they would not, if charging themselves with the execution, have personally carried out to the letter; they denounced death more freely and imperiously than they afterwards inflicted it; and many, indeed, among them were generous and magnanimous, when it came to a test. But slavery had trained the coarsest brutes of society to go forth at such bidding like bloodhounds, and that lower class that had earned its miserable wages by inflicting the lash upon the naked backs of men and women, wreaked vengeance not unwillingly upon Northern soldiers, and in their zeal outstripped the desires of those who set them on. Upon the Richmond government, whether through design or inadvertence, rests the infamy of ill-treating its Union prisoners; and Andersonville remains the foulest blot upon the South of all this fratricidal contest. There, in the interior of Georgia, during the summer of 1864, when other points were men-
1864. aced, the common soldiers captured were brought together for confinement, until 35,000 prisoners occupied a field of about thirty acres, enclosed by a board fence or stockade, heavily guarded. A noisome swamp was in the centre of this field; a small stream passing through the

British minister, on learning of the design, gave information at Washington, and Secretary Stanton took prompt action to frustrate the conspiracy. *Am. Cycl.* 1863, 765.

¹ *Davis*, 440.

enclosure furnished the only water accessible for washing; and the soil, used as a sink, on the edges of that stream, breathed loathsome pestilence. Most prisoners were absolutely without shelter of any kind, jostling and crowding one another in the open air, and exposed to all variations of weather; few of them with even a blanket for protection, and thousands with their tattered and lice-infested clothes dropping apart, until scarcely an underflannel was left to cover one's nakedness. The meagre ration of unboltsed corn meal, with a little bacon such as the soap-maker finds fit use for, could not support life properly under such conditions; for, besides starvation and exposure to sun and storm, were the various loathsome diseases, to decimate their numbers, which result from crowded conditions, filthy habits, bad diet, and depression of spirits. Green corn or other vegetables for keeping down the scurvy were denied these soldiers, and neither soap nor clothing was ever issued. Thousands died of diarrhoea and chills, or wandered about in the horrible stench, unhinged by their sufferings, bereft of hope, and utterly reckless of life. There was no medical attendance provided within the stockade, though surgeons appeared daily at the gates; hospitals outside could accommodate but a tithe of the sick, and only the strongest among the crowd of agonized wretches could reach the gates to be served at all. Men who had died from unknown causes and whom medical officers had never seen were carted out daily from this horrible enclosure, and tumbled into nameless graves; while the living wandered about, skeletons and shadows, raving half-insane, or purposely crossing the dead line to get shot down rather than endure such sufferings longer. Nearly ten thousand deaths occurred here in the short space of eight months.

There was little glory to nerve the soul for patriotic sacrifice in such an experience as this. Hundreds, who at length were rescued or transferred, bore witness to such ill-treatment in their diseased and emaciated bodies; and hundreds more who died here, by their diaries and last letters; but Confederate testimony from officers, generous and candid, who saw but could not help, establishes inde-

pendently the facts here stated.¹ For retaliation of any such slow torture, the warm-hearted Lincoln was incapable; and whatever privations might have been placed upon Confederate prisoners, in consequence, never partook of such incidents. But as soon as the war ended, indignant justice pursued Henry Wirz, the keeper of the charnel-field of Andersonville, and, on sentence by a military commission, he suffered death for his cruelty and mismanagement.²

About a year later than the Confederacy, the Union government found itself compelled by its ravenous needs and the lapse of popular enthusiasm to resort to enrolment and a draft. But no exhaustive process was applied, and volunteering, the primary and more suitable recourse, was favored to the end. By actual conscription, in fact, a small number, by comparison, came into the field; but the initiation of draft powerfully stimulated volunteering, while the commutation money paid for substitutes and personal exemption yielded government a vast sum to maintain its recruitment bureaus. In April, 1865, when the war ended with a million soldiers in the field, enrolment showed that the Union forces still uncalled for amounted to 2,245,000 more. The quotas charged against loyal States, under all calls made by the President during the four years of active conflict following Fort Sumter's surrender, figured at 2,759,049; terms of service varying from three months to three years. Of men credited on the several calls and put into the army, navy, and marine service, the aggregate,

¹ Am. Cycl. 1864, 685; 7 N. & H. c. 16; Wirz Trial, *passim*. Cf. Davis, c. 76. The Richmond government, in the autumn of 1864, moved many of the surviving prisoners to Millen and Florence, where they fared better.

² There can be no accurate count of the mortality in Southern prisons. Our War Department reported 188,000 Union soldiers as captured by the Confederates during the war, half of whom were paroled, and half confined in prison; 36,000 of the latter dying in captivity. As to the statistics of Union captives, cf. 7 N. & H. 470; Davis, 453. Wirz is styled "unfortunate" by Jefferson Davis. See Davis, c. 76.

2,690,401, left but a moderate deficiency in amount. The grand total comprised in such a count, however, as we should observe, included many who reënlisted.¹

During the first great stress, in the summer of 1862, which followed McClellan's repulse in the peninsula and the depletion of his splendid army, nine months' militia were called for, in August, in addition to the volunteers for three years whom loyal State governors had, in July, undertaken to raise; and by that time the War Department gave warning that a draft would be ordered in States whose quotas showed a deficiency.² In most loyal States, however, the governors worked with the utmost energy, and by every patriotic appeal, to fan the fervor of volunteering and avoid that local stigma. The President, on his part, was as forbearing as possible to secure his ends. Early the next year, however, Congress, as one of its final measures, passed the Enrolment act, under which conscription was set up and the nation assumed its constitutional right to raise by force troops need-
1863.
ful for the future. A provost marshal general for the whole United States was created, with provost marshals over the various districts, into which, by the subdivision of States, the whole loyal country was now divided. With stated exceptions all able-bodied male citizens, and those, besides the native born, of foreign birth who had declared their intention to become naturalized, were declared liable to military duty between the ages of twenty and thirty-five, and those unmarried until forty-five. Enrolment lists of the persons thus liable were to be prepared in each district, and a draft might be ordered from them, at the President's discretion, whenever needful. Drafted persons were permitted to furnish each a substitute or pay a commutation of three hundred dollars.³

¹ Am. Cycl. 1865, 31; 7 N. & H. 8. Twelve calls were made by President Lincoln during this entire period. Veteran volunteers, to the number of 150,000, reënlisted in 1863-64.

² In a few instances, but with unsatisfactory results, the draft of militia thus threatened was resorted to. 7 N. & H. 3.

³ This act had other features for increasing the efficiency of the ser-

Colonel James B. Fry, who had served with high credit as chief-of-staff to Buell, was made provost marshal general, with a bureau in the War Department. Under his vigilant direction other army officers of capacity were appointed district provost marshals, with commissioners and surgeons to aid them severally in their duties.¹ The enrolment began in the early part of May, and in all but a few States, where the selection of officers was difficult, was pushed forward with energy. Besides his duties of enrolling and drafting, and of arresting and returning deserters to the field,² the provost marshal general was also charged with the entire work of volunteer recruiting. The task was a complex and difficult one, for State and local authorities still insisted upon raising volunteers where they could, and gaining full credit for quotas. While, too, an aggregate State quota might be fixed, it was not easy to equalize the draft at any one time among the different districts of that State. In some States and municipalities the prescribed quota was so well met by volunteering that little or no draft was needful; but, wherever a district draft had to be made, the names of enrolled men were written on separate strips of paper and placed in a wheel, or circular box, which was then made to revolve, and the name taken out and registered; the process being repeated until the number of names required had been drawn.³

Obstruction to the draft was made by political foes of the administration, whose strength in the earlier months of its enforcement was considerable. Writs of *habeas corpus* were served upon the local provost marshals, and proceedings brought in State courts to test the validity of the statute. In one instance, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, by a

vice. Volunteers, already in service, who reënlisted for one or two years, were promised a bounty with cash instalment, as a special inducement; and deserters were to be arrested and sent back to duty by the several provost marshals. 12 Stats. 731 (March 3d, 1863).

¹ 7 N. & H. c. 1.

² Nearly 20,000 deserters were thus arrested and sent to the front during the first six months after this system was organized.

³ Am. Cycl. 1865, 361-366.

bare majority of its judges, pronounced the draft act unconstitutional; but this went for nothing, for Government pursued its own military course as Congress had directed, yielding to neither process nor decree, unless issuing from the Federal judiciary.¹ Riots occurred in two or three large cities, of which that in America's chief metropolis was the most alarming.

To Lincoln it was a serious vexation that the great Empire State, so zealous to sustain him under Governor Morgan, should in this urgent season have passed into control of the opposition, and that all overtures made by him to the new executive were met by a chilling reserve.² Horatio Seymour was a man of integrity, and loyal, doubtless, to the Union, from his different point of view; but chosen, as he had been the previous November, by a concert of elements displeased with the radical tendency of things at Washington, his public attitude tended to make the State obstructive of the Presidential wishes. When at the New Year he succeeded Morgan in office, his inaugural address stated significantly that he had sworn to support the Constitution of the United States, and had equally sworn to support that of his State. After the conscription act had passed Congress, "It is believed," he said, "by at least one-half of the people of the loyal States a violation of the supreme constitutional law;" and with such a conviction at heart, it is not strange that he permitted himself to become the head and front of an opposition to its practical enforcement. He accused the administration of an unfair and partisan execution of this law against his State; of an enrolment such as made no account of the relation borne by an able-bodied population to the whole community; of a draft contrived, as though purposely, to punish the Democratic city of New York, while bearing lightly upon the Republican rural districts. All such accusations may be passed over as unworthy of the grave occasion.

¹ Am. Cycl. 1863, 366.

² 7 N. & H. c. 10.

Enrolment proceeded in New York City, notwithstanding this comment; and when it was completed the draft began. But the evil passions aroused by harsh accusations in high quarters, which one or two party journals had widely disseminated, roused ignorant and ignoble inhabitants, mostly of foreign birth, to tumult and violence. On

July. Saturday morning, the 11th of July, the draft began without sign of civic disturbance, so that no Federal military force was at hand. But Sunday inflamed discussion, and, after secret meetings by night, Monday, the 13th, saw a crowd gathering force as it moved towards the building which Government occupied for its present purpose.¹ Here the commissioner had resumed his work; the wheel turned and a few names were called and recorded, when suddenly a large paving-stone came crashing through the window, shivering inkstands upon a reporter's table and knocking down one or two bystanders. With scarcely a moment's interval a volley of stones flew through the windows, putting a stop to all business; and the outer crowd, by this time howling and hideous and kindled into fury, dashed forward to violence. The ringleaders burst through doors and windows, smashed the furniture of the office into splinters, sprinkled camphene on the floor, and set the building on fire. By the time fire-engines reached the scene, the mob held possession of the hydrants, and this mute habitation, already in full flame, soon burned to the ground. So furious an outburst took the authorities, State and civic, quite by surprise; much of New York's organized militia had been despatched to Pennsylvania, to aid in resisting Lee's invasion; and upon the efficiency and boldness of its police department the city had almost wholly to rely for checking the brute fury and hatred which raged here through the next three days. A force so inadequate could not possibly maintain law and order, but it checked destructive outrage, with the aid of a few troops from the harbor, until, by the close of the fourth day, regiments, State and Federal, arrived from their more engrossing work,

¹ At the corner of Third Avenue and 43d Street.

the fire of lawless passion having by that time burnt itself out. While arson and the pillage of property went on in various quarters, the animus of the rioters was chiefly seen in brutal assaults upon whatever buildings or human beings bore the badge of negro. The governor's course at this crisis was not commendable: he issued two anti-riot proclamations on the 14th, which made less impression than a speech he had uttered the day before, at City Hall, when riot raged fresh, beseeching the raving crowd as "my friends," to wait until his adjutant returned from Washington, whither he had been sent to get the draft suspended. Archbishop Hughes, the venerable Roman Catholic prelate of that city, invited the rioters, by poster, to his residence, where, on the 17th, he exhorted them, in a speech skillfully framed, to retire to their homes and avoid danger.¹ In the few drafting riots of the war, whether here or elsewhere, native Americans bore no considerable part, but most who resisted were of European birth, ignorant of our institutions, and accustomed, as our people were not, to a ruler's military demands.

No provision of the conscription acts, North or South, caused more bitter dislike than that which exempted drafted men from service upon payment of a commutation price. "The rich man's money against the poor man's blood," was the cry of demagogues which excited most powerfully the unthinking crowd; yet, by limiting to a specified sum the cost of exemption, men of moderate means escaped a competition for substitutes in which those wealthiest would have held the market. In other words, Government enlarged, thereby, the class of exempts from actual service

¹ 7 N. & H. c. 1; newspapers; Am. Cycl. 1863. Governor Seymour estimated the number of killed and wounded in these riots at 1000; others placed it much higher. Notwithstanding Seymour's opposition the draft in New York City was resumed on the 19th of August and completed during the ensuing ten days. Ample preparation was made to put down armed resistance, but none was attempted. 27 Harper, 708.

"simply by admitting poorer men into it."¹ For individual substitution, the deeper principle not objected to, accorded with the constant practice of other nations; and it must have been Quixotic, indeed, for a mercantile and peace-loving republic to undertake that each one drafted should turn into the ranks and handle his musket for a protracted war, regardless whether others stood ready to be hired or whether taxable resources for the nation did not require brains competent at home to furnish them. Conscription has been the practical resort of government for great emergencies in all ages of the world; and in establishing independence, and again in the War of 1812, our American people resorted to it. But Sparta is not modern America, nor is war to be cultivated for its own sake. Nevertheless, the purchase of men to maintain free government, as substitutes or otherwise, brings unquestioned evil.²

Plans of recruitment based upon a pure bounty and purchase system involve expense, and produce, as a rule, soldiers of an inferior class; but this is an ill, as war lengthens out, which cannot be well avoided, the same principle of hire applying in the peaceful pursuits of life. No matter what the waste in dollars, the strongest nation in the world is that which holds its people close to its heart. On the Southern side, as we have seen,³ a sweeping conscription was resorted to quite early; and necessity forced the Confederacy to an application of that policy unparalleled in the history of modern republics. But exemptions were found, under even that harshest of systems, and, for most of the time, the substitute feature prevailed. Not until the last year of the war, and when too late to save

the Confederate cause from ruin, with a contracted
1864-1865.

domain not only surrounded, but penetrated to its very heart, was the furnishing of substitutes abolished, so that every white man in the land between the ages of eighteen

¹ So Lincoln expressed it. 7 N. & H. 54.

² The commutation clause was repealed by act July 4th, 1864, at the President's suggestion, as a concession to popular clamor, but the substitute provision remained. 13 Stats. 379. See also *ib.* 487 (March 3d, 1865).

³ *Supra*, p. 168.

and forty-five was declared a Confederate soldier, subject to personal service. And, more than this, all boys from sixteen to eighteen, and all mature men from forty-five to sixty, though not drafted, were formed into reserve "home guards."¹

The humor of stopping all traffic in substitutes, and marching merchants and money-changers to the front, seems to have tickled old veterans of the Southern army; but by all accounts it was the humor of utter despair and ruin. The infantile and moribund had hardly the heart left to murmur; and it is wonderful that, in those frightful and yet more frightful days, human discipline revealed such depth of constancy and self-sacrifice. Outside of Georgia scarcely a prominent man at the South dared raise his voice for State rights while the iron bands of Confederate tyranny were clamped so tightly. The Richmond Congress, nerveless and vacillating, shifted responsibility upon the President, who, deaf as the adder to clamor or panic, enforced his inexorable demands to the last limit of human endurance. But drastic beyond example as were those latest conscription laws, they were not carried out by the South with that system and thoroughness which characterized administration at the North. The medicine itself came only when the death throes had begun; and Confederate writers, still haunted by the nightmare of recollection, confess, while praising the potency of conscription, that the machinery was ill put together, and neither fair, faithful, nor positive as actually operated.²

Military arrests [continued at the North during 1863, notwithstanding the political reverses of the previous fall. In one notable instance the President was embarrassed by the zeal of a department commander. The impulsive Burnside, soon after taking command of the department of the Ohio, made issue with the copperhead Democracy of that

¹ De Leon, 187 (1864). See comment of 2 Grant, 426.

² De Leon, 188.

loyal State by a celebrated order, which threatened the summary trial and punishment of civilians committing enumerated acts "for the benefit of the enemy." This order, open doubtless to criticism as liable to illegal abuse, was furiously assailed by the set aimed at, and by none with more fire and eloquence than Vallandigham, whose passionate invectives against the Government and the war had caused him recently the loss of his seat in Congress. Burnside sent to one of the political meetings where Vallandigham held forth an officer in citizen's clothes, upon
1863, whose report he had the orator arrested at Dayton,
May. on the 4th of May, and brought down to Cincinnati by a special train to be tried by a military commission. Vallandigham, by his counsel, challenged the legality of these proceedings; but, heedless of his turbulent sympathizers, the court-martial found its prisoner guilty of publicly expressing disloyal sentiments, in violation of Burnside's order, and sentenced him to close confinement at some fortress for the rest of the war. Burnside approved the proceedings, naming Fort Warren as the place of confinement; and the United States court, sitting at Cincinnati, refused to interfere by *habeas corpus*.¹

Lincoln disliked the unpleasant responsibility of what many would style a political persecution; but, with an accomplished fact before him, he chose, as the better alternative, to sustain Burnside's action; and in this his Cabinet agreed with him. But, careful to diminish the odium of the infliction, he commuted the sentence, and, instead of imprisoning, ordered Vallandigham sent into the Confederate lines, where he belonged. This was done, in the latter part of the month, and the Richmond government accepted him on the footing he now claimed, of prisoner of war. Indignation meetings, both in Ohio and New York, were held by the peace Democrats, and, as events turned out, the Democratic convention of Vallandigham's State, which met on the 11th of June, found itself forced, by party sentiment, to nominate its extreme factionist for the office of

¹ 7 N. & H. c. 12; Am. Cycl. 1863, 480.

governor, as a remonstrance against the martyrdom he suffered. The Unionists put up John Brough, a war Democrat, as opposing candidate, on the simple platform of hearty devotion to the Union and an unqualified support of Government in its vigorous prosecution of the war. Before the canvass closed, Vallandigham issued an address to the voters from the Canada border, where he had arrived in July, after a courteous reception South, and an escape, connived at, upon a blockade-running vessel. With the persecution issue much overstrained on his behalf, Vallandigham was buried at the polls in October under more than a hundred thousand adverse votes; and he prudently remained, the next winter, on the Canada side, to avoid the rearrest which threatened his return.¹

Lincoln's great skill as political director and defender never shone to better advantage than in the election canvass of this memorable autumn. To the storm of angry reproach that followed Vallandigham's arrest and sentence he opposed strong specious argument, though expediency had been his real motive for sustaining Burnside. Responding to the protest of an Albany indignation meeting, he insisted that Vallandigham had been arrested, not for damaging the administration in its political conduct, but for assailing the army upon whose presence and vigor depended the very life of the nation. To a committee from the Ohio convention, which asked him in no deferential tone to restore the nominee to his home, he disclaimed, in good temper, all purpose of insult to a loyal State, and promised compliance if the committee would pledge themselves to propositions he had written out, for sustaining the army and navy in the suppression of rebellion—a pledge, it is needless to say, which they would not give.² Here, as in other opportunities of our whole Northern canvass, President Lincoln produced a strong impression on the mind of the common people by making points in discussion against his party adversary, and showing, though with kindness and discreet expression, his resolute purpose to maintain this fight,

¹ 7 N. & H. c. 12; Am. Cycl. 1863.

² Ib.

whatever its errors, until the Union should regain its rightful supremacy.

SECTION VI.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN 1863-65.

The Palmerston ministry had offered neither regret nor apology to the United States for the depredations of those escaping vessels, built at Liverpool, which now scoured the high seas, plundering the commerce of American merchants.¹

1863. For the most part, the same cold, supercilious, and ungracious tone characterized its communications with Minister Adams until after Gettysburg and Vicksburg. Nothing, however, penetrates the thick tegument of English indifference like successes won notwithstanding. Lord Palmerston was of antislavery sentiment, and, despite an aristocratic bearing, his government leaned to the popular side in its foreign policy. The British common people developed by 1863 a better feeling towards the Union cause than before. With the Lincoln government at length committed to a moral revolution, the heart of British philanthropy was touched, and, in place of that stolid indifference or disaffection concerning the merits of the original controversy — a contest for supremacy, as many thought it, where some States wished to get rid of a burdensome compact and the others to compel them to it — was now felt something of a sympathy for the side of freedom under the stars and stripes. In Exeter Hall, in January, a large mass-meeting applauded the new edict of emancipation, many English journals and public men changed their tone, and numerous addresses of sympathy from British antislavery societies and trades unions were forwarded, through Adams, to President Lincoln. The poor and downtrodden abroad turned their thoughts to a home in the New World, and our Government at Washington encouraged immigration as part of its own regenerating work.

¹ *Supra*, pp. 270-272.

Yet relations with the British government were by no means genial. It was now our turn to complain; for scarcely a week passed without bringing home to Northern merchants the news of some fresh spoliation on the ocean. American shipping had to seek protection under a foreign flag. Congress authorized the President to issue letters of marque and reprisal. Minister Adams was instructed to present the *Alabama* claims to the British government as fast as they were made up, and to press them discreetly. Yet Earl Russell coldly disclaimed all responsibility. The wealthy and privileged classes of England, with such organs as the *London Times*, were still bitterly hostile. The influence of a great Democratic nation was dreaded, while Southerners seemed a congenial sort of landed gentry. A Confederate cotton loan had been entirely taken up by English capitalists. New vessels were on the stocks, notoriously under contract with agents of the South, and the Lairds, strong partisans of that section, had commenced two ironclad rams for hostile operations. In Parliament a violent faction pressed resolutions to compel the immediate recognition of the Davis Confederacy.

Discussions at Downing Street had drawn out a suggestion from Earl Russell that mutual amendments might make the enlistment laws of Great Britain and the United States more effective; but when Seward acceded to this proposal, it appeared that the Lord Chancellor thought the present act sufficient, and the ministry would propose no change. Five months later, a fitting comment was furnished by a ruling of the English Exchequer Court in an important case. The *Alexandra*,¹ launched at Liverpool in the spring of 1863, was meant for a vessel of war, and the proof was overwhelming of its Southern destination. This time the English ministry acted promptly, and information was filed on behalf of the Crown against ship and builders. But when, at the trial in June, the facts claimed were fully established, the Lord Chief Baron instructed the

¹ The marriage of the Prince of Wales to the Princess Alexandra of Denmark took place in March, 1863.

jury, in effect, that building and fitting out vessels for a purchaser to use as he pleased was no breach of the Foreign Enlistment Act. The case was appealed; and, now that the tide of military success had turned at home, Seward gave plain warning that, if this new doctrine of neutral obligation was sustained in the higher court, Great Britain must either amend her statutes, or expect the United States to protect their own commerce as against the naval force of a public enemy.¹ Meanwhile the two rams, more formidable than anything hitherto attempted on neutral territory, approached completion; and, regardless of depositions the most convincing, Earl Russell advised Minister Adams, in September, that he could not interfere. "It would be superfluous in me to point out to your lordship," was Adams's sturdy rejoinder, "that this is war."²

That perilous climax brought the Palmerston ministry to its senses. The *Alexandra* lawsuit, like a wounded snake, dragged its slow length up to the House of Lords, to disappear, finally, as vexing litigation does so often, in its own convolutions; and, to relieve itself of a troublesome dilemma, the crown purchased the two rams for the royal navy. Reverberations from Vicksburg and Gettysburg had changed the tone both of Parliament and the Cabinet perceptibly, and that without need of amending the present laws at all. By April of the next year notice was formally given to the South that the "so-called Confederate States" must make no further effort to build war-vessels for use against the United States government, a friendly power.³

¹ Dipl. Corr. 1863, 308.

² 8 N. & H. c. 10; 3 Seward, 180. The conclusion, September 8th, announced to Adams, to detain the rams, was the turning-point in the course of this English cabinet. 4 Pierce's Sumner, 165.

³ 8 N. & H. c. 10. See 4 Pierce's Sumner, 151-154, for a careful analysis of British sentiment towards the United States during the Civil War. Earl Russell, so hard, captious, and cynical in those years, regretted his course in later life. Gladstone, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, was, up to July, 1863, hostile to the cause of Union; Cobden, at first distrustful, gave his good-will because of the emancipation

Except for these "ocean incendiaries," these "gypsies of the sea," as Sumner called them, the British ministry was found just and reasonable in official intercourse; for, besides the treaty for suppressing the slave trade, Seward arranged with Earl Russell for adjusting claims upon the northwest frontier. But this belligerent ship-building for the South, so long and so superciliously permitted, excited in the loyal United States more ill-feeling and resentment than all other European aggressions combined. As Sumner wrote to Bright in early 1863, while this grievance was growing, "All the signs are of war," with Great Britain, "more surely than in the time of the *Trent*."¹ Neither privateers nor public armed cruisers can much longer make respectable among nations this plundering of defenceless private property not contraband upon the high seas. The South gained a questionable glory by her prowess in this enterprise. Not all "pirates," worthy of that name, we should remember, are the individual enemies of mankind; for the Barbary States that pursued this plundering business when the century opened, were recognized governments, sovereignties gone astray, so to speak, in the world's great family.

While open acrimony marked long our official intercourse with Great Britain, the Imperialist of France pursued his stealthier and more treacherous schemes against the peace of this continent, always bland and polite in demeanor whatever the mask he wore. The new conquest of Mexico advanced to its consummation under his inexorable ^{1863,} orders. After numerous delays and a costly siege, ^{May-June,} Forey captured Puebla on the 19th of May, and confiscation of property was meted by the wholesale to such Mexi-

policy; Brougham, like Carlyle and Harriet Martineau, appeared unsympathetic. John Bright alone, among the leading British statesmen, was from first to last the firm friend of the United States. Sumner, who had "loved England," as he wrote, deplored finding her so long on the wrong side. *Ib.* 162.

¹ 4 Sumner, 131.

cans as resisted longer.¹ The Church party of the Republic, which had favored the invading army, now gave in its formal allegiance. Onward to the capital marched the ruthless conqueror, over the route of glory that Cortes and Scott had travelled in succession. Marshal Bazaine, exalted in Napoleon's favor, succeeded Forey, to complete the new conquest. On the 10th of June, amidst reactionary demonstrations of delight, the French commander entered the city of Mexico; Juarez with his cabinet having already fled to San Luis Potosi, there to hoist once more the standard of the people, hastily invested by the Mexican Congress with dictatorial powers. "Adversity," proclaimed the patriot President, "is not sufficient cause for fainting to the determined Republicans who defend their native land and their rights."

Bazaine now placed the Mexican capital under martial law, muzzled the liberal press, and proclaimed against non-submissionists another confiscation. With military despatch he organized in six days a provisional government, which consisted of a junta, or superior council, named upon Saligny's advice, with all adherents of Juarez excluded. This junta, according to programme, committed, temporarily, all executive authority to a council of three, with Almonte at the head, after which, by associating others with themselves, they constituted an assembly of about two hundred and fifty notables, for designating a government. So well had the work of this assembly been laid out for them, that it took but a single day to adopt, by a vote nearly unanimous and without debate, the resolve which abolished the present republic and substituted a monarchy; and, not to leave any doubt of their cringing subservience, they offered the imperial crown to the Archduke Maximilian of Austria, or, in case of his refusal, to such other Catholic prince as his Majesty, the Emperor of France, might please to indicate. Napoleon, from Paris, telegraphed to the archduke his congratulations; but he found

¹ This cruel and impolitic measure was disapproved by the French government, but was only partially revoked. See p. 286.

the court circles of Europe incredulous of this distant assembly which had grovelled so eagerly when obeisance was enough. The House of Hapsburg wished to purge itself of the whole business, nor would Maximilian consent to accept the crown, unless his choice was ratified by the suffrage of the Mexican people. How to secure this was a puzzle, since the French army occupied but a few cities in scattering states, and had conquered but a fraction of the Mexican people. Bazaine managed plausibly, however, a popular sanction in the military departments occupied; and after a year's waiting in vain for broader expedients, the archduke considered himself elected.

Maximilian, ill-fated representative of imperialism in this New World, was a younger brother of the emperor of Austria, and a true scion of the proudest aristocracy of Europe. Scarcely turned of thirty, generous, indolent, good-natured, he was not devoid of ability, courage, or an honorable purpose; but admiral in the Austrian navy had been thus far his sole distinction, with money extravagance in place of exploit. The impetuous spirit of his vivacious spouse, Carlotta, to whom he was fondly attached, and something of a romantic disposition of his own, led him to think more favorably of Napoleon's glittering offer than did the head of his house. With delicate oval face, high forehead, pencilled eyebrows, well-formed nose and mouth, Maximilian looked little like the oppressor of a people, the chief of bigoted partisans; but as clay, rather, to the hand of some craftier potter. On Sunday, the 10th of April, 1864, having formally accepted the sway of Napoleon's new subjects of the West, this ruler was crowned at the beautiful palace of Miramar, whose parks were thronged with visitors. A Mexican deputation was there received which bent the knee and kissed his hand in token of a people's homage and fidelity over the ocean. Amidst the shouts of Austrian spectators and the roar of Austrian artillery, this youth was proclaimed Emperor of Mexico, and a solemn *Te Deum* was sung in the cathedral at Trieste. The royal head of the House of Hapsburg had given at length his assent, nor was the Papal benediction wanting.

1864-1865.

A convention between Napoleon and Maximilian provided that the French troops should remain in Mexico until native forces could be organized to supply their place; that in the meantime the French commander should have equal authority with the Emperor in determining all movements and points of military occupation; that the expenses of the French invasion, fixed at the sum of 270,000,000 francs, and all future expenses of a standing army, should be assumed by the new empire; and that those exorbitant French indemnities for which war against Mexico was originally undertaken should likewise be paid. Under such auspices, and oppressed with the pawn of his kingdom to his patron for a distressing load of debt, Maximilian departed for his new possessions, having renounced all right to the throne of Austria so long as the Mexican dynasty should endure; and for him remained the discouraging, indeed the nugatory, attempt of planting a throne in this thorny soil, which had yielded him but the mockery of a crown.¹

Maximilian made fair professions upon arriving in Mexico. He exhorted his subjects to abandon political dissension and unite in promoting their country's welfare. He promised his people personal liberty and equality before the law. With the offer of a general amnesty he sought to seduce from Republican allegiance the patriot army, which still held some of the richest and most populous portions of Mexico. But President Juarez blocked every such temptation, and, by a prudent and baffling system of military tactics, the European invaders were incessantly harassed. While thus unsuccessful in conciliating the friends of popular institutions, Maximilian soon lost the friendship of those native reactionists who had offered him the throne. Complying with their wishes so far as to decree that the Roman Catholic religion should be the religion of his empire, he refused to repeal existing laws of religious toleration, or to restore the Church property confiscated by the former government. The Church party deserting him in

¹ 3 Dipl. Corr. 1864, 67, 74; 7 N. & H. c. 14.

consequence, French bayonets became the sole prop of his exotic empire. A native army was summoned, but natives would not enlist in it. While in this shabby though picturesque capital and its historical palace, the ceremonials of a bankrupt court were maintained with phantom gayety, Maximilian's fortunes grew more gloomy and hopeless as the months went on. Guerillas hung upon the flanks of Bazaine's occupying army. A captured town would declare fealty to Maximilian, and then, when the main detachment had retired, its citizens rose upon the guard, drove out the imperial partisans, and declared for "Juarez and liberty" as before. The small, swarthy French soldier, who had not yet outlived the fame of his nation's preëminence in arms, toiled through the barren and unthrifty land to confirm this establishment of the lesser Napoleon, — now in mud to the knees, now climbing steep mountains, — glad enough when a herd of stray cattle could be caught to furnish fresh meat for his rations; he slept with unquiet dreams at night by the side of the unpaved road, or within some ruined convent, tortured by fleas and mosquitoes; while by day he sickened heartily of Mexico, sickened of French glory as attempted in the present age.

Juarez and the liberal government received the constant sympathy of Spanish-American republics. The United States, too, while preserving a prudent neutrality in Mexican affairs, withdrew Minister Corwin, and showed plainly that no usurping empire could hope for American recognition or favor. Maximilian sent a messenger to Washington with an autograph letter, but President Lincoln would neither receive the letter nor hold intercourse, official or unofficial, with the person who bore it. As months went on the course of events, in Mexico as well as Europe, was vigilantly watched by our administration. While engaged in the life and death struggle of his own government, President Lincoln could do no more in prudence than to keep steadily before the eyes of the European Powers the adverse opinion of the United States to this whole invasion; and

that was constantly done with candor and firmness. Seward, in long despatches of September and October, 1863, not controverting Napoleon's friendly assurances, 1863-1865. repulsed French overtures for acknowledging the new monarchy in Mexico, and maintained that the normal opinion of Mexico favored a government there republican in form and domestic in organization, "in preference to any monarchical institutions to be imposed from abroad." He pressed, besides, for Napoleon's serious consideration, the interdependence of all American republics upon one another, and the deep interest of the United States in the maintenance of free institutions throughout this continent.¹

Such a posture foreboded the day of reckoning on these American frontiers, when our own Civil War was ended. But in the Senate and House of Representatives were men to whom such diplomacy seemed tame and tedious; and when, in his message of December, 1863, the President wisely refrained from discussing the pending coronation of Maximilian, they undertook to force a crisis of their own. In the Senate a belligerent resolution of January, 1864, against France, was suppressed on reference to the Committee of Foreign Relations, under Sumner's judicious direction. But in the House, the impulsive Henry Winter Davis, chairman of the corresponding committee in that branch, reported a similar resolution, which passed the House,² April 4th, by a large affirmative vote, not a voice raised against it. The administration pursued unruffled its own judicious course, Seward blandly explaining to the

¹ Dipl. Corr. 1863; 7 N. & H. c. 14; 4 Sumner, 119, etc.

² "Resolved, That the Congress of the United States are unwilling by silence to leave the nations of the world under the impression that they are indifferent spectators of the deplorable events now transpiring in the republic of Mexico; and that they therefore think fit to declare that it does not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowledge any monarchical government, erected on the ruins of any republican government in America, under the auspices of any European power." Cong. Globe, 1408. In the Senate this resolve was put to slumber, unreported.

French government, now thoroughly vexed on the subject and disposed to mischief, that, while that resolution truly interpreted the unanimous sentiment of the people of the United States in regard to Mexico, it had not passed, in Congress, to a final stage; besides which the question of recognition remained, under our Constitution, an executive one. This administration meant no present departure from the policy it had hitherto pursued, and France would be seasonably apprised of any change in such a policy hereafter.¹ Nevertheless, while Lincoln lived, and until, in September, 1865, after his death, Seward gave warning to France that our policy had changed and that the imperial experiment in Mexico must come to an end, no occasion was lost in making it known to the diplomatic corps in Washington, and through our minister in Paris to Napoleon himself, that this Maximilian monarchy was thought a temporary and unnatural occupation which must soon pass away. But the Juarez government and its constitution kept the hearty friendship of this administration. And an outspoken sympathy was extended to the harassed Mexican President, who, in wisdom, patriotism, and patient constancy of purpose, as also in conducting to a final triumph his people's cause, showed himself the Lincoln of a neighboring republic.

Slidell, of the Confederacy, unrecognized formally at Paris, had been used to court intrigues and the footfall of covert diplomacy. The Archduke, while waiting at Miramar for his crown, sent him a message, signifying that he thought the success of the South inseparably blended with that of his own prospective empire, and had made French recognition of its independence a condition of his acceptance. But Maximilian's visit to Paris, the next March, brought Slidell no audience, and the latter consoled himself with an absurd fable, current in high circles, that President Lincoln had promised recognition to Maximilian's

¹ 7 N. & H. c. 14 (April 7th, 1864).

empire on condition that there should be no negotiations with the Southern Confederacy. As for Maximilian's proposed empire, Slidell was too deeply an American to indulge in illusions of its permanence.¹

Always preserving the aspect of honorable friendship towards the United States, in official intercourse, the French Emperor used double-dealing to carry out his distant and dangerous enterprise. Slidell, though not officially recognized, was given constantly to suppose that recognition of the Confederacy was only in brief suspense; and the envoy's report of confidential interviews with Napoleon and his ministers excited the liveliest hopes in the breasts of the Richmond rulers. That the French Emperor plotted to keep this Union sundered is undeniable; and to that intent had been his efforts for European mediation, already mentioned.² If what Slidell relates may be trusted, the Emperor himself once, in 1862, suggested the building of a Confederate navy in Europe; and when Slidell expressed his willingness, if the police would not watch too closely; "Why," asked Napoleon, shamelessly, "could you not have them built as for the Italian government?"³ Slidell kept in his pay, so he reports, an official in the department of Foreign Affairs, who, with the sanction of its head, gave him all the information he needed; and the wily Drouyn de l'Huys, preferring to keep his eyes closed, referred him to the Minister of Marine, who, in early 1863, gave assurances, distinct enough, that any Confederate ships of war built in French ports would be allowed to arm, equip, and proceed to sea. The Erlanger loan, the most successful of all Confederate financial operations in Europe, was directly promoted in France by the Emperor.

Slidell, on the 18th of June, 1863, obtained an interview with the Emperor, who sanctioned contracts for building Southern ironclads at Bordeaux and Nantes. "You may build the ships," said Napoleon, "but it will be needful to

¹ 7 N. & H. c. 4, citing Confederate archives, Mss.

² *Supra*, p. 268.

³ Confederate Mss. archives, cited 8 N. & H. 369.

conceal their destination." In this same interview French recognition of the Confederacy was confidentially discussed between them, and the Emperor consented to give audience to two members of the British Parliament, ardently devoted to the cause of the South. A memorable interview took place at Fontainebleau, a few days later, where it seems that Napoleon, chagrined that Lord Palmerston had not met his former overtures, made it known that he wished to press recognition at once. But while public assertions and denials touching this interview were bandied across the Channel during the next month, the victories of the Union arms were proclaimed, and the well-spun cobwebs of intrigue and dissimulation vanished. From that time forward Napoleon suited his friendship to his needs, and, in a path of empire hedged every day with fresh difficulties, avoided further embroilment with the United States.¹

Little remains to be added of our foreign relations during the Civil War. Russia remained our constant friend, while depending much upon the oral intercourse of agents, and prudently abstaining from written despatches. In October, 1863, five Russian vessels of war entered New York harbor, passing many months there and warmly welcomed; an omen of alliance, as our people interpreted the visit, should France and England form plans of intervention.² The purchase of Russian Alaska, soon after the war ended, is proof of the permanent interests that bound two northern nations and emancipators, clasping hands at the Pacific.

With no nation of the world, during the present ordeal, too great to compel our self-respect, or too humble to be won in friendship, the United States cultivated the good will of the far-off Orientals. China forbade Confederate cruisers to enter her ports or receive supplies, while both

¹ 8 N. & H. c. 10, with Confederate archives on this subject; 2 Bulloch, 57, etc.

² "For no unfriendly purpose," was the simple explanation. 3 Seward, 202. Cf. 4 Sumner, 146.

China and Japan lowered the ancient walls of non-intercourse with mankind to extend to this country commercial facilities. These were not auspicious times for treating grandly with the first Powers of the world ; but among miscellaneous treaties negotiated and ratified under Lincoln's administration, were those with Mexico, for extradition of criminals, and postal facilities; with Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, for navigation or the settlement of claims; with Belgium and the Ottoman Empire for facilities in trade; and with downcast Liberia to secure commercial privileges.¹ All this tended to draw more closely to us those humbler nations that strove through suffering to be strong; and when Guatemala deprecated that filibustering brutality that had disturbed her security through years past, Lincoln's government recurred to the true assertion of the Monroe doctrine,² as one not of conquest, but of self-conquest, and favorable to the growth and permanence of republican institutions as a native people plant them for themselves.

SECTION VII.

A NEW CAMPAIGN.

The blockade of the Southern Atlantic coast was effectively maintained by the United States to the end; but the Confederate government, besides protesting strongly to foreign governments against the recognition of such a blockade at all, made repeated efforts to break it.

On one memorable occasion, at the close of January, 1863, two Confederate rams in Charleston harbor took advantage of a hazy morning, while some of the best blockading vessels were at Port Royal, coaling up, to dart out from their covert. They inflicted injuries that were soon repaired, and after a slight skirmish were driven back to the protection of the forts; and by ten in the morn-

¹ 12 and 13 U. S. Stats. Appx.

² 3 Seward, 142. As to maintaining neutrality in the Isthmus, see *ib.* 149.

ing the blockade was fully reestablished.¹ Aggressive operations along this coast had been planned by Admiral Du Pont at Port Royal harbor, where a large number of new ironclads of the *Monitor* type were assembling. To a point about fifteen miles south of Savannah, known from its Confederate defence as Fort McAllister, Worden proceeded with one of these vessels, the *Montauk*, and there, on the 27th of February, discovering the *Nashville* aground—a swift blockade-runner—he opened fire over the swampy ground at a convenient range, and, dropping his heavy shells with a terrible precision upon the disabled vessel, set her on fire from stem to stern, and saw her blown finally to pieces by the explosion of her powder magazine. After other target practice in that region, less injurious, the Union ironclads were deemed ready for more serious exploits; and Du Pont prepared by early April, under orders from Washington, to assault Fort Sumter and the other defences of Charleston harbor.

It was a novel and impressive sight when this fleet, on a bright morning, started forth from North Edisto Inlet, a port intervening between Port Royal and Charleston, already in Union occupation. Nine floating forts, with scarcely more than their turrets and smoke-stacks visible, were loudly cheered from the gunboat reserve as they departed, the *New Ironsides* serving as the Admiral's flagship. For all the discomforts which attended life in these iron chests, and all the naval prejudice they had created, little doubt was felt by the accomplished officers who commanded the ingenious craft that they could silence the batteries and pound Fort Sumter into brick-dust before sunset. But the experimental attack of April 7th turned out a failure; imperfect steering apparatus disarranged the line of battle, as one after another of the novel craft approached obstructions sunk in the harbor, amid a terrific cannonade from Moultrie, Sumter, and the neighboring batteries. Du Pont's flagship

¹ 7 N. & H. 58. Southern officers issued an absurd proclamation, claiming before the world that the blockade had thus been raised by a superior force. 14 W. R. 205.

could not be brought into the thick of the fight, where John and George W. Rodgers, Drayton, Fairfax, Downs and other juniors showed skill and daring. Convinced that further attempt to force the passage of these forts would be useless, Du Pont retired crestfallen to North Edisto Inlet and thence back to Port Royal, reporting to Hunter, who commanded the troops of that department, that monitors were miserable failures for reducing forts, and that no mere naval attack could reduce Charleston.¹ The Government at Washington did not accept this opinion as conclusive, and monitors rendered good service elsewhere before the war was over. The *Weehawken*, while under Captain John Rodgers, disabled and captured as prize the Confederate ram *Atlanta*, on the 17th of the following June at Warsaw Sound; and various other ironclads of this pattern rode safely at anchor off Charleston, inside the bar, and rendered important aid in the combined operations pursued later.²

On the 14th of April, an order from Washington, over the President's personal signature, directed Hunter and Du Pont to prosecute joint operations against Charleston, and try to take Sumter and the batteries on Morris and Sullivan's Islands.³ Beauregard, here for a second time in Confederate command, saw his troops drawn away to reënforce Lee and Pemberton, as the spring closed and no new assault was made. Younger officers were now fixed upon for resuming the Union enterprise. Foote would have relieved Du Pont, but he died on the 26th of June, and Admiral John A. Dahlgren, famous as an inventor of ordnance, was appointed to the vacancy, while General Quincy A. Gillmore, a brilliant young officer of engineers, succeeded Hunter in military command.⁴

Almost two years passed after the seizure of Fort Sumter

¹ 7 N. & H. c. 3; 14 W. R. 436-442.

² 7 N. & H. c. 3; Ammen's *Atlantic Coast*, *passim*.

³ 14 W. R. 440, 441.

⁴ 7 N. & H. c. 3; 14 W. R. 454, 470. Both Du Pont and Hunter were officially complimented for their able services.

before Government made any direct attempt to retake it, and the first of such attempts, we have seen, was a failure. The Union troops in this department were not enough, in view of movements more important elsewhere, to undertake the siege of Charleston by land, hence all efforts were now confined to the harbor and its surroundings, as though for poetic retribution. Gillmore and Dahlgren began heartily together, on the 6th of July, the work expected of them, by way of a new campaign. Morris Island ^{July.} was their first objective point, a low strip of sandy beach, which, lying to the south of Charleston, guards the harbor entrance with Sullivan's Island northward, the pair stretching out to sea like the open jaws of an alligator. Approaching by Folly Island, a similar strip to the southward of Morris, which a narrow channel separated, known as Light-house Inlet, Gillmore sent General Terry's division of 4000 to make an imposing feint to the left, while General Strong's brigade of 2500, at daybreak of the 9th, descended upon Morris Island. With Beauregard's attention drawn aside, Strong swept unopposed over most of the narrow island, but Fort Wagner, near its northern extreme, repelled his approach. Of the enormous strength of this Confederate sandwork, with its armament, full garrison, and capacious bomb-proof, Gillmore had as yet no conception; nor were the maps of the Coast Survey, which army and navy had relied upon, recent enough to mark where the sea had encroached upon the sand-spit south of the fort, on either side, so as to gnaw the dry land down to a narrow causeway. Dahlgren stationed his monitors within range of Fort Wagner at noon of the 18th, and from the harbor entrance opened a fire which quickly drove its defenders from parapets to cover of the bomb proof. Late in the afternoon Gillmore formed his storming party to move at twilight, Strong's brigade taking the lead, and Colonel Shaw, with his Massachusetts colored regiment, in the forlorn advance upon the narrow path of assault. From a front ten times as large as the head of the assaulting column, the enemy now opened simultaneously the guns of Sumter and the neighboring islands, aiding the compact

musketry from Wagner's parapet, which had hitherto kept silence. Amid such diverse firing the Union guns had to suspend work, for fear of striking the assailants, who moved forward only to be mowed down.¹

After this disastrous repulse, which had cost the foe but little, Gillmore, intent still upon his ends, pressed by the slower process of a siege. Two parallels were established by the 23d across the island, and at every advance Gillmore planted breaching batteries against Fort Sumter, continuing these operations steadily under a galling fire from the enemy on front and flank. Dahlgren from the harbor coöperated earnestly with him. A battery bearing both upon Sumter and the city of Charleston was established in the muddy morass separating Morris from James Island. On the 17th of August was begun in concert a furious and sustained bombardment, which knocked Sumter's walls gradually to pieces until nothing visible was left of this historic cradle of civil war. By September 5th, with August-
October. saps and parallels well advanced, the whole Union armament, military and naval, opened fire upon Fort Wagner, which, shortly after midnight of the 7th, the Southerners silently evacuated, and that surprisingly strong work, still virtually intact, received a Union garrison. Gillmore's "Swamp angel" battery, before its monstrous Parrott gun burst, had directed fire for a time upon Charleston, non-combatants being notified to leave the city. Little damage, however, was done at that distance, and with Sumter in ruins while encircled by other forts in the harbor, Morris Island was securely held to complete Charleston's blockade by a shorter line. Such was the final result of joint operations, since Gillmore's force was too small to attempt a landing at Charleston, and Confederates still held that city until Sherman's northward march from the sea, more than a year later.²

¹ The loss on the Union side was very severe ; 1500 were sacrificed, and among the officers slain, besides the devoted Shaw, were Strong, and others of character and promise, who climbed the deadly parapet.

² 7 N. & H. c. 15 ; 28 W. R. pt. 1, 30.

Our attention now turns to the Army of the Cumberland, and to military operations midway between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi River. For six long months after Murfreesboro, much to the disappointment of his government, Rosecrans remained inactive with his army, on the field so gallantly won. He thought, so he explains, that he could best support Grant's efforts before Vicksburg by simply holding Bragg where he could not reënforce Johnston, but Grant seems to have shared no such belief.¹ Probably this tedious waiting sprang rather from a dilatory disposition, characteristic of one whose great merits were accompanied by great faults of temperament. As a patriot and a well-trained soldier, Rosecrans deserved well of his country. He was honest and conscientious in the performance of a duty; he had most estimable social traits and loved the approbation of friends and the public. But he was given to stubborn controversy, and betrayed a strong vein of caprice, while his love of applause was so excessive as to submerge action into effect. Few high commanders of his time possessed such military knowledge and fertility with so little steadiness of purpose in the hour of trial. His promotion to Buell's place² had been owing to an undue estimate of his services at Corinth, where Grant, whose opinion might have been worth asking, found in reality that he could not make him do the thing wanted. Now, put to his own resources, and in immediate correspondence with Halleck and Stanton, Rosecrans soon got into habits of disagreement with them, protesting against every order sent him and objecting to suggestion; wanting vehemently what could not be given him, instead of making the best use of his abundance.³ When promoted to major-general of volunteers, he objected furiously to its date, and when that date was changed to please him, he still felt injured in being left junior to Grant; for a vacancy in major-general of regulars, which soon after occurred, he was an aspirant

¹ 8 N. & H. 45; 1 Badeau, 431.

² *Supra*, p. 257.

³ 8 N. & H. c. 3; *McClure*, February, 1898 (Dana).

with other meritorious officers, and when Halleck intimated to them all that it stood open for the general who first won an important victory in the field, he angrily denounced such "auctioneering of honor."¹ And thus did he occupy a long season most barren of results.

But during the long winter and spring, fortifying and intrenchment went on in middle Tennessee, with the armies opposed on either bank of the Duck River, and raids were kept up, more or less destructive to the adversary attacked, but leading to nothing definite. At length, resolved upon a forward movement, after much controversy with Halleck,

1863. Rosecrans started on the 24th of June, ten days

before the final surrender of Vicksburg. After an imposing feint upon Bragg's left wing, he turned the Confederate right, and, with an energy and skill of which he was quite capable when doing his best, forced the foe to abandon Tullahoma and retreat across the Cumberland Mountains and Tennessee River to Chattanooga. "The work of expelling Bragg from middle Tennessee," relates General Garfield, his chief of staff,² "occupied nine days, and ended July 3d, leaving his troops in a most disheartened and demoralized condition; while our army, with a loss of less than 1000 men, was, in a few days, fuller of potential fight than ever before." This brilliant success, refuting his long and ingenious excuses for lying idle, brought Rosecrans to a new resting stage for epistolary efforts, and this time with the President, of whose solicitude and displeasure he had not been unaware. The President's tone was kindly, but he did not incline to argument; and orders and more pressing requiring a further advance, Rosecrans pursued the march about the middle of August. With reasons political and strategic requiring by this time some vigorous effort to rescue the long-suffering loyalists of eastern Tennessee, Burnside with his column moved down direct to that region from Cincinnati, covering and protecting Rosecrans on the flank. By slow marches, almost unopposed,

¹ 23 W. R. pt. 2, 95, 111.

² President of the United States, years later.

he entered Knoxville with his advance as September opened. Rosecrans, pursuing his own course towards Chattanooga and Bragg's mountain stronghold, reached at length his own essential destination a few days later. By the 6th of the month his Army of the Cumberland lay stretched along the western slope of Lookout Mountain, whose ^{September.} formidable heights rose from a plateau bordering the Tennessee River; and on the 9th, without firing a shot, his extreme left reached Chattanooga's stronghold, the most important strategic point now left in the whole Confederacy. The bloodless execution of his brilliant and difficult feat, with drums beating and colors flying, marks the culmination of Rosecrans's distinction during the war; for the events which next followed disturbed his exalted mood and calculations.¹

Enormous difficulties had been overcome upon this march, and Bragg was quite skilfully manœuvred out of his successive positions. Had Rosecrans stopped and intrenched, drawn closer his lines, and made his strong position still stronger, all might have been well. But he now dispersed his troops to harass the imagined flight of his enemy, presuming a panic which did not exist. Bragg, though taken by surprise at so vigorous a movement, met the emergency with prompt and intrepid behavior, not suffering himself, as Pemberton had done, to be penned within his fortress. Summoning Buckner, who had retreated from Knoxville on the approach of Burnside's column, and reënforced from Mississippi by Johnston, he gathered compactly his aggregate of over 35,000, exclusive of cavalry, and prepared to strike Rosecrans upon the first opportunity. And, permitting Chattanooga to fall into the hands of his foe, he took his own rapid course, apparently in retreat, but really so as to concentrate against the Union centre. Rosecrans, misconceiving Bragg's purpose, kept only a brigade in this immensely important fastness, and sent three corps in rapid pursuit under Thomas, Crittenden, and McCook, by routes which exposed them in detail to assault, while apart from

one another by a hard day's march. Bragg's first effort failed of execution; for Thomas, the nearest prey to be pounced upon, discerned his danger in season and retreated to the mountain passes; Crittenden, too, escaped, by march and countermarch, while McCook, when far to the right, received at midnight of the 12th directions to return to the main body. By this time Rosecrans had learned that Bragg's army was concentrating at the eastward, and with less sanguine confidence than hitherto he drew in his own troops, by the 18th, to await a conflict. For, despite the mystery of Bragg's movements, there were now clear signs that he meant to take the initiative, turn the flanks of his foe, and cut off all communications.

Great efforts were made at Washington to strengthen Rosecrans, but already the two hostile armies faced one another in mass along the banks of Chickamauga Creek, a tributary of the Tennessee, and on September 18-22. and 20th their battle raged in earnest. Bragg had issued orders to cross the stream at daybreak of the 18th, but bad roads and the resistance of Union cavalry delayed this movement until late in the afternoon. By that time General Hood, of Longstreet's Virginia veterans, had arrived to take a conspicuous part. The chief fighting of that day was borne on the Union left, and Bragg's plan was clearly seen, to push by this flank to Chattanooga, taking the neighboring road. This compelled a rapid shifting of the Union force in immediate presence of the enemy. By a tiresome night march Thomas's corps, moving in rear of Crittenden's, took new position so as to guard the Chattanooga road and form the extreme left; Crittenden's close connection made the centre, while McCook posted with his corps at the right in Thomas's former place. The battle, resumed on the morning of the 19th, raged fiercely on the left before McCook was fairly in place, and his corps and Thomas's were both much fatigued by the night march they made to get into place. Thomas stood steadily his ground, and kept the enemy back from Chattanooga. On the extreme Confederate right Walker commanded, while Hood held the centre and Buckner the left; but as the attack of

Bragg's left wing depended upon the success of his right, and the right wing could make no serious impression upon Thomas while daylight lasted, the greater part of the day passed in comparative quiet on Rosecrans's right. Firing ceased at nightfall, with something for encouragement on either side; Bragg had been foiled in attempting to crush the Union left flank and gain the Chattanooga road, but he was not defeated, for he held his ground in several places and was prepared to renew battle the next day. Rosecrans now held a council of war and gave orders for a new disposition of his troops so as to close up on the left more completely and strengthen Thomas in his resistance.

The battle of the 20th, which Bragg had ordered for day-break, began about nine in the forenoon. His entire army was now divided into two commands, Polk, one lieutenant-general, leading on the right, and another, the famous Longstreet, who had just arrived from Virginia, on the left. For reasons since in controversy, Polk's assault was delayed five precious morning hours, during which the sound of axes and of falling trees indicated that Thomas was making ready to repeat his strong resistance of the day before. The vigorous attack by Bragg's right, which should have been rapidly followed up by the left, failed of the full effect intended. Partial successes were won, instead, to be offset by partial reverses. With wonderful nerve and presence of mind Thomas bore at every point the sanguinary onslaught directed upon his lines, employing his whole soldiery to oppose with unfailing skill and precision. Nearly every portion of the Confederate right wing was here repulsed in turn, with heavy loss, and the Union line, though fearfully shaken, remained unbroken. But Longstreet, meanwhile, on the Confederate left, swung his troops forward with momentum; Hood, toward the centre, rushing with wild impetuosity and success. Opposed on the Union side, McCook, whose lines were out of position, gave way before these hostile masses, Sheridan making in vain a gallant resistance in the midst of wild tumult and disorder. Rosecrans, a pious Roman Catholic, was seen crossing himself in the grass as the cannon and musketry broke out into

infernal roar; then headquarters disappeared, McCook's corps broke into a stampede, followed by divisions of Crittenden, who could not check his flying troops. To Rossville, and next to Chattanooga, about twelve miles distant from the battle-ground, Rosecrans hastened, to resist the enemy's entrance into the citadel. McCook and Crittenden arrived later the same afternoon. But Thomas's steadiness kept the battle from becoming another Bull Run. Finding himself cut off from Rosecrans and the right, he at once marshalled all the divisions that remained for an independent fight, and posted his line in horseshoe shape along the slope and crest of a partly wooded ridge. There Gordon Granger joined him from Rossville, with a division and most of the reserve, and combining these forces, more than two-thirds of the Union army, Thomas firmly maintained the fight while daylight lasted. In vain did Longstreet hurl against him those dense masses which had shivered McCook's divisions in the earlier afternoon. His leonine example seemed to inspire every Union soldier under him with his own unconquerable firmness; and Granger, too, his hat riddled with bullets, drove forward wherever the fight was hottest. When night fell, Thomas, complying with orders now sent him by Rosecrans, retired stealthily to Rossville, where he firmly intrenched and fortified; and by the 22d the whole Union army, rejoining, was safely posted for the defence of Chattanooga. Except for that unfortunate break upon the Union right, the fighting at all points on the 19th and 20th had been obstinate and brave, and the losses on both sides were frightful.¹

The first news to reach Washington of this deadly encounter came in a dejected telegram from Rosecrans on the afternoon of the 20th, and his next day's despatches did

¹ 8 N. & H. c. 4; Davis, c. 49; 30 W. R. pts. 1 and 2; *McClure*, February, 1898 (Dana); 3 B. & L. 638-675. The estimated loss on the Union side, in killed, wounded, and missing, was 16,179; on the Confederate, 17,804. Bragg admits in his official report that he lost forty per cent of his entire army, which by revised estimates appears

not show him reassured. Burnside, whom he eagerly wished to join him, had turned aside. Our President sent cheering words to the one commander and positive orders to the other, so that Chattanooga's stronghold might be kept at all hazards; he also despatched the two corps of Howard and Slocum from the Army of the Potomac, with Hooker in command; troops from Grant, besides, being already on their way. Rosecrans, when retreating to Chattanooga, had relinquished the spur of Lookout Mountain which commanded the Tennessee River below Chattanooga. This height Bragg seized at once, with Missionary Ridge, and, extending his lines thence to the river, proceeded to invest Chattanooga boldly. This brought the Union army close to starvation, for all communication south of the Tennessee River was now cut off; and for receiving supplies only a long and steep line over the mountains remained, harassed constantly by the Confederate cavalry. Added to this immediate danger, Rosecrans had to endure bitter wranglings which now broke out among his officers because of the late battle.¹ While Rosecrans, disliking to break old friendships, and embarrassed by his own conduct in action, tried to temporize, his popularity diminished every day as Thomas's star by the contrast shone with growing lustre. Stanton telegraphed a handsome tribute to this latter general, whose noble and unselfish qualities the government had been slow to recognize, and orders from Washington consolidated the two corps of McCook and Crittenden, placing Granger in command. A change still higher was presaged, but Thomas quieted all rumors by positively refusing to supersede Rosecrans in person.

October.

to have been for duty about 71,551, while the effective strength of Rosecrans was 56,965. 3 B. & L. 673, 675.

Bragg, like Rosecrans, was absent from the afternoon fight of September 20th, and Polk and Longstreet led the fighting. 3 B. & L. 659.

¹ McCook and Crittenden were bitterly blamed because they had left the field of battle amid the rout of the right wing and made their way to Chattanooga. A later court of inquiry in 1864 acquitted both generals of blame, each corps having in fact been much depleted to assist Thomas.

By the middle of October the Union army at Chattanooga was in quite a precarious situation; reënforcements had not yet arrived; the enemy which beleaguered grew stronger in numbers every day, and starvation seemed impending. The animals depended upon to haul supply wagons over a miserable mountain road were in weak and dying condition, and the troops had now to be put upon half rations. Rosecrans had lost all buoyancy and cheerfulness, and his despatches breathed dismal forebodings. All this, added to unfavorable reports¹ of his military sufficiency, brought the administration to making a change. Secretary Stanton went West in person, with orders for Grant, who was summoned to Louisville to receive them. Meeting at Indianapolis for the first time in their lives, on the 17th of October, these two distinguished men travelled together to Louisville, and on the train two alternative orders were submitted to Grant for his selection. Both created, for this hero's sole command, a military division stretching over the entire country from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi River, north of the limits of Banks's Louisiana command; but while one of them left department commanders in the Cumberland as at present, the other relieved Rosecrans and assigned Thomas to his place. Grant, without hesitation, chose the latter. At Louisville a despatch from Dana surmised, not quite accurately, that Rosecrans meditated a retreat from Chattanooga; and Grant, to prevent so disastrous a step, at once announced by telegraph his new authority, and assigned Thomas to the place of Rosecrans, urging him to hold that stronghold to the last extremity. Rosecrans, thus relieved from duty, left Chattanooga early on the 20th, before the change of commanders became known.²

The conqueror of Vicksburg reached Chattanooga at dusk of October 23d, after stopping over at Nashville, where a public welcome was extended him by the plebeian Johnson, military governor of the State, whom he found a short and stocky man, with smooth face, swarthy complexion, and an

¹ From Dana, who was now at these headquarters.

² 8 N. & H. c. 4; 2 Grant, c. 40; *McClure*, February, 1898 (Dana).

air of obstinate determination. No one would have supposed that two future Presidents met here face to face. A brief and courteous interview Grant also held with Rosecrans, as their crossing trains stopped at an Alabama way-station. The new commander had left Vicksburg crippled from an accidental fall, and he still at Chattanooga used crutches for a time; but he was alert to comprehend and direct with energy and despatch whatever might appear essential. The first danger, accordingly, to vanish upon his arrival was that of being starved out of the place. Learning the topography of the whole region from Thomas and his chief engineer,¹ he opened, with their advice, a new and closer line of supplies by way of Lookout Valley and Bridgeport, using Hooker's troops, who had just arrived, to force a passage. In five days this new "cracker line," as the hungry soldiers called it, was completed, and with steamers and Hooker's fresh teams to furnish transportation, the Army of the Cumberland within a week fed upon full rations once more, and new clothing and abundant ammunition followed. Cheerfulness and content succeeded the late languor and depression on the Union side, while Bragg's investing forces felt correspondingly disappointed.² Bragg tried to break this new line, by attacking Hooker's force on the night of the 28th and 29th, but, though under Longstreet's lead, the effort failed, and, repulsed at every point, the Confederates sought no such disturbance again.³

Grant next took into serious consideration the welfare of his more distant command. Burnside, still struggling through eastern Tennessee and its hilly roads, was a hundred miles distant from his nearest river base and much farther from railways in friendly possession. Instigated, as it would seem, by the Confederate President, who had

¹ General William F. Smith, to whom the credit of this new "cracker line" appears chiefly due. 3 B. & L. 720.

² See Bragg's report, confident of forcing the evacuation of Chattanooga by cutting off food and forage. 30 W. R. pt. 2, 36; 2 Grant, c. 39.

³ 2 Grant, c. 41; 8 N. & H. c. 5.

visited his camp after Chickamauga's battle, to praise the boys in gray for their valor and make confident speeches, Bragg now despatched Longstreet, on the 3d of November, to drive Burnside's army out of eastern Tennessee, or, better still, to destroy it. Longstreet took with ^{November.} him some 20,000 troops, inclusive of Wheeler's cavalry, and by the 15th was in full motion from Loudon in the Knoxville direction. With despatches from Washington urging that something be done for Burnside's relief in view of this movement, Grant directed Thomas on the 7th to attack the enemy's right upon Missionary Ridge, so as to force Longstreet to return; but Thomas declared this impossible, as he could not move his artillery. A week of anxious suspense followed. At Grant's request, Sherman had been assigned to command the Army of the Tennessee in his place, with headquarters in the field, and for this trusted comrade Grant concluded to wait. Sherman had left Memphis on the 11th of October, under earlier orders, repairing roads as he advanced, so as to bring up supplies; and Grant, reducing those instructions, ordered him under his new authority to hasten forward. Burnside was at the same time encouraged to hold out, and that general's despatches showed full confidence in his ability to do so. Approaching with all the speed that bad roads and swollen rivers would permit, Sherman reached Bridgeport almost simultaneously with Longstreet's departure from Loudon, and on the 14th of November he rode in person to Chattanooga, warmly welcomed by his chief. Blair, temporarily in command of the 15th army corps, brought up the rear later.¹

Grant had now come to depend greatly upon Sherman as his grand lieutenant in all military movements, and that mutual relation, which continued henceforward, was of much advantage to both. For Grant's intimacies, though few, bound in good companionship, and Sherman, as a com-

¹ 2 Grant, c. 42; 8 N. & H. c. 5; 1 Sherman, 389.

panion in arms, was fully to be trusted. Yet Grant used all generals under him with admirable discretion, and dislike, when he cherished it at all, was taciturn and forbearing. By November 23d, or as soon as Sherman's troops could be brought into place after their toilsome journey, the great battle began promptly which Burnside's distant danger and the torturing suspense at Washington compelled Grant to invite. One of the most spectacular encounters the world ever saw lasted over three days on these heights surrounding Chattanooga, with thrilling and impressive incidents. From the Union parapet before the town stretched in sight a noble panorama toward ^{November} Missionary Ridge, along whose heights shone the ^{23-26.} white tents of the besieging Confederates, their lines of trench from Lookout Mountain towards the Chickamauga plainly visible, while hostile sentinels paced in sight less than a thousand yards away. South and east of Chattanooga, with the Tennessee River in their rear, lay the Union troops, confronted in a great half-circle and upon the heights above by Bragg's besiegers. Grant's purpose was to drive that army from the heights, first clearing it, however, from the plain south of Chattanooga and gaining possession of some low hills occupied by the Confederate advance. The preliminary work was committed to Thomas, who, in the afternoon of the 23d, sent out Gordon Granger to execute it. With fine officers under him, among whom was the rising Sheridan, Granger moved at a quickstep with band music and parade precision, while artillery from the Union forts opened upon the Confederate rifle-pits and camps behind the line of fight. Lifting clouds soon revealed the whole scene to both armies. Bragg's pickets were driven in upon the main guards on the hills, and these, too, fled in turn after firing their last volley, no reënforcements reaching them. This entire movement occupied less than two hours, but serious loss was sustained on both sides. And thus did Grant secure, as the first day's result, a line fully a mile in advance of that earlier occupied; its works were rapidly turned to face in reverse, and during the night made stronger. Grant's Army of the

Tennessee being now gathered in position, Sherman, on the 24th, formed those troops for the grand assault on Missionary Ridge. With a skirmish line preceding each column, he worked his way, in the afternoon of the 24th, concealed from the enemy, and gained the foot and then the crest of the ridge, his artillery being dragged behind by hand. Fire opened upon this force as it emerged into view, and later in the day came a more decided attack; but all was without avail, and Sherman fortified at his vantage ground for the next day's battle, joined by Howard's corps. His cavalry had gone to cut hostile communications at Chickamauga station. While these operations progressed to the east of Chattanooga, Hooker, with three divisions assigned him, under Osterhaus, Geary, and Cruft, moved towards the west to capture Lookout Mountain, where Confederate flags fluttered and batteries were planted in defiance. Starting early in the morning, he was hidden from the summit by drizzling rain and a heavy mist. He crossed Lookout Creek almost unperceived, and commenced climbing the mountain, which on that side was woody and rugged for most of the way and difficult to scale. But every obstacle was gallantly overcome. The bridge at the creek was seized after a slight picket skirmish; Hooker's troops pushed up the heights, and gained by noon the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, confronting strong defences. Over ledges and boulders climbed the excited assailants, passing directly under the muzzles of Confederate guns, and gradually expelling the foe from position. So hazy was the day that Hooker's operations could only at long intervals be descried from Chattanooga, but the sound of the cannon and musketry was heard below as Hooker battled among drifting clouds, which once settled so dark upon him that fight had to be suspended. By four in the afternoon he reported his position impregnable, and in course of another hour direct communication was established with Grant, who sent a brigade from below to reënforce him. Firing continued far into darkness, but no further movement was made. The night was a glorious one, and Lookout Mountain was seen ablaze with Hooker's

camp-fires, while Sherman lit up the north end of Missionary Ridge.¹

Though the previous day had been lowering and overcast, favoring the offensive movements greatly, Wednesday, the 25th, broke beautifully clear, and through the carnage and noise of that eventful day the broad and undulating field of battle impressed the beholder by its wondrous sublimity. From Orchard Knob, near Chattanooga, the hill from which Grant and Thomas watched the battle, the whole field was visible all day. Sherman, in response to orders, renewed his attack upon the left, and the battle raged furiously all the forenoon, both east of Missionary Ridge and along its crest, which he was striving to carry. Against him Bragg, who had wholly withdrawn from Lookout Mountain during the night, threw the bulk of his forces, making strenuous efforts to dislodge and crush him. For all his vigorous fighting Sherman found it impossible to carry the strong Confederate works before him; assaults were repeated, but the success Grant had hoped for was not attained. Hooker, too, who had left Lookout Mountain at daylight, and moved upon Rossville and the southern end of Missionary Ridge to divert the enemy, found detentions so great that he gained his summit too late to relieve the pressure. Sherman's condition by early afternoon appeared already so critical, as a new mass of Confederates was seen moving towards him, that Grant, without waiting longer, ordered Thomas to charge at once upon the front of Missionary Ridge against the first line of rifle-pits. The divisions of Sheridan and Thomas J. Wood had been lying under arms since early morning, ready to move at the first signal. Owing to some inadvertence Grant's first order was not transmitted; but when he repeated it, an hour later, the divisions started off at once across the valley, and presently loud cheering was heard as the two impetuous generals and their men drove the foe from the lower line of rifle-pits, following closely. Then, to the amazement of beholders

¹ 2 Grant, c. 43; 8 N. & H. c. 5; 3 B. & L. 720; 1 Sherman, 389; 31 W. R. pt. 2, 315, 573.

below on Orchard Knob, pursuers went for the pursued to the second line of works, neither re-forming nor awaiting the intended orders; over that line and up the steep mountain sides the chase continued, in dark zigzag lines, until, in a space of time incredibly short, the crest of Missionary Ridge was carried, and the boys in blue were seen climbing the Confederate barriers at different points and carrying all before their united vehemence. Grant watched this progress with intense interest, vexed only for a brief moment that his and Thomas's orders had been transcended; then, spurring his horse forward when the culmination was reached, he rode up amid the tumultuous shouts of his soldiers, almost frantic at their victory.¹

The storming of the broken and crumbling front of Missionary Ridge by 18,000 enthusiastic troops was, like Balaklava, one of those wonders of military prowess which in history come occasionally, to remind us what pure inspiration may accomplish. The fire all along the Confederate line had been terrific, but the damage bore slight proportion to the ammunition expended. The retreat of Bragg's army was mostly precipitate, soldiers on that side breaking in panic from their officers, who lost control. Hundreds were captured, and thousands threw away their arms in disorderly flight. The force which confronted Sherman, seeing that its whole reserve was giving way, fled also. All through the evening of the 25th the excitement of the hunt continued, and by moonlight Bragg retreated up the Chickamauga valley, burning what he could not carry away, and lighting the east by his fires, while Sheridan pushed promptly behind in pursuit, continuing his fight beyond the eastern slope of Missionary Ridge far into the evening. The third great general of this war on the Union side now shone with unquenchable promise. On the morning of the 26th Sherman advanced by way of Chickamauga station, while Thomas's force, under Hooker

¹ Sheridan and Wood seem to have given simultaneously the order to storm, catching the inspiration of the moment when the first rifle-pits had been easily carried and their troops could not be restrained.

and Palmer, took the Rossville road; but at a point some twenty miles from Chattanooga Grant ordered the chase to cease, sending Howard, however, to prevent Bragg's junction with Longstreet. It was a great victory to drive away the besieging army, but one far greater to defeat that army on its chosen ground and nearly annihilate it.¹

To Burnside, whom the President had by repeated telegrams urged him to remember, Grant turned attention the night of Bragg's defeat, promising to relieve him if he would hold out a few days longer. Preparations had been made before the battle, and Granger's corps, reënforced to 20,000, was told to start the moment Missionary Ridge was carried. But Granger appeared so slow and unwilling to accept the trust, that Grant detailed Sherman to command, and under his lead the expedition set out for Knoxville quickly and cheerfully.² Eastern Tennessee, we have seen, had Lincoln's strongest sympathy, and upon Buell and every other general commanding in that quarter he had lavished orders and entreaties to rescue Knoxville and the neighboring region, not for strategic gain alone and to deprive the enemy of enforced supplies, but because its people were persecuted loyalists, martyrs for the flag they would not desert. Burnside's march from Ohio, in the summer of 1863, through this secluded region had, however, the reënforcement of Rosecrans towards Chattanooga as a prime object. When September opened, his advance took peaceful possession of Knoxville, and on the 4th Burnside in

¹ 8 N. & H. c. 5; 2 Grant, c. 44; *McClure*, March, 1898. "To Sheridan's prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland and the nation are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and small arms, that day." 2 Grant, 81. During November 23-27 the total Union loss in killed, wounded, and missing, was 5815. The corresponding Confederate loss was 6687, more than 4000 of whom were captured or missing. Grant's effective strength was 60,000. 3 B. & L. 729. Bragg had about half that number, but was in a position believed impregnable. 2 Grant, 95.

² 2 Grant, 92.

person entered the town, wildly welcomed by inhabitants who for more than two years had, with the sick-
September-ness of hope deferred, waited for deliverance.
December. When the stars and stripes were spread from the balcony of the house where he made headquarters, the crowd rushed forward, covering it with kisses, and hospitable was the welcome which its citizens freely bestowed upon officers and privates. It was not strange that Burnside should have lingered among such scenes, instead of hastening to join Rosecrans; he tendered from Knoxville his resignation, as though his mission had been fulfilled, but the President declined to accept it; and finally, yielding to Burnside's wishes and the earnest request of this people, government permitted his column to remain and hold the region, without proceeding elsewhere.

It was against Burnside, with his army thus isolated, that Bragg, at President Davis's request, sent Longstreet with over 15,000 veteran troops, a total presently increased, at Bragg's cost, to more than 20,000. Burnside had now, including his favorite 9th corps, about 12,000 effectives, besides a partly organized force of loyal Tennesseans. He felt none of that strained anxiety for his safety which was entertained at Washington, but wisely proposed, when Longstreet approached his advance post, to draw him farther away from Chattanooga, so as best to aid Grant's plans against Bragg. As for a retreat, he had hardly entertained that idea at all.¹

By November 17th Burnside shut himself up in Knoxville, having made strong its defences, and Longstreet proceeded to invest the town. But soon came the news of Bragg's reverses at Missionary Ridge, and Longstreet, feeling that he must make quick work or none, began on the dawn of the 29th a furious artillery fire upon the Union works; no reply being made, four Confederate brigades advanced over a road spread with entanglements, to charge upon the parapet. Burnside's guns opened with deadly effect, and the corpses of the approaching soldiery fell back

¹ Cf. *McClure*, February, 1898 (Dana); 8 N. & H. c. 6.

into ditch and glacis as they made futile effort to carry the parapet. Longstreet lost in the assault a thousand men, Burnside scarcely more than a dozen. As his shattered and bleeding detachment returned after this signal repulse, Longstreet received orders from Richmond to withdraw, and he soon learned that Grant's reënforcements were already on their way hither. Abandoning the siege, he passed rapidly to the north on the night of December 4th, and made good his retreat. Sherman, whose tired and ill-clad troops had strained every nerve uncomplainingly to reach and rescue before it was too late, was met a day later by an officer of Burnside's staff, who announced Longstreet's departure.¹ When, accompanied by Granger, he rode into Knoxville, the serene welcome which Burnside extended was a new surprise, for he had expected to find a garrison nearly starved; but his astonishment grew when the next day he, with some fellow-officers, sat down, as Burnside's guests, to a sumptuous dinner such as he had not enjoyed for many a month.² For, as his host now explained to him, Knoxville had never been completely invested, and Unionists south of the river had kept the army well supplied with rations.³

Upon Burnside's advice, Sherman left Granger behind, with his fresh 10,000 men, for further security, while he led back his own exhausted troops to Chattanooga. There, under Grant's direction, restoring to Thomas such other troops as belonged to the Army of the Cumberland, he conducted his own army to North Alabama for winter quarters. Burnside gave place gladly in his department to John G. Foster, who had come through Cumberland Gap to relieve him, while Grant, leaving Thomas in command at Chattanooga, transferred his own headquarters to Nashville. Thus came to a successful end this grand combined campaign of the Mississippi Valley. "God bless you all," said

¹ 8 N. & H. 183.

² Roast turkey, with "a regular table, dishes, knives, forks, spoons, etc." 1 Sherman, 396.

³ Burnside's loss in the Knoxville campaign is estimated at 673, and Longstreet's as 1142, exclusive of cavalry. 3 B. & L. 752.

Lincoln fervently, in a telegram of December 8th, tendering through Grant "more than his thanks, his profoundest gratitude," for all that had been accomplished.¹

The modest soldier from Galena, who had risen step by step, by force of merit, was at last appreciated. Fellow-citizens of Illinois presented him with a diamond-hilted sword of exquisite workmanship, and Congress, as its earliest tribute of the session, but not its highest one, voted thanks to him and his command, and ordered a gold medal to commemorate Vicksburg and Chattanooga.² Grant's active brain planned for the coming spring a movement upon Mobile, and Sherman, from Memphis, made a February expedition against Meridian, Mississippi;³ but new and broader fields for fame were to open for both commanders before another summer. Nothing could have been more striking in these operations at Chattanooga than the intermingling of corps from three Union armies,—the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Potomac,—under both Hooker and Sherman; and Grant gladly observed that "there was no jealousy, hardly rivalry" in those combinations.⁴

On the Confederate side, Bragg felt deeply mortified over his failure to hold Missionary Ridge, and in his official report blamed the "shameful conduct" of his men in allowing themselves to be put to flight by an enemy that must have been exhausted from its difficult climb. But his comment was too severe; for his men shot one in five of their assailants in that brief and breathless rush when Sheridan took the guns pointed against him; and the swell of confidence which bore Thomas's seasoned soldiery over trenches and high upward must have carried a tremor to the hearts of even veterans on the crest, who for two days had confronted a foe of superior strength and perceived it closing

¹ 2 Grant, c. 45; 8 N. & H. c. 6; 1 Sherman, c. 14.

² 2 Grant, 100; U. S. Stats. 399.

³ 2 Grant, 108; 1 Sherman, c. 15; 8 N. & H. c. 13.

⁴ 2 Grant, 85.

upon them. Bragg himself had been at fault, in detaching a third of his command for Longstreet's bootless expedition, with that able lieutenant besides.¹ Yet we should observe that the Southern people had begun to concede in heart that the cause of their section was lost, and sickened at the waste of human life. Confederate testimony assures us that the dash and spirit of the Southern soldier was never seen again after the splendid fight at Chickamauga.² Capable officers used the conscript as a destructive instrument, but the eager spirit of self-sacrifice was wanting. Bragg had borne a good record from the Mexican war, and was an officer of intelligence and moral uprightness. But his reputation was that of a quarrelsome officer, captious over small points, and always on the lookout to check little breaches of discipline. In the present campaign he appeared gloomy, morose, reserved, prematurely old, in looks and manner. With Polk, D. H. Hill, and Buckner he had differences, and Longstreet thought him incapable.³ But Bragg, like Pemberton, was a favorite of President Davis, who, yielding unwillingly to public clamor, relieved him of command in December, and still more reluctantly, that same month, assigned Joseph E. Johnston to his place.⁴ Upon the latter Davis had placed the blame of Vicksburg, espousing Pemberton in the controversy, and Johnston, relieved in July at his own request from supervising Bragg, had done little more than reënforce that officer from Mississippi. To Johnston's post Polk was now assigned, while Johnston received orders to resume the offensive; that, however, Johnston declared was impossible, and he gave his shattered forces through the remaining winter the rest and repose essential.⁵

¹ It is believed that President Davis caused Longstreet to be thus detached from Knoxville, because he and Bragg could not get on together. ² Grant, 85.

² 3 B. & L. 662 (D. H. Hill).

³ 3 B. & L. 640.

⁴ Bragg was assigned for a while to duty at Richmond; and about November, 1864, took command in North Carolina.

⁵ The tone of this official correspondence betrays a mutual dislike. Seddon, now Secretary of War at Richmond, sent optimistic instruc-

Longstreet's continuous presence in eastern Tennessee all the winter was irksome to Grant, who desired Thomas to drive him out, but plans of the kind were frustrated by bad weather and the want of proper transportation. The winter of 1863-64 was one of great severity, and the opposing armies of the West rested quietly, for the most part, in their respective camps.¹

SECTION VIII.

THE LONG SESSION OF CONGRESS.

The long session of the Thirty-eighth Congress occupied from Monday, December 7th, 1863, to Monday, July 4th, 1864. On the day of convening, the Senate recognized the credentials of the two new members sent from West Virginia, and 1863, admitted them, after debate, on a test vote which December- conceded that West Virginia was a State. In the 1864, House, Schuyler Colfax of Indiana was chosen July. Speaker upon the first ballot, by 101 votes out of 181, the minority votes being scattered, with Samuel S. Cox of Ohio in the lead. Edward McPherson was chosen Clerk.² Despite political defection, the administration had clearly a majority over the various shades of opposition in either branch. The President's message, received on the 9th, was brief and emphatic; it left details to be set forth by the heads of departments, and purposed continuing the present policy unchanged. Its most important feature was an appended proclamation of amnesty, founded upon the plenary power which the Constitution had vested in the Executive to grant reprieves and pardons, and made as an inducement to the people of insurgent States to reëstablish loyal State governments by their own spontaneous action.³

tions, and Davis's despatch was exasperatingly confident. 8 N. & H. c. 13; Johnston's Narrative, 263-276.

¹ 8 N. & H. c. 13.

² Am. Cycl. 1864, 219.

³ Am. Cycl. 1863, 781.

In the course of this seven months' session Congress responded generously, in the main, to the President's call for men and money to continue the present operations for suppressing revolt and restoring the national supremacy. Its action was zealous and efficient. Its general tone of debate was loyal and patriotic, ranging over the general issues of policy to be pursued. The first necessity was to provide for renewing the army, whose earliest terms of enlistment would soon expire.

The new enrolment act of February, with its supplement of July, rendered every able-bodied citizen from twenty to forty-five years of age liable to actual service, either personally or by a substitute from among the exempted. It authorized the President at discretion to call for any number of volunteers, for one, two, or three years, to give a bounty of \$100 a year to those thus responding, and in case of all unfilled local quotas, to order a draft for the deficiency. It denied exemption to aliens who had once declared the intention of citizenship or assumed that right by voting or holding office; it permitted State governors to recruit volunteers in the region of actual rebellion, and to receive credit on State quotas accordingly. This act gave credit further for naval enlistments, and it ordered the enrolment of colored men to form part of the national forces, locally credited, by draft or enlistment, as the case might be, but mustered into service only as troops of the United States.¹

A new tariff act increased largely the duties on imports from the 1st of July, with the idea of levying most of all upon articles of luxury, and of discriminating, besides, upon goods imported in foreign bottoms where no existing law or treaty bound differently. This act caused withdrawals from bond and a decrease of foreign imports.² A new internal revenue act reached, more widely than ever

¹ Acts February 24 and July 4, 1864; 13 Stats. 6, 379. By a later act (March 3d, 1865) permission to recruit in rebellious States was repealed and stringent provisions were made against "bounty jumping" and the fraudulent enlistment of convicts and the insane.

² June 30, 1864; 13 Stats. 202; Am. Cycl. 1864, 371.

before, the pursuits of the people.¹ Its burden came chiefly upon the old States of diversified industries, three of which in order, New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, paid more than half of the entire tax thus raised. Licenses for pursuing business yielded a large special revenue without being burdensome, and gave somewhat of a recompense in the nature of a guild or monopoly. The stamp tax, yielding from 1864 an income which trebled in two years, was convenient to collect, and, though annoying, not very harsh of operation.²

Not military and revenue laws alone were provided at this session. The last remnants of the old fugitive slave law were wiped out under Sumner's lead. Enabling statutes were passed for the admission of Nevada, Colorado, and Nebraska as States, but Nevada alone of those territories took the requisite steps and was fully and formally admitted to the Union during the Civil War.³ Provision was made to carry on the work upon the Capitol and other public buildings; to encourage immigration and the construction of continental railroads and telegraphs, besides a cable line, in conjunction with Great Britain and Russia, for messages across Behring's Straits. Improvements were made in various national measures already in operation.⁴ All efforts by the opposition to rebuke the President, or to make an issue against him upon arbitrary arrests and the imprisonment of Vallandigham, were rejected by a decisive vote. In the Senate was seen a fruitless effort made to defeat a statute imposing a strong test oath of loyalty.⁵

¹ Act June 30, 1864; 13 Stats. 223.

² See *supra*, p. 286.

³ See President's proclamation, October 31, 1864; 13 Stats. Appx. Freedom was made a prerequisite in the enabling act of March 21, 1864.

⁴ 13 Stats. *passim*.

⁵ Am. Cycl. 1864, 219.

A Presidential campaign was now approaching. The fall elections of 1863 had encouraged the administration, and in the spring of 1864 those favorable indications increased. In both Maryland and Louisiana it seemed as if local slavery might soon be abolished by State constitutional amendment. The President now showed his firmness and sincerity of purpose by repeated calls for more three years' volunteers, with the alternative of a draft. He was ambitious to be chosen for a second term, and realized that popular sentiment favored him, but he had no wish to be selfish or obstructive, nor to cater favor by faltering. "Is there any man in the Democratic party," he asked Thurlow Weed, "who can push this war one step faster or farther than I? Because, if there is, I want him to take my place."¹ But though the general drift of opinion in loyal States favored strongly his continuance of the work he had so discreetly, so honestly, and withal so strongly conducted, this feeling was by no means unanimous. And it was the radical antislavery element, impatient and impolitic in its zeal, that constituted the main opposition in Republican party ranks. Liberator though he was, and a genuine one, Lincoln moved too slowly in their estimation; and his retention of generals who from their point of view had "no heart in the cause," his lenient disposition toward slaveholding fellow-citizens, and his amnesty offers did not suit their sterner ideas of public policy. Pride of intellect made certain of them purblind to the rare qualities of leadership which this President disclosed under a plain and unimposing exterior. Against his popularity, however, because of his considerateness for all, it was almost hopeless to contend, and Chase alone, in the higher circles of the administration, had the folly to encourage overtures from party malcontents and enter the lists for a nomination.

Pure and austere though he was in ideals of public duty, Chase had something of that insatiate ambition to be first that perverts good feeling and keeps one wrapped in an atmosphere impervious to clear sunshine. The great Secre-

¹ 3 Seward, 196.

tary listened too readily to his sycophants, ignorant of the drift of public thought or of his true relation to others. As a member of the Cabinet he had cultivated those of possible influence who happened to get into cross-currents with the President, — Fremont and Rosecrans, for instance, — and he criticised his chief unkindly in the many peevish letters he found opportunity to write privately. During the winter of this long session, while openly disclaiming all wish to be a candidate for the term ensuing, he gave clearly the impression that a change was desirable, and that if he himself were put forward he could not feel at liberty to decline.¹ The "Pomeroy circular," secretly sent out in February, 1864, was the fruition of a senatorial effort to defeat Lincoln's renomination in convention by substituting his Secretary of the Treasury. It argued the impossibility of reëlecting one whose tendencies were so manifest to compromise and shifting expediency. Copies of this circular, eulogizing Chase and the one-term principle, reached the White House as well as the press, and Chase wrote Lincoln to assure him that he had not known of the existence of the paper before seeing it in print. "I do not wish to administer the Treasury Department one day," he added, "without your entire confidence; for yourself I cherish sincere respect and esteem, and, permit me to add, affection." But his language was that of an intended rival, and he intimated that he would retire to private life were the President reëlected. Lincoln replied, in a well-considered letter, that he saw no occasion for a change at the head of the Treasury, and on that point would be guided only by public considerations. The bow of Chase's candidacy lingered not in the sky, and Pomeroy was no conjurer; for so irresistible ran the current in favor of Lincoln's renomination, that in Ohio itself the Union members of the legislature named the President rather than Chase, at the demand, as they called it, of the people and the soldiers. Rhode Island, too, where Sprague, Chase's son-in-law, was potent, Pennsylvania, and other States hoped for, ranged in the same category, and on

¹ 8 N. & H. c. 12; Warden, 562, etc.

the 5th of May the Secretary, concluding his contest hopeless, wrote his friends to dismiss the further consideration of his name.¹

But men more earnest than Pomeroy among radical Republicans combined with some of Lincoln's personal enemies to hold an independent mass convention at Cleveland on the 31st of May, hoping to forestall the delegate action expected at Baltimore a week later. Incongruous elements composed the gathering: German enthusiasts from St. Louis, who wished for Fremont, and "War Democrats," so called, from New York City, whose preference was for Grant, and their motto "integrity and economy." To the five hundred of this convention Wendell Phillips wrote a lively letter, which was read aloud; he counselled among other radical measures, in his vehement phrase, to confiscate and divide up the lands of rebels among Union soldiers and settlers,—a proposal which this convention placed among platform resolutions which were otherwise, on the whole, sane and reasonable. Fremont was by acclamation nominated for President, and John Cochrane of New York Vice-President.² Fremont accepted the honor with a caveat against the confiscating plan, and poured out his bitterness against Lincoln personally, as a usurper of constitutional rights and at the same time an administrator without capacity or vigor of execution. In order to feel free to accept this nomination, he resigned his military commission. When the two conventions regularly opposed produced later their candidates, and party lines were defined, Fremont, to whose sporadic canvass there was found no popular response whatever, was asked by his friends to withdraw provisionally. He refused, and then a few weeks later abandoned the contest altogether. But he could not leave the field without shooting a Parthian arrow against the President, whose administration he denounced as "politically, militarily, and financially a fail-

¹ 3 N. & H. c. 12. Pomeroy, in the Senate, declared that Chase had not known of the formation of this committee, but had been "drafted into service." Am. Cycl. 1864, 784.

² 9 N. & H. c. 2.

ure," and its necessary continuance "a cause of regret for the country." This was Fremont's last appearance in public life, though he lived a quarter of a century longer.¹

The Union-Republican convention, which met at Baltimore on the 7th of June, was bound by a popular mandate to renominate Abraham Lincoln. From January onward, when New Hampshire and Pennsylvania started the movement for his second term, convention, legislature, State or local committee, on every possible occasion, put Abraham Lincoln forward for reëlection. The call for this convention issued on the 22d of February; throughout the months of spring, while delegates were being chosen, Lincoln led the list, and with cheering and uncontrollable clamor, from Maine to Colorado, and southward into Maryland, delegations were instructed to present him a second time as the loyal candidate. Nowhere, indeed, except in the State of Missouri, where local discontent had arisen, was a resolution to that effect laid upon the table. Apprehensive friends, however, had cautioned the President to beware of Grant; "If he takes Richmond," was Lincoln's ready reply, "let him have the office."

Grant, in truth, was never a competitor, nor gave the slightest sanction to efforts made in various quarters to bring his name forward in popular offset to Lincoln's. When at length the convention met at Baltimore, it had little to do, as concerned the chief office, but formally to register the decision of the State constituencies in June. whose name it had met. A venerable clergyman, Robert J. Breckinridge of Kentucky, made an impressive speech as temporary chairman; Ex-Governor William Denison of Ohio succeeded him as the permanent one, and a conciliating spirit was shown, both in settling delegation controversies and in arranging the platform, which Henry J. Raymond of New York reported from an appropriate committee. These platform resolutions declared it the duty of every citizen to maintain the integrity of the Union and quell rebellion by force of arms, without compromise.

They favored the full and final abolishment of slavery throughout the land by constitutional amendment;¹ they applauded the practical wisdom, unselfish patriotism, and unswerving fidelity of the President, thanking, moreover, the soldiers and sailors of the Union for their heroic service; they commended foreign immigration, the speedy construction of a Pacific railroad, and faith inviolate towards the public creditors. By a sagacious and compromising expression they avoided factional effort to compel Lincoln to reorganize his Cabinet or to change his forbearing policy towards Napoleon's intervention in Mexico. When, on the 8th of June, the nominations were reached, acclamation yielded courteously to the call of States, and Abraham Lincoln was renominated President by an undivided choice, except for Missouri alone, whose vote was first cast for Grant, under local instructions, and then, on the announcement of the ballot,² changed so as to make Lincoln's renomination unanimous.

For Vice-President the chief names were Hannibal Hamlin of Maine, the present incumbent, Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, and Daniel Dickinson of New York. Johnson leading on the first ballot, friends of the other candidates changed votes in his favor, and his nomination, upon motion, was declared unanimous. There had been no real opposition to the old complete ticket, but Republicans, in their strong desire to hold the full Union strength at the polls, felt impressed with the fairness of presenting a War Democrat for the second office. Besides the claim for his national recognition in this respect, Johnson belonged to a border slave State, where he had endured and done great service to the Union cause. That selection proved of tremendous consequence in its later bearings, but it was lightly made, as such convention arrangements have usually been, nor probably did Lincoln take more than a passive part in

¹ Slavery was proclaimed as the cause and the constituted strength of this rebellion, contrary to the principles of Republican government, and its death-blow, dealt by the government, was commended.

² For Lincoln, 492; for Grant, 22.

bringing it about.¹ For himself Lincoln commended the decision "not to swop horses while crossing a stream."

Congress had not yet adjourned when the Baltimore convention dispersed. Besides a disappointment in the military campaign, which we shall note presently, civil perplexities ensued. In the present Cabinet reorganization impended, not quite such as this convention had hoped for. Chase, when withdrawing from his contest for the nomination, nursed such bitterness of defeated rivalry towards his chief, that they ceased to work in due harmony together; for the Secretary was deficient in that buoyancy or sense of humor which alleviates ambitious failure. Francis P. Blair, Jr., whom the President had sent in command of a corps to rejoin Sherman at the West, had lately, while a member of the House, made a pungent attack, which Chase resented the more deeply because Lincoln seemed to reward instead of breaking with him. In reality, the President had with gentle tact induced Blair to quit politics, where he was showing too combative a temper, and return to the military life.² Chase's private correspondence took on that malcontent strain which found open vent at Cleveland; with the President and his own colleagues he grew fretful and irritable, and at length, upon some Federal appointments in New York City which he was determined to use for his personal patronage, regardless of other considerations, he tendered repeatedly, when opposed, his resignation from the Treasury. On the 30th of June the President took him at his word, and sent unexpectedly to the Senate the nomination of David Tod of Ohio for a successor. Ex-Governor Tod had respectable talents for the Treasury, but he was not widely known, and reputation was needful to ensure public confidence while the financial condition of the country was so critical. Tod with great discretion declined the appointment, and William Pitt Fessenden of Maine was quickly

¹ 9 N. & H. c. 3. And see, further, *Am. Cycl.* 1864, 788, 789.

² 7 N. & H. c. 13.

named next, and confirmed by his colleagues of the Senate without hesitation or a reference. Fessenden was chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance, a statesman of splendid renown and unsullied honor; physical robustness was his only possible failing for a post so onerous, but though averse to taking the responsibility, he overcame his first impulse to decline, and yielded to flattering solicitations. Chase, at the close of June, retired in consequence from office, the greatest financial director this country had known since Hamilton; like that earliest of official predecessors, he did not remain to complete the erection, but planned as architect and laid broad the foundation.¹

Chase and his friends charged that Lincoln's managers had procured an early convention, so as to forestall competition and force his selection. "Few," wrote Chase, "except those already committed to him will consider themselves bound by a predetermined nomination."² Even after the Baltimore convention had done its work and dissolved, Republican disaffection festered for a while and factional discontent was shown in high quarters. We have seen Lincoln feeling his way towards Southern reconstruction in his opening message to Congress by offering amnesty. No discordant voice was raised when that message was read, but administration men in the two Houses seemed to be of one mind, and conservatives and radicals vied with one another in praising the document. But Henry Winter Davis in the House showed a covert hostility.³ Procuring the reference of this portion of the message to a special committee, of which he was made chairman, he reported in February a bill for keeping Southern rehabilitation within the control of Congress, and supported it in an able speech. His bill meant to check the military reconstruction begun in Tennessee and Louisiana, and to prevent its extension to other revolting States. Congress, and Congress alone, as representatives of the people, he contended, had the power

¹ 9 N. & H. c. 4.

² Warden, 593.

³ It is said that he bore a grudge against the President for preferring Montgomery Blair to himself as a Cabinet adviser from Maryland.

to revive the reign of order in all that insurgent territory which had placed itself outside of legitimate authority. "Until, therefore, Congress recognize a State government organized under its auspices, there is no government in the rebel States except the authority of Congress."¹

In view of later events, the challenge here made deserves attention. But Davis's bill went to the limbo of abortive legislation. It passed the House towards the close of the session, little discussed, and in the Senate Wade of Ohio called it up on the 1st of July, taking the same line of argument in its support. Amendments in this latter branch carried the bill into conference, whence it emerged to reach finally the President, as he sat in the Capitol approving bills, scarcely an hour before the session was to close. Lincoln laid the parchment aside, unwilling to surrender absolutely to its postulates, at the same time desirous to avoid a quarrel; the session closed at noon, and the bill failed for want of his signature. To pacify radical Republicans, who, for one cause or another, were much exasperated by this pocket veto, the President issued, on the 8th of July, a proclamation commending the general plan of this bill as very proper, but announcing his unwillingness to be inflexibly committed to any one scheme. The danger that Southern States might be readmitted with local slavery, which this bill would have forbidden, Lincoln meant to dispel by constitutional amendment without raising at all that troublesome question whether rebellious States were in or out of the Union during the war. It is "a merely metaphysical question," he had lately remarked, "and one unnecessary to be forced into discussion." His avoidance of so mischievous an issue was accepted by the great mass of Republican voters. But Wade and Davis were so indignant at seeing their work brought to naught, that they issued through the press, in early August, a joint manifesto denouncing the President in violent language for encroaching upon the domain of Congress; and they insinuated, what was wholly unfair, that he meant to reconstruct the South,

¹ 9 N. & H. c. 5.

not only with slavery unimpaired, but so as to hold its electoral votes in pledge at his ambitious dictation.¹

All this dissension, with Fremont's candidacy to make further breach, and a military situation by no means up to expectation, fanned the hopes of the Democratic managers, whose party convention had been postponed to the last of August. An address to the people, put forth by the opposition of Congress, just before adjournment, charged Lincoln with the engrossment of all power, with military interference in elections, with the creation already of bogus States.² Republicans were exposed to a rattling fire, not knowing yet against whom to aim their own artillery. Chase's departure from the Treasury seemed to many the presage of public bankruptcy. With United States securities down to forty cents in gold upon the dollar, and drafting threatened to commence upon the third million of Union soldiers, a considerable fraction of Lincoln's own party adherents found fault. Some complained that this administration had been indifferent to peace and had not met advances from Richmond to procure it. When so influential a journalist as Greeley was found promoting such false ideas, the President sent him upon a special peace mission to self-styled Southern envoys at Niagara Falls,³ and by another experiment towards Richmond through two good citizens⁴ he gave public proof that the Davis government would consent to no terms short of final independence.

Despondency darkened as the day of the Democratic convention drew near, and the foe to be fought still lurked unseen. "At this period," as Lincoln himself described it, "we had no adversary and seemed to have no friends." Republican canvassers in New York reported that unless some

¹ 9 N. & H. c. 5 ; Am. Cycl. 1864, 307.

² Am. Cycl. 1864, 793.

³ For details (July), see 9 N. & H. c. 8 ; Am. Cycl. 1864, 780-784.

⁴ Colonel James F. Jaquess and James F. Gilmore ("Edmund Kirke"), the author. 9 N. & H. c. 9 ; Am. Cycl. 1864, 779. These held two personal interviews with Jefferson Davis which were fruitless.

bold step could be promptly taken, all was lost and Lincoln's reelection impossible. The President, preparing himself for the defeat then expected, took a characteristic course to nerve his administration for a last duty towards the Republic. On the 23d of August he secretly wrote on a sheet of paper, to the effect that between the election and instalment of his successor he would seek to coöperate in a final effort to save the Union; then folding and pasting the sheet, so that its contents might not be read, he procured each member of his Cabinet to indorse the paper, and laid it aside in his desk. That successor he then felt would be McClellan.¹

McClellan had, indeed, been the prominent candidate on the opposition side, and various efforts during the last twelve months to draw him out in support of Lincoln's administration and its policy, had failed. On the 29th of August the Democratic convention assembled at Chicago. Two distinct and prominent elements composed this political gathering; one of "War Democrats," mostly from New York and the East, who worked for a war candidate, and the other of "Peace Democrats" at the Northwest, who were reckless of all things save to end this war on one basis or another, and whose chief spokesman was Vallandigham, now home from Canada and permitted to remain at large. William Bigler of Pennsylvania, once its governor, was temporary chairman of this convention, and Governor Seymour of New York its permanent one. Vallandigham was placed upon the Committee of Resolutions, whose chairman, James Guthrie, reported, with the rest of the platform, a paragraph of this refugee's own drafting. It was carried against violent opposition in the committee room, but the convention adopted all the resolutions without debate, being chiefly intent upon nominations. The platform contained other-

¹ This curious instrument of pledge, Lincoln, after the election was over, brought out from his desk, in the midst of his rejoicing Cabinet officers, and, cutting it open, revealed its contents. 9 N. & H. 251.

wise the platitudes to have been expected — a general avowal of devotion to the Union and sympathy with the soldiers, sailors, and prisoners of war, fierce denunciation of arbitrary arrests, of military usurpation and interference at the polls, of test oaths and the like; but the plank forced in by Vallandigham's faction was the damnatory one.¹ McClellan, though plainly the favorite of the convention, was not satisfactory to all; a two-thirds vote being essential, craven candidates were proposed, and a sharp discussion arose touching McClellan's arrests in Maryland. But when, on the 31st of the month, a ballot was taken, McClellan received more than his needful two-thirds, which rose before the result was declared to 202, against 23 for Thomas H. Seymour of Connecticut; and then, on Vallandigham's motion, the choice was made unanimous. George H. Pendleton of Ohio was added as Vice-President to the ticket, after a second ballot, Guthrie and other competitors having withdrawn.²

McClellan, while willing enough to accept the nomination, was too loyal a soldier, too high-minded, and withal too wise an interpreter of the times, to load himself with the abject proposals of the peace faction. He, like the delegates from his own vicinity, felt that in the platform of this convention was the poison of disaster; and he took the contradictory course of repudiating that platform while taking the candidacy which came with it. "The Union," he announced in his letter of acceptance, "must be preserved at all hazards.

¹ "Resolved, That this Convention does explicitly declare, as the sense of the American people, that, after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war, during which, under the pretence of a military necessity, or war power higher than the Constitution, the Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part, and public liberty and private right alike trodden down and the material prosperity of the country essentially impaired, justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of the States, or other peaceable means, to the end that at the earliest practicable moment peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States."

² 9 N. & H. c. 11; Am. Cycl. 1864, 793. This convention adjourned, not *sine die*, but subject to future call.

I could not look in the face of my gallant comrades of the army and navy, who have survived so many bloody battles, and tell them that their labors and the sacrifice of so many of our slain and wounded brethren had been in vain, that we had abandoned that Union for which we have so often perilled our lives.”¹ These were noble words, but they would have sounded nobler still had he declined consistently both nomination and platform together.

That sinking of the heart which the Union party had experienced before the Chicago gathering — a symptom whose diagnosis fails frequently, since much of the danger may be imaginary — vanished when battle-field and opponents were plainly revealed. At once began the marshalling of the hosts for a short and sharp campaign, under skilful political managers on either side. Superfluous candidates were thrust out, the opposing lists were opened, and the voting array tended to one or other of the two diametrically opposed. The breeze of opinion, so long stagnant, began to blow favorably to the administration; and military victories, such as the midsummer had not brought, dispersed before November the gathering gloom by new sunshine.

This was the first Presidential contest, within the memory of our voters, that eliminated slavery from the canvass; for, though “thorough” was the word inscribed upon emancipation’s banner, no open issue was made against that policy by Democratic opponents, nor did slavery as an institution find defenders. This was, moreover, the sole Presidential election, thus far in our history, from which a large fraction of the American people stood self-excluded; and the first, since the downfall of the Whig party, where no third platform and third Presidential candidate kept conservatives together against the extremes of one or another section. Each party present, that of Lincoln and that of McClellan, made strong exertion to draw over the respectable residue of the doubtful to its side; and in the various ratification meetings

which followed, all through the two months' canvass, local managers placed programmes and resolution drafts in the hands of eminent private citizens, inviting them to preside or take some other leading part. The same course was pursued in making up the State electoral tickets; thus Horace Greeley, now pacified, was a Lincoln elector at large in New York State; in Massachusetts the conservative Winthrop headed the list on the McClellan side, while Everett took the corresponding place of honor on the Republican ticket, to perform the last public function of his life.

As old Northern Whigs now parted company forever, so, too, did Northern abolitionists. Wendell Phillips, to whom a destructive policy was the breath of life, we have seen pointing his spectral artillery at Cleveland against the President, and hailing the superficial Fremont for his hero. But Garrison, with far sounder discretion, fell into step with the embattled host and its champion that practically accomplished the crusade he had preached and prayed for. Attending in June as a spectator the convention which met in Baltimore, this chief of apostles made a visit to Washington, and at the White House and in the Senate chamber was handsomely received.¹

It was a strong and convincing argument on the Union-Republican side that the logic of events demanded Abraham Lincoln for another Presidential term. Four years before, he had been elected, but the South refused to submit; in its pride that errant section hoped now to see him defeated; but should the loyal people of the Union reaffirm their previous choice, disloyal resistance would drop nerveless.² All three Presidential conventions, obedient to sentiment, had tendered the public gratitude to those brave soldiers and sailors who fought to reestablish the Union; but Lincoln's reelection, as lines were now drawn, gave the only real assurance that this fight would be maintained under

¹ 4 Garrison, c. 3. And see 9 N. & H. c. 11; Am. Cycl. 1864, 798.

² 3 Seward, 196.

auspices of success. Political leaders of the Confederacy watched, in fact, this canvass with the most eager interest, building their last hopes of independence or national compromise upon McClellan's candidacy. Stephens, the most accommodating of those leaders, declared his regret that an out-and-out peace man had not been nominated at Chicago upon its peace platform. But the platform itself, as he saw, was for ceasing hostilities, for opening negotiations; and hence he presumed that those electing McClellan would try by negotiation to restore the Union, otherwise conceding a peaceful separation. A convention called by the consent of both governments ought, he thought, to recognize the sovereignty of each separate State as fundamental.¹

Both President and Vice-President of this Southern Confederacy had long since conceded that Lincoln's proclamation of freedom was irrevocable; that it utterly destroyed all prospect of a restored Union, with slavery as formerly, so far as that candidate was concerned.² But Davis was stubbornly resolved to fight to the bitter end for Southern independence; and all means, all resources, that could yet be reached, he had brought within his tenacious grasp, crushing State rights at the South and individual liberty by military process. His martial obstinacy was shared by many other West Point graduates, now high in civil or military influence.³ But Stephens, more of a philosopher, saw, like others of his own State of Georgia, that constitutional liberty, at the South, while protecting itself at one point, was in peril at another, and he labored to pacify. "The great majority of masses, both North and South," he observed in 1863, "are true to the cause of their side; a large majority on both sides are tired of the war, want peace. But as we do not want peace without independence, so they do not want peace without Union."⁴

¹ Johnston's Stephens, 469, 473.

² *Ib.* 432.

³ "We will fight you to the death!" wrote Hood to Sherman passionately this September; "better die a thousand deaths than submit to live under you or your negro allies!" 2 Sherman, 124.

⁴ Stephens, 435. The Confederate Congress, February, 1864, had

Following those reverses at the polls which our administration bore in the autumn of 1862, the peace faction of this Union, active, inveterate, and unscrupulous, had availed itself of every draft, of every disaster in the field, to strengthen its opposition. But Lincoln pursued ^{1862-1863.} his duty unflinchingly, while a double pressure bore upon him which in a measure neutralized itself; that of radicals among his own followers, who reproached him as too conservative, too lenient with the enemy, and that of the conservatives, who denounced him as too radical, too severe. To steer midway, as he did, and yet advance onward, was doubtless the wiser course in a revolution. Efforts for peace, feeble on either side, followed those mid-term elections. Both Henry S. Foote, in the Richmond House of Representatives, and Garrett Davis, in the Senate at Washington, introduced resolutions for a conference which were laid on the table.¹ But in June, 1863, Stephens was permitted by his government to go to Washington and propose a negotiation, just at the time when Vicksburg was despaired of, while Lee's invasion threatened a recompense. The aim of the Southern Vice-President, as he admitted, was not so much to act upon the Lincoln government, as to influence the Northern people, who, he imagined, were, like himself, in growing distress over a centralizing despotism which threatened their liberties. Stephens reached Hampton Roads at an inopportune time, for Gettysburg had just been fought and Vicksburg's surrender was announced from the distant West. President Lincoln refused him a safe-conduct within the Union line; for military matters, was his response, the usual military channels would suffice, and civil negotiations could not assume that the Confederacy was a government to be treated with.²

The Vicksburg and Gettysburg victories of 1863 were an argument for Lincoln's policy in the local canvass more potent than many discussions; and in the turning tide of

formally suspended *habeas corpus*, enumerating a variety of causes. 7 N. & H. c. 2.

¹ 7 N. & H. c. 13. ² 2 Stephens's War, 563, 780; 7 N. & H. c. 13.

public confidence, the peace party was submerged at the various State elections which followed in the fall of that year. Pennsylvania reelected Curtin as governor by over 15,000 majority, against Judge Woodward, who in a State case had pronounced the enrolment act unconstitutional, and because of that decision was made the candidate of the opposition; another judge of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania lost his reelection for assenting to that opinion. In Ohio, Vallandigham for governor was overwhelmed at the ballot box; New York, indignant over the draft riots and those who palliated them, chose a State ticket of minor officials against the Seymour candidates. A breezy and admirable letter from Abraham Lincoln to an Illinois mass-meeting, which was held at Springfield in August, gave strong inspiration to that autumn's canvass; for, honest, plain-spoken, logical, and with its points put in his unique and characteristic style, that letter declared him unflinching in purpose, both as to the war itself and the policy he had chosen to adopt for striking the fetters from the slave. Upon the whole that election result in 1863 was highly encouraging; and Lincoln set the precedent of nationalizing New England's Thanksgiving Day, by proclaiming a celebration in November over the victories gained for the Union cause.¹

That same tide of military success, which held back through the spring and summer of 1864, was sure, whenever it came, to settle favorably to the administration and the Union-Republican cause this more portentous Presidential issue. It came; but had heavy disaster come instead, the November result at the polls might have been quite different.

SECTION IX.

GRANT GENERAL-IN-CHIEF.

Immediately following Grant's great victory at Chattanooga, a bill was introduced in Congress to revive the grade

¹ 3 Seward, 194; 7 N. & H. c. 13.

of lieutenant-general of the army. Officers in Confederate service bore already the title; but only twice before had that exalted military rank been conferred by the peace-loving Congress of the United States—once, as a crowning mark of honor upon Washington, when war with France was thought imminent; and, once again, after the lapse of more than half a century, upon Winfield Scott, as conqueror of Mexico. Scott's distinction was by brevet only, nor was Washington's more than honorary, as he chose to regard it, while conscious that he could not live to take the field again. Here, however, it was proposed for the first time to crown thus an American and loyal general in the midst of his active service, as aid and inducement to finishing a war successfully. On this account, and because of its despotic temptation and the disappointment that lesser military promotions had already brought to the Union, Congress hesitated to revive in the army at such a time so supreme an honor. But the bill finally passed on the 26th of February, and three days later received the Executive approval. It empowered the President to appoint a lieutenant-general from among the major-generals most distinguished for courage, skill, and ability. Grant was the person understood to be fixed upon for that exceptional mark of public confidence; and it was Grant's devoted friend and fellow-townsmen, Washburne of Illinois, who had introduced that measure in the House and worked hardest for its passage. On the 1st of March, the day after he had signed the bill, Lincoln nominated Ulysses S. Grant to the Senate for this new honor, and his nomination was promptly and cheerfully confirmed.¹

Grant, on the 3d of March, was ordered, through the War Department, to report at Washington, in person, as early as practicable, and receive his commission. He started from Nashville for the national capital the very next day, meaning at the outset to accept no command which would require him to make headquarters in Washington—a purpose to which Sherman adjured him with characteristic prejudice to

stand fast. "Leave the Atlantic slope to its own destiny," was the tenor of his friendly advice, "and let Halleck and the rest at Washington take there the buffets of political intrigue which they are better qualified to endure, while you keep for yourself and your old comrades the better conquest of the Mississippi Valley." With such dim forecast of his future, the new Lieutenant-general took his train eastward unpretentiously, little heeding the shouts and exultation which greeted him on his way. Reaching Washington on the evening of the 8th of March, he registered quietly at Willard's Hotel, and about half-past nine attended a reception at the White House. Here had collected an unusual throng of those wonder-seeking citizens sure to be on hand to come in contact with the latest celebrity. Grant, finding himself on this occasion the lion whose roar was waited for, swayed, short of stature, into the inner reception room, and without formal presentation shook hands with the President, who recognized and greeted him warmly. After a few words of conversation between them, Grant was introduced to Secretary Seward, Mrs. Lincoln, and others, and then moved under convoy of the first-named into the East Room. There the pressure of an enthusiastic crowd was so positive and persistent that the Lieutenant-general was forced amid their cheers to mount a sofa, blushing with embarrassment, and shake hands with the gazers of both sexes who rushed eagerly upon him from all sides for the unwonted privilege. On the next day, March 9th, at an appointed hour, Grant, once more at the White House, received formally his commission from the President, in presence of the assembled Cabinet, Halleck and a few invited spectators being also present.¹

With these nervous preliminaries undergone, Grant, who by this time had found that Washington must of necessity be his official headquarters, returned West on the 11th, to arrange for turning over the command there, and to give directions for his spring campaign; first, however, procuring the permission, which was readily accorded, to have Sher-

¹ 8 N. & H. c. 13; 2 Grant, 114.

man advanced to his own late command, and McPherson to Sherman's, Logan being placed in charge of McPherson's corps. For Grant's desires closely pursued the lines of personal friendship. "You and McPherson," said he, gratefully, to Sherman, "are the men to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for whatever I have had of success."¹ To Meade, whom he also visited near the Rapidan, just after receiving his new commission, Grant wisely left the direct command of the Army of the Potomac; and with mutual regard each accepted a delicate relation, though comparative strangers.² Halleck, aware that his authority of general-in-chief was gone, now asked to be relieved of his duties; but the President still retained him as a professional counsellor, or chief-of-staff. With every opportunity of rising to the rank which Grant now held, this general had proved a disappointment; most commanders in the field had resented the critical suggestions he made from his easy chair, meddling in details; while the President complained that ever since Pope's defeat Halleck had shrunk from taking responsibility.³

Meade's pursuit of Lee, after the battle of Gettysburg, had been fruitless. The latter, once again in Virginia, evaded all effort to intercept him at Manassas Gap, and, after working his way up the Shenandoah Valley, re-^{1863,}
tired once more behind the Rapidan, to repair ^{July-}
his shattered strength. Meade, with the Presi-^{September.}
dent's approval, gave his own army for the next two months the rest it greatly needed. When Lee in his chagrin tendered his resignation to Jefferson Davis, the latter, with assurances of undiminished confidence, refused to accept it, and left him untrammelled in his plans as before.⁴ Appre-

¹ 8 N. & H. 337.

² It pleased Grant that this general should have suggested the substitution of some comrade more intimate, in his place, and he assured Meade in response that the thought of a successor had not entered his mind. 2 Grant, 117.

³ 8 N. & H. 335.

⁴ 3 B. & L. 421.

hending no immediate attack, Lee now granted many furloughs and leaves of absence as a reward for good conduct; and he lent Longstreet's corps to Bragg for the exigencies in Tennessee already narrated, with the intent that it should be returned him when needed. Now was the time to strike a blow, in Lincoln's estimation, while there were three Union men to the enemy's two, for the battle chances. When reënforcements went West, under Hooker, to strengthen Chattanooga, the Army of the Potomac was lessened in numbers to about 68,000 men; but it still some-
October- what exceeded in effective strength the opponent
November. army. Both Meade and Lee now planned taking the offensive, but Lee was the earlier, supposing the depletion on his front greater than it really was. Skilful manœuvring was shown by both generals in gaining a position north of the Rappahannock for another fight; but at Bristoe Station, on the 14th of October, where A. P. Hill's corps fell upon Warren and the rear guard of Meade's army, marching, it was handsomely repulsed, after a brief and obstinate battle. Lee came up after the fight was over and listened in silence to Hill's explanation of the disaster, as they rode among the slain. "Well, well," he sadly said, "bury these poor men, and let us say no more about it."¹ This ended the present Confederate advance, for Lee had no heart to repeat the risks of Gettysburg by attacking Meade's army in full position. He turned back gloomily, on the 18th of October, towards the line of the Rappahannock, and from Centreville Meade with speed and vigor took up in his turn the pursuit.

The Rappahannock crossed, a spirited encounter on the 7th of November took place at Kelly's Ford; but Lee, retiring the next day, drew together his army behind the Rapidan and the pursuers halted. In course of a fortnight, Meade conceived a brilliant and daring plan for resuming the aggressive. Over the lower fords of the Rapidan, which were quite unguarded, he proposed throwing his army, and, turning the enemy's right, attack his works in reverse. But, unluckily, bad weather damaged the effort; not to add the

¹ Cooke's Lee, 355.

bewildered lead of an elderly officer whom Meade had indiscreetly placed in charge. Five days were thus lost, and by the 28th, when Meade's whole army was brought into position in front of Mine Run, the Confederate heights beyond the brook and brushwood were seen bristling all over with defences which Lee had hastily constructed. Meade ordered an attack for the dawn of the 30th; but Warren, who like himself was an accomplished engineer, induced him to make a careful inspection, and the two agreed that the risks of an assault were too great to encounter. Meade countermanded the attack, withdrew his troops prudently and in safety, and the two hostile armies went into winter quarters.¹

On several occasions after Lee left Gettysburg, opportunities for the Union army seem to have been missed; but impartial critics will agree that the fault had not been due so much to Meade's want of vigilance, as to the failure of others in carrying out his plans and intentions. Warren gained personal prestige in these futile movements; but with Reynolds dead, Hancock wounded, Hooker removed, and Meade himself promoted, the several corps of the Potomac army had of late lost heavily in fighting stimulus.²

Civilian though he knew himself, our President had given the most ardent heed to all the military movements that went on at the seat of war. Not wise in such a sense as to be free from occasional error, his military wisdom grew with military experience, and no personal pride of opinion could pervert his judgment. From Halleck, as an expert close at hand, he derived much technical instruction in the art of war; and with the political responsibilities of war already his, the military, besides, had been saddled heavily upon him. But Lincoln gained in philosophic temper, while so

¹ 8 N. & H. c. 9; 4 B. & L. 81, etc.

² 8 N. & H. 252. As to Kilpatrick's cavalry raid to Richmond and Ulric Dahlgren's death, see 4 B. & L. 95.

many of his commanders disappointed him, perceiving that war took time, whether fought under one general or another; yet he considered and reconsidered what ought to be done to improve campaign methods upon general principle. "My last attempt upon Richmond," he wrote about two months after the battle of Gettysburg, "was to get McClellan, when he was nearer there than the enemy, to run in ahead of him. Since then I have constantly desired the Army of the Potomac to make Lee's army, and not Richmond, its objective point. If our army cannot fall upon the enemy and hurt him where he is, it is plain to me it can gain nothing by attempting to follow him over a succession of intrenched lines into a fortified city."¹ Here, perhaps unaware of it, he came to the point of view which Grant at the West had assumed and acted upon in his highly successful operations, to make the capture of an enemy, rather than a place, the first concern.

The President had declined to order an attack where one so trustworthy as Meade felt doubtful about making it, and to that excellent commander he showed throughout a patient deference. Still more strongly did he now incline to give Grant, whose busy persistency he had long admired, a full choice of plans; and he divested himself of onerous burdens he had borne so long for helping out generals less secure in his own or the country's confidence. Through storm and sunshine, Grant had won his way to consummate rank by consummate merit. Hence the new Lieutenant-general was allowed to form in secrecy his own plans for the coming campaign; he communicated them neither to the President, nor to the Secretary of War, nor to Halleck. Grant asked, when he received his commission, what was expected of him. Lincoln replied that the country wanted him to do what other Union generals had not been fortunate in doing—take Richmond. "This I can do," rejoined Grant without hesitation, "if I have the troops;" and the President assured him they should be forthcoming. What Grant actually proposed doing the President did not wish

¹ 29 W. R. pt. 2, 207; 8 N. & H. 236.

to know, nor was the route to be chosen discussed or even mentioned, between them.¹ But before the new leader took the field, Lincoln was particularly pleased to learn that his design was to bring the whole numerical strength of Union armies, East and West, so superior to that of the South when combined, into one simultaneous and concerted movement.²

Grant, on the 26th of March, having now returned finally from the West, took up his headquarters at Culpeper Court House, close by the Army of the Potomac, and prepared for the grand campaign. His main purpose was to mass and move at the same time against the two great Confederate armies in the field, that of Lee in his immediate front, and that of Joseph E. Johnston, in Dalton, Georgia, opposed to whom, at Chattanooga, was Sherman, Grant's second in command and Western successor, to whom he chiefly looked for coöperation. Sherman was to bear from Chattanooga, making Johnston's army and Atlanta his objective points; he was to penetrate the interior of the Confederacy as far as possible and inflict all possible damage upon its war resources, but the mode of operation was left largely to his discretion. Grant chose the most difficult task for himself; to conquer and capture Lee's army was his prime object, with the fall of Richmond as its necessary result, and he thought it better to fight this wary antagonist outside his stronghold than within it. In aid of Sherman, Banks was to finish up his remote Red River expedition, and operate against Mobile; while to assist his own immediate movements, Gillmore was to join Butler at Fortress Monroe, with ten thousand men, and the two generals were to advance by the James River against Richmond and Petersburg. Sigel, who now commanded in the Shenandoah valley with an increased force and a long line of railroad to protect, was to advance from Harper's Ferry, or at least cover the North from invasion; helping

¹ 8 N. & H. 343; 2 Grant, 123. Grant relates that the President submitted a plan in Virginia concerning which the general might do as he pleased; and that he listened, but ignored it. Ib.

² 8 N. & H. 348.

thus the fighting elsewhere if he could not fight himself.¹ But Banks, as it turned out, could not return in time from his other enterprise, and 40,000 veterans were lost to the present campaign in consequence; and Sigel's assistance, too, proved disappointing. As for the route to be taken in Virginia, Grant reserved his decision until just before the march commenced, and then concluded to engage Lee boldly in front and pound his army to pieces before he could retreat. For attempting, at least, such an enterprise, he had good reason.²

At the West, the advancement of Sherman and McPherson was cheerfully acquiesced in by the other high generals of that department. Sheridan, the hero of Missionary Ridge, was summoned eastward at Grant's request to direct the cavalry branch of the Army of the Potomac. That army was now reorganized thoroughly and reduced to three corps: the 2d, commanded by the brave Hancock, who had now recovered from his wounds; the 5th, which the well-dressed Warren led with gallantry, and the 6th, under the tried and trusted Sedgwick. Burnside, with his 9th corps, received at first an independent command at Annapolis, there to await emergencies; but finding this arrangement unsuitable, Grant blended later his force of 20,000 strong with that of Meade at the front. Towards Meade personally Grant showed the utmost delicacy, not meaning to inflict the pain he himself had been made to suffer when marching under Halleck in a similar relation. All directions for the Army of the Potomac he issued to Meade to execute; he established his own headquarters so near, when he could, as to make formal orders unnecessary.³ Combining all the armies of the Union, henceforth, as one intelligent whole, no longer to operate so separately and independently of one another as to yield longer to the South its advantage of depleting at one point for

¹ "If he can't skin, himself, he can hold a leg while some one else skins," wrote Grant, using a Western metaphor which he gained from the President in conversation. ² Grant, 132, 143.

² 8 N. & H. c. 14; ² Grant, c. 47.

³ ² Grant, 118.

reënföring at another, Grant viewed his Army of the Potomac as the centre of united operations, that of the Mississippi Valley under Sherman as the right wing, and Butler's Army of the James as the left wing; all remaining troops of the Union to the southward constituting a reserve force in the enemy's rear, to be moved in subordination.¹ Under a system framed so clear and simple, and preparing without a moment's waste of time, while organizing at the front rather than in Washington, the new general-in-chief, without boast, bustle, or pretence of any kind, announced himself all ready by the last of April to begin the new campaign.

Skill and experience had by this time brought the efficiency of the War Department to a maximum, in all its bureaus, for providing men and supplies, and Grant's will and temperament, unobtrusive but strong, made all officials zealous to help him out. Not a symptom of jealous interference or quarrel was manifest, such as had hindered operations under most predecessors; and Grant declared himself amazed at the readiness with which all that he asked for had been yielded by the government without asking even an explanation. The President, on the last day of April, sent the Lieutenant-general a kind letter, expressing his entire satisfaction up to the present date, and bidding him a loving farewell. "The particulars of your plan," he wrote unreservedly, "I neither know nor seek to know. You are vigilant and self-reliant; and pleased with this, I wish not to obtrude any constraints or restraints upon you. If there is anything wanting which is within my power to give, do not fail to let me know it. And now, with a brave army and a just cause, may God sustain you."²

Punctual at the time proposed the week before, Grant's army of the centre started May 4th, soon after midnight,

¹ 2 Grant, 127.

² For this letter and Grant's modest and appropriate reply, see 8 N. & H. 355.

upon that campaign for Richmond which, without turning
back, was to be the last and victorious one, though
May. long, devious, and interrupted, and strewn with
many a bloody sacrifice. Ten days' rations, with forage and
ammunition, were taken in wagons, beef-cattle being driven
along to be butchered as wanted. Three days' rations, in
addition, and fifty rounds of cartridges, were borne upon
the person of each soldier. Like McClellan, two years
before, Grant went forth with a host which outnumbered its
adversary by about two to one,¹ and in effective strength
he had not far from 120,000. Leaving Culpeper and that
line of intrenchments north of the Rapidan which had so
long confronted an enemy unmolested, Sheridan, Hancock,
and Warren, with their respective commands, crossed the
river upon bridges placed in the darkness of the night, and
on the 5th of May the Army of the Potomac had fairly
reached Chancellorsville, with a march stolen upon the
enemy, so Grant believed, like that of Hooker a year
before. Another day would take his forces through the
dark and tangled Wilderness, with its gloomy woods, into
more open ground south and west of it. But this ad-
vance was not to be made unchallenged. For, rapidly as
Grant was moving, Lee moved to counteract with equal en-
ergy and decision when he learned that his foe had passed
the Rapidan. He knew every foot of the ground here.
Treating the Wilderness as in itself a cover to him, he
threw forward Ewell's corps by the turnpike and A. P. Hill's
by the plank road, making such despatch that by nightfall
of the 4th they were halfway through this fearful forest,
ready to strike the next morning. Lee buoyantly relied
upon putting Grant to the same stress as that of Hooker,
the year before, and then driving him with still greater
success. Now ensued, on the 5th and 6th of May, a bloody
and determined struggle for the mastery; "more desperate
fighting," wrote Grant afterwards, "has not been witnessed

¹ See 4 B. & L. 182, 184, which gives Grant's effective strength as 118,000, and Lee's as not less than 61,000. Cf. 8 N. & H. 352; also 31 Century, 218-220, which computes Lee's strength as about 75,000. And cf. *supra*, pp. 194, 196.

on this continent.”¹ At the close of the second day’s slaughter the opposing armies stood relatively in strength about as at first; but the decisive gain and the only one was on the Union side, in having crossed the Rappahannock River in perfect safety, with integrity unimpaired. Inferior in number as were the Confederates here engaged, they had for advantage, to counterbalance, a strong natural barrier in the jungles of scrub forest growth almost impenetrable to Grant’s infantry. Lee fought, too, upon interior lines in his own native and friendly State, where he had scarcely yet lost a battle.

Grant, on the early morning of the 5th, had lingered at the Rapidan to hasten Burnside’s crossing and place him in position, when news reached him that the enemy was approaching. Meade’s headquarters being now at Old Wilderness tavern, he hastened thither and prepared to take the initiative, as he had meant to do whenever Lee could be drawn out from his intrenchments. Warren’s corps in the advance, which had felt the enemy about sunrise, Grant ordered to assault, with that of Sedgwick divided so as to reënforce on either side. Hancock was next directed to support Getty of Sedgwick’s corps on the left, who fought handsomely. Warren, about noon, commenced the action, his troops plunging into the dense and difficult thicket, where they were soon lost to sight of their generals and of one another, while, unseen and secreted, the foe delivered his murderous fire, detecting their whereabouts by the noise of their footsteps. But, for all their disadvantage, Griffin led gallantly on the turnpike against the Confederate Ewell, until Early’s division on the latter side interposed a check. Neither contestant could follow up a real advantage gained; and with Sheridan’s cavalry holding in check superior numbers at another point, while Hancock and Hill fought one another stubbornly from late in the afternoon to nightfall, the first stubborn day of scattered and sanguinary skirmishes came to an end.²

¹ 2 Grant, 204.

² One of Birney’s best officers, General Alexander Hays, an esteemed

Grant gave orders to renew promptly the fight at five the next morning, so as to get the start of Longstreet, who was known to be on his way with twelve thousand men to join Hill's right, and for whom Lee waited. Hancock, with half the army of the Potomac, including Wadsworth's fresh division, confronted Hill consequently on one side; Sedgwick and Warren opposed Ewell on the other; while Burnside, whose divisions were now coming up by a rapid forced march, was ordered to fill the gap between, and pierce, if possible, the enemy's centre. The fighting recommenced promptly, as directed, on both wings. Wright of Sedgwick's corps engaged Ewell's left on the turnpike with great vigor, but was presently hindered; and Warren could not dislodge the foe from the intrenched lines in that vicinity. Hancock, however, at first made better progress against the Confederate right. Not knowing by what road Longstreet would approach, and diverting some of his force for contingent needs, he made, nevertheless, so prodigious an assault upon Hill's right, in course of the forenoon, with Wadsworth to assist him, that the Confederate column was forced down the plank road in confusion, a mile or more, and except for the screen of the forest, would most likely have been put to disastrous flight.¹ But Hancock's own ranks were so torn and disordered by this fierce charge through the underbrush, that the only discernible gain was in procuring an advanced position; and upon that position came Longstreet, cool and imperturbable, about noon, his fresh battalions inspiring Hill's disheartened troops to turn back with new courage in their company. Burnside's progress, meanwhile, through the woods towards Hancock's support had been too toilsome and slow for rendering a corresponding service. When the combined Southern corps, under Longstreet's lead,—their approach undiscovered in the woods until within a few hundred yards,—struck in succession Birney's and Mott's tired divisions of Hancock's advance, the latter were swept

comrade of Grant in younger days, was killed; and on the Confederate side Generals John M. Jones and Leroy A. Stafford.

¹ Cf. 2 Grant, 197; Long's Lee, 330.

back with slaughter. Hancock made other hurried dispositions in vain to hold the ground he had gained, and had to recede with his whole line to the morning position, which was strongly intrenched. During this retreat, and while endeavoring to rally his men, Wadsworth fell mortally wounded, his gray hairs crimsoned with blood. And here, too, Longstreet met nearly the fate which had befallen Jackson, a year before, in the same dense woods, for he and his staff were fired upon by Confederates, who mistook them for Union cavalry as they rode to reconnoitre. Not by death, this time, but by a disabling wound, was a prominent Southern general removed from the scene, and Lee had to replace the loss by leading a furious attack in person.¹ Besides Longstreet's loss for many weeks, that mistaken volley cost the Confederate cause a brigadier who rode in Longstreet's company.²

Lee's impetuous assault upon Hancock's intrenched line was made about four in the afternoon. It was repulsed after a heavy firing, in course of which the woods and part of the Union breastworks caught fire and burned badly. At one moment a Confederate force would plant its colors amidst the flames; at another, it was driven from the rude rampart with heavy loss. The day closed with a sharp demonstration by Early's column upon Sedgwick's right, which yielded several hundred Union prisoners, among whom were two brigadiers. But the mishap was less serious than it promised at first; for Sedgwick held strongly his line of defence, and when night came the one main army secured its safety with as little positive distress as the other.³ Burnside, Sedgwick, and Warren had all kept up assaults during the afternoon, but their efforts served chiefly to prevent Lee from throwing his whole strength against Hancock.⁴

On the morning of May 7th, all was silent in the dense jungles and uneven space that divided the two armies. All

¹ "Go back! Go back!" his soldiers cried, as Lee exposed himself incautiously: "we will do our duty." Long's Lee, 330.

² General Micah Jenkins.

³ See Early's Memoirs, 20.

⁴ 2 Grant, c. 50; 8 N. & H. c. 14.

of Lee's army had withdrawn during the night behind their intrenchments, and showed no disposition to fight again. Grant, who through these two terrible days had given his orders with composure and calmness, while staff-officers galloped back and forth in intense excitement, many of them with wild and exaggerated reports of danger, issued orders to Meade at dawn to prepare this day for a night march to Spottsylvania Court House, by the left flank. His object for thus moving was twofold: to prevent Lee from retiring to Richmond and crushing Butler, who had already advanced up the James from Fortress Monroe; also to interpose his own army, if possible, between Lee and Richmond, or else force him into an open field. The grand combined movement, of which he was watchful, had already begun, and news reached him, this afternoon, that Sherman was setting forth against Johnston, while Butler had just taken City Point. Grant's cool behavior and ready judgment in danger had made a marked impression upon that famous Army which now experienced his temper in fight for the first time, and under the severest of ordeals. He listened to whatever message came to him, gained by a few searching questions the true situation, and despatched troops with the utmost speed to sustain the fight at critical points.¹ Occasionally during the fight he would ride to important points in company with Meade, but oftener he was found before headquarters, sitting upon the stump of a tree, with a lighted cigar in his mouth and his penknife kept in active use, whittling sticks as a vent for the inner emotions which he suppressed. The latter habit he seldom indulged in later battles, but the cigar was his constant recourse for taciturnity; for taciturn he continued, except towards a few intimates, long after the battles of this war were over. Some men make impression by an affluence of speech, and some by a meditative silence. Grant as a soldier thought well and constantly of what was next to be achieved; nothing but the aggressive could suit

¹ "There was a spur on the heel of every order he sent," relates one of his staff, "and his subordinates were made to realize that it is the minutes which control events." 31 Century, 227 (Horace Porter).

his temperament: and, as Sherman has suggested, one reason why he succeeded so much better than some who had taken their turn before him was, that, while they thought so much about what the enemy would do next, Grant thought all the time what he was going to do himself.¹

There were features in this battle of the Wilderness which the annals of warfare have scarcely matched. For two wearisome days two veteran armies opposed, whose aggregate strength was near two hundred thousand, fought like fiends among the horrors of raging forest fires and exploding ammunition trains, with every obstacle in the path to a clear progress, and systematic combination impossible, — in a wilderness, fitly deserving that name, whose outlook was limited, in all directions, by a skirt of forest growth, almost impenetrable, whose interlacing trees held the smoke of artillery and shut out sunlight, and whose tangled undergrowth of scrub-oak and cedar retarded progress. Ravines yawned, right and left, and the ruins of forsaken quarries, where once had been an ill-starred mining industry. Hundreds of soldiers were burnt to death in the unchecked conflagration.² Lines had to be established by the pocket compass, and the battle was guided by sound and touch, rather than by the sense of sight. Temporary intrenchments of earth and rails, and on the Union side the convenient field telegraph, figured in this fight, as they did in all Grant's later movements.³

Wagon trains were put in motion for Spottsylvania in mid-afternoon of May 7th, and soon after dark the Union columns began their march in the same direction. When Grant, in the deepening shadows, rode with Meade and their staffs to take the advance, and it was seen that the line of march pointed towards Richmond instead of Washington,

¹ 31 Century, 230.

² More than 17,600 men were lost, during these two days, on the Union side in killed, wounded, and missing, while of the Confederate loss, scarcely less severe, no accurate account can be given.

³ 4 B. & L. 168, 182; 31 Century, 230, etc.; 2 Grant, 205-208.

the delight of his soldiery broke out in long and vociferous cheers; for at last it seemed as if the bloody struggle under disadvantages was over, and that a fair and open fight would conquer the fruits of a triumphant campaign.¹ But this deception passed, as did that of Lee on the other side, who imagined from the easterly bearing of these wagon trains that Grant meant to retreat across the Rappahannock after the former fashion, and so shifted his own right towards Fredericksburg to intercept. Lee found, on the morning of the 8th, that Grant was neither vanquished nor retreating, while Grant, who had hoped to pass round Lee's right wing towards Richmond, beheld, before night, the whole Confederate army massing upon the hills a mile north and east of Spottsylvania, directly in his front, to dispute his passage. Accident gave to Lee his timely information, and accident (to apply Grant's comment) decides often the fate of warfare. It seems that Longstreet's corps, now under the command of R. H. Anderson, had been ordered to move in the morning to Spottsylvania, instead of which he had marched thither the night before: not hindered by the Union cavalry as he might have been, because of some inadvertent change made by Meade in Sheridan's orders. Having given Lee the alarm, Anderson intrenched himself immediately across the front of Warren, who led the Union advance. Here again were topographical difficulties for the aggressive. Warren assailed but was repulsed; then, gathering up his strength, he assailed a second time with his whole corps, and gained a front position, where he intrenched, driving the enemy back some distance. Anxious to crush Anderson before Lee could reënforce him, Grant despatched Sedgwick to Warren's support; but it was late in the day before these forces united, and, with inadequate time to prepare, the effort failed.² Hill's corps, now commanded by Early and moving by the very road Grant's army had taken,

¹ A drum corps struck up the camp-meeting tune, "Ain't I glad I'm out of the wilderness."

² Grant has regretted that his march from the Wilderness had not placed Hancock, with his superb fighting capacity, in the lead.

came upon Hancock in the rear, and hindered the latter from reaching Spottsylvania that day. Each adversary passed the night in strengthening his position.¹

On May 9th Hancock went into place on Warren's right. Beyond the work of posting and intrenching, little was done that day by either army, except that sharpshooters and skirmishers interchanged a brisk fire, in the course of which, during the morning, Sedgwick was killed, an officer of the highest merit, brave, modest, and intelligent. To the command of his corps succeeded General Horatio G. Wright. This 6th corps had been posted on the left, with Burnside upon the extreme left of the line. Hancock, at the other end, faced the left flank of Lee's army, though separated from it and from the rest of Meade's army by the Po river, which he had now crossed. For the Mattaponi river in this region is formed by the junction of four streams, ingeniously styled the Mat, the Ta, the Po, and the Ny; and Spottsylvania was on the ridge which divides the Ny and the Po, the two northernmost of these narrow streams, where they flow easterly, in deep current, a few miles apart. Hancock, during the night, had built three bridges over the Po to protect his rear, and Lee had to reënforce correspondingly at that extreme. On the Confederate side intrenchments defended by Anderson, Ewell, and Early, in order, with their respective forces, stretched from left to right in an irregular semicircle inclosing the town, while a bold salient jutted out a mile to the north. Aside from the two abrupt streams, not easily crossed without bridges, the country hereabout, heavily timbered except for occasional clearings, served well for a defensive fight; and Lee's works, which he made exceedingly strong, gave him a more than fourfold strength, in the opinion of good observers, provided he could man well his intrenchments.² Yet Grant, with numbers in his favor, meant to fight Lee whenever chance offered, rather than turn aside, or, worse still, retrace his course. On the latter point he was almost superstitious. "I shall take no backward steps" was his present despatch to Halleck.

¹ 2 Grant, 215.

² Humphreys, cited 8 N. & H. 375.

Lee had weakened the rest of his line to meet Hancock's threatening movement towards his rear, and of this Grant resolved to take advantage, on the morning of the 10th, by striking strongly in front. Accordingly he ordered an attack made on Lee's centre by the corps of Warren and Wright, Hancock to bring his force north of the Po and command the whole assaulting force. Burnside meanwhile was to move forward and threaten in force on Lee's extreme right, and, if he found a good chance, attack with vigor in coöperation. This day was notable for successes almost, but not altogether, achieved. When Hancock drew back his divisions to the north of the Po, Barlow's division, isolated at the south, was twice attacked by the Confederates with great fury; but Barlow crossed the stream in admirable order, receiving and inflicting heavy loss. Hancock's new position did not compensate for the loss of the old one. Wright formed a storming party of twelve regiments, and placed Colonel Upton in command. At four in the afternoon the assault was ordered; Warren and Wright, with Mott's division of Hancock's corps, moving simultaneously. Warren was repulsed with heavy loss and Mott's attack failed; but Upton's storming party, which projected far beyond, poured over the Confederate parapet, and swept through the outer defences, carrying everything, with prisoners and guns, to the second line of intrenchments. The supporting troops, however, under Mott were roughly used, and slow in reaching the place. Grant, to relieve Upton, ordered a renewal of the assault with Hancock's corps, but after another rush, and a gallant one, the prize had to be relinquished about nightfall. Upton, badly wounded, was promoted to brigadier on the field, and was brought up to receive the personal thanks and compliments of the Lieutenant-general. Burnside, on the Union left wing, completely turned Lee's right while these other movements went on; but as neither he nor Grant was conscious of the advantage gained, Burnside at night received orders to connect closer with Wright, and that advantage was lost.¹

¹ 8 N. & H. c. 15; 2 Grant, c. 52; 31 Century, 350, etc.

Both armies rested on the 11th of May, and the only firing occurred in course of a reconnoissance which Grant now ordered to find out whether any point could be broken in his adversary's line. Shortly after breakfast the Lieutenant-general wrote on his field table the despatch, conveyed to Halleck, wherein occurred that famous phrase, "I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer," a purpose, by the way, which he found himself compelled to modify.¹ While cheerfully commenting in this letter upon the results already gained, and asking for heavy reënforcements as something "very encouraging to the men," he frankly owned his frightful losses in killed, wounded, and missing. But he reckoned the opposing loss as much greater, and believed Lee's army gave signs of wavering.² It was not in such sanguine, nor even such respectful, strain, that McClellan had couched his requests from the Peninsula at a crisis; and what Grant wished, the authorities sought readily to give him. While maturing plans for conquering, our general-in-chief had kept a close lookout to see that Lee was not detaching troops for crushing Butler or Sheridan, each of whom was now operating towards Richmond. On the same day came good news from both, which Grant promptly transmitted to Meade and Burnside.

For himself, the day's result was to discover more definitely the character of the salient before Lee's defence which Upton had assaulted so gallantly. It was in the shape of a V with a flattened apex. The ground in front sloped down toward the Union position, thickly wooded for the most part, but with a moderate clearing just in front of this apex. Grant issued orders this afternoon for a movement thither under cover of the night, to be followed by an assault the next morning. As usual, he trusted Hancock most of all for the hard fighting; but

¹ Grant sent this letter by the hand of Congressman Washburne, who had accompanied him thus far on the march, and now returned to Washington. 31 Century, 353.

² 2 Grant, 226.

Burnside he also directed to attack simultaneously on the left of the salient, sending two staff-officers to impress him to be vigorous. Hancock's corps made a difficult night march, groping its way through mud and forest gloom in the midst of a drenching rain, and gaining but little rest after reaching its destination. The morning of the 12th opened foggy, which delayed the start over a rising ground, heavily wooded, still to be traversed. But reckless of difficulties, his troops pressed quickly on without firing a gun, and when within close range of the enemy's line rushed upon the looming breastworks with rousing cheers. Barlow and Birney were over the parapet almost at the same instant, and a desperate hand-to-hand fight took place, with clubbed muskets, in the scant space within. A whole division of Ewell's corps was at once captured, Johnson, the division commander, and one of his brigadiers, being of the number; and Hancock, though checked in progress by another strong line which stretched across the base of this salient, a mile away, held the captured apex firmly in reverse, turning its guns upon his foe. Lee hastened reënforcements on every hand, with the most strenuous effort, to dislodge or resist, and round this "bloody angle"¹ raged all day a furious fight which did not wholly cease until three the next morning. Lee massed heavily on the broken point of his line, five times assailing with great violence, but failing to dislodge the Union troops from their new position.² Large trees were cut down by the flying missiles, logs and fence-rails shattered into splinters; soldiers planted opposing flags at intervals against one another; prisoners were pulled over the breastworks on one side or the other, and stabs inflicted through the chinks underneath by bayonet-thrusts. Here lay dead corpses piled so thick that the trenches had to be cleared

¹ Sometimes recalled as "Hell's half-acre."

² He rode about on his spirited gray horse, and so exposed himself personally that his men were afraid he would be shot. 4 B. & L. 243.

of them more than once. Grant, who passed from wing to wing all day long on the Union side, giving directions, called up speedily the reserves under Warren and Wright; the latter, though wounded while advancing, kept long the field, and his corps gave Hancock a splendid support; but the former found Anderson so strongly posted in his front that he thought it imprudent to attack, until Grant repeated his orders with strong emphasis, whereupon Warren fought and failed, incurring his chief's displeasure. Burnside, on the left, accomplished positively but little, though negatively very much, in keeping Lee from reënforcing his centre from that quarter; once he penetrated the angle, but he could not hold his own against the fresh troops of Early's corps which hastened to the breach. Lee at night took a position in rear of his former one, and there intrenched himself; while Grant, from the field, at sunset, reported his eighth day of battle closed with not an organization, nor even a company, lost. To the latter, Lee's situation seemed "the last ditch;" but "the enemy are obstinate," he was forced to admit. Full twenty hours of constant fighting had been endured there by many of the troops on both sides.¹

Following these eight days' battles, Grant wrote to the Secretary of War recommending for promotion those whose gallantry had most impressed him. Meade he wished to rank with Sherman as his two fittest subordinates for large commands; and for Hancock, Wright, Gibbon, Humphreys, Upton, and Carroll, he desired an advance in their several grades. Meade's position, it is seen, was a somewhat anomalous one, in view of the constant presence of his general-in-chief; and having, withal, a somewhat irascible

¹ 2 Grant, c. 53; 8 N. & H. c. 15; 31 Century, 354-358; 4 B. & L. 118, 170, etc. The Union loss at Spottsylvania is reckoned at 18,399 in killed, wounded, and missing; which is 1,000 more than in the Wilderness battles. The Confederate loss can only be conjectured, as it was never reported, but Grant considered it about the same as his own. See 4 B. & L. 182.

temper, this officer would offend others of high rank who came in contact with him.¹ Grant, whom all the army respected for his grave and calm temper, was urged to make a change that would bring him closer to these corps commanders and unite responsibilities; but he preferred to leave things as they were. For Meade he had found capable and wholly deferential; both met continually on the field, and the present arrangement relieved the chief of many details, enabling him better to mature his general plans. To this view of the situation Grant mainly adhered, and the two officers kept together in perfect harmony for the rest of the war. But the general-in-chief concluded to give a closer personal direction to his campaign, and with that end in view he soon assigned Burnside's corps to the Army of the Potomac, placing Burnside under Meade's command. This gave better unity to operations, and reduced his correspondence. No one praised Grant's order more than Burnside himself, and his readiness to serve under a junior in rank, who had been only a division general when he himself commanded this army, affords strong proof of his unselfish spirit.²

After burying his dead, Grant, on the 14th of May, advanced his line to the east of Spottsylvania, and as Lee moved in the night to cover this new front, Hancock was ordered from his late position. Other tactical changes followed; but with five days of almost incessant rain the roads by the 16th proved miry and impassable and hostilities had to wait. Under such conditions, tramping for merely a few miles becomes intensely difficult, tents and clothing get saturated with water, cooking fails for want of dry wood, and soldiers the most buoyant grow gloomy and dispirited. Very few reënforcements had arrived when on the 18th, after a profitless assault at the salient where Hancock had won the only positive success of the campaign, Grant learned ill news from his other armies. Sigel had been badly defeated at New Market and was retreating through the Shenandoah Valley towards Harper's Ferry;

¹ See 2 Grant, 538.

² 2 Grant, 235; 31 Century, 486, 498.

Butler had been driven from Drewry's Bluff, though still in possession of the road to Petersburg; while Banks had been worsted in far Louisiana. Sigel was at once relieved, upon Grant's suggestion, and Hunter assigned to his place; Canby was sent to supersede Banks. Our Lieutenant-general lost no time in useless regrets for ill success, but resolved upon still bolder movements for the troops under his immediate direction. Sitting at his field desk once more, with the weather more promising, he wrote an order for a general movement by the left flank southeasterly towards Richmond, to begin the next night. He also sent to Washington, asking that the navy might aid him in changing his depot of supplies to Port Royal on the Rappahannock.¹ His immediate army was now to operate in a new and unfamiliar country, with broad roads and well-tilled fields, but with neither guide nor map to show unerringly the way, towards McClellan's old Peninsula region and the James River base. Male non-combatants were hardly seen on his entire route, even the blacks having been sent away. When setting forth, Grant reduced his trains by sending back to Washington more than a hundred pieces of artillery, and before reaching the James River he had reduced that arm of the service still further, convinced that his cannon here were more than he could bring into effective fight.²

Lee, in the afternoon of the 19th, made an unavailing effort to turn the Union right; and General Robert O. Tyler sustained the shock so handsomely, with raw troops just arrived, that Hancock's veterans easily made the repulse complete. Grant waited another day, hoping that Lee would draw out of his works and fight in the open field, but the delay was unavailing. On the night of the 20th, then, began the new movement by the left flank, with Hancock constantly in advance and separated from the rest, as a lure to Lee; but the latter hung off persistently, intrenching while he intercepted approach, and his attack of the 19th was the last initiative in force that he ever ventured to make, for by this time he dreaded his new opponent.

¹ 31 Century, 490, etc.; 2 Grant, c. 53.

² 2 Grant, 241.

In this manner, though not without harassing fights, of which Hancock's corps in the lead bore with strained nerves the larger share, Grant's army crossed brilliantly the North Anna River by detachments, but recrossed as Lee's manœuvres compelled it to do, bearing farther to the left, crossed at Hanover Town the Pamunkey, about twenty miles from Richmond, and then, changing the base to White House, McClellan's old depot, reached, by the close of May, Cold Harbor, near the Chickahominy River, about halfway between Hanover Town and Richmond. Here heavy skirmishing showed the two armies of North and South face to face once more, not far from where they had faced two years before; and Grant's objective point, like McClellan's before him, was now the James River, below Richmond's defence.¹

Grant never clearly explained why he changed that line of attack upon which he had purposed fighting "all summer." To turn backward from an enterprise, we have seen, was not in him; while misgivings, when he felt them, he concealed from others. McClellan's vindication, in after years, insisted upon the circumstance that this shifted base to the James, which brought ultimate triumph to the Union arms, was what he himself had wished, and Government denied him. But the mood in which the present change was made, besides the attendant conditions, were so different that no safe parallel can be drawn. Grant's despatches all the while were as buoyant and confident as possible; and this went very far towards keeping the good will of his Government. "Lee's army is already whipped," he wrote on the 26th; "I may be mistaken, but I feel that our success is already assured."² We may question, however, whether at heart he felt so sanguine. His Virginia campaign had been planned with the idea of a coöperation up the James and in the rear of Richmond, and when that

¹ 8 N. & H. c. 15; 31 Century, 500, 714; 2 Grant, c. 54.

² 2 Grant, 253.

coöperation went badly, it was natural that he should wish to swing round to where he could direct in person at that important point, and simplify by combining his forces. In this neighborhood and towards Petersburg he had long expected the death struggle would take place, and Lee's army, as he well knew, would interpose, until vanquished, to protect Richmond. Lee, like himself, was being reënforced, and a fortnight of as terrible fighting as the world ever saw impressed him probably with the belief that pounding and hammering under such conditions was too exhaustive for both sides, when victory might be gained at far less sacrifice. An open battle outside intrenchments could not be had, as he had hoped for, nor could he here, as at the West, count upon dissension and the blunders of generals opposed to him to spring a success. Almost bitterly did he view Lee's baffling skill and wariness with inferior numbers, while refusing to fight manfully and be whipped. Convinced, then, by bloody experience that discretion and not daring now opposed him, he schooled his impetuous eagerness for a new Gettysburg of fame, and resolved to win by means commensurate. To such a drift of purpose, upon silent reflection, we may impute Grant's final change of base, which absorbed Butler's army with his own, and moved his approach from the Rapidan to the Chickahominy, and then from the Chickahominy to the James.

Butler was not the man Grant would have chosen for skilled coöperator; some professional soldier, educated like himself, would have been his natural preference; but Butler stood squarely upon claims, military and political, and was not a pleasant person for the administration to antagonize. As planned in May, this subordinate was to have made the grand coup of the war by investing Richmond in the rear, while the general-in-chief battered and beat Lee's army on the original line of the Rapidan. Butler had some 32,000 excellent troops under William F. Smith and Gillmore, both able generals, also 3000 cavalry under Kautz. Leaving Fortress Monroe, he landed at Bermuda Hundred without opposition, intrenching there on the 6th of May,

while Richmond and Petersburg were very feebly defended. Three days later Kautz's cavalry damaged the railroads south of Richmond in one of those raids which advertise marauders, but whose mischief is soon repaired. By the 14th, when Butler moved out against Beauregard, who was now at Drewry's Bluff, he found him in strong intrenchments, with a force nearly equal to his own. After an engagement on the 16th, involving an almost equal loss, Butler fell back to Bermuda Hundred, where, between the James and Appomattox rivers, he got shut up in his intrenchments, "as in a bottle strongly corked," to use the borrowed imagery of Grant's report, strong enough for defence, but unable to resume the offensive.¹ Sheridan had meanwhile made a dashing foray upon Richmond, passing through its outer defences and communicating with Butler at the James on the 14th. Between the 8th and 24th of May, with his mounted troopers, he passed completely round Lee's army, defeating the Southern cavalry in four fights, capturing prisoners and destroying miles of railroad and munitions of war. Grant's army, which he had left at the Rapidan, he finally rejoined on its new march from the North Anna River to Cold Harbor.²

Cold Harbor supplied Grant's last destructive encounter with Lee's army during the campaign which he was already reshaping. In that neighborhood the adversary had been found strongly fortified on the 30th, and on that same evening Smith's corps, as directed, reached White House Landing from Butler's checkmated command, ready to debark and reënforce. Sheridan, on the 31st, after a hard fight, carried Old Cold Harbor, the only point essential to Grant's progress; but Grant, after various efforts to get his

prey out of cover from Totopotomy Creek, made,
June.

on the morning of the 3d of June, near Cold Harbor, a determined assault to break through Lee's long line of prudent intrenchments. The attack failed disastrously, as it must have done, and upon the advice of his corps com-

¹ See 2 Grant, 152 ; 8 N. & H. 399.

² 2 Grant, c. 48.

manders, Grant at noon desisted.¹ His later expressions of regret indicate that in ordering the assault he had allowed himself to be drawn from a new resolution, tempted by this last chance to indulge the fighting propensity that was strong in his nature. He meant this, probably, as a last effort, before passing south of the James, to destroy Lee's army, as he had set out originally to do. That effort failed, and reason with the new resolve reasserted itself over brutal ferocity and the spasm for immediate glory. Henceforth, as his critics have allowed in justice to his fame, Grant was found sparing of human sacrifice and never wasted a life. For now he took up, as his settled immediate concern, the slow besieging process, to reduce Richmond and its obstinate defenders. Leaving to Sherman the laurels of a more active field, he opposed to sheltering works and lines of military defence, works and lines still stronger, and slowly and steadily tightened his strangulating, bull-dog grasp upon the throat of his foe, well persuaded that by such methods, at all events, full victory awaited him.²

SECTION X.

SHERMAN AND SHERIDAN.

Sherman, on the 18th of March, 1864, as Grant's Western successor, assumed command of the military division of the Mississippi, which embraced the departments of the Ohio,

¹ Hancock, Wright, and Smith, with their commands, had been put forward, while Warren and Burnside supported.

² 8 N. & H. c. 15; 2 Grant, c. 55; Long's Lee, c. 17; 31 Century, 482, 712; 4 B. & L. 213. The loss at Cold Harbor in killed, wounded, and missing was 12,737. 4 B. & L. 182. Sheridan, while on his raid, mortally wounded Stuart, which was an immense loss to the enemy. He also killed Gen. James B. Gordon.

Horace Porter states that Grant, in an early discussion, had stepped up to the map and said, indicating with a sweep of his forefinger a line round Richmond and Petersburg, "When my troops are there, Richmond is mine; Lee must retreat or surrender." 31 Century, 218.

Cumberland, Tennessee, and Arkansas, with headquarters at Nashville. The department of Arkansas, under 1864,
March- General Fred Steele, was transferred, May 8th, to
May. the Gulf or Southwestern army, which, under Canby as Banks's successor, meant to operate against Mobile. Sherman moved promptly on the 5th of May, taking his course southward from Chattanooga with a compact force of nearly 100,000, veterans for the most part, intending as preconcerted to engage Johnston and the western forces of the Confederacy, while the eastern movements progressed in Virginia which we have just described. Three columns comprised this light-marching army: that of the Cumberland, under Thomas; that of the Tennessee, under McPherson; and that of the Ohio under Schofield. All three were trained and experienced generals, admirably qualified for the work in hand; and Sherman, who conducted the campaign in person, was the ablest of them all, being fertile, quick, and vivacious, and original in his cast of mind wherever new military problems were presented for solution.¹

Grant had given his next in command a free discretion, merely instructing him to bear down upon Johnston's opposing force, destroy it, if he could, and get into the interior of the enemy's country, there to inflict all the damage possible upon its war resources. So far as Sherman could look forward when he started, he meant to keep his adversary too busy to reënforce at other points; but should Johnston fall behind the Chattahoochee, he would act against Atlanta. The provision problem was felt to be the most difficult one for this campaign. "But in that," as Sherman wrote to Grant, "I must venture. Georgia has a million of inhabitants; if they can live, we should not starve. If the enemy interrupt our communications, I will be absolved from all obligations to subsist on our own resources, and will feel

¹ 2 Sherman, c. 16. Sherman's grand aggregate for the march was 98,797, of all arms: Thomas having 60,773; McPherson 24,465, and Schofield 13,559. *Ib.*, 23. A cavalry force of varying strength and numbers aided upon detached service, and Blair with an infantry corps joined the march besides in June.

perfectly justified in taking whatever and wherever we can find." To subsist in extremity upon the country he traversed, and at the same time inspire his command with the idea that their absolute needs of life were few and simple, Sherman kept constantly in view in the present enterprise, while he advanced hundreds of miles from a definite base.¹

Transportation was of the most urgent consequence for this expedition. From Louisville to Nashville, where, in a half-hostile region, was located his chief depot of supplies, from Nashville to Chattanooga, and from Chattanooga eventually to Atlanta — Sherman had to maintain a single railroad track without a break, posting strong guards at bridges, trestles, and culverts, and conveying the means for repairing every injury. He impressed all the rolling stock he could find to increase the railway capacity from Nashville southward, and in April issued a general order limiting the use of cars to the transportation of essential food, ammunition, and supplies for the army proper, forbidding all further issues to citizens, and cutting off all civil carriage; he required all his troops destined for the front to go on foot, and all beef cattle to be driven on their legs. Some of the poor Union people who had suffered for principle protested, fearing a famine, but Sherman was inexorable, and they who remained had to haul and ride by team, as in the olden time. He reduced, too, his transportation for the march to the limit of absolute necessity, for wagons, baggage, and every kind of incumbrance. Each officer and soldier had to carry on his horse or person food and clothing enough to last five days. To each regiment he allowed but one wagon and one ambulance, and to the officers of a company one packhorse or mule. Complete tents were forbidden to all but the sick or wounded; and the hardy commander himself set the example of using a simple wall-tent fly spread over some picked-up sapling or fence rail. "I doubt," says Sherman, "if any army went forth to battle with fewer impedimenta."²

¹ 2 Sherman, 28 (April 10).

² 2 Sherman, 22.

The Richmond government had not meant that Sherman should take the initiative; but Johnston chose in disregard his own plan, and settled upon a wily and defensive course somewhat as Lee was finally pursuing, though with less chance or disposition to vary it. The animosity between President Davis and himself was scarcely smothered, nor would his subordinate generals work together in smoothness and harmony. Hood, Polk, and Hardee commanded respectively his right, centre, and extreme left, and the first-named, in high countenance both with Bragg and Davis, had given his voice for a fighting campaign. Johnston's army on the 1st of May numbered 68,000, being in effectiveness little more than half that of Sherman, who as invader needed of course much the greater strength. Sherman kept as closely as possible to his rail communications; he gave McPherson the right, Thomas the centre, and Schofield the left. Toward Dalton, so long the headquarters of the Confederates and so strongly fortified, Sherman shaped his course on the 5th of May, the day appointed by Grant for the grand aggressive, and by a skilful flank movement compelled his foe to retreat. This month saw Johnston driven steadily southward from the strong positions of Dalton, Resaca, Cassville, Allatoona, and Dallas, one after another, while Sherman advanced his column in compact order for nearly a hundred miles from Chattanooga to Big Shanty, a railroad station in full sight of the Kenesaw Mountain. The fighting along this march was continuous, almost daily in fact, and among trees and bushes where one could rarely see a hundred yards in front.¹

On the 8th of June, Blair's new corps joined the column at the natural stronghold of Allatoona, which Sherman had now made his secondary base, and the Union army aggregated again that original effective strength which June. had been impaired on the march to this point. About Kenesaw Mountain ensued an almost continuous battle for the rest of the month, both sides sustaining a serious loss; and now came rifle trenches into regular use,

¹ 2 Sherman, c. 16; 9 N. & H. c. 1.

as in Virginia, to cover quickly for one adversary or another the lines of musketry. Polk, on the 14th, while imprudently exposing his ample figure, was killed by one of Sherman's volleys from a battery fired to keep up the appearance of a bold offensive.¹ Johnston, who showed unusual vigilance while he kept in command, concentrated his strength by the 20th and made his position strong, with the Kenesaw Mountain for a salient. Bad weather now hindered the invading army, here as in Virginia; and on the 27th, when the skies had cleared, Sherman, after stretching his lines to the utmost, fell upon Johnston's fortified position, impatient over the scanty progress he himself was making while the foe relinquished one stronghold only to take up another. Soon after breakfast, with telegraph wires laid for close intercourse, the Union troops moved to the assault, and all along the line for ten miles Sherman's muskets and artillery kept up a furious fire. But at all points the Confederates resisted with boldness and resolution, and before noon Sherman's attempt was a pronounced failure, like Grant's, three weeks earlier, at Cold Harbor. McPherson's corps fought up the face of the lesser Kenesaw Mountain, but could not reach the summit; and at the parapet, a mile to the right, which was stormed by Thomas's column, but not carried, Harker and D. McCook were desperately wounded. Johnston, by July 4th, withdrew at leisure to a strong position at the *Chattahoochee River*, which served him admirably as a *tête-du-pont*.²

Sherman had all the time been feeling round Kenesaw Mountain while holding his foe in front, and he established Schofield south of the *Chattahoochee River* by the 9th of July with a heavy force; having likewise despatched Rousseau with his cavalry on a raid for operations which now

¹ 2 Sherman, 53. Polk's place, as a Confederate corps commander, was filled temporarily by General W. W. Loring, and permanently by Lieutenant-general A. P. Stewart.

² 2 Sherman, 61, estimates his loss in this battle in killed and wounded, at 2500, and Johnston's at 808. And see 9 N. & H. c. 1.

pointed plainly to Atlanta. In consequence of these proceedings, Johnston evacuated his stronghold north of the river, and crossed the Chattahoochee the next night, burning all his bridges behind him, and leaving Sherman in undisputed possession of the north bank. The Union forces took the opportunity to complete their crossing, and on the 17th began a palpable movement against Atlanta, almost unopposed. Johnston, it appears, had intended to give Sherman battle at Peach Tree Creek and contest the new advance, but orders from Richmond dispossessed him summarily of command, and made Hood his successor. This resembled Hooker's displacement by Meade, on the Union side, just before Gettysburg, only that the change did not work so favorably. Johnston's failure to arrest his foe at the Chattahoochee, and a want of confidence exhibited in his power to defeat or repel, were the reasons announced by his government for relieving him. Johnston had still the confidence of his troops and the Southern people hereabouts; but the antipathy of President Davis was inveterate, and mutual dislike appeared in all the despatches they interchanged. Johnston felt probably that he would fail; but his prudent policy, which had hindered invasion at every step while economizing his strength and gaining time, seems to have been the best that the situation, now distressing enough, admitted. "For my own part," observes Grant, "I think that Johnston's tactics were right."¹

Hood, who had criticised such tactics as a subordinate, felt his sudden elevation so embarrassing that repeatedly, as he relates, he urged Johnston to pocket these Richmond orders and fight as he had meant to do; and upon Johnston's refusal to so act, he accepted that plan of attack for himself, and proceeded to execute it. Hood's temper was bold and vehement even to rashness; he idolized the late "Stonewall" Jackson and his methods of rapid and stealthy approach; and Sherman surmised not incorrectly that this change of commanders meant more fight. At Peach Tree

¹ 2 Grant, 167.

Creek, sure enough, on the 20th of July, Hardee was hurled forward with sudden noise and violence, somewhat as Jackson had hurled his soldiery at Chancellorsville; but here it was upon Hooker's corps that the furious sally spent itself, and after two hours of hard fighting the foe retired to his trenches. Accepting this both as a victory and the omen of future tactics to be guarded against, Sherman now advanced his lines in compact order close to Hood's intrenchments, from which the enemy withdrew, forming again on the fortified line of Atlanta, and approaching once more like a whirlwind in an unforeseen direction and under cover of the forest. Sherman's united forces, on the 22d, after repulsing with much labor two such sallies, drove the Confederates into Atlanta and behind their last intrenchments. This battle, which is known as the battle of Atlanta, lasted all day, and covered a space of ground, partly clear and partly wooded, for an extent of seven miles. The losses in fight were nearly equal, but the Union army made the actual gain.

During the forenoon of this battle, McPherson, while passing from point to point and arranging his troops, rode incautiously upon an ambuscade, in advance of his staff, and was shot dead. His horse came back, bleeding and riderless, but the corpse was soon after recovered. McPherson died in his prime, soldierly in port and stature, a man of noble qualities, beloved by all who served under him, and respected by his adversary; to both Grant and Sherman the loss was irreparable as that of a personal friend. To supply his command was an important concern, and, after conferring with Thomas and Schofield, Sherman chose Howard for the vacancy, and the selection was ratified. Logan, who had served well in McPherson's place, succeeding by virtue of seniority while the battle raged, was passed over; and so, too, was Blair; for both Sherman and Thomas cherished strong prejudice against "political generals," and favored officers bred to arms, like themselves. Howard was a West Point man and a trained soldier; and setting, withal, a personal example in religion and philanthropy, which made people style him the Havelock of this Civil

War, he, like Logan, found in later years a public scope of work which eminence in arms could not satisfy. But the resentment shown on this occasion was by Hooker, whose professional pride was deeply wounded by the preference of that junior who, at Chancellorsville, had contributed much to his misfortune. Hooker had displeased Sherman and Thomas on the present march by presuming somewhat upon the rank and reputation he had held at the East. But this was not very singular, for in action he was brilliant still; Chattanooga and Peach Tree Creek added new laurels to his many former ones. He had borne discipline at the West patiently, kept down his offending temper, and faithfully performed as directed; yet here again he was found uncomfortable to live with, and Sherman felt a sense of relief when Hooker was detached altogether, in compliance with the request he now made. The fighter of the "battle in the clouds" remains an historic figure, yet in the companionship of the war's immortals he never quite found his place; others proved inconsiderate of him, as he had been of others.¹

Slocum was now recalled from Vicksburg to succeed Hooker at the head of the 20th corps, and Stanley, a division general, replaced Howard in command of the 4th. In pursuance of Sherman's new plans, the Army of the Tennessee, July 27th, moved boldly and rapidly against the railroad below Atlanta; while the Union cavalry, under McCook and Stoneman, skirmished in advance. With a rough charge through the woods and a terrifying yell, Hood made a reckless attack, on the forenoon of the 28th, which Logan's corps repulsed with steadiness and skill. The month of August opened sultry enough, but Sherman's

August. position before Atlanta was a healthy one, and supplies of fuel, water, and provisions were ample for a siege which steadily proceeded under his vigilant and minute direction. His skirmish lines stretched up close to Hood's army, while his main lines were kept farther back, to conform to the shape of the ground; field

¹ See 2 Sherman, 86; 2 Grant, 539.

batteries occupied all choice positions. Convinced by this time that his cavalry could not make the lodgement he purposed below Atlanta, Sherman committed that task to his main body; Schofield, on the right, taking immediate charge. To gain possession of this Macon railroad was his vital objective, and he expected some fierce fighting to obtain it. It was upon this operation, as Hood concedes, that the fate of Atlanta rested. Eager for results, Sherman did not like to linger for the slow approaches of an investment, nor on the other hand did he intend assaulting the works. "We keep hammering away all the time," he now telegraphed to Halleck, "and there is no peace, inside or outside of Atlanta."¹

Confederate cavalry under Wheeler did damage by a circuitous sweep above Resaca and the Chattahoochee; but Sherman soon repaired the mischief and restored his line of supplies and communication, while Kilpatrick's Union cavalry made a corresponding success to some extent about Jonesboro. Sherman's real movement towards the railroad began on the 25th of August at night. A desired point was reached with Thomas and Howard, when, on the 29th, a genuine demolition began, such as taught raiders the art of war in destroying communications. The track was heaved up by the infantry in long sections, then separated rail by rail; bonfires were made of ties and fence rails, in which the rails were heated, bent with hooks in their softened state, and so wrapped round the trees and left to cool there. This spoiled the tracks utterly unless the rails could be rolled again.² Jonesboro was reached the first day of September, for tearing up its railway track ^{September.} in like manner. Hardee, who was intrenched there, had to yield control, escaping under cover of the night; and Hood at Atlanta, after blowing up the magazines of the place, decamped also in haste, compelled to evacuate. Slocum, whose corps was north of Atlanta, moved unopposed into the city at the next morning's dawn; he sent the good news to Sherman, who deliberately posted his troops on

¹ 2 Sherman, 101 (August 7th).

² See 4 B. & L. 685, n.

a suitable line, and then entered Atlanta with ovation on September 8th.

The occupation of Atlanta was a highly opportune triumph for the Union cause, and set the country all aglow, relieving a political depression which had set in, and powerfully aiding Lincoln's canvass for reelection to the Presidency. Another military success followed under Sheridan, to be presently described. Atlanta was a capture fairly won; and this "gate city of the South," as some styled it, was a centre of foundries, arsenals, and machine shops, and a leading Confederate reliance for the sinews of warfare. After an arduous campaign of four months, Sherman sought for his army a brief repose and recreation, while new plans of action were arranged. One of his first orders converted this city into a pure military garrison or depot, stripped of all civil population that might retard his operations. All residents, therefore, were accordingly required as non-combatants to go North or South, as their sympathies inclined. This seemed a harsh proceeding, but there was good reason for it, and justification in the rules of war. He put restrictions, too, upon the sutlers and traders who followed in the wake of his army. In honor of Atlanta, President Lincoln sent to this hero a special letter of congratulation, while Grant at City Point ordered a general salute fired from shotted guns.¹

Sherman, while preserving due dignity, was unaffected and simple on the march, kindly and even expostulating in tone when maintaining discipline or giving a reprimand.

¹ See at length 2 Sherman, c. 19; 2 Grant, c. 49; 4 B. & L. 293, etc.; 9 N. & H. c. 12. Sherman recapitulates his losses during the campaign of August and September as 5139, Hood's being 7443, half of whom were captured as prisoners. The loss of his total campaign, from May to this date, he reckons at 31,687, in killed, wounded, and missing; computing the total Southern loss as 34,979. 2 Sherman, 131-136. Sherman had 81,758 at the close of this campaign, counting Blair's reinforcements. The Confederates, when reinforced, had at least 67,000, with a maximum, at one time, of 75,000. 4 B. & L. 281.

With his highest subordinates he had a happy way of dropping in upon them to explain what he purposed doing. Grant's comprehensive plan of a combined campaign assigned to Sherman a conspicuous and essential part, and gave to the Union an enlightened aggressive at last.¹ And here let us note how greatly the policy towards rebellion had changed on the Union side, from what it was up to July, 1862, either in East or West.² Until that time Union commanders had usually protected the property of loyal fellow-citizens whose territory was invaded, and were scrupulous of inflicting loss. But thenceforth it became rather the rule of government to consume whatever in the enemy's country might be used for subsisting its own armies, while destroying without bloodshed whatever might aid the foe, and was otherwise unavailable. This permitted, not promiscuous pillage by the troops, which continued punishable, but to consume or destroy, on principles of warfare, for aiding the one army or hurting the other; receipts being given to owners, if possible, in furtherance of claims, if loyal, that might later be made upon the Treasury. This policy became justified by increasing emergency and hastened unquestionably the end of hostilities.³

Grant was highly fortunate in having such excellent subordinates as Sherman and Sheridan, each of whom contributed very largely to his fame and success. He was fortunate, too, in his opportunities to advance their rank with his own, and place each in his fittest sphere of action; fortunate in their unfaltering friendship and personal devotion; fortunate, finally, in losing neither one of them while the great struggle went on, from which they emerged in due order the three consummate conquerors. It was after McPherson's death that Sheridan became second of soldiers in Grant's esteem. So on the other side, Lee found in Jackson his strongest lieutenant, and in Stuart his best leader of cavalry; but one and then the other passed in

¹ 4 B. & L. 294.

² *Supra*, pp. 214, 222; 1 B. & L. 486. The President's first orders for greater severity in this respect were issued in July, 1862. *Ib.*

battle and storm, and in unique assistance neither could be replaced.

Sheridan's operations in the valley of the Shenandoah made an exciting feature of the Virginia campaign, after Grant had established himself upon his final base of the James River. Hunter, upon succeeding in that valley to

June-July. Sigel's command,¹ made in June a successful progression towards Lynchburg, which he reached and invested on the 16th. For want of ammunition, however, he sought Harper's Ferry by a circuitous route, which left the valley uncovered. Early, then in command of detachments which Lee had sent to oppose Hunter's progress, took prompt advantage of this opening to cross the upper Potomac into Maryland and threaten the nation's capital at its very gates. This he did with the permission of Lee, who wished to relieve Grant's pressure upon his front. Early was a prompt and enterprising general. By rapid marching he reached Winchester on the 2d of July, occupied Martinsburg on the 4th, and crossed the Potomac unresisted. On the Maryland side Lew Wallace commanded in Hunter's absence; he made an obstinate stand against these invaders with raw troops, but had to retire towards Baltimore; Early with his veterans at once took the Washington road, which lay open to him, and on the 11th made audacious demonstration at the strong outworks of our Union citadel. Now was renewed at Washington, though in a much less degree, the alarm and consternation felt two years before.² Fortifications were strong, but the troops were few to man them, for most veteran soldiers had gone to the front, and the city was ill guarded. Danger vanished, however, with the timely arrival of Wright and his 6th corps, despatched from the Peninsula under Grant's watchful orders, and reaching Washington in full force the very day of Early's near approach. With these troops, and a division of the 19th corps seasonably added, Wright pushed out to attack Early as soon as he could get his

¹ *Supra*, p. 501.

² *Supra*, p. 213.

soldiery in hand; but the foe escaped with little punishment, retiring across the Potomac to Leesburg, unharassed except by some Union cavalry that Hunter, upon arriving at Harper's Ferry, now sent after them.¹ Finding pursuit at an end, Early turned back presently from Strasburg to Winchester and the Potomac, whence Confederate cavalry, under his direction, recrossed the river, dashed over the Pennsylvania border, and on the 30th laid the defenceless town of Chambersburg in ashes, leaving hundreds of families homeless.²

The Shenandoah Valley, with its ripening crops, was of high importance to the Confederacy at this time, being the chief remaining source of supplies in beef and cereals for feeding the armies about Richmond. It afforded, besides, as hitherto, a convenient route for menacing Washington and the North, bringing disheartenment and dissension to the Union cause, and diverting Union commanders from their main purpose. Not without some distrust to overcome from his own government, Grant, soon in August, procured for Sheridan the active command of all troops brought forward in the field against Early; Hunter, whom he visited in person, asking generously to be re-
August-
October.
lieved for that purpose. On the 7th of that month, a new military department, consolidating all others, was constituted, and Sheridan was assigned to its temporary command. This fiery young officer, at home in the saddle and fearless of fatigue, found about 30,000 men to move with, of whom 8000 were mounted. Early's force was about the same, but the superior fighting capacity of Sheridan more than outbalanced advantages. With confidence and address the new commander entered upon the task experimentally trusted to him, and in the severe skirmishing, chiefly by cavalry, which followed for the next five weeks, rolled back the tide of conflict to Virginia. Grant, now visiting him from City Point at his valley headquarters near Harper's Ferry, and anxious as the first pitched battle near Winchester approached, found Sheridan

¹ 2 Grant, c. 57; Sheridan, c. 23; 9 N. & H. c. 7.

² *Ib.*

so well prepared and so confident of success, that the only order he could give was to "go in." Never again, relates the general-in-chief, did he deem it necessary to visit this subordinate before giving him directions.¹

On the morning of September 19th, Sheridan went forth to attack Early at the crossing of Opequon Creek, and after a fierce and bloody battle, which lasted until nearly sundown, drove him with heavy loss, carrying his whole line and capturing several thousand prisoners. Early rallied his troops where the Shenandoah valley narrowed at Fisher's Hill, but on the 22d he was again defeated with heavy loss, and sent speeding up the valley through Staunton and the gaps of the Blue Ridge. Sheridan now gathered in the ripe crops and forage, and retired northward, driving herds of impressed cattle before him. Once again with reënforcements Early returned the next month, following behind the Federal cavalry. In the dusk of daybreak, October 19th, under cover of darkness and a fog, he surprised and turned to flight and confusion the Union force encamped at Cedar Run, which halted and made a rally finally between Middletown and Newton. At this juncture, Sheridan, who had been called to Washington on business and was far away at Winchester on his return when the battle began, came galloping eagerly upon the field, arranged his lines just in time to repel Early's heaviest onset, and, quickly assuming in turn the offensive, attacked the enemy with mighty vigor and effect. Early was worsted with great slaughter, losing most of the morning trophies and his wagon trains. The wreck of his remaining army fled ignominiously when night came in the direction of Staunton and Lynchburg. And thus ended the last Confederate attempt ever made to invade the North by way of the Shenandoah Valley and the Potomac.² Sheridan's six hours' ride from Winchester on his mettlesome black charger, while cannon roared in the distance, and the enthusiasm upon his arrival which inspired his once de-

¹ 2 Grant, 583.

² 2 Grant, cs. 57 & 58; 9 N. & H. c. 13; 4 B. & L. 500-530.

jected soldiery to new deeds of valor, have been immortalized in verse. For rallying a routed army and turning what was so nearly disaster into a brilliant victory, Sheridan was soon after made a major-general in the United States army.¹

SECTION XI.

LINCOLN REELECTED PRESIDENT.

In the Presidential campaign of 1864, which was brief and earnest, the early gloom of Union-Republicans lifted off, and the prospect brightened of a complete success at the ballot box. First and most essential of all, to dispel the omens of political defeat, was victory ^{September-}_{November.} in the field; and Sherman and Sheridan, by their brilliant conquests West and East, Farragut, too, by naval exploits in Mobile Bay, supplied that potent argument. War thus made visible progress, and its conduct was in safe hands. Next Fremont's withdrawal from the canvass averted in good season a threatened schism in the dominant party, and the ranks, which had yawned apart, closed up.²

In such a situation no chance was afforded for side issues or a middle ground; but the political canvass had to be made and the campaign fought out for approval or disapproval, as a whole, of the administration now in power, whose policy had been, without wavering, to uphold by force of arms the cause of the nation. All three conventions had shown their sense of public opinion by applauding the soldiers and sailors of the Union, but the devotion of these gallant defenders could not be cunningly divided; their

¹ 2 Sheridan, c. 3.

² Fremont formally recalled his candidacy, September 17. He had in vain stood out, hoping that a new party convention would be called, so that, with both Lincoln and himself withdrawn, some new candidate might be put forward. *Am. Cycl.* 1864, 791-794. In such an effort to induce Lincoln to stand aside, Henry Winter Davis, Sumner, and others were concerned. All these came into line later, while Seward's friends had constantly pronounced for Lincoln. 9 N. & H. c. 16.

logic was to fight this war through on present lines of policy, and win peace by an ultimate triumph of arms, not seemingly distant. Such, too, was the conviction that gained ground at home; the issue became simplified as that of union or disunion — of a peace to be won by perseverance in the present course, or of some ignoble peace, whether with a permanent severance at once or with some false truce and compromise, which, sooner or later, must precipitate another armed conflict, under auspices far less promising. Posterity may deal kindly with McClellan and the conservative citizens who supported him upon the platform he had tried to make for himself when accepting his nomination. But the platform itself of the convention nominating him was fatal to his prospects, nor could the amiable support which he attracted from Northerners wedded to old precedents have safely sustained his Presidency, had he been elected, against the positive pressure of peace factionists, who cared far less for him than for pleasing the South, and subserving some new political alliance with that section.

In some Northwestern States, proofs show the establishment of a secret order, whose membership ramified North and South, for the overthrow of the Lincoln government, or the frustration, at least, of its military plans.¹ And Southern letters indicate that Vallandigham and his Northwestern set, so influential at Chicago, pursued some clandestine intercourse concerning that convention, having peace and the cessation of hostilities in view.² Vallandigham, while in banishment, made certainly a convenient agency for such conferences. Public opinion in our Northern

¹ 8 N. & H. c. 1.

² Stephens observes significantly in a contemporaneous private comment that this Chicago convention would have done better "if our authorities had backed the leading peace men there from the beginning, as they should have done." He further observes, — "knowing, as I do, the sentiments" of several of those peace leaders, — that they were really advocates of peace on a basis of separation of the States, but dissembled such expression while intending to work to that result. Johnston's Stephens, 469.

Democratic ranks harbored, of course, no traitorous designs, but the suspicion which fastened upon copperhead allies and the platform plank they got inserted was deadening to a loyal Democratic canvass.

Canada, near Niagara Falls, we may remark, had been the asylum for various political and military refugees and desperadoes, deadly hostile to the Washington government; and plots and raids were concocted over those borders for annoying the United States and embroiling relations with Great Britain. Here Jacob Thompson, the infamous Secretary once in Buchanan's Cabinet, plied this year the vocation of mischief-maker, under a confidential license from Richmond. He had placed himself in communication with the leading spirits of this Northwestern secret order, misnamed the "Sons of Liberty"; but he reported them nerveless for an armed revolt, disconcerted by the searching measures which Governor Morton of Indiana, under Lincoln's warrant, had taken for their prompt suppression, and "totally demoralized" at last by "the necessity of pandering to the military feeling, which resulted in the nomination of McClellan."¹ Turning to other schemes, when this intrigue failed him, Thompson, in September, with his Canadian gang, organized captures of the Union war steamers plying on Lake Erie, and plotted wreck, pillage, and arson from over the border. A raid of unusual outrage, fostered by such instigation, though, likely enough, without Thompson's immediate complicity, was made on the 19th of October at the Vermont village of St. Albans, near the boundary line. A party of Southern outlaws, some twenty or thirty strong, coming over from Canada, robbed the banks there of a quarter of a million dollars, firing upon unarmed citizens, and attempting to burn the houses. In less than an hour they fled back, escaping on stolen horses.²

¹ Confederate Mss. archives, cited 8 N. & H. 17.

² For this outrage, our government asked reparation of Great Britain, whose authorities here proved remiss after making arrests; and after the war had ended Canada made a partial restitution.

All such hostile designs, and the simple suspicion that some leaders identified with the Chicago convention leagued with the plotters, damaged immensely McClellan's candidacy, which, as interpreted by himself, meant no national danger, and the Democratic opposition was put upon the defensive to prove good faith and loyalty. Pendleton, the Ohio candidate for Vice-President, felt compelled to write an open letter, avowing that he personally favored no terms of peace that would involve a final rupture. Meanwhile the Southern press frankly proclaimed that Southern people depended upon McClellan; that Southern success in the field would insure his success, while Southern failure would involve inevitably his failure.¹ Both Lincoln and McClellan kept aloof from the canvass with dignity and self-control, while their friends spoke for them; but on a few convenient occasions, the former dropped wise words, where prejudice had arisen, and kept a watchful survey of the whole field.

Vermont and Maine, in September, with their State elections, opened the contest of ballots like skirmishers in advance. Both Commonwealths gave good Republican majorities for the local candidates. Next came the heavy fighting of the October States, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana, whose symptoms seldom deceived. All these, again, like some iron column of veterans, ranged in solid support of administration candidates. Pennsylvania, whose Representatives in Congress had of late been equally divided, now changed the proportion to fifteen against nine, besides making the legislature of the State strongly Republican; Ohio, revolutionized even more strongly in Congressional districts, gave an aggregate Union majority of over fifty thousand; in Indiana, Morton was reelected gov-

8 N. & H. c. 1; Am. Cycl. 1864, 178, 796, 807. Congress now gave notice to terminate the limit of naval force on the boundary lakes, as fixed by treaty. 13 Stats. 568.

¹ 9 N. & H. 353.

error by a large majority, and four Republicans were gained in the national House. All these signs pointed to an overwhelming November victory along the whole line, on the day of electoral battle; and yet, so momentous was felt the decision, that fits of confidence and despondency alternated during the weeks still intervening. Butler was sent with a military force to New York city, to preserve the public peace and secure an honest poll; other precautionary measures against disorder were taken at Chicago.

At length, Tuesday, the 8th of November, registered a verdict the most solemn that American voters ever rendered,—whether in fact, as they felt it, this Union should endure, or, to please foes of its own household, be sundered, with so much blood and treasure thrown away. That verdict, which was not doubtful, showed that the wisdom of the many may be trusted, for totals went almost unanimously to the administration electors. Lincoln, who in 1860 received an actual minority in the popular vote, gained now a splendid majority. Out of 314 electors, supposing colleges for the whole Union, 212 were positively for Lincoln and Johnson,—a margin ample enough to have doubly overcome any adverse expression for McClellan and Pendleton, even were their votes and rebellion's vacancies combined. Only 21 electoral votes went, in fact, to this opposition; from New Jersey, which was McClellan's own State, from Kentucky, and by quite a narrow margin of the people's poll, from Delaware. All the other States, loyal to this Union, stood, great or small, by Lincoln, and his firm policy of peace through suppression.¹ The electoral college of Maryland, which in 1860 upheld Breckinridge, and that of Missouri, which then went for Douglas, were now the gain of this candidate, with those, besides, of all the States since added to the Union, Kansas, West Virginia, and Nevada. Through Lincoln's rare discretion Maryland now stood a free State, local slavery having been abolished by a constitutional change carried in October.²

¹ See Tables, *appendix*.

² By a close vote, however. See, in detail, 8 N. & H. c. 19.

Soldiers in the field, now voting by permission of their several States, swelled generally the majorities for Union candidates. And not the least of Union Republican triumphs at the November poll, was Governor Seymour's defeat in New York for reelection by Reuben E. Fenton, a member of Congress with Democratic antecedents of another type. Neither drafts nor military repression could keep the Empire State longer hostile to a President who was sincerely resolved, as its people felt, to do his honest duty.¹

Lincoln received the tumultuous congratulations following his reelection, with modesty and deprecation. In a carefully written speech of thanks, which he read through his glasses from manuscript when serenaded at night in front of the White House, while one stood by him with a lighted candle, he made some admirable remarks. "The election, along with its incidental and undesirable strife," he observed, "has done good. It has demonstrated that a people's government can sustain a national election in the midst of a great civil war; until now, it has not been known to the world that this was a possibility. It shows, also, to the extent yet known, that we have more men now than we had when the war began;" and this first impression, which he afterwards confirmed by careful figuring, was correct.²

McClellan, on the November election day, resigned his high commission in the army, and his vacant place was filled by the promotion of Philip H. Sheridan,³ one striking indication, among many of this year, that a new set of

¹ 3 Seward, 194; Am. Cycl. 1864, 798.

² "But the rebellion continues," he added, "and now that the election is over, may not all having a common interest reunite in a common effort to save our common country? For my own part, I have striven and shall strive to avoid placing any obstacle in the way. So long as I have been here, I have not willingly planted a thorn in any man's bosom." 9 N. & H. 380.

³ 9 N. & H. 384.

generals had come forward to gain the laurels which those first trusted with opportunities had failed to gather.

Important changes occurred, besides, in the civil 1864-1865.
service. The Baltimore convention had in its platform placated radical support by requesting the President to dismiss conservatives from his Cabinet and make it more homogeneous. At first, Lincoln took no notice of such distasteful advice, but party pressure became very strong to at least get rid of Montgomery Blair, who had gradually drawn the enmity of ultra Republicans, and of his own colleagues besides. As Postmaster-General, Blair's business management had been without complaint, and in personal devotion to his chief he was not wanting; but his temper was difficult, whether for meeting political issues or working politically with Northern men. The influence of the Blairs, father and two sons, had vastly aided in giving this new party of freedom a first foothold upon border State soil, when slaveholders abhorred its teachings. Jacksonian and Southern Democrats by training, the repeal of the Missouri compromise had driven them all into the new fold. Montgomery Blair, after graduating at West Point, became a lawyer in St. Louis and an able one, holding there when young a judgeship; later, a suburban resident of Washington, where he pursued his profession, he was counsel for plaintiff in the famous case of Dred Scott. And now pugnacity, a family trait, made him bitter enemies in high station, as it did his brother Frank, and with a party which treated emancipation in the Northern spirit he could not remain congenial. Foreseeing the trouble, Blair placed his resignation at Lincoln's disposal, and on the 23d of September, while the Presidential strife waged fervent, he was relieved of office. William Dennison of Ohio, who had presided over the Baltimore convention, was his official successor; and Blair, leaving politics forever, pursued his profession at the capital for the rest of his life.

The renovation of Lincoln's official household went farther after the fall election, as though by some natural process. Bates, the Attorney-General, his other border State coun-

sellor, wearied of the cares of office, and of the rapid current of that racial revolution which, in his slaveholding section, he had helped originate. He carried now the weight of threescore and ten, and while heartily devoted to the essential cause of freedom for the negro, which no one had better fortified by legal argument than himself, he mistrusted the deep departure from precedent and sobriety to which politics tended, especially in his own State of Missouri. This excellent Whig of the older school resigned office accordingly on the 24th of November; and the President, failing to secure the conscientious Holt in his place, who modestly thought himself no longer fit to conduct cases before the Supreme Court, called in December to the vacant place another Kentuckian, James Speed, an accomplished lawyer of a family connected with Lincoln's youthful days. Another change came with the new year when Fessenden, once more elected from Maine to the Senate, resigned the Treasury portfolio in consequence. For this vacancy came a wide and spirited competition, which the President closed, when entering upon his second term, by promoting Hugh McCulloch of Indiana, whose record had been excellent as comptroller of the currency.¹ None of these three changes named was in the line of positive reconstruction, nor was the President inclined to agree with his censors that official advisers had shaped his administration for him. They who departed expressed warmly their personal and official respect, and they who succeeded gave good promise of bestowing it.

There is a suggestion in all this that Lincoln repelled extreme Republicans from his Council, and meant to hold personally the initiative which the plain people confided to him, in a strife for controlling the terms of Southern restoration, which was already impending between Executive and Congress. But an opportunity came, just as the Novem-

¹ 9 N. & H. c. 15. Morgan of New York had declined appointment to this station, preferring to continue in the Senate, and McCulloch's support, which was exceedingly strong in financial circles, procured him his merited promotion.

ber election approached, to please those radicals of the party who had tried to expel him from the canvass. On the 12th of October died Chief Justice Taney, in the midst of rejoicings that hailed the reversal in his native State of the social philosophy he had expounded from the bench. Taney was an able lawyer, an honorable judge, an austere, upright man, to whose virtues and talents it was impossible to draw close attention or do full public justice while present passions raged. Republicans welcomed the vacancy, and friends of ex-Secretary Chase, claiming he was the ideal successor, began canvassing for him without delay. Others were mentioned for the place, such as Evarts and Swayne; Montgomery Blair strongly wished and hoped for the appointment. The Chief Justiceship is the noblest piece of civil patronage at a President's disposal; but, together with professional skill, perfect integrity, and prodigious industry, that office needs abstinence from politics and an unswerving continuity of purpose and regard. Marshall and Taney had each set the example of undivided industry, and enjoyed a remarkably long tenure. Chase, with impressive face and figure and unfailing dignity, was certainly the ideal personage to appear with silken robes on grand occasions, and a certain solid weight of talents and character belonged to him. Nor had he himself been unconvinced in calmer moods that this superb position was the true one for him; but the sinister circumstances under which he had lately left the Treasury, and his unreconciled mood towards Lincoln's candidacy which continued for a longer space, cost the President not a little moral struggle, to be magnanimous. He waited, reticent of his intentions, not unyielding in demeanor, but disposed to await overtures.¹ Chase's chief sponsors were of course from the "thorough" Senators, though a mass of solicitations came from other quar-

¹ When a letter was brought from Chase himself, then in Ohio, Lincoln asked his private secretary, "What is it about?" "Simply a kind of friendly letter," the secretary answered. The President smiled shrewdly, and said, "File it with his other recommendations." 9 N. & H. 392.

ters, for Chase had won the respect of the whole country. The idea that he would uphold judicially the general issues of the war, if appointed, was widely urged in his favor; one is needed, wrote Sumner, "whose position on the slavery question is already fixed, and who will not need argument or counsel to convert him." But Lincoln had his personal misgivings: "If I were sure," he observed, "that he would go on the bench, give up other aspirations, and do nothing but make himself a great judge, I would not hesitate a moment." Waiving, however, all such doubts on his own part, hoping for the best, generous of impulse, and strongly disposed to pacify and unite all the elements of national support, Lincoln, on the 6th of December, nominated Chase to the Senate for Chief Justice. He had confided his decision to no one, and wrote out the nominating letter himself. The appointment was confirmed at once, without reference to a committee, and was hailed throughout the land with perfect satisfaction.¹

Congress had reassembled for its short and final session on the 5th of December. Its memorable action was now to complete the passage of a joint resolution, which submitted to the States a constitutional amendment for prohibiting slavery throughout the Union. That resolution, first reported to the Senate by Lyman Trumbull, chairman of its judiciary committee, had passed that branch in April of the long session, but was afterwards lost in the House for want of the requisite two-thirds vote in its favor.² But the issue had since gone before the people in the platform of the Baltimore convention which accompanied Lincoln's renomination, and Lincoln himself supplied the proposal for that platform, which Senator Morgan offered amid thunders of applause when opening the convention, and Breckinridge, the Kentucky divine, indorsed as temporary chairman.³ Upon no decla-

¹ 9 N. & H. c. 17.

³ *Supra*, p. 467.

² The vote June 15, in the House, stood 93 to 65.

ration of the late canvass had voters rallied more heartily to the polls and won their overwhelming victory, than upon this pledge to extirpate by constitutional means the whole vital cause of the Southern rebellion. Hence, in the President's opening message, instant deference was urged to the public will as expressed at the polls, and they whose terms in the House were soon to expire were exhorted not to wait until a new Congress would surely pass this measure, but to reconsider their former votes and reach at once the laudable end. James M. Ashley of Ohio, being charged with this resolution, had, at the test of the previous session in this branch, changed his vote so that he might move a reconsideration; he now called up that motion and opened a new debate. That debate was earnest, but the logic of events was of more convincing force than any party strategy or appeal to argument; and most moving was the pregnant fact, that in the loyal border States, the last citadel of legalized slavery, this old serpent was expiring. Maryland had already freed her slaves; Missouri prepared to follow, and the same spirit of change was perceptible in Tennessee and even in Kentucky. Elsewhere, under the President's proclamation and the fervent flames of Civil War, this peculiar institution, with its mammon of unrighteousness, was shrivelling like a parched scroll, and blackening into ashes. Thus, then, was the conservative opposition itself of the House divided in conviction, and with help from the more liberal of Northern Democrats and from members of border slave States who heeded their constituents' wishes, the two-thirds vote needful for a final passage was presently obtained. The climax came in the Representatives' chamber on the 31st of January, when the galleries were filled to overflowing and members on the floor watched results with visible anxiety. The final roll-call came at four in the afternoon, and when the Speaker announced the final passage of the joint resolve by a two-thirds vote,¹ the whole hall cheered and applauded wildly, members setting the example, regardless of parliamentary rules, while they in

¹ Yeas 119, nays 56; not voting, 8.

the crowded galleries followed with waving of hats and handkerchiefs. This turbulence lasted several minutes and then an adjournment was carried.¹

The President hailed heartily this constitutional cure-all, in consummation of the grand policy initiated by his proclamation. From that act of initiation, as he had said and reiterated, he would never retreat nor retract a word once written; yet as a military act, purporting only a partial application, the validity of that edict might later be raised in the courts. But this amendment constitutionally proposed, would, when constitutionally adopted by three-fourths of the States, eradicate slavery in the whole Union, wholly, fundamentally, and forever. This new year of grace did not pass without accomplishing that full fruition, though stupendous political change was destined to occur before the nation's new birth of freedom. No happier incident attended the canvass of legislatures now following, to "constitutionalize," as Garrison happily styled it, "our declaration of independence," than the conciliation of that sage, now honored where he had been detested, to the conserving forces of the Union. Recognizing that his life's mission was accomplished, he left the future to work out its own normal results, discontinued his press, wound up his society of agitators, and gave the remnant of his life to assuaging national malice and bitterness, and cultivating peace with his fellow-men. In this he showed a genial heart, and something, withal, of a statesman's sagacity.²

¹ Globe, 531; 10 N. & H. c. 4. This joint resolution, which the President approved February 1st (though needlessly, since constitutional law requires no such approval) follows in general expression the Ordinance of 1787. Article XIII. (1) Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. (2) Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

² 4 Garrison, c. 6. But Phillips, his eloquent associate, who here parted company with him, led into deeper shades of negro agitation. *Ib.*

A tender compassion was now widely felt in the North for a race long benighted in bondage. The dullest and most ignorant, even, of these uneducated souls, seemed stirred with the consciousness that a new deliverance was being wrought, which would lift them to the plane of equal opportunities with the white man, and, like children in simplicity, they asked guidance from their benefactors. Of all mortals they worshipped Father Abraham as a leader and liberator. At his New Year's reception in 1865, a throng of colored folks of both sexes, some in tatters and some gaily and even gaudily dressed, hung about the outer porch of the White House, while ceremonious guests took precedence within; then, timidly entering the hall and reception rooms, they shook in turn with energy the President's huge hands, wild with joy, weeping and laughing.¹ And so, too, when Sherman marched to the sea, the Georgia negroes, men, women, and children, were frantic to greet the "angel of the Lord"; they clustered about his horse, as he rode, shouting and praying, with "a natural eloquence," as he describes it, "that would have moved a stone."² The first impulse of freedom, when it comes, is to wander far and wide; and the swarms of blacks that followed this army to Savannah, despite all injunction that they should remain where they were, gave much concern to Stanton; upon whose visit there Sherman issued orders in January, with that Secretary's consent, which, besides enlisting colored troops, provided for the time being that freedmen and their families should occupy the abandoned seacoast from Beaufort to Jacksonville, adjacent to the St. John's River.³ To this policy Congress gave further direction, by an act, approved at the close of this short session, which established in the War Department a temporary "freedman's bureau," sanctioned the issue of provisions, clothing, and fuel to negro refugees, and set apart for their temporary occupancy such abandoned or confiscated tracts of land as might rightfully vest in the United States.⁴

¹ Am. Cycl. 1864, 800.³ Ib. 250.² 2 Sherman, 180.⁴ 13 U. S. Stats. 507.

With little real conception, however, of the vast problem before the nation, public opinion in the free States progressed swiftly towards raising at once the social and political condition of the negro to something of the white man's plane. Fred Douglass, a mulatto manifesting the highest type in this era of intellect rescued from early bondage, urged eloquently that his race should have perfect equality before the law, in the jury box, at the ballot box, on the battle-field, and in the distribution of public offices. Wendell Phillips pledged himself never to cease negro agitation until that perfect equality was obtained. Many earnest anti-slavery leaders at the North sincerely wished to confer the franchise at once upon the liberated race as an act of moral justice; others, intent more upon political chances, inclined in the same direction, hopeful that racial gratitude would cement a powerful alliance and keep the present party uppermost when slave States became reconstructed. "The ballot is itself an educator," was a common answer, when doubts were expressed of the sufficient morality and intelligence of a race uncultured and but just emerging from the dense darkness of irresponsible existence. "Recognition," argued Chase, now Chief Justice, in an open letter, "should be made of the defenders of the flag, and ballots should go with bullets."¹ That alliterative phrase took mightily with a large element among those loyal citizens who had sunk preferences to bring in Lincoln safely for his own successor.

Jealousy and distrust of Executive reconstruction had not ceased, in Congress, with the discomfiture of Wade and Henry Winter Davis the preceding summer;² and intervention by statute was attempted once more at this final session. Ashley, in the House, offered measure after measure, in an effort to conciliate the President's friends while asserting the general principle of supremacy in Congress; but that popular branch shunned the issue as premature and put all such measures aside.³ In the Senate, however,

¹ Am. Cycl. 1864, 800.

² *Supra*, p. 470.

³ Globe, 1002 (Feb. 22, 1865); 9 N. & H. 453.

this issue came up in a somewhat different form, upon a question of credentials from the State of Louisiana, which had lately reorganized under Lincoln's guidance. Trumbull, in February, submitted a joint resolution which recognized Louisiana's new government, set up by local convention the previous April, as a legitimate one; but against the main body of their Republican colleagues, a minority of five, including Sumner, Wade, and Chandler, interposed dilatory motions, and the session closed with the point itself undecided.¹ All this was ominous of approaching difference in the dominant party; with Sumner in the lead, who inflexibly opposed the President's plan of prompt and practical reconstruction. Slavery, to be sure, was eliminated from the problem, but the party minority was formulating other irreversible guarantees, prominent among which was that of peremptory negro suffrage. As advocate for an oppressed race, none could equal this Massachusetts senator for vigilance and effective energy, but as pacificator of sections he was less admirable. "State suicide" was still his theory against party colleagues like Sherman, Fessenden, Dixon, and Doolittle; confiscation and punishment interested him, and he planned to break ground early and prepare the Northern mind to follow him. Finding that the President on points of penal reconstruction differed from him, he prepared, when this session closed, for a contest in the coming Congress.²

How events might have shaped out on this novel and difficult problem, had Lincoln survived to another March, we need hardly speculate. The tender, tolerant spirit which he would have brought to that solemn task, vanished with his mortal presence, and public confidence did not vest in his immediate and casual successor. But his own purpose was to make restoration as nearly as possible his military work as commander-in-chief, leaving to Congress in each branch the undoubted discretion to refuse admission to members sent thither as from a reconstructed State, and submitting to that body as a whole the power to undo his

¹ 9 N. & H. c. 19.

² 4 Pierce's Sumner, 76, 233-247.

work by regular legislation, should public opinion sustain its constructive discretion against his own. The pardoning power was constitutionally his, and his inclinations were just and merciful; the abolition of slavery was practically accomplished, and for imposing other conditions upon the South he was not prepared. Harsh and inflexible plans, at all events, he clearly disfavored; he would not risk party schism upon abstractions, nor tear open sectional wounds, nor reconstruct otherwise than on the most generous basis which promised national safety. He had already lent the spur that brought in West Virginia as a loyal State; and the Peirpoint government of Virginia herself, though reduced in consequence to almost ridiculous limits, he had permitted to remain *de facto* as a convenient nucleus for future occasion. He had chosen military governors in the insurrectionary States, wherever repossession justified such a course, under his amnesty and reconstruction offer of December, 1863. Arkansas, Louisiana, and Tennessee had all in convention set up reorganized governments that he wished protected.¹ And he kept it well in view that, to complete a constitutional three-fourths vote of the whole United States to the newly proposed amendment for abolishing slavery, one at least of these rehabilitated commonwealths must expressly ratify.

In his last public utterance on this subject, and within a week of his death, Lincoln reviewed the whole question in the light of existing facts, with intent to gain popular support. "We all agree," he said, "that the seceded States, so called, are out of their proper practical relation with the Union, and that the sole object of the Government, civil and military, in regard to those States, is to again get them into that proper practical relation. I believe that it is not only possible, but in fact easier, to do this without deciding or even considering whether these States have ever been out of the Union, than with it. Finding themselves safely at home, it would be utterly immaterial whether they had ever been abroad." Yet with

¹ See, in detail, 8 N. & H. cs. 16, 17, 18.

so great peculiarities pertaining to each State, with sudden changes liable, and the whole problem, withal, so new and unprecedented, details, he admitted, might have to be varied. "In the present situation, as the phrase goes, it may be my duty to make some new announcement to the people of the South. I am considering, and shall not fail to act, when satisfied that action will be proper."¹

Following Lincoln's triumphant reelection by popular and electoral majorities so decisive, all signs now pointed to the speedy collapse of the Confederate States, and the failure of all plans for pacification which should recognize in any way the existence of a distinct Southern government to treat with, or of States capable of negotiating sovereign terms. Yet efforts to so negotiate and save sectional pride were not wanting, nor was the President disposed to refuse those efforts a decent countenance. Francis P. Blair, Sr., who was Southern born himself, and knew well the individual character and temper of the Southern political leaders, made a journey to Richmond at the close of December, 1864, upon his personal request, receiving his President's safeguard through the lines. In a confidential interview with Jefferson Davis, on the 12th of January, he disclaimed all diplomatic character, and was received as an old familiar friend, who had rendered kindnesses in other years. Blair's proposal, which was of his own framing, had decidedly the Jacksonian color. It was to stop the effusion of fraternal blood, and open out a new channel for bitter waters by turning the arms of North and South against Maximilian in Mexico, making common cause to enforce the Monroe doctrine against the European invaders. Davis considered such a project not unfavorably, and gave Blair a letter which stated his willingness to negotiate for peace without finding obstacles over forms, and to send commissioners for preliminary conference. But Lincoln was not to be turned from his humane and

1865,
January-
February.

¹ 9 N. & H. c. 19 (April 11, 1865).

patriotic task into a scheme which might degenerate into a joint spoliation foray upon Mexico, with national slavery undisposed of; and the whole interest he took in Blair's mission was in the despondency it disclosed of rebellion's choicest leaders, and their desire to abandon armed resistance to the constitution. In a response, on the 18th, he signified his willingness, now and at all times, to receive agents informally sent him. Blair covered his retreat from the Mexican project, while Davis, on the 28th, appointed for conference three commissioners, Alexander H. Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter, and John A. Campbell, all of whom felt convinced that armed resistance was hopeless, yet were unwilling to admit the logical consequences of that situation.¹ The three reached Grant's headquarters in the Union lines, and after a telegraphic interchange, Seward left Washington to meet them at Hampton Roads. Upon Grant's strong request, the President went down besides in person; and on the morning of February 3d, on board a steamboat which lay at anchor near Fortress Monroe, a free conference was held for four hours. No memorandum of that conference was made, on either side, and no account ever written out except from memory. A former personal acquaintance and reciprocal good feeling made mutual intercourse easy and cordial, but radical differences in the political point of view, Southern and Northern, forbade agreement. Stephens, who led discussion on his side, dangled Blair's glittering bait of an allied Mexican expedition, as though credulous that Lincoln could be allured to it; he also pleaded for an armistice. The President pointedly refused an armistice on any terms, before the great and vital question of reunion was disposed of. A man of paradoxes, whose good sense was too often led astray by his speculative philosophy, Stephens contended, as in his writings of this period, for an "ultimate absolute sover-

¹ President Lincoln's note promised to receive commissioners sent "with the view of securing peace to the people of our one common country." Davis sanctioned the conference, instead, "for the purpose of securing peace to the two countries." 10 N. & H. c. 5.

eighty of each State" as a "continental regulator,"—a dogma which, if duly applied, might bring them back to the Union as it had taken them out of it, leaving them free, moreover, to secede again. Conversation taking presently a more practicable channel, the President, in circumspect and guarded phrase, while discriminating as between Executive and Congress, defined his own position upon reconstruction, confiscation, the proposed amendment of freedom, and other points of inquiry.¹ In short, this memorable conference ended as it had begun, in a spirit of good will and courtesy, but Stephens and his colleagues returned to Richmond, conscious that they had utterly failed to find ground for negotiation on equal terms; nothing they felt was left but entire submission, States and individuals, to the Federal constitution, trusting to the usual rights and securities under that instrument; while as for the Confederacy, that must die the death. President Davis, upon this report, took counsel of his indomitable pride, denounced terms such as only "the conqueror may grant," and with the bitterest defiance pursued at reckless cost his hopeless military struggle.²

Hunter presided at a midday meeting called in Richmond, where Davis and Benjamin made last efforts to rekindle the sinking flames of resistance.³ But this was too much for Stephens, who foresaw subjugation close at hand, and further conflict hopeless. He withdrew from

¹ President Lincoln had persisted in asserting that he could not, upon matters of reconstruction, enter into any agreement with citizens in arms against the Government. "Mr. Hunter interposed," writes Stephens, "and in illustration of the propriety of the Executive entering into agreements with persons in arms against the acknowledged rightful public authority, referred to repeated instances of this character between Charles I. of England and the people in arms against him. Mr. Lincoln in reply to this said: 'I do not profess to be posted in history. On all such matters I will turn you over to Seward. All I distinctly recollect about the case of Charles I. is that he lost his head.'"

² 10 N. & H. c. 6. And see Davis, c. 77; 2 Stephens's War, 600.

³ Am. Cycl. 1865, 191. "Better go down, subjugated and fighting," said the press, "than agree to any deceptive peace."

the Southern capital, abandoned fight, and retired to his home in Georgia, still preaching reconstruction upon the basis of separate State sovereignty. Gladly, no doubt, by this time, would Georgia's statesmen have thus resolved their State out of the Davis Confederacy, but they shrunk from forcing that sanguinary issue with the Richmond centralizers, who now drew all Southern resources together for a last determined stand.¹ The situation of the Confederacy was indeed deplorable. Its financial credit was bankrupt, and its currency, which, up to July, 1862, had depreciated but slowly, ranged now from \$45 to \$60 for a single gold dollar. The Confederate treasury was empty, and immense hoards of cotton and tobacco, privately owned, could not be turned to profit. During the early summer of 1861, gold and silver circulated, notwithstanding the suspension of State banks, but so rapidly were the precious metals hoarded or bought up for speculation, that they disappeared, as in the North. By another year, temporary expedients having run their course, Confederate notes for dollars and fractional amounts became the entire currency of this section. Plentiful enough they were, but with dingy paper and poor print they soon assumed a miserable appearance, the fit presage of an approaching worthlessness.²

Southerners have thought it a grave error that their government did not, as many had urged in the fall of 1861, buy all the private cotton at current rates and then issue bonds

¹ President Lincoln at the Hampton Roads conference had not missed the opportunity to impress upon his old friend the influence he might exert, by getting Georgia to abandon a doomed warfare and place herself in prompt allegiance once more to the Union; but that advice was not taken. Johnston's Stephens, 484-487; 10 N. & H. 128. Stephens was arrested at his home by military authority of the United States in May, 1865.

² Am. Cycl. 1865, 188; 10 N. & H. c. 8. Beef, pork, and butter at Richmond reached \$35 a pound, common cloth \$60 a yard, while a barrel of flour cost \$1400. A suit of clothes cost \$600, or \$30 in gold. De Leon, 232, 233. Stephens, as Vice-President, had been paying \$30 a day, in Confederate paper, for his meals and room, while the Richmond Congress was in session, and \$30 more for fuel, light, and extras. Johnston's Stephens, 475.

upon its pledge; but to have sent that immense store to places of safe custody outside the lines would have been difficult. Secretary Memminger flooded the South with paper, whose only basis of redemption was a prospective independence. For its inordinate issue there was little demand, and the glut of currency increased. All this heightened President Davis's unpopularity, and people said he was autocratic. Discontent with the financial as well as military situation was laid at his door. An imperious mandate to fund millions of these paper notes into bonds, at a penalty of losing a third of their value, was a first step in repudiation; for as old Treasury issues of currency went out of sight new issues came from the press. The portentous rise in Southern prices was due less to inflation than to a spreading disbelief in Confederate success and in the final redemption of public paper. Bonds were refused, and the credit of this government became a biting jest. Among country people grew up a system of barter, and one class of necessities would be traded off for something else equally needful. Men sought to invest in something that would keep. Tobacco, being of intrinsic value, compact, and portable, was the choice investment; but cotton, real estate, merchandise, anything but the paper money, found acceptance.¹ Living was hard enough in the cities when rates became extravagant; but far away from these centres and the army lines, what with mean transportation, with impressment to strip the impoverished, with fields wasted and the ravage of fire and sword, this insurgent people lived on the barest produce at hand, and the few who could bring forth the needful bundle of paper notes to buy a meal, scarcely knew where amid the general scarcity to find one.²

Families of comparative means had flocked into the rebel capital, but even there supplies grew scarce, while paper

¹ De Leon, 235; 10 N. & H. c. 8. Most of the civil officers of the Confederacy managed to get their supplies at cost prices from the military stores; and otherwise they could not have lived upon their salaries at all. 10 N. & H. c. 12.

² De Leon, 233.

currency became more plentiful. People with surplus portables were soon seen turning them into money. Here raged a high fever of speculation in all commodities, with an ever-failing ratio; and with trade's ordinary channels blocked, auction stores, with their red flags, dotted the main business street of Richmond, and all sorts of incongruous articles were offered here, as at the retail shops,—bonnets and cavalry boots, ribbons and rifles, bread and cartridges, packs of cards and groceries, spikes, rum, feather beds, and cutlasses. The necessities of life, however, were held back by those figuring upon a rise. Flour, bacon, beef, and salt, were hoarded for increasing profit. The hyenas of speculation locked up salt, while soldiers in the trenches sickened for want of it, and stored flour, too, which some starving military squad might be guarding. Here, in gaudy and gilded saloons, gambling became an epidemic, and civilians and soldiery, high in rank, found relief, among bright lights, good liquors, and cigars, for the monotony and ennui of existence, while rattling the ivory chips. Here, high and low gambled, some lightly for excitement, some dashingly and brilliantly, a few sullen, and bent upon gain. And all this while the fortunes of the Confederacy and its financial resources grew more ruinous.¹

SECTION XII.

THUNDER ALL AROUND.

After the repulse at Cold Harbor, Grant determined that his next flank movement to the left should carry his army to the south of the James River; there steadily to besiege Richmond, and stretch the line of his foe to its utmost tension against his own. This resolve he at once announced to the War Department, as consistent with his ultimate plans, and compelled by Lee's obstinate refusal to meet him in open battle.²

¹ De Leon, c. 27.

² 2 Grant, 279.

By June 14th the Army of the Potomac had safely reached the James River, and preparations began for laying pontoons and crossing over to the south bank. Simultaneously, with the aid of W. F. ^{1864, June.} Smith's detachment, now sent back by the way of White House to City Point, Butler was directed to move against Petersburg, that railway centre of supply to the southward upon whose retention Richmond essentially depended. Through Meade, Hancock's corps was ordered also to be moved in readiness to the rear. When Smith arrived before Petersburg on the 15th, he reconnoitred what seemed to be empty works,—a series of redans connected by rifle pits, some of which he carried about nightfall by a successful assault with the aid of colored troops. The next morning, the 16th, Hancock, who had come up, took command, but after another success he had to be relieved, because the wound broke out afresh which he had received at Gettysburg. Meade, taking his place in person, assaulted and carried more of these redans; but his loss was very heavy, and after severe fighting on the following day, the Confederates, who now manned the defences in force, fell back to an interior line where they fortified anew.

The golden opportunity had been missed here on the day of Smith's arrival; for against his 16,000 troops, Petersburg had then for defence only about 2500, and could he possibly have pushed on for another hour, the city might have been taken or its rear cut off; and this would have hastened the final capture of Richmond by half a year. In fact, Beauregard, who commanded here on the Confederate side, had acted with the utmost energy and promptness. Apprehending more quickly than did Lee this point of danger, he stripped the lines at Bermuda Hundred, and begged more troops to defend Petersburg, while his superior, incredulous, was holding all forces in hand to fight Grant upon the roads to Richmond between the Chickahominy and James, just as he had fought McClellan. By Beauregard's intrepidity, most of all, Petersburg was saved on the 16th, and, two days later, the bulk of Lee's army strengthened him in support, with Lee in person to com-

mand. When, therefore, on the 18th, at noon, Meade opened a vigorous assault upon the Confederate works, impressed, like Grant, with the importance of their capture, the valor of Birney, Warren, Parke, Barlow, and the rest was fruitlessly spent. Grant, at the close of this day, called off the fight, and his gallant troops were placed in shelter, and permitted the rest and recreation they had so long needed. In these four days' struggle, some ten thousand had been lost, though not wasted, on the Union side; and the Army of the Potomac felt exhausted by long and arduous marches, and by incessant attacks made under every disadvantage. It was high time to place them behind intrenchments, like their foe, and give them safe cover and comparative respite.¹

The siege of Petersburg now commenced; and to Meade's army Grant assigned the close investment of that city, while Butler's force held Bermuda Hundred and all the ground gained on either side of the James River. Burnside, with his 9th corps, occupied the right, followed in due order by Warren with the 5th; Birney (in Hancock's place), with the 2d; and Wright, at the extreme left, with the 6th. White House, no longer wanted as a store of supplies, was now forsaken, and its garrison and wagon trains were transferred to Grant's new base before the end of this month, under the escort of Sheridan, whose cavalry had been scouring northward in a raid upon the Virginia Central railroad. To break the lines of Lee's communication, and cut off his supplies from the rear of Richmond, was a purpose which Grant had never lost sight of; and he made, on the 22d of June, his first attempt at seizing the Weldon and South Side railroads, those lines of communication, by moving the 2d and 6th corps to the left. The attempt, however, was unsuccessful, for as these two corps were not well closed up, the Confederate A. P. Hill thrust between them and inflicted damage. A cavalry raid under Wilson, undertaken with the same object, achieved nothing. Following these incidents, comparative quiet reigned for

¹ 9 N. & H. 318; 2 Grant, c. 56.

several weeks, Grant's army being busily occupied in intrenching and strengthening its lines.¹ Both Grant and Sherman, through experience, were now reaching the conclusion that mere cavalry raids, though brilliant and effective in many respects, can accomplish very little in crippling railroads; and Confederate leaders shared ^{July.} most likely that conviction. For both sides had become quite expert in repairing broken tracks after an enemy's troopers had dashed away; and such, in particular, was Sherman's facility in running his railroad trains again before an enemy's cavalry had time to boast their exploit, that the saying went through the South that he carried duplicate tunnels in his baggage.² Grant's resolve to cease his costly sacrifice of lives came none too soon; for the humane heart of the President had sickened at the slaughter of so many thousands, and had it not been for the nerve, the confidence, and the constant progress of this new general-in-chief, which made a cheering impression, dissension might have broken out at Washington to injure him, as it had done his predecessors.

A dull, dry midsummer found the Army of the Potomac recuperating fast in strength and spirit, despite the dust endured and the difficulty of obtaining good water. Lee, foreseeing now the inevitable end if this siege were to proceed steadily, encouraged Early to threaten Washington afar off and thus draw off the foe for guarding his own domains. The effort failed, as we have elsewhere seen, nor could Grant be tempted to attack Lee again in his works, as the latter's strategy contemplated. The Union general-in-chief held doggedly to his main task, and would not weaken his advantage by menaces elsewhere. To other operations he gave judicious attention, and did whatever seemed needful for combinations elsewhere which had worked

¹ 2 Grant, 303 ; 9 N. & H. c. 18.

² For the true method of damaging the railroads of an adversary, which Sherman now taught, see *supra*, p. 513.

feebly; but nothing could draw him away from his present purpose, which was to pen up and capture Lee's army. His siege train was on the ground, his approaches were begun, and through day and night resounded the deep roar of artillery and the toil of pickaxe and spade. Towards the end of July, Burnside completed an immense mine before Petersburg, under the centre of the Confederate works, with a gallery, more than five hundred feet long, which was crossed by lateral branches of some forty feet each; there were eight chambers in all, each of which required a ton of powder for charging.¹ When all was ready Grant ordered a feint upon the north side of the James, with a view of drawing away as many of Lee's troops as possible before the decisive moment of discharge. Shortly before five o'clock in the morning of the 30th, the mine exploded with terrific effect, lifting a Confederate salient high in air and disclosing in its place a huge crater whose broad breach was a good four hundred yards in extent. The foe fled from the vicinity of the hole in horror, but the advantage of assault was not quickly followed up on the Union side, as it should have been, while consternation lasted, and the whole effort proved a wasteful and stupendous failure, for which Burnside and an incompetent division-general, whom he sent to conduct the charge, were chiefly liable. Meade's fiery temper getting momentary control of him, an angry passage ensued between him and Burnside; and, with a court of inquiry ordered upon this spectacular fiasco at the desire of the general-in-chief, Burnside's conspicuous military career, chequered as it had constantly been by good and ill fortune, came to an end.²

The engineers now went on under Grant's orders, perfect-

¹ An enterprise suggested by an officer of the 48th Pennsylvania Volunteers, a regiment largely composed of coal-miners.

² 9 N. & H. 425. The military court of inquiry censured Burnside, together with some of his subordinates, while, on the contrary, the War Committee of Congress sustained him. Burnside now resigned from military service, the war ending by the time of this latter report; but Rhode Island bestowed the highest civil honors upon her illustrious son, whose public career ended finally in the United States Senate.

ing before Petersburg their redoubts and connecting lines, while Grant's own mind was chiefly intent upon the operations of Sherman and Sheridan, developing victoriously at a distance. The President, in a terse and characteristic despatch, commended his unwillingness to relax the prudent grasp he now held for temptations of glory such as his great lieutenants were winning elsewhere. Besides attending to engineering work, Grant's immediate army stretched its lines on the right and left so as to force Lee with a weaker thread to stretch correspondingly towards the breaking point; menace and skirmishing were constantly kept up, though without risking at present another assault; and further effort was made, moreover, to clutch and keep those communicating railways to the southward upon which both Petersburg and Richmond depended. In a movement conducted by Warren on the 18th of August, the Weldon railroad was seized at a point a few miles below Petersburg; Lee and Beauregard made repeated efforts to dislodge, and in the bloody skirmishes of the next few days each side lost heavily; but Warren kept and strengthened his new position, and the Weldon railroad remained in occupation of the Union army until war ended. A partial destruction followed of the tracks and bridges, compelling the besieged to haul their supplies by wagon for a distance of thirty miles.¹ Near the close of September, while Sheridan was in hot pursuit of Early, Grant ordered a demonstration north of the James under Ord and Birney, whose partial gain enabled his lines to be drawn permanently closer to Richmond in that upper direction. Finally, Meade made a vigorous effort, towards the close of October, to get possession of the South Side railroad, but in an action of the 27th, at Hatcher's Run, was forced to withdraw; and Butler, the same day, made a demonstration in his support, on the north side of the James, which also failed of notable results. This ended all active operations for the year, so far as Grant's immediate troops were concerned. Pickett skirmishing continued, to be sure;

¹ 2 Grant, c. 57 ; 9 N. & H. c. 18.

but no real battle was fought near Petersburg or Richmond during the succeeding winter season. Hancock, whose 2d corps, which Grant so much depended upon, had been greatly cut up by constant fighting, was now ordered to Washington to organize a new command in preparation for the coming spring, Humphreys taking here his place. While the Army of the Potomac gained its needful repose, a large amount of raw material was assimilated in the ranks, which draft or heavy bounties at the North had procured, to replace the veteran thousands, whose bones since May lay bleaching on Virginia soil, along the stubborn line of march.¹

Sherman's march to the sea from Atlanta was the latest military exploit of the present year, and its immortal fame redounds to the brilliant commander who planned and pursued it. To bisect the remaining Southern Confederacy, now already parted at the Mississippi, might, like that earlier enterprise, have occurred to various minds, but it was this general who showed how and when to do it, and who accomplished it, moreover, personally leading, where commanders less fertile and intrepid might have failed. Between him and Grant no question of origination was ever raised, for Grant heartily accorded to Sherman the entire credit for conception and achievement.² President Lincoln was indeed anxious, if not fearful, when this march began, but he acquiesced in Sherman's proposal, and would not interfere with his wishes.³ Sherman already held Atlanta, stripped of its civil inhabitants, as a military base; being justified in his harsh procedure by the rules of war, and heartily sustained at Washington. Neither he nor his general-in-chief intended that he should linger there long before commencing another campaign and pressing his invasion far through the interior.

¹ 2 Grant, c. 58 ; 9 N. & H. c. 18.

² 2 Grant, 375.

³ 9 N. & H. 494 ; 2 Sherman, 166.

Mobile had long been a favorite objective point with Grant ; but motives for concerting there with Canby existed no longer, and, while other plans were being discussed, Hood, with the aid of Wheeler's cavalry, moved suddenly upon Sherman's rear by rapid marches, and forced a new initiative. This move was in pursuance of plans arranged with Davis, the Confederate President, who visited Hood's camp in Georgia towards the close of September, and in florid and defiant speeches on the way disclosed the design very frankly. This army, as he boasted, meant to invade middle Tennessee, whither Forrest had already been sent, and the Yankee retreat from Atlanta would prove more disastrous than Napoleon's from Moscow. Forewarned was forearmed, and Sherman took instant precautions for his rear, where garrisons needed strengthening. At Allatoona, General John M. Corse made a stubborn defence, on the 5th of October, and held his fort against a furious cannonade. Hood, moving still October. northward, struck the railroad again between Resaca and Tunnel Hill, and, after tearing up the tracks for twenty miles, demanded and received the surrender of Dalton; he then disappeared towards the Tennessee line, joined, about the 20th of October, by Beauregard. By this offensive progress Hood had sought to improve the morale of his troops, not yet daring, however, to risk a pitched battle. The Confederate President had, on his late visit, composed some personal difficulties in the camp, by transferring Hardee, of whom Hood complained, to a command on the seacoast, which was nominally a promotion; while Hood himself was delicately supervised by Beauregard, who now united the commands. Meanwhile, Forrest had made a bold circuit in middle Tennessee, avoiding all fortified points, and broken up the railroad at several points, inflicting some temporary damage; and afterwards retreating before Rousseau, he left the state near Florence, Alabama, escaping unharmed.

Sherman took vigorous means to find and fight the wayward and eccentric Hood; but he could not achieve his purpose. By this time he had fully conceived the plan of

marching forth to desolate the southern interior and reach the seacoast, and he was eager to commence. "I can make this march," he telegraphed Grant on the 9th of October, "and make Georgia howl!" With that bold end in view, he proposed breaking up his railroads at once all the way from Chattanooga to Atlanta, as a defence too costly and exacting to be worth attempting longer. His bread rations and cattle on hand were already sufficient for commencing the march, and with his wagons he could forage, he believed, for whatever else might be requisite to subsist upon. This purpose he reiterated in his despatches, making such preparations as he might while awaiting permission; but October passed before his plans were approved. Hood, all the while, hovered about northern Alabama, in Forrest's vicinity, busily collecting shoes, clothing, and ammunition for a projected invasion of Tennessee, which Beauregard furthered while himself remaining at Corinth. Sherman supplied Thomas with troops sufficient to hold Nashville in secure defence; but for himself he did not wish to be decoyed away from Georgia, nor to give up his present advantages for the sake of making a tedious chase from behind. Hood, he said, can "turn and twist like a fox, and wear out any army in pursuit." His wishes gradually prevailed with November. Grant, who had proposed the ruin of Hood's army first of all; and, accordingly, by the 2d of November, the counter aggressive which Sherman was so ardent to commence, received at Washington a full and final sanction.¹

Experience had made of Grant's second in command an admirable general for the initiative, for he adapted operations to occasion and went straight forward to execute them. Sherman was decidedly original in his treatment of military problems, quick to perceive a point and to distinguish; and much of the ill-temper he aroused among insurgents by the severity of his methods was allayed by his frank piquancy in discourse and an evident sincerity of purpose. With Hood, as also with civic authorities of Atlanta, he had carried on a vivacious correspondence, not unrelieved

¹ 2 Sherman, c. 20; 2 Grant, c. 59.

by humor of expression, touching the harsh policy he had undertaken to pursue. "War is war, and not popularity-seeking," was his apology when accused of barbarity in methods towards Confederates; "if they want peace they and their relatives must stop the war." He permitted Southern vehemence to vent itself, and responded with equal warmth of argument. After all, it was talk like this from clean-handed men, whose courage they respected, who had deprecated war in the beginning and cherished no political aspirations, that brought misguided Southern brethren to their senses. In Sherman's mind at the present time two ideas were strongly uppermost: one, that his army might actually subsist in the enemy's country without a base; the other, that to make this war effective and thorough, rebellion must be crippled and ruined to the utmost in military resources. He relied upon the moral effect he would produce by his intended expedition against the enemy. "If we can march a well-appointed army right through his territory," he argued, "it is a demonstration to the world, foreign and domestic, that we have a power which Davis cannot resist."¹

In the middle of November, then, began Sherman's famous march through Georgia. Thomas had been sent to Nashville, previously, there to watch and obstruct Beauregard and Hood with an augmented force, large enough to defend both Tennessee and Kentucky, besides maintaining the present Union base from the Ohio River down to Chattanooga. All surplus stores below that point were sent back to Tennessee. By November 10 all troops that Sherman designed for his immediate exploit were ordered down to Atlanta; and two days later railroad and telegraphic connections with the rear were wholly broken, and his invading column stood detached from all friends, dependent upon its own means of further supply and resources in an enemy's country. Destroying such depots, machine shops, foundries, and other buildings at Atlanta as might possibly be turned to hostile use, and tearing up the railway tracks

¹ 9 N. & H. 479; 2 Sherman, 167.

he had now forsaken, Sherman started upon his southeasterly march from Atlanta towards the seacoast on the morning of November 15, making Milledgeville, the capital of Georgia, which was about a hundred miles distant, his first point of destination. His invading column, carefully purged already of non-combatants and the sick, numbered, from first to last, about 60,000, as able-bodied and intelligent a body of soldiers, as well armed, well equipped, and well seasoned to endurance, as the world ever saw. Howard and Slocum, both of them trained and competent generals, commanded the two wings, with Osterhaus, Blair, Jefferson C. Davis, and A. S. Williams for their next highest subordinates; while Kilpatrick led the cavalry. Artillery and the wagon trains had been reduced to the smallest practicable compass, and were lightly loaded; each soldier of the infantry carried on his person forty rounds of ammunition, with his rations; of rations altogether about twenty days' supply were transported, while beef-cattle were driven along on the hoof. But the forage carried by this army was scant, and for keeping up a supply dependence was chiefly placed upon the invaded country.

Sherman's orders for the march, which were clearly and concisely written out, showed a purpose to make the region of Southern insurrection feel heavily the annoyance of his presence. He directed the march to be as nearly as possible by parallel and converging roads, so as to threaten different points at once and keep the foe from concentrating. Instead of giving his army a general train of supplies, ammunition and provision wagons were to be divided up among the different corps and proceed by subdivision behind the several brigades and regiments. Each separate column was to start habitually at seven in the morning and make an average march of fifteen miles a day. Liberal forage upon the country traversed was not only allowed, but enjoined; and parties duly organized were to gather up meat, provisions, and whatever other edible supplies might be needful, keeping their wagons well loaded. Corps commanders, wherever they found their progress molested, were permitted to destroy mills and houses; while horses, mules, and wagons

they might freely appropriate for military needs, preferring to discriminate against the rich. Negroes who were able-bodied and serviceable might be taken along, if they so desired; but the promiscuous and wanton pillage or destruction of private property was forbidden.

On the 16th of November, Sherman, with his personal staff following the advance, rode out of Atlanta, leaving that city smouldering and demolished, with black smoke hanging in canopy over its roofs like a pall. Wrecked engines, bent and twisted rails, this army left behind; but scenes more exhilarating opened upon the vision as the forest screen was passed: for it was a day of perfect sunshine and the autumnal air felt bracing and delicious. A mysterious sense of distant exploit and adventure seemed to pervade the whole column, and the soldiers of the Union, singing in chorus as they swung along, by corps and divisions, to the martial strain of their bands, cast with rollicking delight the load of responsibility upon their immediate superiors, which these, with equal zest, shifted in turn upon the chief commander. In this lively mood the progress went on from day to day, Sherman making up his own nightly couch with the rest, among abundant pine boughs, which served for ample repose and shelter. Closing up the ranks by day, whenever they marched through a town, the color-bearers of a detachment would unfurl their flags and the bands strike up patriotic airs; the white inhabitants, in spite of disloyal feeling, gathering inquisitively at doors and windows to see the sight, while negroes of every shade of complexion, male and female, young and old, went simply frantic in the ecstasy of joy, clustering about the horses of the high officers as though to welcome a saviour, hugging the banners borne, and shouting, praying, and pouring out fervent thanks. For the people long in darkness here, now saw a great light, and it was comprehended far and wide, through means mysterious, that slavery or freedom was an issue of this long war, and that success on the Union side would give this race deliverance.¹

¹ 2 Sherman, cs. 20, 21; 4 B. & L. 688, 689.

With skirmishers thrown out in advance, flankers busy, and forage parties gathering their supplies abundantly from the rich planters' grounds, Milledgeville was reached on the 23d of November; its legislature, after having passed an act for levying Georgia's population in the mass, fleeing with the governor and State officers in dire confusion. For a day Sherman quartered at the governor's mansion, and some of Slocum's soldiers, who held a mock assembly at the State House, repealed, with pretended gravity, Georgia's ordinance of secession. From Georgia's capital the horde of invaders next shaped their progress towards Savannah and the seacoast. Sherman's orders to forage liberally on the country, each individual soldier was inclined to apply for himself, but the column was kept as closely as possible to the literal injunction, which was no easy matter. Being in an enemy's country, and without supplies except such as the country afforded, invaders had of course to appropriate largely. They swarmed like an army of locusts, seeking whatever could be eaten by man or beast. Sherman's "bummers," so called, collected their loads with surprising skill and speed, when detailed for the various commands. Their captures comprised cattle, sheep, poultry, with bacon and cornmeal, often molasses, and sometimes coffee or other small rations. They would start out on foot in the morning, and return, by night, mounted on strange horses or mules; but whatever they took was turned over to the commissaries for general use, and the next day they left on foot, to return at sunset mounted once more. Many racy anecdotes are related of these men and their pillaging exploits, of which a large part, probably, are unfounded.¹

On the 10th of December, Sherman's column reached the outer defences of Savannah, and all that now barred its way to the seacoast was a formidable work on the Ogeechee River, known as Fort McAllister. In this vicinity
December. the scraps and remnants of an opposing force of some ten thousand had already collected under Hardee's command, which included some Georgia militia, not very

¹ 2 Grant, c. 59; 2 Sherman, c. 21.

eager to fight, and openly objecting to be marched beyond the limits of their own State.¹ Indeed, the most frantic official fulminations, both civil and military, to "assail the invader in front, flank, and rear," had produced but meagre response. Richard Taylor, who now joined Hardee from the far West, bringing no troops to assist, agreed with him that Savannah ought to be abandoned in time sufficient for escaping, so as to make another united stand in South Carolina. Fort McAllister fell speedily before the assault of Hazen's division of the 15th corps, on the evening of December 13. This triumph enabled Sherman to place his right wing at once upon impregnable ground, as he desired, and opened full connection with the Union fleet, which had lain waiting below, expectantly, at Ossabaw Sound, with supplies of food and clothing and an immense mail for this army.

Hampered, as it seemed, in his movements, by despatches from Grant, which now reached him, to the effect that vessels were on their way to transport him and the bulk of his command to Virginia, Sherman submitted other proposals of his own, and then, to lose no time, sent Hardee, on the 17th, a summons for Savannah's surrender. The answer was a calm refusal, and preparations followed to break his lines at once or else besiege the city. But on the night of the 20th-21st, Hardee stole away, as he had planned, marching his whole garrison over a pontoon bridge and causeway into South Carolina. The inundated rice fields both aided his escape and hindered a pursuit; he had destroyed already at Savannah his ironclads and the navy yard; yet the city itself, with heavy guns and ammunition, and twenty-five thousand bales of cotton, was no contemptible prize for a conquest so surprisingly easy. As a Christmas gift to the President, Sherman, in a sprightly and appropriate despatch, presented Savannah, on the 22d of December, and the spontaneous praise of the nation, which reached him for this crown to his splendid campaign and the year's arduous work, was grateful to his feelings. But still more grateful

was the revocation, which now came, of his orders to proceed northward by sea; and he was left entirely to his own discretion, in the matter of his further movements.¹

Sherman's plan, which he had worked out during the march, was, after reducing Savannah, to continue his inland advance through the Carolinas and their respective capitals, Columbia and Raleigh, thence to coöperate finally with Grant in the rear of Richmond. He meant, as hitherto, to gather forage and provisions as he advanced, and march after a similar fashion. "My aim," so he afterwards wrote, "was to whip the rebels, to humble their pride, to follow them to their inmost recesses, and make them fear and dread us." His march to the sea had developed in a sense as a means to such an end—so as to be, in fact, one stage in the direction of Richmond, rather than that solitary and anomalous enterprise which popular interest inclines to regard it. In Georgia, however, came the first grand test of his pungent experiment; there such a march had to be met and frustrated, or this rebellion was put, like one smote on the hinder parts, to perpetual shame. There was a stroke of military genius in this whole devastating enterprise, and whatever incidental pillage may have attended its course, the moral effect, as apprehended, was great upon friend and foe. At last, the bosom of the Confederacy was plainly bared, and its heart was shown to be beating feebly in its last pulsations.

Sherman's whole Southern progress, presently to be resumed, supplies to posterity the most picturesque and peculiar military campaign of the Civil War, and that which, at the least proportional sacrifice to the Union cause, secured the amplest results. Its success stamped its leader and originator as the second great Union commander of the whole conflict in point of merit—some have thought the first, but this cannot be conceded. No general could have been more happily placed for his fame than Grant himself had here placed him,—far from those circles of public and political influence which Sherman could never fairly esteem

¹ 9 N. & H. c. 20; 2 Sherman, cs. 21, 22.

nor judiciously cope with; freely and trustfully left to his own devices by a general-in-chief whom he loved as a friend and respected, and favored most liberally by a President and administration that perceived him to be loyal, frank, and capable. Nature and circumstances, like the stars in their courses, seemed to fight for him in this his final campaign. For Sherman's breadth was not equal to his intensity, though his military intuition lit up like lightning and his strictly professional attainments were very sound. He was liked by those who served under him, down to the humblest private, for he was easily approached and would say the right word for the occasion, at the same time that he repelled too easy familiarity. He bore hardships with the humblest on this campaign, making no parade of rank or dignity. He would ride from one corps to another, acknowledging salutations on the way as though too hurried to waste time over etiquette; his uniform coat wide open at the throat, and displaying a loose black cravat and linen collar; and his common foot-gear consisted of low shoes and a single spur. He understood his officers and their individual traits, and detailed them with a discretion that made all feel that his eye was on them.¹ His interesting Memoirs show that he had a lively power of description, a strong imagination, and the gift of stating forcibly what he truly felt.

To make Sherman's triumph complete, however, on this march, it was needful to defeat the large army which Beauregard and Hood massed in his rear at the time he left Atlanta. That army, instead of pursuing, aided effectually his progress by concentrating all effort for resistance in the opposite direction. Beauregard, who had hurried to Macon to confer about opposing Sherman on the march, gave little more than his rhetoric to relieve Georgia from invasion, and returned to Corinth, solely intent upon his counter-aggressive. One of the gravest responsibilities of this war

¹ 4 B. & L. 671.

rested consequently upon Thomas, whom Sherman had left confidently behind at Nashville, to command all the reserves of the department, which aggregated, after various gains and losses, about 55,000 men of all arms, including corps under Schofield and D. S. Stanley, for the chief reliance. Hood's army, on the other side, had now, by the most strenuous exertions, been brought up to its fullest strength, so as to comprise infantry corps variously estimated from 40,000 to 45,000, to which were added 10,000 cavalry under Forrest; so that the opposing armies were pretty fairly matched.

When November opened, Hood occupied Tuscumbia, a town on the south bank of the Tennessee River, located in northern Alabama. There, after nearly a fortnight's discussion with Beauregard, it was fully resolved that Hood should leave Sherman unmolested and invade Tennessee. On the 13th of November, the day after Sherman had severed his last communications with Thomas, Hood moved across the river to Florence, where Forrest reported to him; and, almost simultaneously with Sherman's setting-out from Atlanta, on the 15th, towards one point of the compass, Hood's army faced the other, taking up eagerly its march towards Nashville, as an offset, on the 21st. "Victory in Tennessee will relieve Georgia," was Beauregard's assuring telegram to Howell Cobb, when the latter reported the destructive advance of Sherman, now fully developed; and, once and again, this Confederate commander, who kept headquarters at Corinth, charged Hood to push rapidly upon his aggressive. Regardless of snow, sleet, and rain, weather far different from what Sherman was now encountering, Hood moved with alacrity towards Columbia, a midway point; progressing so rapidly, indeed, that he would have cut off Schofield from that town, had not the latter, whom Thomas sent from Nashville to intercept the Confederate approach, arrived there first, after a toilsome night march, by the morning of the 24th. Balked, therefore, in his first effort, Hood next meant to proceed by the right flank, crossing the river some distance above Columbia, thence to assail Schofield's line of com-

munications at Spring Hill. Bridging the river during the night of the 28th, and crossing at daybreak to lead his own flanking column, he started forth for a new and daring exploit, in emulation of Stonewall Jackson's example; but again he failed, for Stanley, Schofield's next in command, had been sent to anticipate and oppose such a move, and, after a tough conflict, on the 29th, for possession of Spring Hill and the Franklin turnpike, which the Union forces held firmly by good fighting, aided by their excellent artillery, Hood and his generals had to encamp for the night, with the grand stroke missed. Schofield, already convinced that the main Confederate army purposed marching upon his rear and cutting him off from Nashville, withdrew from Columbia after sunset, and pushed his solid force for the town of Franklin, marching all night with heavy trains and artillery past Hood's sleeping army. The head of his column reached Franklin, by the turnpike, on the 30th, shortly before sunrise, the main body arriving during the forenoon.¹

On this 30th of November followed the battle of Franklin, which Hood forced, with violence, in furious desperation, bitterly vexed by his earlier discomfiture, and angry with his principal generals, whom he loaded with reproach and adjurations, for their failure to succeed the day before. His invectives stung them to new effort, and, with impetuous assault, they rushed upon the Union lines, like wild Indians, at early four o'clock, just as Schofield's weary soldiers had flung themselves down for a little repose behind their breastworks, here hastily built. Two fresh brigades of Wagner, who had fought well the day before, had been posted outside by Schofield, with instructions to baffle and retire in case of attack; but they lingered imprudently to fight, and now came rushing over the parapets, while the enemy enveloped rather than pursued them. The Union troops inside, bewildered and half awake, could not resist the overwhelming Confederate force thrown suddenly upon them with immediate success; and a large breach was made

¹ 10 N. & H. c. 1.

in the centre of Schofield's breastworks, into which a superior force of the enemy was nearly wedged with irreparable effect, when Stanley, with Opdycke's brigade and other troops at hand to help him, closed the gap quickly, and with a rally Hood's fierce onset was repelled. All along the line, however, and through this whole day, assault after assault was made by the Confederate army upon Schofield's line with a steadily diminishing success; and the sun went down upon a bloody and fruitless battle, desperately fought and frightfully destructive of human life for the assailants, who lost by nearly three to one, and were much demoralized by their eventual failure. Hood was a daring and courageous fighter, and could make others fight under him. Sitting on horseback, a little way behind his lines, he had despatched his almost frantic orders, again and again, to "drive the Yankees into the river." But he had not that constraining judgment which accepts repulse upon sufficient trial, and at all times economizes military strength. In this severe encounter, Cox, on the Union side, commanded under Schofield's orders in the thick of the fight, splendidly performing his duty on the south side of the river, where this battle was mainly fought; for Stanley was wounded early in the day, and Schofield himself mainly occupied with bridging and posting, so as to resume his march towards Nashville, on the north side.¹

Hood's shattering failure before Franklin gave Schofield the full opportunity he needed to move all troops and supplies to Nashville, as Thomas, from headquarters, now directed him to do. While the battle of that day went on, Forrest and his cavalry had been checked by Wilson at the river, so that the Union army fell back unmolested. On arriving at Nashville, Schofield took a position already selected for his command upon the left; the 4th corps, under Wood, held the centre; and A. J. Smith, with his strong 16th corps, arriving most opportunely, was

¹ 10 N. & H. c. 1, citing Cox; 4 B. & L. 440, etc. From Hon. Thomas Speed of Kentucky the author has received important details of this battle.

posted at the right, with his flank resting on the Cumberland, just below the city. Hood, as if impelled to adverse fate by some evil demon, followed Schofield rashly to Nashville and settled down for another fight, bold and visionary to the last, and trusting for his final fame and success to the chapter of accidents. He formed his line of battle in front of that city on the 2d of December, assigning S. D. Lee, with his corps, to the centre, across the pike towards Franklin, while Stewart and Cheatham occupied the respective wings. Forrest, on the 5th, he detached, with an infantry division, upon a distant expedition to Murfreesboro, to invest and capture its garrison, then under Rousseau's command. That expedition failed, and, as a result of this diversion, Forrest remained too far away from Nashville to be recalled thither when most needed by the Confederate forces.

While Hood was strengthening his intrenchments, waiting, or rather hoping, for reënforcements from Texas and good news from Forrest, neither of which ever came, the unflinching Thomas, behind the ramparts of Nashville, was preparing, without a moment's haste or impatience, not only to give Hood battle, but to give it in such measure as to overwhelm that adversary with utter disaster. Sherman chose well when selecting a general for this responsible and isolated command, and his confidence was not misplaced. The lion-hearted Thomas was the officer of all others to break and dissipate the frothy vehemence of Hood rushing recklessly to his fate. He had won fame already as the "rock of Chickamauga"; and his steadiness of purpose and solid military qualities were so approved that no adversary but a rash one would have engaged him boldly. Thomas was slow but certain, never really dilatory, deliberate but not diffident. He was too plodding a general, perhaps, too much a man of routine, to have shone in such unique exploit as Sherman was now personally conducting; but none safer breathed on the Union side to hold a fort and make defence effective. Thomas, however, was not easily gauged by his own government; Grant seems to have taken a dislike to him, when at the West, for a sturdiness of

opinion, which sometimes went counter to his own; and such was the dread Eastward that he would let slip his present chance of a brilliant victory, that days seemed weeks while his preparations for fight went on, and unkind messages urged him to give battle at once, as though his own methods and his own judgment might not, like Sherman's, be trusted. He understood his duty, but felt distress of mind, with orders, uncalled for, raining upon him day and night, and the threat of supersedure impending. "If Thomas has not struck yet," telegraphed Grant impatiently to Halleck on the 7th, "he ought to be ordered to hand his command over to Schofield." Halleck pacified judiciously, while Grant's impatience grew. Thomas reported his reasons for delaying, with dignified regret that his general-in-chief was dissatisfied. "If he should order me to be relieved," was his response, "I will submit without a murmur." In truth, a spell of frightful weather, with rain and sleet, lasting for six days, had hindered progress equally for friend and foe. But Grant's uneasy irritation continued; Logan, then visiting him at City Point, was despatched to Nashville with orders to relieve Thomas if the latter did not move before he got there; and next, Grant started in person, only to find at Washington the news, which gladdened the land and dispensed with Logan's mission, that Thomas had fought upon the 15th and 16th, and splendidly conquered. Thenceforward was secure and impregnable this modest hero's fame, yet he had not moved a moment before he was ready, but ran all the risk of being removed for not yielding weakly to the judgment of others. For Thomas's military spirit was indomitable, and equally indomitable was his military sense of duty.

On the morning, therefore, of the 15th of December,—after all, within a brief fortnight of Hood's arrival,—and in the midst of a heavy fog which masked his movements, Thomas threw forward his troops for an attack which, except for bad weather, he would have ordered a week before. The roads were still miry, and more timid generals would have asked a longer respite. Schofield's force, under Couch and Cox, gained ground gradually upon the enemy,

while Wood assaulted Hood's advanced position about one o'clock. The whole Union line worked steadily forward, all the afternoon, till Hood and the Confederates were forced back to a new position. At daybreak of the 16th the fight was renewed on the Union side, and by this time with confidence and enthusiasm; Wood, Steedman, Smith, and Schofield pressing on, until Thomas, after riding the entire line in person and surveying every inch of the field, gave orders that the movement should bear against the Confederate left. Post's brigade, which the day before had handsomely carried an assault, failed in a new one at three o'clock, in the course of which Post was wounded; Hood, for a moment, appeared fiercely jubilant; but while he dashed in to take advantage, his whole line broke at all points, as he relates, and he "beheld for the first and only time a Confederate army abandon the field in confusion."¹ In fact, just after Post's assault had failed, Schofield and Smith moved forward to their particular task, and, with marvellous celerity, their soldiers burst over the enemy's works in every direction, like a rising flood, breaking the hostile lines in a dozen places, and capturing artillery and thousands of prisoners. No rout during the whole war was more complete than this. Hood's army, in a disorganized mass, poured southward down the Franklin turnpike, which was the only avenue of escape left open.²

Night closed in quickly, and a drenching rain came down, making pursuit difficult. Thomas continued the chase for more than a week with becoming swiftness and efficiency, but Hood, who was joined at Columbia, for assistance, by Forrest, fled too rapidly to be overtaken; his army, except for its rear guard, crumbling into a disheartened rabble of half-armed and barefooted men, who fell out wherever they could, to find their way homeward. Soon after Christmas

¹ Hood's Narrative, 303.

² 10 N. & H. c. 1; Cox, *passim*; 4 B. & L. 425, 440, etc. The whole command of Thomas numbered about 70,000 effectives at various points, in early December, while his available force in and about Nashville was about 55,000. Hood's force before the fight at Franklin made an effective total of some 40,000, if not more. 4 B. & L. 474.

Hood recrossed the Tennessee River, reaching Tupelo on the 13th of January, from which place he despatched to Richmond his resignation from command. Though daring and eccentric in adventure, full of fight and possessed of some vigorous qualities, this general was a dreamer, and stumbled over the realities of military experience. With Beauregard much enfeebled by sickness, President Davis now reappointed Johnston to this command, as public clamor and his necessities compelled him to do, — or rather, it should be said, Lee made this appointment; but the army of 50,000 strong, which Johnston, by good husbandry, turned over to Hood at Atlanta, had since been so bruised and battered in repeated fights that scarcely a tenth of that number came back to him. As for the Confederate reconquest of Tennessee, so hopefully looked for when Sherman left Atlanta, that ended at once and forever.¹

The capture of Mobile Bay was an important enterprise of 1864. Mobile, basking like a crocodile on its low and sandy stretch of seacoast, long continued a favorite port for blockade-runners, whose lucrative trade had tempted immense hazard. Munitions of war were here unloaded, and, to the last, articles of capricious luxury besides. Grant's earlier wish to make this port a base for military operations has been observed;² and the navy, too, deemed Mobile harbor a desirable place to gain, in order to seal up tightly its illicit commerce.

The city of Mobile stands at the head of a bay of the same name, which extends thirty miles northward from the Gulf of Mexico, with a channel running its entire length, which had, in these days, to be skilfully steered through, and with two low-lying sand-points to guard its main entrance. These sand-points were at this time strongly

¹ 10 N. & H. c. 1. Hood's losses upon this Nashville campaign were not carefully reported. Thomas lost about 3000 at Nashville and 2300 at Franklin, in killed, wounded, and missing. 4 B. & L. 473, 474.

² *Supra*, pp. 458, 485.

guarded by Forts Morgan and Gaines. Admiral Farragut, after carefully studying the vicinity, made preparations for an attack early in August, 1864, when the last of ^{1864,} his needful ironclads, the *Tecumseh*, reported to ^{August.} him, and General Granger with an army of some 5,000 troops landed on Dauphin Island in the rear of Fort Gaines. Farragut's naval attack, which comprehended running the two forts and their obstructions, was planned for the 4th, but postponed another day because of foul weather. After a hard rain the clouds cleared and the sea calmed about midnight; and at three in the morning of August 5th, with a favoring wind and a flood tide, the admiral lashed his vessels together, two and two, and gave orders to attempt an entrance. Morgan was found the more formidable of the two forts in passage, and between that and Farragut's wooden ships four Union monitors took position, charged with the double duty of keeping down the fire of the fort and attacking a monster iron ram, the *Tennessee*, which lay inside Mobile harbor. This ram, constructed by the Confederacy as one of its most formidable vessels, was well commanded, and, though slow of motion, was quite efficient for defence; its deck and sides were armored with wrought iron, an iron beak projected from its hull under water, and it carried six rifled guns. As at New Orleans, Farragut wished to lead his fleet in forcing a passage, and yet was persuaded by his officers to assign the first exposure to others; but this time he insisted upon following closely, and destiny found him in the van of the fight, with his broad blue pennant flying.

It was just after six in the morning that the leading vessels of the Union fleet crossed the bar and formed in line of battle. The *Tecumseh*, commanded by Craven, was soon sunk by an exploding torpedo; and while the *Brooklyn*, which followed, was backing in shoal water to avoid a like catastrophe, the admiral's flagship, the *Hartford*, moved westward and passed through the torpedo line, unharmed and in the lead. The marine battle now became general; Fort Morgan and the *Tennessee* ram, with its convoy of gunboats, all volleying together upon the Union ironclads

and wooden vessels, which opened their fire in return. On his flagship, Farragut had mounted to the maintop, where, lashed by his own orders lest he should fall wounded, fame has taken his portrait for posterity. Whilst the Union fleet moved by, the fire from Fort Morgan was subdued somewhat by the incessant cannonade from without; but when the leading vessels sailed out of range, its guns damaged badly those bringing up the rear. Meantime the *Hartford* became hotly engaged with the ram *Tennessee*, but, being more skilfully manœuvred, it escaped danger, while the Confederate gunboats were pursued in turn. Franklin Buchanan, formerly of high rank in our navy, who had managed the *Merrimac* in the famous fight at Hampton Roads, and was now a Confederate admiral, charged the *Tennessee* up and down, returning with temerity after the first fight was over and Farragut's men were taking breakfast. This rashness was fatal to his vessel; for the Union gunboats instantly centred their fire upon it, and Union monitors approached to engage it at close quarters. Tiller chains were severed, the smokestack was shot away, Buchanan got wounded in the leg, and, pressed thus severely, the *Tennessee* soon had to put out a white flag, and surrendered,—a goodly prize. On the 7th of August, Fort Gaines was shelled and forced to surrender, and on the 23d, after an obstinate defence, Fort Morgan succumbed to a heavy bombardment, General Page, its commander, having first spiked most of the guns and destroyed the stores.

With Mobile harbor thus regained, its outer defences won, and their guns and garrisons surrendered, this port became completely closed to Confederate commerce and intercourse. But the city itself, which had lost its strategical importance, Grant permitted to remain unmolested until the following spring.¹

¹ 9 N. & H. c. 10 ; Navy Report for 1864; 400, etc.

CHAPTER III.

SECOND ADMINISTRATION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

MARCH 4, 1865 — APRIL 15, 1865.

SECTION I.

LINCOLN'S SECOND INAUGURATION.

THE second inauguration of Abraham Lincoln took place out of doors, at the east portico of the Capitol, and before an assembled crowd. It was the first of reëlection ceremonials since Andrew Jackson's time, for Presidents of late had served but a single term, and, ^{1865.} ^{March 4.} unlike most occasions of the kind, it renewed the pageantry of a first induction. By this time the bronze statue of liberty surmounted the finished dome of the national temple, looking eastward as though peering to discern the first sunbeams of hallowed peace and restoration in the dappled glow of the horizon. A throng strange in one respect assembled here; no favored race of men monopolized the honors of the day, for the negro, hitherto enslaved and degraded, found place in both civic procession and military escort, which attended the ceremony. Lincoln's brief inaugural address, delivered before taking the oath which Chase, the new Chief Justice, administered to him, proved his last great message to his fellow-countrymen; and its language will be remembered while America has a literature.

"With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan — to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among our-

selves, and with all nations.”¹ These were the words of a President whose heart throbbed with tenderness and compassion, while pressing to its just conclusion a war whose present magnitude and duration, or whose revolutionary outcome, not one member of his administration had expected. Once before, on the 19th of November, 1864, at the consecration of a soldiers’ cemetery on the field of Gettysburg, Lincoln, in an address equally brief, had given to the world a masterpiece of pathetic expression, whose final phrase remains to this day a bosom-text of democracy.²

The assemblage on this 4th of March, we may remark, was a large one, and the inaugural ceremonies were brief. Andrew Johnson had already been installed as Vice-President in the Senate Chamber, at noon and before the President arrived. The balmy and genial day of Lincoln’s first induction contrasted with the present; for there had been incessant rain for two days, and the skies were still dark and angry during the forenoon; yet the sun came out while the man of the people spoke, and all was halcyon and radiant by evening. The former day, observed a Northern journal, “was the exordium of the great struggle; the latter, we fervently believe, proves its peroration.” After the procession had returned from Capitol Hill, some fifteen thousand people called at the White House to pay their official respects.³

Abraham Lincoln, as he stood on the threshold of a new administration, was filled with heartfelt gratitude for the confidence reposed in him by the whole loyal people of the

¹ 10 N. & H. c. 7.

² 8 N. & H. c. 7. The final sentence of this familiar Gettysburg oration urges a new dedication to the great task remaining: “that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain — that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom — and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.” The gifted Everett, who was the chosen orator of the occasion, gracefully acknowledged, afterwards, that in two minutes the President touched the chord of the occasion more deeply than he himself had done in two hours. *Ib.* 202. And see *Am. Cycl.* 1865, 710.

³ *New York Tribune.* And see *Am. Cycl.* 1865, 797.

Union, and, with mingled awe and gladness for the grandeur of a task in which he must have felt himself, by this time, God's chosen instrument. That task, he saw, now rounded to a successful completion, through the waning of insurrection, as the signs unmistakably pointed. Vindictiveness was no component in his nature; but seemingly secure, in the new tenure of a four years' leadership, his chief thought towards the misguided South was to shorten, by generous conciliation, the space yet to be trodden by bloody feet. He took no concern in passing this proud and intelligent people of his own flesh and blood under the yoke, except for assuring to the world the just fruits of final victory in the entire supremacy of the United States government, and in humane treatment of the race newly unshackled.

Returning to Washington from the conference at Hampton Roads,¹ magnanimous and tender, and aware, no doubt, of the undercurrent of anxiety which the Southern commissioners betrayed in their conversation, that these ravages of war should come to a speedy end, Lincoln con-
voked his Cabinet on the evening of February 5th, February. and read to them the draft of a message he had written to Congress during the day. It proposed tendering \$400,000,000 for distribution in the slave section (including States still rebellious), by way of indemnity for the loss of slave property, on condition that all resistance to national authority should promptly cease, and the new constitutional amendment which abolished slavery find voluntary acceptance. Upon such a basis he proposed pardoning all political offences and recommending to Congress a like liberality on other points. But political prudence forbade such an overture, and, upon the unanimous disapproval of his Cabinet, Lincoln sadly laid the document aside; and, leaving his first liberal impulse unrevealed, he officially reported to the House, on the 10th, in answer to its request for information, that the conference at Hampton Roads had "ended without result."² When, on the 8th of this same month, the two Houses of Congress met in joint convention to count the

¹ *Supra*, p. 537.

² 10 N. & H. c. 7.

electoral votes, Vice-President Hamlin, as chairman of that convention, declined to present the returns sent in from the supposed States of Louisiana and Tennessee; and no discussion arising, since those returns could not possibly have changed the general result, only certificates from the loyal States were counted.¹ This course conformed to a joint resolution of the same date, which declared that the condition was such in certain States on the previous 8th of November, that no valid election of Presidential electors was possible on that day.²

Duly installed for his second term, President Lincoln retained all former members of his Cabinet as the list then stood; Seward and Welles being the only original incumbents of his former administration still in office. On March 8th, in consequence of mutual explanations which

March.

had taken place between the governments of the United States and Great Britain, an order was rescinded which required passports from all persons entering the United States from Canada.³ On the 11th issued, in compliance with an act of Congress, an Executive proclamation requiring all absentees from the army or navy to return to duty within sixty days, or forfeit their rights and privileges as citizens. On the 14th, provost marshals were ordered to arrest all engaged in holding intercourse or trade with the insurgents, if citizens or domiciled aliens; and, furthermore, all non-residents and foreigners tarrying twelve days who had engaged in violating the blockade of Southern ports.⁴

The Confederate government was already in its death throes. The immense depreciation in its treasury notes,

¹ *Ib.*

² Observe the softening of phraseology from its first allegation that all the States named were "in armed rebellion" on the 8th of November. 10 N. & H. c. 7; 13 U. S. Stats. 567.

³ That order had been issued in the past December, because of the St. Albans and other raids over the border, and the facility with which hostile invaders of the United States escaped punishment. *Am. Cycl.* 1865, 797; *supra*, p. 521. ⁴ *Am. Cycl.* 1865, 797; 13 U. S. Stats. Appx.

now sinking lower and lower in intrinsic worth and purchasing power, was the necessary consequence of their redundancy and the hopelessness felt that they would ever be redeemed. But the latter element of discredit predominated, for George A. Trenholm, who, in June, 1864, succeeded Memminger as Secretary of the Treasury, did all that was possible to check inflation, and incurred reproach for doing so. When, by December, 1863, this floating currency amounted to over \$600,000,000, or more than threefold the amount required by the business of the South, the Richmond Congress, at Davis's instigation, passed a law for its compulsory reduction, a new issue, to the extent of two-thirds the sum received under its provisions, being permitted in its stead. That new limit had been nearly reached by the middle of the present March, and President Davis, in a complaining message, announced that the Confederate government could not purchase the needful supplies for its army. He proposed impressing and seizing such supplies, if private owners would not sell them on credit; also that a standard of market prices be fixed. There was no market price, he alleged; but extravagant and speculative rates — the result of a general disbelief that the Confederacy would ever redeem its promises in coin.¹ The Treasury report of November, 1864, reckoned the entire debt of the Confederate States, domestic and foreign, at upward of one and a half billion dollars, with six dollars in hard specie worth a six per cent bond of a hundred dollars; and each later month must have made estimates less favorable.²

The last session ever held by the Confederate legislature, began at Richmond on the 7th of November and ended, somewhat in turbulence and panic, on the 18th of March.

¹ Under the Confederate act of February, 1864, one of whose features was a tax levied upon the circulation of outstanding currency, the estimate of the amount funded was placed at \$230,000,000 by July 1st following. Davis, 123. The original plan, adopted in July, 1861, had been to issue Treasury notes, convertible at the pleasure of the holder in long bonds with interest payable in coin. But as these bonds fell into discredit, such a check upon the over-issue of notes had ceased to operate. Ib. 122.

² 30 *Harper*, 257, 802.

Excluding the States represented that belonged in no actual sense to the insurgent government, scarcely half the members of that body were present at any time. And, as usually happens when affairs go headlong, re-
1864, November-1865, March. crimination between the responsible authorities was incessant, each branch of government seeking to throw blame upon the other. This second Congress, whose predecessor had been so subservient to Davis's will as to have earned the contempt of the Southern people, betrayed a different style of imbecility. It wrangled with the Executive, and within itself, vamping in vituperation, but moving neither forward nor backward. Not until March had far advanced did it act positively upon measures of taxation, and a division of opinion upon the policy of armed resistance hindered all efficiency.¹ As disaster followed disaster, announced by a despondent press from the seat of war, government lost steadily in the public confidence and respect. Congress made issue, consequently, against the administration, which did persistently its best to save the Southern cause from perdition. The eager anxiety shown by some of its members to make peace with the United States on whatever terms, invited the accusing charge from others that they were traitors and miscreants. On the 19th of January, by joint resolution, this discontented body, in aid of the Virginia legislature, forced President Davis to appoint Lee general-in-chief of the Southern army; a proceeding whose real animus was to rebuke the former for his military intermeddling. But a more bitter humiliation, as the sequel of this act, which Southern opinion compelled, was the reinstatement of Joseph E. Johnston, towards the close of February, to command whatever remnants of an army might be available to resist Sherman's rapid march from the West and South. The Virginia delegation at Richmond voted its want of confidence in the present conduct of the war; and Seddon, deeming his honor impugned, and not unwilling to gain relief from his hopeless task, resigned, late in January, the portfolio of war. For the

¹ Am. Cycl. 1865, 194.

few weeks of futile struggle remaining, General John C. Breckinridge gave to that Cabinet post the last prestige of a fame once national. This session closed in March with a censorious message from the Confederate President, which elicited a censorious reply.¹

Congress was not the only enemy within the gate that President Davis had to confront, though to its ill-will must be laid, in some sort, his loss of executive influence and, with it, the power to save. Other States of the Confederacy complained that they were sacrificed to save Virginia. Governor Brown of Georgia, with whom there had been a bitter feud since Atlanta fell, made a fierce attack upon the Richmond Executive in a message to the legislature of that State, and his official correspondence showed little color of allegiance. The feeling in North Carolina towards the Confederate government was scarcely better. Disaffection was rife at Richmond in official circles.² Meanwhile the Southern people, losing confidence in their distracted government, lost confidence in themselves and in the cause of Southern independence. From the extremities to the heart of the Confederacy was felt a benumbing sense, sure symptom that the end was near.

Warnings of disintegration came daily from the army — for that most efficient prop of revolution was also failing. It was hard replenishing the ranks, as Davis had, months before, admitted, in the speeches of his Western tour following the fall of Atlanta. "If one-half of the men now absent from the field would return to duty," he then assured his hearers, "we can defeat the enemy." The situation since then had grown immeasurably worse. Thousands and tens of thousands had deserted from the ranks of the soldiery; the men were mostly at home, taking little trouble to conceal themselves; yet laws with heavy penalties required them to be sent back. In truth, the local sentiment forbade returning or punishing them. White conscription had been

¹ 10 N. & H. c. 8; Am. Cycl. 1865, 188; 30 *Harp.* 802.

² 10 N. & H. c. 8; Pollard's *Lost Cause*, 653; De Leon, c.

stretched to the last limit it would bear.¹ In these latest weeks, even government clerks who could be spared were sent to the front, and women, together with males aged or disabled, took their places. Men who could not possibly be spared by the civil authorities were drilled, mustered into service, and organized for local defence, so as in effect to become regular soldiers detailed on special duty. Whenever the wild notes of Richmond's alarm bell pealed forth upon the startled air, these home guards would throw down pen, hammer, or butcher-knife, and, seizing their muskets, hasten to the rendezvous. But supplies of war material, of clothing and of arms, were almost as scarce as men; for the incessant drain had to be resupplied from factories almost paralyzed by financial derangement and the imperative conscription of their workmen. Old supplies of iron, coal, and ore had been worked out, and to find or utilize new material required skilled labor not available. Blockade forbade all goods or materials from abroad, while Sherman's capture of Atlanta, and the devastating march that followed, closed out cornfields and workshops in the interior of the South, indispensable for the needs of the public, and once held securely.²

Now that the agony of Confederate dissolution had begun, and the voracity of the Richmond government, in pangs of distress, was hindered by sheer want of power to do as purposed, it is curious to note how our Northern policy towards the negro, once furiously denounced, made converts here through necessity. The value of slave property was already disappearing, and one might hire a negro of his nominal owner at the bare cost of food and lodging. The Confederacy itself, still professing to respect a master's chattel ownership, had made much military use of slave labor, with promises of indemnity which it was too bankrupt to ever make good. By February, 1864, all free male negroes be-

¹ Am. Cycl. 1865, 188. The Confederate act of February, 1864, required that all white men between 18 and 45 should be in the military service, "for the war," and that all then in service of the same age and class should be retained during such period. Davis, 124.

² De Leon, 318.

tween the ages of eighteen and fifty were made liable to perform duties with the army, the hospitals, or in connection with defensive and manufacturing works. For similar service the Confederate Secretary of War was authorized to employ any number of negro slaves not exceeding twenty thousand.¹ This latter act gave less important aid than anticipated, but it brought before the vision of Southern people the issue of employing negroes as soldiers. It seemed the mockery of fate that this fight for Southern independence should go on, regardless of all amnesty offers, with the essential principle of protection to the peculiar institution wormed out of the cause. Yet the Union government, almost before the eyes of insurrection, had recruited from among black runaways and made of them good military men. Hence many unblinded leaders of this section, casting consistency to the winds, urged that caste and color be laid aside in so dire an extremity. The new pressure of opinion was felt by President Davis, who, in his opening message to the new Confederate Congress, avowed himself ready for such a policy whenever subjugation by the North became the sole alternative. Events each week confirmed him in that direction, and he urged, privately, the members of that body to pass an act for enrolling negroes as soldiers. Lee, when summoned before a committee at Richmond, and afterward in a public letter, gave his voice emphatically for such legislation. After much discussion a bill passed the Confederate House, which authorized the President to accept from their owners negroes in such number as he might deem expedient; but pride and prejudice were strong, and by a single vote this measure failed in the Senate. At length, Virginia senators, personally hostile to the policy, changed their votes upon the instruction of their State legislature, and the bill finally passed, in March, with an amendment which limited the percentage to be drawn from the able-bodied slave population. Such as it was, however, the measure came too late to be of any genuine effect; for the fall of Richmond was

¹ Davis, 124.

near at hand, and the Southern cause lost, by the time the Confederate States stood on the brink of this new experiment.¹ Whether military service by the slave should earn or not his social ransom, was a point unsettled in that singular proposal, and, perhaps, was left purposely so. The world should lastingly remember that the Southern negro made no effort, in this era, to regain his natural freedom by massacre or violence, even where only women and children and other exempts of the master race remained at home to rule him. Yet the instinct of liberty is found among even the tamest animals of the brute creation; and where fastenings are not secure and marauders throw open the stable doors, ownership must be precarious.

When death and destruction impend, and are not yet present in plain sight, men and women do not altogether betake themselves to prayer and supplication, with wringing of the hands; but, rather, to forget their approaching misery, they plunge into pleasure and even into wild and extravagant dissipation. To trust the Richmond orators and their graphic picturing, the subjugation of the South, and a forced restoration of the Union, foreboded horrors scarcely less than Jerusalem endured at the hands of Rome's pagan legionaries; and while men and means combined for a last prodigious resistance, youth seized the eager day for frenzied delight, reckless of the morrow's bitterness. Southern annalists relate that, besides the gilded saloon, with drink, good suppers, and the rattle of the dice-box, to allure to sensual pleasure, Richmond indulged strange gayeties in the fashionable set. There alone could rebellious resistance still walk erect, and, with hard fighting suspended for the winter about Richmond and Petersburg, young officers would come into town on leave, for a few days at a time, worn and tired with camp life and famishing for social pleasure. Others lashed in and out on horseback from the lines, ten miles or less distant, to have an evening's dance and frolic. Through the new *deux temps* and

¹ 10 N. & H. 154; 6 ib. 487; Davis, 125; 30 *Harper*, 251, 669, 803; *Am. Cycl.* 1864, 697; ib. 1865, 717; *supra*, p. 407.

the German, just coming into vogue, both sexes whirled with delight; the young maidens of Richmond ready as ever to aid and comfort the soldiers, not with needle, lint, and bandage alone, but in plans for mutual enjoyment. "Starvation parties," so called, at which all refreshments were forbidden save for the James River water served up in queer and homely drinking-cups, vied with tableaux, concerts, and amateur theatricals for entertainment; while for dance music the old negro fiddler was called in, or some now impecunious belle swept with her fair fingers the keyboard of a family piano which sadly needed tuning. It was almost like the dance of death, enjoyed to-night with the recklessness of long restraint, and ending with the waved farewell, as the young officer vaulted into his saddle under the bright moonlight and rode back to camp, joyous and glowing; perchance on that very night to be shot by a bullet in some picket skirmish and to be borne back in a country cart, the next day, a lifeless corpse. Upon that strange contiguity of gay waltz and the heavy rumble of ambulance and death-cart, Southern writers have moralized; and it manifested the peculiar and abnormal social condition which prevails where gathering gloom is irradiated by forced and fitful rays of pleasure.¹

Before entering upon the narrative of the last military movements of the war, let us recite one or two special operations, which properly preceded. With New Orleans and Mobile in full Union control, and Charleston closely besieged, the ports of Wilmington and Savannah remained the only hopeful means of communication with the outer world through the exploits of blockade running. Sherman had captured Savannah near the close of December;² and it was in the course of that same month, and while Sherman's approach was eagerly awaited by the Union fleet at the entrance to that port, that a combined expedition of naval and military forces sailed from Hampton Roads

¹ See De Leon, c. 37.

² *Supra*, p. 553.

against Wilmington, to gain that harbor also, and reduce its chief defence, Fort Fisher. Porter, now a rear-admiral,

1864. took charge of the naval vessels, which, gathering at Hampton Roads, surpassed in numbers and equipment all others of an earlier date. For commanding the troops, a force of over 6000 having been promised, Gillmore was desired by the President; but that capable officer falling under Grant's displeasure, General Godfrey Weitzel was substituted, who, after a thorough reconnoissance in September, reported Fort Fisher a formidable work. The expedition remained for weeks in abeyance, when Butler, at Fortress Monroe, conceived the idea of exploding a huge mass of gunpowder in front of the fort, which he hoped would produce such momentary injury and confusion that an easy capture would follow. The plan meeting favor, a large boat of little value was selected and laden with 235 tons of powder for the experiment. The joint expedition left Hampton Roads near the middle of December, under unpromising auspices; for neither Weitzel, nor Butler, his superior, was on good terms with Admiral Porter, while Butler took an unexpected advantage of the orders transmitted to him by going in person to reap the expected renown. The powder-boat was towed to its place near the beach, four hundred yards from the fort, on the night of the 23d, by brave volunteers of the navy, the fuse was lighted, and the whole fleet waited breathlessly at a distance to watch the result. There was little or no concussion felt on ship or shore; possibly the ignition was imperfect, for there followed a blaze on the horizon, a dull detonation, and nothing more.¹ By Christmas Day, under cover of a heavy but not destructive fire from Porter's fleet, troops were landed and pushed close to the parapet of Fort Fisher, when Butler and Weitzel agreed that the work could not be carried by assault. Hereupon, against Grant's explicit orders,² Butler chose to abandon the enterprise, and, order-

¹ 10 N. & H. c. 3. The troops in Fort Fisher supposed it to be the bursting of a boiler in one of the Yankee gunboats. 2 Grant, 391.

² That the troops when landed safely should remain and intrench for a siege, if the work did not fall at once.

ing his land force to reëmbark, returned to Fortress Monroe. Upon a report of his ill-success, made in early January, Grant made indorsement that he had never in-^{1865,} tended Butler should go with the expedition, and, ^{January.} relieving that officer from command, he ordered him home to Massachusetts.¹ This closed the military career of a general conspicuous in civil life many years longer.

Our President was deeply disappointed over the present failure, and, with Porter and Grant both eager to renew the attack on Fort Fisher under other auspices, the former was directed to hold his position with his fleet, while the latter sent General Alfred H. Terry to command the land forces, whose number was somewhat increased.² Terry sailed with his transports from Chesapeake Bay on the 6th of January, and, after some delays caused by a heavy storm, landed at Fort Fisher on the 13th. The navy resumed its attack; Porter's ironclads at close range opening first, so as to draw the fire from the fort and ascertain the position of its guns, after which the shots were delivered thick and fast from the whole armada. Very soon the guns of the fort were silenced by this concentrated fire, and the work on shore became comparatively easy. In a joint attack, arranged for the afternoon of the 15th, Curtis, of Adelbert Ames's division, led towards the land face, while a naval detachment, armed with pistols and cutlasses, undertook to attack the bastion at the sea-angle at the same time. The latter attempt failed, but it served to divert the foe's attention while Terry's troops poured over the parapet and gained the inside of the work. There the labor was unexpectedly severe, owing to a system of bomb-proof traverses which made Fort Fisher resemble a dozen small forts enclosed by a large one. With one traverse won by a fight and then another, the whole place was finally carried, late in the evening, Porter's fleet keeping up a continuous fire all the while, informed by signals whither to direct its shots. It was a well-won victory, not gained without heavy loss; and

¹ 10 N. & H. c. 3; 2 Grant, 393.

² Terry had nearly 8000 effectives in all. 4 B. & L. 661.

during the next succeeding nights smaller Confederate works near by were blown up and abandoned. Fort Fisher, massive with bomb-proofs made since 1862, was the largest earthwork in the whole South, its heavy timbers being covered with sand and sodded with turf. Terry received a merited promotion for his gallant and successful exploit.¹

This capture of Fort Fisher closed the last Southern gateway by ocean to the outer world, and blockade-running came utterly to an end. Lee had sent word to Colonel Lamb, the gallant defender of this important work, that it must be held, or he could not subsist his own army.² For proof that it was difficult to maintain here a vigilant watch, two English blockade-runners, shortly after the place had fallen, worked their way at night through the whole Union fleet, unobserved, and, on signalling, were made prizes.³ This illicit Southern commerce during the war, though highly hazardous, offered to speculating adventurers the chance of enormous profit, for it was carried on as a barter of needful supplies for cotton, which, purchased in Wilmington at eight cents a pound, could be sold in Liverpool at two shillings—a margin of profit which enabled three successful voyages to pay a vessel's whole cost. Yet the blockade of this war was one of the most effective ever known, and particularly during the last six months, when three cordons of Union ships were drawn about each blockaded port.⁴

As for the Confederate navy, so called, the famous duel of the *Kearsarge* and *Alabama*, just outside of Cherbourg harbor on the coast of France, ended the depredations so long committed upon American commerce under the pre-

¹ The number of Confederate prisoners captured here was 2083 ; and about 700, besides, were killed or wounded. The Union loss was about 955 in killed, wounded, and missing. 2 Grant, 398 ; 4 B. & L. 642-661.

² 4 B. & L. 642.

³ 2 Grant, 388.

⁴ Soley, 94, 156 ; 4 B. & L. 655. As blockade-running became difficult, ladies of the South learned to make their own clothes from products of the soil, and provided various substitutes for tea, coffee, illuminating oil, and other necessities. 9 N. & H. 223.

tentious blind of belligerent cruising. When, in 1864, the *Alabama* went to Cherbourg for supplies, Captain John A. Winslow, of the *Kearsarge*, hastened from Flushing and steamed outside without anchoring or entering, an act which Semmes and the French officers of the port accepted as a virtual challenge. On the 19th of June, accordingly, Semmes brought out the *Alabama* to engage his ^{1864,} Union adversary, and the fight took place before ^{June.} Cherbourg harbor, at a point seven miles from the coast, where no controversy of jurisdiction could arise with the French authorities, whose ironclad was near at hand to keep peace within the marine league. The two contending vessels were not unequally matched, since the *Alabama* was somewhat larger than the *Kearsarge* and carried one more gun, while the latter vessel was in better condition and had a superior crew. The *Alabama* sheered as the *Kearsarge* turned upon her, so that the two vessels, under full steam, fell into a circling track, which they maintained while the action lasted.

The fight thus begun, neither adversary could withdraw from the other, and Winslow, intent upon destroying so that there should be no possible escape to French waters, held Semmes close and delivered his fire steadily at a good aim, while the latter's shot, though twice as rapid, went wildly. At last, upon the seventh rotation, the *Alabama* presented her port broadside in attempting to take flight to Cherbourg, and the *Kearsarge*, taking full advantage, poured into the hull a raking fire so destructive, that in a few moments a white flag fluttered, and, less than half an hour later, the *Alabama* went down by the stern, and was swallowed up in the waves.¹ But while Winslow lowered his boats an English steam yacht, the *Deerhound*, which had come out from Cherbourg to witness the fight, rescued Semmes, with most of his officers and men, and conveyed them safely and

¹ 9 N. & H. c. 6; 4 B. & L. 615, etc. Winslow received the thanks of Congress and became presently a rear-admiral. Semmes was welcomed with enthusiasm in England by clubs and journalists friendly to the Confederate cause.

speedily beyond reach, to the shore of England. Winslow had, with humane impulse, hailed this vessel to assist him in saving the lives of his legitimate prisoners, but the yachtsmen showed a sympathetic purpose quite unexpected.

A final naval exploit of this war, and one of the most signal for personal adventure, was the destruction of the Confederate ram *Albemarle* by Lieutenant William B. Cushing. This occurred off Plymouth on the North
October. Carolina coast, in October. The *Albemarle*, with her ram and iron armor, had gained great fame in two encounters with the Union fleet in this vicinity; and Cushing, a youth scarcely turned of majority, destroyed her on the night of the 27th, by approaching in a light launch with a torpedo at the end of a spar, which, by a skilful contrivance, he attached to the hull of the hostile vessel with a line held in the hand. Such marvellous coolness in the midst of extreme peril has been rarely witnessed. Not a nerve nor a muscle of his arm lost its steadiness, though he steered in front of a 100-pound cannon to perform his work, and was under a hot fire of musketry from ship and shore, which caused bullets to pass through his clothing. Finally, when his launch was captured, with crew and companions on board, some of whom had been wounded, he jumped into the cold river, after divesting himself of his clothes, and saved his own life and freedom by swimming to the shore and concealing himself in a swamp from the enemy. Hailing his fleet once more, after another day's exciting adventure, Cushing was received on board the flagship as one risen from the dead; and for his successful act of gallantry he was suitably promoted.¹

¹ For the thrilling details of this exploit see 10 N. & H. c. 2; 4 B. & L. 625-641. Except that the hero here escaped, uncaptured, there seems something of a parallel between Cushing's exploit and that of young Hobson of our Navy in the recent (1898) war with Spain.

SECTION II.

DOWNFALL OF THE CONFEDERACY.

Sherman, active and untiring whenever he found a military advantage to pursue, began from Savannah, on the 1st day of February, his northward campaign of the Carolinas. His two wings were commanded respectively by Howard and Slocum, and the present movement properly prolonged the march he had made through Georgia, with the same intent of laying waste the country by foraging for subsistence and destroying rebellious munitions. His actual strength for the new enterprise was about 60,000 and his wagon trains carried an ample supply of ammunition, besides the forage and provision needful for a start.¹

The grand object of the expedition was to reach the vicinity of Grant's main army and coöperate against Richmond from the rear. To this end Sherman meant, in a continuous campaign, to reach Goldsboro, in the State of North Carolina, an important railroad junction 425 miles distant, in the interior. Against that point a futile expedition from New Berne had moved in 1862. Confederate armies now occupied intermediate points of the march, fairly capable of defending, but powerless against such a compact host of veterans in any open field. In fact, little fighting occurred on the way except for the forces of nature, which were found formidable enough at that early season of the year. Roads which had become quagmires of mud had to be corduroyed, layer upon layer; swollen streams and expansive swamps needed to be bridged; and through a country whose topography was almost unknown, the invaders were forced to grope their way, the advance guard not unfrequently wading through water waist-deep. Indeed, this whole march was one of the most remarkable on record, and amazing, it would seem, in having been undertaken before the winter's floods subsided, and with five wide

¹ 2 Sherman, c. 23.

rivers to cross. It was "bridging chaos for hundreds of miles," said General Cox, of this expedition; and Sherman himself, on the retrospect, considered it in relative importance to his previous march through Georgia, as ten to one.¹

By making feints skilfully to the left and right, Sherman produced the impression that both Charleston and Augusta were threatened, while, in fact, he marched almost unopposed to Columbia, in the very heart of South Carolina. Charleston, being turned by these tactics, fell like ripe fruit, on the 18th of February, into the hands of Dahlgren and Gillmore, who had so long been operating imperfectly against it from the water front. No organized resistance was offered at South Carolina's State capital to the invading column — both Beauregard and Wade Hampton had made headquarters there, but they had not the means of opposing; and Sherman, on the 17th of February, entered Columbia over a pontoon bridge. That night a great part of the town was destroyed by a fire, ignited probably by the flames of cotton bales which the Confederate troops had set on fire when retreating. The wind was high, and, in spite of all Sherman's efforts to check a conflagration which started before his arrival, the damage done was very great. Foundries and the State arsenal, to be sure, were destroyed under Sherman's own order; but secession's historical birthplace suffered a retribution far heavier than he had intended. Leaving Columbia on the 20th, Sherman's column resumed its northward progress, with the Great Pedee River as the next objective. On this river, at Cheraw, Hardee, after evacuating Charleston, had established himself; but, flanking him out of his works, Sherman secured that town, destroyed most of the large military stores collected there, and crossed the Great Pedee on the 6th of March. His whole army next marched for Fayetteville, North Carolina, as the last stage short of its final destination.

Satisfied from signs upon the way that Wilmington had now fallen, Sherman sent messengers down the Cape Fear River, on the 8th of March, requesting Schofield to join

¹ 2 Sherman, 221 ; 10 N. & H. c. 12.

him presently at Goldsboro. The latter general had, since the battle of Nashville, been detached from Thomas's department, with the 23d corps, for this ultimate purpose. As department commander of North Carolina, Schofield's first duty was to take Wilmington after the fall of Fort Fisher; and this he accomplished on the 22d of February, with his western troops added to Terry's command, by turning the position held by the Confederate General Hoke, forcing the latter to evacuate, and gaining thus an unopposed entry into the town.¹ In this success the navy bore a distinguished part, as at Fort Fisher. Hence at Fayetteville, by March 12th, Sherman received favorable despatches by a river tugboat, and definitely arranged that the desired junction with Schofield should be made about ten days later; after which, with his whole column moved over Cape Fear River on the 15th, the march recommenced for Goldsboro.²

At Goldsboro railroads from the coast to the Tennessee mountains crossed each other, and the place was of great strategical consequence. Here, however, Sherman encountered his old adversary, the subtle Johnston, who, under Lee's new and comprehensive order, had begun opposing Sherman and Schofield separately to the utmost, in a department liberally bounded.³ His force, though quite inadequate for this important purpose, numbered about 30,000, a portion of which he bestowed upon Bragg to oppose Schofield southward, while with the rest he sought to hinder Sherman's impetuous progress. Twice, therefore, did Sherman, on this last stage of the march, encounter his former foe; at Averysboro, on the 16th of March, and again at Bentonville, on the 19th. At the latter place, Johnston concentrated nearly his whole army and made a fight stubborn enough to hold Slocum in check; but Sherman, overestimating the enemy's strength, avoided, cautiously, a

¹ 10 N. & H. 69; 2 Sherman, c. 23; 4 B. & L. 683-695.

² *Ib.*

³ See Lee's orders sent him, February 23d, when made general-in-chief. Hughes, 261.

general battle, and gave up a strong position which had been gained for cutting off Johnston's retreat. Letting go the prey that he might probably have destroyed, he hurried his march, and rode into Goldsboro at the head of his column, on the 23d of the month, finding that Schofield had arrived shortly before him.¹

Schofield, it appears, had made New Berne his base for the present junction. His advance, while occupied under Cox in repairing the railroad from that town to Goldsboro, was attacked midway by Bragg, on the 8th of March, at Kinston; a partial success cheered the Confederates, but Bragg was repulsed on the following day and retired through Goldsboro to unite with Johnston. Schofield occupied Kinston in force, on the 14th, and opened communication below with New Berne, by the Neuse River, while Terry, who was moving upon Goldsboro directly from Wilmington, secured the crossing south of that town, which Schofield occupied at length, on the 21st.² With the victorious Union armies here united, and his own command increased to about 80,000 effectives, all in superb condition, healthy and cheerful, Sherman, at Goldsboro, now gave his mind to the final operations about Richmond, which would presently close the war. Hoping to share in these important movements by a combination with Grant, and fearing nothing just now from Johnston's inferior force, he proceeded in person, by rail, to New Berne and Morehead City, and thence took a steamer to City Point. There, where military interests centred, he held close conference with Grant, submitting his plans for a combination; and there, too, he met the President himself, for the last time in life. He returned to his command, assured that Richmond would soon be captured, and expecting, besides, that the last battle of this war would be fought in North Carolina, with his own coöperation.³

¹ 2 Sherman, c. 24; 10 N. & H. c. 12; 4 B. & L. 698-700.

² 10 N. & H. 70.

³ 2 Sherman, 307-327 (March 25-28); 10 N. & H. 165; 4 B. & L. 698, etc.

At the same time that the armies of Sherman and Schofield joined at Goldsboro, two well-equipped cavalry expeditions moved east and south from Thomas's department in Tennessee: the one, under James H. Wilson, to overrun Alabama, and the other, under Stoneman, to cut off Lee's last possible avenue of escape into the mountainous region bordering Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee. Stoneman had, during early winter, swept eastern Tennessee clear of hostile forces; and now, on the 22d of March, he started eastward towards Lynchburg, destroying that important depot of Confederate supplies in ^{March-}April. Virginia, and tearing up railway tracks; thence pushing southward, on the memorable 9th of April, he captured Salisbury, in North Carolina, with its large military magazines, three days later. The cavalry raid of Wilson into Alabama, which began March 23d, pursued with rapid columns right and left a like devastating course; he fought and dispersed Forrest's last available force near Selma, and, on the 2d of April, closed in upon that place, whose great arsenal for arms and stores of every kind he ruthlessly destroyed.¹

In support of Sherman's northward march, and so as to keep Confederate troops at the westward from hindering him, Grant had ordered Canby, Sheridan, and Thomas to lay waste the railroads and military stores of insurrection in various directions. On the 18th of January he directed Canby, whose headquarters were at New Orleans, to move rapidly against Mobile, Montgomery, and Selma, with that special end in view; but it was not until March that Canby commenced aggressive operations, which took the ^{January-}shape rather of a joint military and naval expedi- ^{March.}tion, for the reduction of Mobile. Sheridan, in February, while in the Shenandoah Valley, was ordered to push forward to Lynchburg with his cavalry as soon as the weather would permit.²

¹ 10 N. & H. 237-240.

² 10 N. & H. c. 10; 2 Grant, 408-410.

Our narrative now turns to Grant and the Army of the Potomac, quartered in huts through the winter on the bank of the James. The harbor of City Point was full of war and merchant vessels, and its wharves and warehouses wore a busy aspect. Lee's army was visibly doomed, and the main anxiety of our general-in-chief was to prevent his escape, when Richmond should fall. Johnston, who now confronted Sherman in North Carolina, had an army one-fourth or less in size, and much demoralized. Lee's forces in Virginia would have outnumbered Sherman's, but Grant held him with an army still superior, while Sherman, as already reënforced, could have held at bay the two Confederate armies together for an indefinite period. And more than this, if Lee escaped Grant, the latter would be on his heels, and Lee and Johnston would both have been prostrated in a single blow whenever attempting a forcible stand. Both Grant and Sherman, while conferring at City Point, believed that one or the other of them would have to fight one more bloody battle, which battle, nevertheless, would be the last.¹ Grant's own winter had passed in comparative inaction, but with a growing dread all the while lest Lee's army should steal away from before Petersburg and escape southward, to elude a battle and prolong the war indefinitely; for Grant felt convinced, like his adversary, that Richmond must soon be evacuated, and that only the pride and moral prestige of holding its chosen capital had kept the Confederate government there so long. Desertions were depleting the Confederate army everywhere, a sure sign that the men who had fought so long and so gallantly for the cause they believed in had lost all heart in its final triumph.² But impatient as our Union commander felt to start his spring campaign and close the war, he was

¹ 2 Grant, 419; 2 Sherman, 326.

² Grant estimated that while his enemy could get practically no more recruits, at least a regiment a day was lost by desertions alone. 2 Grant, 426. President Davis, about February 11th, offered a last pardon to all deserters returning within twenty days. *Am. Cycl.* 1865, 193.

hindered by the impassable condition of the roads, and, until Sheridan should return, by the want of sufficient cavalry.

Sheridan, while working down the Virginia Valley, met Early between Staunton and Charlottesville, on the 5th of March; and, defeating him utterly, he captured almost the entire command, Early himself barely escaping.

The exultant news of this victory was heralded in ^{March.} the same Northern journals that reported the ceremonies of the new inauguration. By the 12th Sheridan turned eastward, unable to go to Lynchburg, as Grant had wished, because the rivers were swollen by heavy rains; but moving quickly across the South and North Anna rivers, he reached White House on the 19th, where supplies had been kept open for him. He had over 10,000 cavalry, and moved with light equipment, carrying little else than ammunition and moderate rations. In the course of his rapid progress he tore up miles of railway and destroyed mills and factories.¹

Early in the present month Lee and President Davis had conferred together, and agreed in opinion that Richmond and Petersburg were no longer tenable, but must be relinquished as soon as weather and the condition of the roads permitted. Lee's next purpose was to reach Danville, form a junction with Johnston, and take the risks against Sherman, with Grant left behind. In aid of such an escape, and so as to secure a wider opening southward to the Danville road, Lee chose the night of the 24th of March for assaulting the right of Grant's lines about Petersburg, having assigned General John B. Gordon, with half of the entire army, to its execution. The point selected for making this assault was near Fort Stedman, where the Union lines were closest together. The attack was to be made at night, and Lee hoped, by breaking through the Union lines, to create a panic and gain higher ground in the rear. Grant, with accurate prescience, had long anticipated some such effort, and had issued orders to be ready. The Con-

¹ 2 Grant, c. 63.

federate assault was made with great spirit at early dawn of the 25th of March, and its initial success was due to a stratagem, on Gordon's part, in sending his guards forward, under cover of the night, to creep to the enemy's lines, as though deserters, and then overpower the Union pickets before a shot could be fired. For it seems that desertions from Lee's armies had become so common of late, over the picket line, that the "butternuts" approached often without a serious challenge, even when guns were in their hands. With Gordon's entrance forced thus successfully by a ruse, Fort Stedman and three Union batteries were taken, with their arms and defenders, before it was yet light enough to clearly distinguish friends from foes. Meade happened to be at City Point over night, and Parke, commanding in his place, prepared, with praiseworthy promptness, to drive the enemy back. By half-past seven he had his task well in hand. Two of the detached batteries were recaptured, and the Confederates were forced, with heavy loss, into Fort Stedman, upon which, the target of a sweeping artillery fire from different directions, Parke threw his surrounding line. Unable either to retreat or to gain assistance under this withering cross fire of artillery, Gordon's assailants were caught as in a trap, and fell captives. But this squandering of his best troops by two to one was not Lee's only loss, for Humphreys and Wright, who led on the Union left, succeeded in carrying his intrenched picket lines in front of them, which, in spite of repeated attempts to regain them, were firmly held, and gave Grant great advantage in the fight which followed the next week.¹

Grant, on the 24th, and indeed at the very time that Gordon was preparing his sortie, issued orders for the grand attack upon Lee, which was destined to end this war. Ord was moved from the north side of the James River to a position on the left; Weitzel was kept at Bermuda Hundred and that vicinity, while Parke confronted Peters-

¹ Gordon's attack cost Lee about 4000 men, and resulted in killing, wounding, or capturing half that number on the Union side. 2 Grant, 433; and see 10 N. & H. c. 8.

burg; Humphreys and Warren were to cross Hatcher's Run and extend their lines westward towards Five Forks, with the object of gaining a situation from which to strike the South Side and Danville railroads. Considerable fighting occurred in taking up this last-named position.¹ Sheridan reached City Point on the 25th of March, for consulting the general-in-chief; and Sherman arrived there the next day to submit a plan for coöperation, which Grant approved but events soon made superfluous.²

The iron energy of the lieutenant-general was plainly visible as the momentous movement commenced. He felt his solemn responsibility, and was only anxious that his vigilant foe should not by some means escape him. Grant had now a magnificent army in numbers, and more than twice that of the adversary. He meant this time to direct its movements in person, and take whatever advantage events might give him; but his mind was made up to push resistlessly to the end, to drive the enemy from Petersburg and Richmond, and finish the whole conflict of arms before he rested. Lee's extreme right was by this time at Five Forks, and Grant's purpose was to stretch his own lines westward towards that point and take quick advantage of any weakness discovered in the opposing line to break and throw that army into confusion. Sheridan, whose cavalry galloped to the extreme left, was his chief reliance; to him Grant gave free leave to move against Five Forks, and, upon reaching Lee's right and rear, to fight him if he came out of his intrenchments, otherwise to push to the Danville road, for its destruction; or else, in an emergency, to cut loose from this Army of the Potomac and, proceeding southward, get behind Johnston, who was guarding that road, and coöperate, from the rear, with Sherman. Sheridan was disappointed at his first literal instructions, not liking the possibility of separating from Grant's immediate army once more. He believed that the war was nearing its end, and wished to be in at the death; and hence he besought Grant to finish the work at once with this Army of the Potomac,

¹ 2 Grant, 435, 616.

² *Supra*, p. 584.

that so richly merited the honor, and had for so many months allowed the laurels of war to be gathered far away. "So much of your orders as require you to go to Sherman," responded his chief kindly, "are merely a blind for some contingency of failure not expected; and, in fact, I mean to close the war here, sending you no farther." Sheridan's face at once brightened, and his jubilant spirit encouraged Grant to hasten on, regardless of rains or heavy roads.¹

By night of March 29th the Union line was intact, with cavalry pushed up to Dinwiddie Court House, and the commands thence to the James held in due order by Sheridan, Warren, Humphreys, Ord, Wright, and Parke. Grant's blood was stirred, and, from his tent at Gravelly Creek, he wrote his young favorite: "I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going back. . . . In the morning push round the enemy, if you can, and get on to his right rear. . . . We will act all together as one army here until it is seen what can be done with the enemy."² From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell in such torrents that the roads were like quagmires, and it was impossible to move wagons forward without laying corduroy roads; but the army had grown so accustomed to such work that it was done quite rapidly. On the 30th Sheridan advanced from Dinwiddie Court House towards Five Forks, where he found the Confederate army in full force. For Lee, justly alarmed at Grant's threatening movements, had drawn all his available forces out of the trenches and made strenuous efforts to protect his indispensable railroads against the new approach. He sent Pickett with five brigades to reënforce Five Forks, and, after despatching cavalry under Fitz-Hugh Lee to hold that important cross-roads, took personal command of his remaining forces at White Oak Ridge. Grant, positive that this long line which now confronted him at every point from Richmond to Five Forks must be weak and penetrable in places, considering Lee's inferior numbers, resolved to extend his own line no farther, but to reënforce Sheridan with infantry, so that his

¹ 2 Grant, 437, 620; 2 Sheridan, 128.

² 2 Grant, 621.

subordinate might cut loose and turn Lee's right flank by assault.

On the morning of the 31st Warren was directed to get possession of the White Oak road, which he did, with assistance, after a partial repulse. Sheridan advanced and, with a portion of his cavalry, gained possession of the Five Forks; but against Pickett and Fitz-Hugh Lee combined he could not hold his ground. He fell back to Dinwiddie Court House, displaying great generalship, and fighting with pertinacity; deploying his cavalry on foot, with only mounted men enough to take charge of the horses, he compelled his foe to deploy slowly over a vast extent of wooded and broken country.¹ By nightfall he reported his situation to Grant in a cheerful and valiant tone, and Grant despatched Warren to his succor. Warren's troops had been marching and fighting pretty steadily for three days, but, after a few hours' needed rest, they reached Sheridan in early morning. Pickett had not waited to be caught between two Union columns, but, with Fitz-Hugh Lee and the whole Confederate detachment, withdrew noiselessly by midnight towards his strongly intrenched April. post at Five Forks. Grant, incensed against Warren because of Pickett's escape, and ignorant that it actually occurred before he could possibly have arrived, sent a message authorizing Sheridan to relieve that officer.²

The battle of Five Forks, which now followed, April 1st, in a true sense terminated this Civil War. Sheridan, at daybreak, hastened to the cross-roads with his cavalry, pressing the retreating Confederates on the way, and leaving Warren to bring up behind him his 5th corps by detachments. Never were the fire and inspiration of his personal gallantry better combined with a clear and rapid apprehension than on this eventful day. Putting spurs to his famous coal-black horse, "Rienzi," and equally restive to make a start, Sheridan repeated the tactics of his valley campaign, with the added prowess of cutting off his immediate opponent from Lee's main army. He fought brilliantly the

¹ 2 Grant, 622.

² 2 Grant, 443; 10 N. & H. 171; 4 B. & L. 713.

battle, almost as he had planned it, and by four in the afternoon assaulted and carried the enemy's lines, aided by the divisions of Ayres, Crawford, and Griffin of Warren's corps; while emulous cavalry, under Custer, Merritt, and others, skirmished all day at the westward. At a critical moment, while bullets hummed like bees, he rallied the column with a fury and vehemence founded upon the soundest apprehension; and, dashing from one point to another, waving colors, shaking his fist, swearing, praying, threatening, and animating with words that rang out like pistol shots, he gathered the faltering battalions together as one, and swept with them over the hostile breastworks. Nor was Warren wanting, that day, in deeds of personal valor while assisting in person on the right. He rode forward with the corps colors in his hand, when leading his troops across the field, and his horse was shot dead in the final charge. The dusk of evening descended upon a complete and signal victory on the Union side. Pickett was routed, his troops were seen flying in every direction; every man was driven from the field, except the killed and wounded; and prisoners taken, to the number of nearly six thousand, with guns and colors.¹ As the fight was ending, Sheridan sent Warren an order which relieved him of command, as Grant had suggested, and Griffin succeeded to his place.²

Lee's long line, which had been drawn out to a cobweb slenderness in various places, broke at the bold assault of Grant's superior forces the next day. The vigilance of Parke and Wright had already detected opposing points of weakness; and Grant, upon hearing of Sheridan's victory

¹ 10 N. & H. c. 8; 2 Grant, 446, 623; 4 B. & L. 713, 714, 723.

² Grant's smothered dislike of Warren broke out into an expression at this time which he afterwards regretted. The immediate cause of it was founded in a misapprehension of existing facts, but Grant had thought him dallying and dilatory on former occasions. Warren, though an able and devoted officer, had an unfortunate habit of discussing the orders sent him, and would suggest changes in plans and movements for his support. See 10 N. & H. 171; 2 Grant, 445. "As we had never been thrown much together," writes Sheridan of Warren, "I knew but little of him." 2 Sheridan, 168.

late in the evening, gave immediate orders for a strong onset to begin the next morning all along the front. Nervous lest Lee might wholly withdraw overnight and, by falling heavily upon Sheridan, drive him from position and open a retreat, he despatched Miles's division of Humphrey's corps specially to Sheridan's support, and kept up a bombardment over night. At the first glimmer of dawn, on April 2d, the general assault commenced, and was pursued along Grant's whole line with the fury of complete confidence. Wright, with his storming column, penetrated the Confederate array, sweeping everything before him towards Hatcher's Run, and capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners. He was closely followed on the left by part of Ord's command, until, by a complete junction, both forces swung about and closed against one side of Petersburg's strong outworks; Humphreys, after some other earnest work, joining them. Parke succeeded in carrying the outer line in his front, with large captures; but, at a strong interior line, Gordon resisted him. Upon reaching the Confederate lines close to Petersburg, a part of Gibbon's command, by a gallant charge, took two strong inclosed works, the most salient and commanding south of Petersburg, thus materially shortening the line of investment for that city. Miles, when sent back by Sheridan, who needed no assistance, overtook Southern soldiery on the retreat, with whom he had a sharp fight, until, threatened on their flanks by Meade and Sheridan, they fled down the road in precipitate disorder, leaving guns and prisoners behind.¹ All this was glory enough for the day; for many on the Union side had fought or marched the day before, and at Petersburg a fresh corps of Longstreet's confronted the assailants behind formidable works. Grant, expecting a speedy evacuation, ordered Sheridan upon Lee's line of flight, and gave his remaining army a little well-earned rest before resuming work on the morrow. Happy in the possession of so many prisoners, he had telegraphed to the President, who was stopping at City Point, how the work went from hour to hour.²

¹ 10 N. & H. c. 9; 2 Grant, 448, 623; 4 B. & L. 708, etc.

² Ib.

Lee seems to have been stunned, bewildered almost, by Sheridan's terrible blow at Five Forks of the day before. For Wright's bold attack, at early sunrise of the 2d, came so unexpected to him that squads of men in blue were seen down the road, and, in riding forward to ascertain what that strange apparition meant, his comrade, A. P. Hill, lost his life.¹ But the Southern general-in-chief soon recovered the easy composure that distinguished him, and prepared gracefully for the worst. In full new uniform, with the elegant sword by his side which he seldom wore, but which he had put on that morning, he watched from headquarters the formidable onset before which his attenuated lines were breaking like gossamer, and then, mounting his charger, rode slowly back to the rear. There his tattered veterans received him with loud cheering, as though to give assurance that there was fight in them yet; and there, too, he despatched that historic message to Richmond which counselled the evacuation of the capital before another sunrise.¹ As the day went on, his mind evolved new schemes from utter disaster, and he wrote a letter to Jefferson Davis, amazingly calm and hopeful, in which he discussed negro recruitment and plans for his next campaign, as though the fabric of the Confederacy were not already falling in irremediable ruin. At nightfall, with all preparations completed, he drew his troops noiselessly from before both Richmond and Petersburg, and began the forced march by which he meant to concentrate his army upon the Danville road, and, joining Johnston, if possible, prepare to renew the stubborn conflict for Southern independence.²

Before sunrise on the 3d, Parke had gone through the lines at Petersburg, and that stronghold was formally sur-

¹ "I see no prospect of doing more than holding our position here till night. I am not certain I can do that." Long's Lee, 181; 10 N. & H. 181.

² 10 N. & H. c. 9. "Lee had never contemplated surrender. He had long before expressed to me the belief that in the mountains of Virginia he could carry on the war for twenty years." Davis, 479.

rendered. Grant rode with Meade into the city, a few hours later, while the musketry was still earnest and troops in gray were seen retreating down the roads. He had not the heart, he says, to turn his artillery April 3-9. upon such a mass of defeated and fleeing men, whom he hoped soon to capture.¹ But, already divining Lee's intentions, he had despatched a messenger to Sheridan, with orders to push at his utmost speed to the Danville road, taking Humphreys, Griffin, and the cavalry. Meade, as directed, marched his own army rapidly up the Appomattox, by the river road, in close pursuit of the retreating foe. In deserted Petersburg Grant tarried long enough to receive the President, who came up thither from City Point at his suggestion, and returned in early afternoon. Unaware of Grant's next plans, and preferring not to have them disclosed to him, Lincoln rejoiced over this grand success, but with a heart full of mercy. Just after the President left, Grant gained from Weitzel the good news he had been expecting,—that Richmond had been taken early in the morning, and was held securely. It was characteristic of our general-in-chief that, without allowing himself to turn aside to look at this pearl of great price, he pressed on towards that other prize without which, as he well knew, no victory could be final. "Rebel armies," he announced in a despatch, "are now the only strategic points to strike at." And by night he was encamped far from Richmond, far to the westward of Petersburg.¹

Pursuer and pursued had started almost at the same moment, and for secession's host it was the last chance. But a few night hours of sleep were gained by the Union army before the chase was resumed. Grant kept near Ord's corps; Meade, whose spirit never flagged, became so broken in body that he had to ride in an ambulance. Cheered by the green fields and forests of his native State, and relieved of a long mental tension of pride and endeavor, now that Richmond had fallen, Lee rallied in soul with the hope of escape. But a terrible disappointment awaited him at

¹ 2 Grant, 455.

Amelia Court House, whither he had ordered rations sent by rail from Danville;¹ for when his troops, half-famished, arrived there, on the 4th, they found no food, and nearly twenty-four hours were spent in foraging, for men and horses, through a meagre country. This delay was fatal, and could not be retrieved;² for the same day Sheridan had brought up his cavalry at Jetersville, about eight miles southward, whither Grant despatched two corps to strengthen him, which arrived the next day; Grant and Meade also joining him. Lee's prime object was now to reach subsistence; but when he made a new start, on the night of the 5th, the whole pursuing force stretched south and west of him, while the railroad to Danville and the south was heavily barred at Burkeville. Compelled to change his route to the west, he now started for Lynchburg, a town he was destined not to reach; since Grant's sure intent was not merely to pursue, but to get in front and head off progress.³ Running fights ensued on the 6th, and the left flank of Lee's fast wasting army was harassed by Union cavalry, which, with infantry to assist, made great havoc of the wagon trains, and took many thousand prisoners. Sheridan's encounter near Sailor's Creek in the afternoon caused special disaster; here Ewell's corps was captured; Sheridan penetrated the fugitive line of march, and Gordon, at sunset, was driven with his men in great confusion. This was a day to Grant of incalculable gain, and Sheridan, at its close, reported that if the thing were pressed, he thought Lee would surrender. Grant sent this despatch to President Lincoln, who replied, "Let the thing be pressed."⁴ At daybreak of the 7th the chase recommenced; Lee's army crossed to the north bank of the Appomattox and moved out upon the road which ran through Appomattox Court House to Lynchburg; but so close was the pursuit that one of Grant's detachments got possession

¹ As to the reason for their non-arrival, cf. 10 N. & H. 185, and 2 Grant, 465.

² 4 B. & L. 724 (Lee's report).

³ 2 Grant, c. 65; 10 N. & H. c. 9; 4 B. & L. 724.

⁴ 10 N. & H. 188; 3 Badeau, 581; 4 B. & L. 720.

of a bridge before it could be destroyed, and at once crossed over, other detachments joining from different directions.¹

Lee's army was now brought nearly to bay, like a wounded and crippled stag, and escape was no longer possible. Many of his officers advised a surrender, but he himself could not easily dismiss the thought of mountain fastnesses and a new campaign; besides which he thought it unwise to betray weakness by inviting a correspondence. Somewhat aware of the situation, through what was said by his chief prisoners and their friends, who thought Lee unwisely constrained by his President's obstinate disposition, Grant resolved not to drive his gallant antagonist to humiliating extremes. On the 7th he sent from Farmville a courteous summons to surrender; appealing to the conviction Lee himself must feel that further resistance was hopeless, and avowing his own sense of duty not to be responsible for any further effusion of blood. At daybreak of the 8th, before leaving that place, he received Lee's reply, which denied any such conviction on his own part, but, reciprocating the wish to avoid useless bloodshed, asked what terms Grant would offer. To this the latter made immediate answer, inviting a definite conference, and tendering, as his only indispensable condition, that all men and officers surrendered should not again take up arms against the Union until properly exchanged.² About midnight came another letter from Lee, proposing an interview for the next forenoon; not, however, with a view to surrendering, but, as he equivocally expressed himself, to ascertain the bearing of any such negotiation towards the restoration of peace. To this, on the morning of the 9th, Grant replied that he had no authority to treat on the subject of peace, and must decline any such interview; but his tone was con-

¹ 2 Grant, 471, 625. Lee reported (4 B. & L. 724) that every effort had been made in vain to reorganize his shattered divisions; and that his men on the march, depressed by fatigue and hunger, threw away their arms or followed the wagon trains, impeding progress.

² 2 Grant, 478, 625; 4 B. & L. 730.

ciliating, and he intimated the belief that all difficulties might be settled without the loss of another life.¹

All the while our general-in-chief had pressed closer in pursuit, doubting Lee's disposition to come to terms, and determined to force, should persuasion fail. Lee appears to have toyed with Grant's first proposal, anxious to discover the full measure of the proffered generosity, and disposed, in any case, to keep negotiation open for a last emergency; nevertheless, he strained every effort to break away from his pursuer, so long as a hope remained of eluding him by swiftness or stratagem. His army was rapidly disintegrating under the prolonged flight. Only two corps kept up the march under Longstreet and Gordon, and men dropped out, meaning to desert, or else too weary and dejected to proceed farther. Scant food for man or beast could be found by foraging; all ration supplies by railway were cut off; the soldiers were worn out for want of food and sleep, and dispirited by constant harassment on the march. By heroic effort, Lee pushed the head of his column to Appomattox Court House on the evening of April 8th, and halted it for rest, with orders to resume the march an hour after midnight. Attacks were borne in the evening, with signs of a large hostile force gathering on the left and front.² For Grant, immediately after sending Lee his third despatch, had started to reach his advance column, now closing about the enemy on every side. Already had Sheridan struck the railroad at Appomattox Station and captured Lee's artillery there, together with trains of cars which arrived laden with supplies. Ord and Griffin, by a long march of some thirty miles, taken by day and night with elastic step in the excitement of near triumph, reached Sheridan's support in the morning of the 9th, just as Lee's cavalry was making a desperate effort to break through. The mingled mass of Confederate horse and foot beheld a formidable force of infantry, filling the road in front of them, covering the neighboring hills and valley, blocking further progress like a wall of adamant,

¹ 2 Grant, 627.

² 4 B. & L. 724 (Lee).

and threatening, besides, to cut off Gordon from Longstreet. Sheridan and Ord closed all approaches on the south and west, Meade on the north and east, each with overwhelming numbers. In a word, Lee's forces were encircled and overpowered, virtual prisoners of war already; and, convinced that further bloodshed would be actual murder, if he permitted it, Lee sent out white flags to front and rear, and asked an interview with Grant to negotiate a surrender, hostilities to be suspended in the meantime. Neither Meade nor Sheridan inclined to any such suspension. "I've got 'em like that!" cried Sheridan, doubling up his fist, fearful that some ruse or evasion was intended. To Grant, however, who was still at a distance, Lee sent a written message by a special escort; who found him just before noon and arranged the interview, which, in fact, took place an hour later.¹

The memorable meeting of surrender was held in a private dwelling at the edge of the village of Appomattox Court House.² On the crest of a neighboring hill to the south Sheridan's forces were drawn up in line of battle; but Sheridan and Ord attended the interview in company with Grant, several members of whose staff were also present. Lee awaited their arrival in a small and barely furnished parlor, accompanied only by his secretary, Colonel Charles Marshall. Two opposite tables had been placed convenient for writing, at which, after greeting one another, Lee and Grant sat apart, as unlike in outward aspect as could be imagined. Lee was more than fifteen years Grant's senior, a man six feet high, well formed, and with the air of patrician breeding; Grant, plebeian in aspect, was of less than medium height, slightly stooping at the shoulders. Lee was dressed in a full fresh uniform of Confederate gray, and wore the jewelled sword which his State had presented to him; while Grant was without a sword, as often happened when in the field, and, though habitually neat in

¹ 10 N. & H. c. 9; 4 B. & L. 724, 732; 2 Grant, 626; ib. c. 67.

² The house of Wilmer McLean. As to the fiction of a surrender "under an apple tree," see 2 Grant, 486; 4 B. & L. 734.

person, he wore the dress of a common private, with nothing but shoulder-straps to indicate his commanding rank. Each hero, however, was simple and self-possessed in bearing, and, after his own fashion, impressive. No great survivor of this war was ever so reticent as Lee of his personal recollections. But Grant has recorded that his own feelings were sad, rather than jubilant, and he appears to have made efforts, which Lee did not reciprocate, to lighten the serious business of the occasion by informal personal intercourse. When Lee asked to know the terms which would be accorded, Grant stated them clearly in form of a letter, writing with instant decision and despatch, and without draft before him of any kind. He wrote with genuine compassion for his proud antagonist; for, not only did he permit the officers surrendering to retain their side-arms, horses, and baggage, — this thought occurring to him, as he relates, while his pen was on the paper, — but he went to the very verge of the authority given him by the President in granting an immunity from arrest to all, privates and officers of every grade alike, so long as they observed their paroles and obeyed the laws.¹ Lee, having put on his glasses, read this memorandum carefully and then handed it back, doubtless with some gratified surprise; for he remarked that the permission to retain side-arms would have a happy effect. He then suggested and gained still another concession, — that such of his cavalry and artillery as owned their horses might take them home. He then sat down at his table and wrote a formal acceptance. Duplicates of these two letters were signed and interchanged, and the interview ended; but not without a further promise on Grant's part, which was fulfilled, to supply Lee's famishing soldiers with immediate rations. Whatever real anguish Lee may have felt on this occasion, he kept all emotion suppressed while the formal interview lasted; his manner was dignified and impassive, and only by his abstracted air as he left the

¹ In 10 N. & H. 196, Grant is said to have "practically pardoned and amnestied" the high officers, contrary to the President's orders; but it is observable that he made no stipulation whatever as touching civil or political disabilities.

house, and in the involuntary clenching of his hands while he waited for his steed to be brought up, did he betray a mental agitation.¹

When news of the great surrender first reached the Union lines outside, the cannon began firing a victorious salute, which Grant at once stopped. He forbade any rejoicing over a fallen foe, who, he hoped, would be a foe no longer. Before setting out for Washington to put an end to the costly outlay of war, our general-in-chief, the next morning, rode to the Confederate lines to make Lee a farewell visit. Sitting on horseback between the armies, the two warriors held a friendly and informal conversation. Lee thought the war practically at an end, that further resistance at the South was useless; and he expressed the fervent hope that there would be no more loss and sacrifice of life. Grant urged him to use his great influence to advise surrender elsewhere; but Lee made answer, fixed in his views of subordination, that President Davis would have to be consulted first. Treating the conflict now over as one of two distinct governments, the Southern commander, in a farewell address to his soldiers, praised them for "their constancy and devotion to their country."² But he was scrupulously true to his parole, and for the rest of his life submitted to the authority of the nation in peace and soberness.

It is an inspiring thought that this Republic has borne so many sons who, in civil or military service, have subjected personal ambition to the public welfare, and laid

¹ 2 Grant, c. 67; 10 N. & H. c. 9; Horace Porter (an eye-witness) in 4 B. & L. 742. The number actually surrendered by Lee, as the paroles showed, was 28,356; and the best estimates of his effective strength, when the advance began, reckon the number at 54,000 to 57,000; Grant's captures alone, since March 29, amounting to over 19,000. 4 B. & L. 753; 2 Grant, 500. The effective Union strength at the outset was correspondingly about 120,000 to 124,700, while Union losses aggregated 10,515. 4 B. & L. 751; 10 N. & H. 166.

² 4 B. & L. 747; Am. Cycl. 1865, 64, 65. Lee had not assumed the dictatorial powers intended by the Confederate Congress, but to the end he treated Davis as his real commander-in-chief. 10 N. & H. 159.

their laurels upon the common altar. Grant, simple, unassuming, earning every step of promotion by faithful work, deserves the highest military fame of them all for this period. Opinion in some quarters has done him scant justice in this respect. All concede his unflinching perseverance,—his sobriquet, too, of the “great hammerer,”—but many credit him less with feeling and intelligence than as the ruthless tearer of human flesh, the bruiser and pulverizer of opposing armies by the merciless momentum of two to one. Yet at Appomattox, as at Vicksburg, this captor of immense vanquished armies showed conspicuous clemency and kindness towards those who had fought against him, and a generous forbearance. He could grapple like a wild beast, first of all, but when that method failed, he resorted patiently to siege and slow approach. Grant had the best and broadest military temperament for aggressive warfare this continent has ever seen; he was the supreme and indispensable warrior for whom the Union cause long waited. With his hard sense, grim tenacity, and clearness of military insight, he conducted the most difficult of conquests—that of subduing brethren forcibly by other brethren of the same race and traditions; and in doing so he simplified and adapted modes of warfare to his ends, unhindered by routine or precedent. Grant had splendid subordinates, it is true; but it was his safe discrimination that brought them into place, and he got the best work out of all who served under him. The vigorous Sherman, the fiery and hot-blooded Sheridan, the methodical Meade, he generously allowed to reap each his full glory, in commands the fittest for winning a peculiar lustre; yet he all the while inspired and directed, brought up supports at the right time and place, thought out and worked out details, and quietly and discreetly kept down those quarrels and jealousies which, under most other Union commanders, were a constant obstacle to success. Nor did he, like McClellan, strive against his political masters at Washington; but his relations with the President and War Department, and with Halleck, too, were harmonious and friendly, and largely because he lodged no complaints, but always did cheerfully the best with what

was given him. Grant could take the city, and rule his tongue besides; and his military judgment, surpassingly sound on the whole, betrayed him but rarely into an irritable or harsh exercise of discipline. No commander, North or South, approached him in the wide range of experience gained, from the Missouri River to the James, in contact with high officers or immense operations. Besides Sherman, Sheridan, and Meade, he personally directed McPherson, Thomas, Schofield, Hooker, McClelland, Buell, Logan, Blair, in the West; Burnside, Hancock, Wright, Ord, Humphreys, in the East; and many other generals of distinction. He served early under Halleck, Pope, and Fremont; he coöperated with Foote and Porter of the navy. His responsible operations, too, were more varied, as well as on a vaster scale, than any other general of the war, on either side, conducted. Nearly all the historic surrenders of this war were made to him, and he negotiated them with admirable spirit and self-possession. Behind his quiet and impassive demeanor must have bounded a restless and impetuous spirit of activity, in these years, which he repressed by habitual discretion. Had not this hero resigned his supreme generalship later, to accept from a grateful people the Chief Magistracy of the nation, and still later to return to business pursuits, one would hardly have realized that, like so many other plain American citizens, he shone in only a circumscribed sphere of activity; for Grant's realm of perfect lustre was, after all, the military one.

Grant had gratified Sheridan, who so distinguished himself in these later campaigns, by permitting the Army of the Potomac to bring its famous foe to cover, without the intervention of Sherman's army, which waited ready and desirous, in North Carolina, to coöperate. The Western armies, he felt, had been in the main successful, conquering and advancing from field to field; while the Eastern armies, not at all inferior in morale, had been baffled and driven back so often, that it was only justice to let them vanquish at last, unaided, the enemy against whom and whose fortified citadel they had made such repeated and gallant attempts

in vain.¹ There spoke the soul of a true general-in-chief, arbiter among the various military aspirants he led to fame and honor.

SECTION III.

DEATH AND TRIUMPH.

Over Richmond, all through March, brooded the gloom of compulsory evacuation; and archives and stores of the Confederate government, not immediately needful, were sent to more distant points for security. The families of President Davis and his Cabinet went south; and members of the insurgent Congress, adjourning after their long and fruitless winter session, gave signs that they never expected to assemble again. Supplies of food were getting terribly scarce, and even the wealthiest of the people began to be pinched for the barest necessities of life. Desertions from Lee's army were making great gaps that Executive rigor could not possibly fill, and conscription resorted, though with little gain, to the meanest expedients of a press-gang. Squads of military guards went about the streets of Richmond with orders to arrest all able-bodied men and despatch them to the front; loiterers were swept from the pavements, and citizens with exemption papers in their pockets hustled off with the rest; but, in less than a week, more than half the civilians thus forced to the trenches had been dropped or deserted, those of influential families gaining an official release. All this indicated that the numbers in military service at the front were inadequate for maintaining properly the vast extension of Lee's lines.²

But the day of doom came sooner, after all, than Lee or the Confederate administration had expected. On the forenoon of Sunday, April 2d, President Davis, while at public worship, received Lee's telegram, stating that his lines had been broken and Richmond must be evacuated.³

¹ 2 Grant, 460.

² 2 Jones's Diary, 305, 384; 10 N. & H. 150, 199; De Leon, 353.

³ *Supra*, p. 594.

With no betrayal of emotion, the Executive left church and hastened to his mansion to give needful directions. But the rector stopped the services and dismissed his congregation, and, like an earthquake shock, the danger was felt through the city, almost before definite news could spread, — as they did very quickly. From the Sabbath stillness of a bright spring forenoon, the streets became noisy with crowds, and the scene quickly shifted. The Confederate Cabinet was convened, public papers and stores were hurriedly packed for shipment towards Danville. Such ordnance supplies as could not be transported were rolled into the canal; commissary stores were thrown open and their hoarded contents of pork, flour, and sugar distributed to ravenous crowds of men, women, and children, poor and half-famished, who grasped hungrily at all they could convey to their several homes. Citizens who had the means made preparations for flight; but the far greater population of Richmond, compelled to stay behind, devised methods of cover and concealment. Banks opened their portals and depositors flocked thither for their money and valuables. The streets soon filled up with hurrying pedestrians, loaded wagons, and mounted officers, who galloped hither and thither with orders to execute. Towards nightfall, as the confusion and excitement increased, fierce vagabond crowds of half-drunken men and women gathered, starving and distracted, before the public commissary stores, swearing and fighting with one another over the spoils they were late in securing; barrels of whiskey, not seasonably destroyed as they should have been, were stoven in madly, and while the pale liquor ran in the gutters it was dipped up in mugs, tin pans, buckets, and whatever other available vessel came to hand, or lapped with the tongue, by miserable beings who became more and more maddened by the stimulant.

Meanwhile the turbulence on the streets culminated, by dusk of this Sunday, at the railroad depots, where trains, overcrowded and overloaded, moved out into the murky darkness amid the flitting and waving of lanterns. Confederate officials had secured the chief accommodations, while a clamoring multitude of common people, with baggage,

had to scramble for places, or be left behind. Under Ewell, who took the final orders of his War Department, and left at seven the next morning, the details of evacuation were completed. Troops in gray were withdrawn, leaving the defensive works on the north side of the James unoccupied. But long before daylight of the 3d, sleepers and watchers at Richmond were startled by a series of explosions which shook the whole city. Unfinished gunboats at the river, nine in number, were blown up; the arsenal was fired, and heaven's vault resounded with the bursting of its loaded shells. Already had the torch been applied to every Confederate armory, machine shop, and storehouse, whose contents since midnight had been burning briskly; and, most deplorably, under the mandates of the flying administration, whole warehouses of tobacco and cotton were set on fire, and a vast waste of valuable merchandise fed a general conflagration of no military gain whatever. The rear guard of Early's retreating troops burnt three great bridges as they fled; and a vast civic fire was under fierce headway towards morning, exciting the rapacity of rioters, while the helpless and peaceably disposed inhabitants stood among their scanty effects on Capitol Square, keeping anxious vigil.¹

Hither came, early on the 3d, the first Union brigade from Devens's division, sent by Weitzel as a provost guard, just after Richmond's mayor and committee had come forth to surrender the city. A grandson of John Quincy Adams, and a namesake of the Minister at St. James, was among these rescuing officers. The stars and stripes were promptly hoisted over the Capitol, and deliverance came to a stricken and unnerved people through their so-called foes. For the first care of the Union soldiery, in this atmosphere of paralyzed dismay, was to subdue the consuming flames and get them under control, to reestablish civic order

¹ De Leon, c. 37; 10 N. & H. c. 10; 4 B. & L. 726. Ewell seems to have earnestly endeavored to prevent such fires from being started, realizing the private waste and misery that would ensue; but against his remonstrance the War Department pursued its inexorable purpose. 10 N. & H. 206.

and security. Confederate writers confess that from these "Yankee invaders," whose brutal rapacity with their negro allies had been pictured and vaguely awaited as hell's own torment, Richmond actually received, on this day of humiliation, generous aid and protection against the needless funeral pyre to which Southern military friends had devoted her. And, more than this, now and for many days did Weitzel feed the Richmond poor upon Union rations, saving them from starvation, as did Grant Lee's famishing army upon the surrender at Appomattox, soon after.¹

Abraham Lincoln, who had lingered at City Point after his return from Petersburg,² made a visit to Richmond, on the 4th of April, in company with Admiral Porter. The Union flotilla steamed cautiously up the tortuous James River above Drewry's Bluff, and, finding obstructions to the progress of the vessels, transferred the Presidential party of five to a twelve-oared barge, rowed by sailors of the navy. Their landing was made at a pier near the late Libby prison, where neither wagon nor escort was at hand to receive them. Never, perhaps, in the world's history, did a conqueror enter the capital city of his stubborn foe with so little pomp and ostentation. Guided by one of the negroes who had quickly swarmed about, and with a guard improvised from ten sailors armed with their carbines, the distinguished guests walked the tiresome distance of more than a mile to Weitzel's headquarters, occupying the late Executive mansion of the Confederacy, from which Davis had fled two days before. Richmond's fire was not yet wholly quenched, and blackened ruins showed visible signs of public disorder. After resting here and partaking of refreshments, the real President held an informal reception, which was attended chiefly by Union officers, and in the afternoon rode in a carriage, with Weitzel and Porter, attended by a cavalry escort, to visit various points of interest. At Weitzel's headquarters, this day, and, on the next, aboard Porter's flagship in the stream, Lincoln accorded interviews to John A. Campbell and other prominent

¹ 10 N. & H. c. 10; *supra*, p. 600.

² *Supra*, p. 595.

citizens, on the subject of political reconstruction;¹ and by the 6th he was back again at City Point.²

There was submission, at this time, but little sign of a reconciled mood in the late rebellious capital. Richmond's proud daughters remained at first in their homes, dreading both victors and deserters from the vanquished; their houses were tightly closed, the shutters fastened, and curtains drawn down. In the streets it was little different, for few but negroes mingled at large with the blue-coated soldiers, whose considerate courtesy was shown in many unobtrusive acts. Clad usually in deep mourning, and with heavy black veils over their faces, they stole out at last, broken-hearted, moving about like shadows of the past, compelled, many of them, in their utter destitution, through want of food or money, to accept the charity of Union rations, after each slender stock had been consumed at home. There was no such display of disdain or loathing as the fair rebels of New Orleans had once shown; but deep dejection and sorrow, rather, and a cold though courteous dignity, which proclaimed impassable barriers. Lee's surrender brought back Southern paroled soldiers by scores and hundreds, and these were welcomed with suppressed demonstrations of delight and sympathy; Lee himself, among the number, passing with silent salute to his own door, never again to be seen abroad in uniform. Prayers for the President of the United States were not offered up in churches, as they had lately been for the Confederate President; and Weitzel started out so lenient in his military rule, so tolerant of stubborn sentiment for the lost cause, that Stanton had begun to make reprimand, when calamity fell upon the whole land like a thunderbolt, and Northern policy changed towards the South under a change of administration.³

¹ Campbell, lately assistant Secretary of War to the Confederacy, had remained behind to tender his submission. He figured at the end of this conflict as in the beginning (*supra*, p. 14), an amateur negotiator, whose efforts bore no other fruit than a misunderstanding. See 10 N. & H. c. 11; Am. Cycl. 1865, 798.

² 10 N. & H. c. 11; 4 B. & L. 728.

³ De Leon, 367; 10 N. & H. 226.

The 14th of April was a day not to be forgotten in American annals. It opened at Charleston harbor in a public thanksgiving; it ended at Washington in the saddest tragedy this modern age ever witnessed. ^{April 14, 15.} The day was Good Friday, observed by a large part of the Christian world in solemn religious commemoration; and yet in these United States, even upon the most devout of churchmen had the grand tidings of the previous week exerted a joyous influence, as upon loyal people generally. To the mass of the South there was relief felt, at least, to think there would be war no longer. A national thanksgiving was celebrated at Charleston harbor, where, just four years earlier, Civil War began with the humiliation of Fort Sumter. Following Charleston's capture, in February, the government at Washington resolved that on this coming anniversary the flag of the Union should receive a conspicuous salute on the spot where it had first been conspicuously outraged. Sherman being absent, the ceremonies were placed in charge of General Gillmore. Garrison, the late agitator of abolition, figured among the guests of honor; Henry Ward Beecher, famous as preacher and philanthropist, was the orator of the day; and precisely as the bells of a Union flotilla struck the hour of noon, Robert Anderson, with his own hands, hoisted to its place above Sumter's battered ruins the identical flag he had lowered in grief four years before. They that sowed in tears now reaped in joy; and that joy was swollen to abundant gratitude by the news of Lee's surrender, which had reached Charleston the night before.¹

At Washington, too, this was a day of deep peace and thankfulness. Lee's surrender and the fall of Richmond were universally considered the end of organized insurrection, and the President, relieved of the long strain which had furrowed his face and deepened in his eyes their look of tender and inexpressible sadness, now turned from preserver to pacificator of the people. The sense of popular responsibility weighed upon him still, and "with malice

¹ 10 N. & H. 277-280; 4 Garrison, 138.

toward none, with charity for all," as he had so admirably expressed it,¹ he strove on to finish his stupendous work.

Grant, arriving that very morning in Washington, had gone to the White House, where he met the President and Cabinet, Friday being the regular day of the meeting. It was here that, in that vein of prophetic mysticism which, though checked by common sense, made a striking element of his character, Lincoln related a dream he had the previous night, where a strange and indescribable vessel moved rapidly on towards a dark and unbounded shore. On this, the last day he was destined to meet his official counsellors, the vast topic of reëstablishing normal relations with the insurrectionary States was taken up; and the President sketched out the policy he purposed pursuing, so far as his own authority and influence might extend. He meant that these States should be reanimated and their local governments set into orderly and successful relation with the Union before the new Congress met next December. He deeply desired to close this prolonged era of sectional strife without overmuch discussion; and, most of all, he wished to avoid the shedding of blood, or any vindictive punishment. No one need expect that he himself would take any part in hanging or killing these fellow-citizens, even the worst of them. "Frighten them out of the country, open the gates, let down the bars, scare them off," he continued, lifting up his hands with an appropriate gesture; "but enough lives have been sacrificed; we must extinguish our resentments if we expect harmony and union."² Seward was absent from this Cabinet meeting, being confined to the sick room by injuries he had received when thrown from his carriage a few days before. Stanton offered a plan of temporary military government, to which Welles and Dennison objected, so far as it proposed uniting two States under one government; and that objection the Presi-

¹ *Supra*, p. 565.

² Welles, in *Galaxy*, April, 1872; 10 N. & H. 283. Conversations are related by Sherman and others, held during these past six weeks, where the President, by parable or precept, had indicated the same clement disposition towards the leaders of the late Confederacy.

dent sustained. With the autonomy of each Southern State strictly preserved, it was agreed that Stanton's scheme should be reported anew, at a meeting set for the following Tuesday. "This," said Lincoln impressively, as he dismissed his Cabinet, "is the great question pending — we must now begin to act in the interest of peace."¹

The rest of this tranquil day was one of unusual enjoyment to Lincoln, passed in the companionship of his family and personal friends; and in the evening he went, by appointment, to Ford's Theatre, accompanied by his wife and two younger intimates. Grant and his wife were to have shared the box engaged by him, but they changed their minds, and, cancelling their acceptance, left the city by an afternoon train. Forever mournful was the tragedy performed at this theatre, which interrupted the progress of that pleasing play, "Our American Cousin," before a large audience whose eyes were fixed upon the stage. John Wilkes Booth, a young actor of histrionic parentage, foolishly fanatical for secession, and the self-appointed avenger of a South whose Brutus he theatrically thought himself, used the present opportunity for fulfilling a plot against the President's life that hitherto had miscarried. Familiar with this building behind the scenes, and with those employed there, he arranged an evening exhibition of his own as daring and sensational as it was horrible, and before spectators whose political sympathies he seemingly meant to brave. Yet the boldest of risks may sometimes be taken more securely than the lightest, and Booth, in his morbid mood, invited the whole country for witnesses. Holding a pistol in one hand and a knife in the other, while all were intent upon the comedy, he opened noiselessly the door of the President's box, for which he had already arranged a special fastening, put his pistol to Lincoln's head and fired: then dropping that weapon, he brandished the knife wildly as he rushed forward through the box, placed his left hand

¹ Welles, in *Galaxy*, April, 1872; 10 N. & H. 285.

on its front railing, and vaulted lightly over to the stage below. It was not a great leap for one accustomed to such feats as a player. Turning to the audience, with uplifted knife, he shouted out Virginia's State motto, "*Sic semper tyrannis*," fled to the rear of the theatre through passages well known to him, mounted a horse which waited in the alley-way, and was galloping eastward along the avenue towards the navy-yard bridge before any in that great multitude of spectators and performers, dazed and horror-stricken for a moment, could follow and seize upon him. "He has shot the President!" was the cry, as the assassin dropped and disappeared behind the footlights, as though taking some strange cue of his own in the interrupted play. He had fallen upon the stage in his hasty leap, his spur catching in the folds of a flag with which the President's box was draped; but he instantly rose as though unhurt, when, in fact, his leg was broken. President Lincoln scarcely moved after the pistol shot, his head drooped forward slightly, his eyelids closed. Amid the intensest excitement the stage performance broke up; army surgeons entered the box, and, perceiving that the wound was mortal, with a large bullet buried in his brain, directed the removal of the unconscious victim to a small brick house across the street. There Abraham Lincoln breathed his last, shortly after seven o'clock the next morning, April 15th, with a distinguished group surrounding his bed in the strange little chamber, while his wife and eldest son, Robert, were near by. For nine long hours, recognizing no one, and silent, too, except for an automatic moaning as he breathed, the President lingered in unconscious existence; then a look of unspeakable peace stole over his worn features, and the great heart stopped beating.¹

Booth, it seems, had created a little coterie of conspirators, fascinated by his engaging person and the classic coloring he had imparted to a project, such as, long ago, made Harmodius famous. Lewis Powell, alias Payne, a

¹ 10 N. & H. c. 14; Am. Cycl. 1865, 476. See also 4 Pierce's *Sumner*, 236; *Century*, February, 1893.

discharged soldier from Florida, George Atzerodt, a spy and blockade-runner of the Potomac, David E. Herold, a druggist's clerk, and John H. Surratt, were of the mystic number; and at a small boarding-house in Washington, kept by Mary E. Surratt, the widowed mother of the last named, this little band had concocted various schemes for Lincoln's abduction, which failed of opportunity. The present plot was hatched with great haste, for only about noon did their leader learn from the press that the President meant to attend this theatre in the evening. Booth hurriedly assigned the parts for a more complete tragedy than had been planned before, counting upon his own address and audacity for gaining the requisite facilities at Ford's Theatre, where he was well known and liked.¹ The Floridian, called Payne, went that same night, in pursuance of Booth's orders, to Seward's mansion to commit another murder; and boldly forcing himself into the sick chamber upstairs against the resisting members of the Secretary's household, he stabbed the injured statesman as he lay there, inflicting three terrible wounds in his cheek and neck; but Seward saved his life by rolling off between the bed and the wall, whereupon Payne, breaking loose from attendants about the house who seized him, bounded down the staircase and reached the front door unhurt; then, leaping his horse, he rode freely off, like Booth from the more terrible encounter a few squares away. Atzerodt's part, which was to dispose of Vice-President Johnson, failed utterly of execution. Payne was arrested in Mrs. Surratt's house a few days after. Booth, identified on all sides as he stood brandishing his dagger at the footlights after leaping from the box where he had fired the fatal shot, rode on with Herold, who joined him down the river bank of the Potomac, and for ten days the two eluded pursuers, having gained the Virginia side. There, finding food and shelter hard to pro-

¹ Booth went so far as to prepare a careful statement of his reasons for assassination, which he intrusted to a fellow-actor to appear in the next day's newspapers; but the latter burned it secretly in the terror of the night. 10 N. & H. 293.

cure, even from among those of pronounced secession sympathies, suffering from his broken leg, and scarcely less from the wound given his vanity by the abhorrent comments of the press, which he read upon the flight, Booth was at last traced, with his accomplice, to the barn of a lonely farmhouse. There a sergeant of the capturing squad of Union soldiers shot him down for refusing to come forth and surrender. Herold, however, gave himself up, and all but one of Booth's fellow-conspirators were speedily arrested and tried by a military commission, which met at Washington, in the arsenal building, during the months of May and June. Payne, Herold, Atzerodt, and Mrs. Surratt were hanged, while others, more remotely connected with the plot, were sentenced to imprisonment for life.¹

The assassination of public rulers was so strange, in that day, so abhorrent to public sentiment, that the whole world stood aghast at the new recurrence of an ancient and mediæval practice; but since then this same enlightened century has witnessed, painfully enough, other instances of that brutal resort by irresponsible zealots, even as against the chief magistrate of a Republic, chosen by the people. Such methods do not win that public support needful nowadays to effect great public changes, nor accomplish more than substitute in a well-ordered nation one constitutional magistrate for another, like any casualty of death. Lincoln, from the very outset of his Presidency, had been threatened through the mails with brutal and vulgar menace, mostly anonymous, the expression of vile and cowardly minds. Friends had warned him against such threats; and Lamon, while marshal of the District of Columbia, made himself a sort of body guard, solicitous that the man he loved should not expose himself to danger. Lincoln was too intelligent not to know that attempts on his life were

¹ 10 N. & H. c. 15; Am. Cycl. 1865, 476. John H. Surratt, who escaped at this time, was brought back from Egypt in 1867, and put upon civil trial, but the jury disagreed in its verdict.

intended by individuals, but he had the full courage of high station, and wore the strong breastplate of a heart untainted. We have seen him walking the streets of captured Richmond, not strongly guarded, a few days earlier. Often at the nation's capital had the President sallied forth in the darkness, on foot and with only a single friend; unadvertised, he had often taken his recreation at the theatre; but the wide publicity of his intention cost him, on this latest occasion, his priceless life.¹

How terrible the corresponding cost to the South, that vanquished section could but slowly realize. So far from tyrant, it lost in Lincoln the best and the most capable benefactor among its Northern conquerors. That spirit of clemency and moderation, with which he was already opening the work of reuniting the country, strongly supported by loyal opinion, took flight with his noble soul, and embittered hostility, vindictiveness and suspicion, hindered long the reconciliation of a national household.² The universal sorrow and indignation felt by the bereaved multitude of the American people at the tragic death of their President, was shared by the chief powers of Europe. France and England hastened to accord their sympathy, and Queen Victoria wrote a letter of condolence, with her own hand, to Mrs. Lincoln, from "a widow to a widow."³ British feeling was profoundly moved; as John Bright wrote to an American senator, "The whole people positively mourn, and it would seem as if again we were one nation with you."⁴

Warned not to go out of doors without a guard, when waited upon in the gray of that drizzling morning of

¹ *Century*, January, 1865 (Brooks).

² For months it was widely believed at the North that Booth's conspiracy was instigated by the Davis government. See 10 N. & H. 312. Davis admits that he and his fellow-fugitives of the Confederate administration exulted rather than mourned when the news of Lincoln's assassination reached them; but no complicity whatever was at all likely. *Ib.* 313.

³ *Am. Cycl.* 1865, 367, 407.

⁴ *Pierce's Sumner*, 240.

April 15th by those who brought the first tidings that death had just devolved upon him the Presidency, Andrew Johnson perceived at once that a new departure in the policy of reconstruction was looked for by the able administration senators, led by Sumner, whom Lincoln's generous prepossessions had displeased; and Stanton's draft of military government was now laid aside, upon their foreboding criticism. A strong and determined pressure was brought at once upon the new Executive to induce greater severity towards the South, and more guarantees for the colored race.¹

But rebellion had collapsed, and all fears that armed conflict would be renewed or prolonged were quickly dismissed. Lincoln's death came in the midst of his complete triumph. Following the surrender of Lee's army, that under Johnston was expected to capitulate when Lincoln met Grant on the last day of his life; Sherman had already returned from City Point to Goldsboro on the 30th of March. He reorganized his army and replenished its stores, so as to move forward by the 10th of April, in concert with Grant. But scarcely had he resumed the march with his splendid phalanx when he received the good news of Appomattox, and thenceforward was apprehensive only of dispersal and a prolonged guerilla warfare. His resolute foe, who had fought and baffled him on so many fields, was sick to the heart of war and longed to conclude it. At Raleigh,

whence Johnston had fled at his approach, Sherman, on the 14th, received from that general, under a flag of truce, a proposal, dated the day before, that hostilities should be suspended long enough for the civil authorities to arrange a peace. Such an offer should have been objected to, as asking an armistice for the two govern-

¹ Congress was not to convene before December, but Sumner and a few other Republican leaders of the radical wing still tarried at the capital. See Julian, 255, 257; 10 N. & H. 316. "It is probable that the policy towards leading rebels will be modified," writes Sumner, April 18, just before the funeral. 4 Pierce, 239. And see *ib.* 244, as to his earliest interviews with the new President. The Stanton draft he thoroughly objected to, because it conferred no franchise upon the negro. *Ib.*

ments to negotiate on equal terms; a thing repugnant, of course, to the whole policy of this national administration.¹ But Sherman, eager for peace and friendly towards his able opponent, made no adverse comment, but invited a personal conference in terms so unreserved and cordial, that Johnston felt encouraged to ask conditions better than Lee had gained, and more consonant to the wishes of his Confederate President. On the 17th Johnston and Sherman met on the road, and terms were discussed which, on the 18th, were embodied in an agreement signed by both and forwarded to their respective governments. News of the President's assassination having just arrived, Johnston expressed his unfeigned distress at the calamity; and in this sympathetic mood of old military friends, Sherman allowed too little for the Northern indignation which was likely to have hardened a negotiation like the present, or even for the probable temper of a changed administration. The President's instructions to Grant on the 3d of March had peremptorily forbidden his generals in the field to "decide, discuss, or confer upon any political question." Sherman, it seems, had received no notice of these instructions, for which there was blame somewhere; yet such a reservation to himself had marked Lincoln's course of dealing from the very first aspects of the emancipation issue. Sherman, in any case, was too contemptuous of politics and politicians to arrange judiciously on such points, if, indeed, to be a political negotiator at all. Compassionate, as he acknowledges, for an army whose commander had frankly and honestly confessed himself unable to cope with him, and anxious to end the war without shedding another drop of blood,—flattered, too, as his own story seems to intimate, with the idea of arranging for a universal surrender of Southern hostilities,—he extended his leniency, as there was no need of his doing, beyond Grant's terms at Appomattox, when Johnston

¹ This proposal had, in fact, been dictated by Jefferson Davis, who was then in Greensboro, on his flight southward; Mallory of the fugitive Cabinet wrote it down on the spot; and Johnston simply signed and sent the despatch to Sherman. Davis, 488; Johnston, 400.

demurred to them, and not only assured full political and property rights to the whole Southern people, as part of this military arrangement, but provided for at once reëstablishing the Southern State governments and confirming their legitimacy.¹ The capitulation thus arranged was curtly disapproved at Washington, and the truce terminated; but later, on the 25th, by which time Johnston refused to obey the futile and selfish directions sent him by the Confederate President, whose remaining authority was but an empty breath, the two commanders met once more, and a written surrender was readily narrowed to terms such as Grant had accorded to Lee's army.²

The present surrender embraced in scope Johnston's own army, inclusive of troops then operating in Georgia and Florida.³ Canby, who commanded the Union forces in the Gulf, had, in March, opened his campaign against Mobile with a military force nearly twice as great as that commanded by the Confederate Taylor, and a naval fleet, under Admiral Thatcher, coöperated. After a heavy bombardment and gallant assaults made upon the defences of this city, from the 9th to the 11th of April, Mobile was captured. On the 4th of May the Confederate fleet, which fled up the Tombigbee River, was forced to surrender;⁴ and on that same day Taylor arranged with Canby the capitulation of all Confederate armies east of the Mis-

¹ 10 N. & H. c. 12; Am. Cycl. 1865, 66, 72. Breckinridge, the Confederate Secretary of War, was thrust into the present conference, though Sherman, as he relates, refused to consider him in that official character, and himself drafted the terms which he submitted Johnston for signature. ² Sherman, 352. "I notified General Johnston," writes Davis (who by this time had fled to some distance), "that I approved his action; in doing so I doubted whether the agreement would be ratified by the United States Government." Davis, 489.

² *Ib.*; ² Sherman, 346-370. Stanton offended Sherman by the rude and unkind method he pursued in setting aside the previous capitulation.

³ Prisoners with Johnston, 36,817; surrendered in Georgia and Florida, as reported by General J. H. Wilson, 52,453; total, 89,270. ² Sherman, 370.

⁴ 9 N. & H. c. 10.

Mississippi River not already paroled.¹ The insurgent forces west of the Mississippi were commanded by General E. Kirby Smith, upon whom Davis's fugitive government fixed its last hopes, after Lee and Johnston had surrendered. For, stubborn to the last, the President without a people meant to move thither, gathering stragglers as he fled, and, in the green pastures of Texas, renew his perishing cause. For a time Smith's attitude seemed so threatening, that Sheridan was sent from Washington to bring him to reason. After one more skirmish, near Brazos, quite needless, Smith, too, on the 26th of May, surrendered his whole armed force to Canby, receiving the same generous terms accorded to the other Confederate armies.² And thus was slavery's grand levy of war against the United States brought to a conclusive end.

The mustering out of the vast Union host had already begun, at the close of April. The volunteer soldier returned peacefully to his home and civil pursuit, and an army of a million men, like the host which had so long opposed it, melted gently away, as the winter's burden of snow in a northern zone when the summer solstice approaches. During this whole Civil War 2,200,000 men had been enrolled for the Union cause, while nearly a million men served on the side of disunion. The immediate cost of this long and tremendous struggle of four years to the Union, over and above the ordinary expenses of civil government, was about \$3,250,000,000; to the Confederates somewhat less than half that amount.³

¹ 10 N. & H. 327. About 42,000 were thus surrendered, besides those embraced in the naval surrender to Thatcher.

² The number here surrendered aggregated 17,600. Davis, 490.

³ 10 N. & H. 339. About 2,700,000 names are on the rolls, but these included reenlistments. Cf. 4 B. & L. 767. The total aggregate of deaths during the war on the Union side (exclusive of sailors and marines) was about 360,000, and of this number 110,000 were killed or mortally wounded in battle. The number of Confederate dead cannot be accurately ascertained, but it is believed, in the absence of complete statistics, to have been nearly as great as on the Union side. Cf. 10 N. & H. 339; 4 B. & L. 767, 768.

As to the employment of Indians on either side, see 5 N. & H. 292.

The capture of Jefferson Davis in his flight from Richmond gave a somewhat ignominious exit to the Confederate government, whose death-clutch upon the normal Southern States and their people loosened with its military potency like some departing nightmare. When this President and the remnant of his Cabinet left Richmond by railway, on the night of April 2d, incumbered with the public archives, they passed through Danville to Greensboro, one more lurid manifesto issuing on the way. At Greensboro, on the 12th, Johnston and Beauregard, then close at hand, were called to a council of war, at which Benjamin, Mallory, and Reagan, of the fleeing civil advisers, were present, besides President Davis himself, who still maintained the arrogance of a constitutional director. By afternoon of that day arrived Breckinridge, also of the Cabinet, with positive tidings that Lee and his whole army had surrendered. At a second conference, held within twenty-four hours,¹ Davis was still for fight, but yielded so far to the wishes of his generals and of all but Benjamin of his civil advisers, as to dictate the despatch already mentioned, which Johnston at once tendered to Sherman.² On April 14th, without waiting to hear results, the administration continued its fugitive journey southward. At Charlotte, where the stay was prolonged, Breckinridge brought the duplicate memorandum made by Johnston and Sherman in his presence. This, on the 24th, Davis officially ratified; but, almost immediately after, came the further news that this agreement had been rejected at Washington, with orders sent Sherman to resume the offensive. Davis, as President, now ordered Johnston to disband his infantry, and, with cavalry and light artillery, seek a retreat; but Johnston disobeyed, as we have seen, and the government took a last flight toward Kirby Smith and the trans-Mississippi region, dwindling daily in dignity and resources. All of Davis's Cabinet but Reagan, who lived in Texas, dropped out, with one or another pretext, unwilling to trust longer their chief's illusions. Finally, at daybreak of May 10th, the Presiden-

¹ See 10 N. & H. 260.

² *Supra*, p. 617.

tial remnant was surprised and captured by Union cavalry scouts, while encamped among pine woods near Irwinville, in southern Georgia.¹ This terminated the Southern Confederacy in its civil embodiment. Of all the Southern leaders, civil or military, in this great rebellion, the Mississippian alone showed neither a dignified reticence nor a willingness to be sensibly reconciled; but his later historical writings betray a rancorous hatred of the Union he had sought to destroy, whose honors he had perverted, and whose clemency he appeared to the last incapable of appreciating.

Seward, recovering almost miraculously from the murderous assault of the fearful night and from his previous injuries, retained his premiership in the Cabinet for the remaining period of the four years' term for which Lincoln had reappointed him. Pursuing the same perse-¹⁸⁶⁵⁻
vering and yet forbearing course as before in foreign^{1869.} relations, with President Johnson's acquiescence, he procured, before retiring finally from office and public life, the amplest fruits of that wise diplomacy which Lincoln had supervised and approved. With France, the opportunity soon came to reassert the Monroe doctrine in terms whose import could neither be mistaken nor safely disregarded.²

¹ 10 N. & H. c. 13; 4 B. & L. 762; Am. Cycl. 1865, 77. Women and children were of the present party, and Davis, when arrested, had his wife's raglan and shawl thrown over his head and shoulders, probably for disguise and escape. See Davis, 701.

Jefferson Davis was imprisoned for two years at Fortress Monroe, and then indicted for treason; but in May, 1867, he was released on bail (Horace Greeley serving as one of his bondsmen), and the case never came to trial. Under President Johnson's general amnesty proclamation he received a final immunity from prosecution and lived unmolested, at his home in Mississippi, for more than twenty years longer.

² When the Union-Republican convention that renominated Lincoln, in 1864, adopted a strong resolution on this subject, at a time when active intervention in Mexico would still have been dangerous to the safety of our government, the President, in his letter of acceptance, construed that resolution as in approval rather than disapproval, of the course the State department was then taking. 7 N. & H. 421.

Polite and plausible through life, the Emperor Louis Napoleon withdrew his invading army from Mexico, and left his exotic establishment to perish. The unfortunate youth Maximilian, refusing to leave with the imperial troops, was shot, in 1867; Juarez reestablished the constitutional Republic, and Mexico, under him and an able military successor, entered upon a brighter and more orderly career than that distracted country had ever known before, bound lastingly in gratitude by the disinterested friendship of the neighboring Republic that had once despoiled her. Great Britain, too, offered amends, within these four years, for the wrong she had done by allowing hostile cruisers to be built in her ports. True, the treaty of friendship and indemnity which Seward negotiated failed in the Senate, because of a bitter wrangle between our new Executive and Congress; but the just spirit it manifested was of new avail when Grant became President, and, under the award of Geneva, the long score of grievances during this distressing era was effaced.

But such grand triumphs won at last could not restore to the helm that great captain and pilot whose firm and steady guidance through the long tempest assured his pre-eminent ability to steer among the dangerous shoals which yet remained. The American people mourned the untimely death of Abraham Lincoln long and sincerely; and in the depth of their universal sorrow, enhanced by an indignant sense of the degrading crime that had so miserably removed him, they and the civilized world began to realize, as never before, the true grandeur of his character and the conspicuous place he was destined to occupy in history. At our nation's capital all insignia of rejoicing over late military successes disappeared at once, and the city was shrouded in black. A funeral was prepared such as no potentate, ancient or modern, ever received before, in the intensity of real sorrow that pervaded the breasts of a great governed community and found expression from lofty and lowly alike. Lincoln's body, embalmed and prepared for the grave, re-

posed for four days in state at the White House under a tall canopy, enclosed in a black casket, and embosomed in rare and costly flowers. On Wednesday, the 19th of April, after an impressive service in the east room, the remains were borne in sad and solemn pomp to the Capitol, escorted by a well-appointed military force, in which colored troops took part, and attended in procession, or as pall-bearers, by the highest dignitaries of the nation, with State delegates and foreign ministers, besides. The day, by official request, was observed as one of mourning throughout the land, and no American, in the loyal States at least, who was old enough to comprehend a public sorrow, can forget the quiet depth of grief manifested in his own local neighborhood on that occasion. It was the anniversary of the first hostile bloodshed in two most memorable American revolutions; thousands of miles from Washington the occasion was kept as reverentially as though the funeral pageant itself wound visibly by. Stores were closed, business was suspended, the people poured out for a holiday; the weather was mild and inviting, yet none sought sportive recreation, but local inhabitants would assemble rather as for prayer and worship. With grief subdued and spontaneous, civic crowds thronged about the journal bulletin boards to share by electric sympathy, were it possible, in the obsequies telegraphed from the Potomac. All day during the 20th, also, the President's body lay in state in the rotunda of the nation's Capitol, under its now completed dome, visited by more than twenty-five thousand persons, many of whom were sick soldiers in hospital, who left their beds for a farewell gaze. On April 21st, at sunrise, after final prayers, the casket was transferred to a train, whose funeral car left Washington, with a guard of honor, for a slow journey of twelve days towards Springfield. For Illinois had claimed her greatest citizen for a last sepulture among the scenes where he had grown to greatness, and whence he had set forth for his immortal task, with sad parting from his neighbors. The route reversed as nearly as possible that traversed by Lincoln in February, 1861; and in prominent cities on the way,—at Baltimore, Harrisburg, Phila-

delphia, New York, Albany, Buffalo, Cleveland, Columbus, Indianapolis, and Chicago,—the journey was broken and the corpse borne in renewed pageant procession, to repose in state for other crowds to visit tenderly, before the sad progress was resumed. Again and again, and from day to day, were bells tolled, minute guns fired, and solemn dirges played by the bands, while fresh flowers were piled high upon the black coffin; and through public halls, in one city or another, festooned with crape and adorned with battle flags, surged the great stream of mournful people. So, too, all along the route, wherever the funeral train might travel without such interruption, tracks near each way station were seen bordered by sad spectators, gathered in wagons or on foot, who looked silently with uncovered heads or in groups sang hymns and dirges as the car of death glided by. Even by night, while the train travelled on, multitudes thus waiting reverentially were revealed by the fitful glare of torches. In this manner, and after an interior Northern tour of seventeen hundred miles, the final removal from the train, drawn by the last locomotive, was made at Springfield on the 3d of May; and, following a night's repose in the Illinois State House, Lincoln's final interment took place the next day at Oak Ridge Cemetery, and with dirges due and sad array the coffin lid was closed forever, and the remains of the martyred President were laid at rest.¹ All through the fortnight of protracted mourning and pageantry that funeral train was sadly watched by the people, as it approached or receded, and in States like those of New England, not on the iron course at all, the people shared at heart in solemn tribute, and spectators, as it were, in spirit, followed the corpse of their lost leader to its distant tomb.

“There lies the most perfect ruler of men the world has ever seen!” said Stanton, in tears, at this President's death-couch;² and, probably, for a eulogy so brief no fitter one

¹ Am. Cycl. 1865, 476-478; 10 N. & H. c. 16.

² Chittenden's Lincoln, 186.

could have been pronounced. Well did that stern subordinate — headstrong, impulsive, born to be unpopular — realize how much of his own splendid opportunity and success in achieving he owed to that generous and genial direction. Abraham Lincoln need hardly be compared with the great rulers of mankind in other ages and countries; it is enough to take him in his most admirable adaptation to the age and country in which his destiny was cast. He clearly understood the thirty millions of Americans over whom he had been placed by the people's choice, and the tremendous task given him by his Maker to be accomplished. Lincoln was not a profound scholar, but his mind was acute and his logical faculties clear and active; he had a lawyer's self-culture to comprehend the relations of republican society; he had studied American political history and problems of government, and no one understood better his country's institutions, State and national, in their practical workings. He had fair public experience, besides; and his excellence as an administrator in affairs lay in his consummate tact and skill as a manager and director of political forces under the complex and composite system of this American government. His high qualifications in this respect were first made manifest in his own important State of Illinois; and, though not among the chief founders of the new national party which brought him into the Presidency, he promptly came forward as one of its leaders, and, once placed in direction, he guided it confidently for the rest of his life, unapproachable as chieftain and popular inspirer. As President of the United States he harnessed together the greatest intellects of this party, — statesmen diverse as the winds in temper and sentiment, better capable than himself to push forward the car of legislation or handle the multifarious details of executive work; and he held the reins over them with infinite considerateness and discretion, conciliating, assuaging rivalries, maintaining good humor, and encouraging each to his greatest work. He kept his Cabinet in the closest touch with Congress, and both Cabinet and Congress in generous accord with public opinion, which last he carefully watched and tilled like a good gardener, plant-

ing seed, nurturing the growth of new ideas, and bringing, in proper time, the ripe fruit. Raw haste, the falsehood of extremes on one side or the other, he sedulously avoided; yet he sowed and cultivated. And, once again, while conducting the cause of the whole Union, of national integrity, he was yet highly regardful of State pride and State magistracy, seeking not suppression, but assistance, as to this element of allegiance; and the harshest military rigor he ever exercised over State rebellion was tempered by clemency, forgiveness, and compassion. Not an insurgent commonwealth of the South did he attempt to reorganize and reconstruct, save through the spontaneous aid of its own recognized inhabitants and such native and natural leaders of the jurisdiction as were found available; while of border slave States, at first doubtful and wavering in allegiance, because of a divided interest and affection, the two that he grappled most violently became not only stanch to the Union, but converts to emancipation, from their own choice, before war ended. The armed potency, almost unexampled, which this President exercised through four distressful years, was always exercised unselfishly and as a patriot, in the name and for the welfare of the real constitutional government which he represented, and for the permanent welfare of the whole American people. Rarely leaving and never going far from the nation's capital during that entire period, he there came in contact with people from all parts of the land, — soldiers and civilians, men, women, and children, — and by his rare personality, in whose external expression pathos and humor were remarkably blended, he dispelled unfavorable prejudice and endeared himself gradually to all classes of our people, at the same time giving reassurance as of one genuine, self-posessed, and trustworthy, who knew well his responsibilities and was capable of exercising them.

Lincoln was an American of Americans, the best and noblest type of an indigenous democracy, such as several generations of native independence and self-government had developed in lowly life. He was the ideal of the common American voter, — the common citizen, — sharing with the

average of our race the wish to better, honorably, the conditions of humble origin; proud of his own native land, and desirous that its example to the world should be unblemished. Like the vast majority of Americans, he was conservative while in progression, and loved that liberty which comes protected by law. Cautious, practical, and with a homely sagacity, notwithstanding high ideals, he yielded not to theory, but to trial, respected customs, and pursued the plans of life with wondrous patience and perseverance. Father of his country, as Emerson has well said of him, the pulse of many millions throbbed in his heart, and their thought was articulated by his tongue. Even as Washington was the typical ruler for a generation bred to traditions of royalty and privilege, so Lincoln suited the common conception for a people long confident of themselves. With him, adventitious birth or wealth went for little; but he weighed all men by their intrinsic worth, giving to each the due ponderance that personal character had won, and avoiding falsehood, whether of the social theorist, who treats dunces and the wise alike, or of the demagogue, who courts meanness only. God's greatest miracles on earth have been wrought out of natural elements, and His greatest tasks committed to men of true, steadfast hearts and simple faith. If this President had no great erudition, in him were happily combined, at least, the qualities for conducting a great social change—a strong intellect, convictions strong when once formed, a hardy physical frame, sound moral sense, and a persevering will.

After all, the real ruler of mankind, and especially of a vigorous and intelligent community, is he who can rule himself; and to that type of men Lincoln certainly belonged. He was plain in manners, unostentatious, unaffected, free, to a remarkable degree, from vindictiveness or fierce passion. Cheery and good-natured by disposition, calm, and even jocular, while others were angry or excited, he would show displeasure by raised eyebrows, closed lips, or a clench of the hand; but resentment with him seldom went further, and in action he was just, magnani-

mous, and bore no malice. The display of others' foibles amused more than it offended him, while for real sorrow and suffering he mourned in sympathy. Though a giant in stature he had a woman's tenderness of heart, and he sorrowed deeply over the calamities that necessity compelled him to inflict. Ambitious we may well suppose him to have been, but his ambition was of that lofty and laudable kind that prompts to the general good. From earliest childhood he had known what it was to strive and struggle upward against the world's disdainful regard, yet experience of life made him not crabbed, but kind-hearted, and the poem whose bosom-lines he most loved to repeat rebuked the spirit of mortal pride and taught a chastening lesson. No high ruler ever showed less the caste of race or station in demeanor; and it was Douglass, the man of colored skin, who pronounced him free from that condescending manner that had impressed him much among other philanthropic friends of his race. It was, indeed, his broad range of sympathy, and his keen appreciation of human nature, with all its faults and failings, that kept him so close to the common heart. Lincoln took the world as he found it, with always a disposition to make it better. Holding before followers and the country the loftiest ideals of public duty, while capable at the same time of using the selfishness of others for the good of the cause, he required no sordid or selfish abuse of official spoils, no cunning organisms of petty tyranny, for keeping himself secure in power; and it was the popular intuition that seldom errs which secured his reelection for another term, rather than that cunning thwart of opposition which picks out delegates and shuts rivals from the suffrage of the people.

Lincoln was, to a singular extent, representative of the whole American people, the component of all sections of the United States. He foresaw and foretold that in the great struggle between North and South neither side could afford to disbelieve in the courage and intrepidity of the other. He had the unfailing courtesy and honor of a Kentuckian born; but, unlike Henry Clay, he was, in manners

and modes of thought, a denizen north of the Ohio River. He had the ingenious fertility for contrivance of a New England Yankee, with, at the same time, the breezy and unconventional boldness of the Westerner. He approached the social problem of his age with an average Northern man's objective dislike of slavery, and yet with something, moreover, of the subjective misgivings over emancipation which were felt by border slaveholders and the more humane of Southern masters. We may recall the various expedients he employed to lighten the coming blow, rather than offend susceptibilities. So, too, as new areas of the South were regained, or made secure, his capacity was shown for soothing Southern fellow-citizens, allaying their former misconceptions, and reconciling their hearts to the new order of things. In short, as Lincoln's biographers¹ have well pointed out, his blood was drawn from the veins of every section of the Union, and of East, Middle, South, together with pioneer civilizing growth in the great Northwest, his nature equally partook.

Lincoln's peculiar methods as President have been observed in the course of our narrative. He was true and steadfast to his main public purpose, a present inspiration, clearly conceiving the immediate duty to be performed, but borrowing as little trouble as possible for the far future. Eminently practical in statesmanship, his exhortation was to action, and he disinclined to hamper himself by schemes which might not readily yield to circumstances and a coming exigency. "My policy," he would say, "is to have no policy;" not intending this literally, but so that political convenience, or the mercy of exceptions, should give to formulas all needful corrective. "I do not cross Fox River until I come to it," was another saying of his; yet he well apprehended the general direction in which he headed, and simply made his way from point to point, with cautious circumspection, and throwing out skirmishers, so to speak. He thought and felt with the common people, or rather so as to educate them to change with himself; hence expres-

¹ 10 N. & H. final chapter.

sions, like his point of view, might shift, though in general exhortation he was sound and consistent. It is now conceded that he chose precisely the right moment, neither too soon nor too tardy, for issuing his edict of emancipation, so as to give it actual effect; and so, too, was his time well selected for giving permanent and comprehensive force to this new national policy by the sound process of constitutional amendment. In all things patient and incessantly pursuing, his mind would turn to indirect experiment for gaining the desired end, or so at least as to force the conviction that expedients were useless. He liked to approach reform by the flank before assaulting. "Pegging away," to use his homely phrase, as of one industrious over an humble manual toil, he rounded out his work by dint of a sound intelligence honestly and with constancy applied. For, carefully though he watched the growth of public opinion, and heedful not to get too far away, he formed and guided opinion, and was no mere waiter for other men. He took the public into his full confidence, and, by message, speech, or open letter, would utter plainly his views and purpose upon critical occasions.

From one of such tenderness and broad affiliation with his fellowmen, one whose favorite weapon had been argument, and not compulsion, this long and sanguinary strife, more bitter and protracted than he himself or most other countrymen could possibly have anticipated, must have truly been a fearful strain. Yet of the wrestlings and agonies in soul that this President underwent, the world knew little, beyond noting the ghastliness he would present, with sunken cheeks and hollow eyes, after a night's secret vigil of sorrow, while no words but cheerful ones escaped his lips. His prayerful communings in secret must have been deep and fervent. Few men ever lived with nerves and a constitution to bear responsibilities like these. But he would relax the tension of mind by abandoning himself to frolic and play with his children in the inner apartments of the White House, or by observing the humorous aspect of scenes about him in his audience chamber, or by reading, with

keen zest, the pages of native humorists, such as Artemus Ward,¹ who touched off American life in phases familiar to him. With the jocose manner habitual to him, and little pleasantries towards those whom he happened to accost, he would throw off the burdensome anxieties that must otherwise have broken him down. Lincoln's rare vein of humor, as disclosed in the many authentic stories and pithy sayings of his, long since recorded, make him stand out, fresh and original as a public personage, like those early heroes, Greek or Roman, whose lives and characters are described by anecdotes. The piquant zest of whatever he might say was heightened by a quaint dialect and the flavor of a singular personal experience; yet many of his parables were doubtless invented or adapted, on the spur of the moment, to enforce some argument, or, as often happened, to ward off inquiries from others too pointed and searching. Of all rulers who pleased in intercourse, this one, while truthful, was shrewdest in fencing where he was not prepared to express; but on great occasions, strong impulses came welling up from that noble heart, and great thoughts found a most adequate utterance. For, in spite of a rare inelegance of metaphor, such as would grate upon ears polite, Lincoln was a master of style, and, while Chief Executive, wrote more that was clear, forcible, and simply eloquent in literary prose, and sure of enduring, than any other American of that eventful period. He was not only first among historical actors of this Civil War, but its ablest contemporary interpreter besides.

If not wholly free from the commission of minor faults, this Chief Executive was remarkably exempt, as an administrator, from radical error. He was quite at home in American politics; his memory of faces was wonderful, and he knew well or learned readily the statesmen and managers of his times, and took in their characters, one by one, their personal appearance, and their means of helpfulness to his

¹ It was with a chapter from this author that, much to Stanton's disgust, the President regaled his Cabinet, before introducing the historical proclamation with its graver exordium. 6 N. & H. 158.

public purposes. He was true to those purposes, honest and to be depended on. He trusted the loyal people, and the loyal people trusted him in return; their predilections were for peace, and so were his own; and hence for war much had to be learned. As our narrative has shown, it was not in the civilian, but the military aspect of his Presidency that he was seen to grope, to feel out fallibly, to make imperfect estimates of character and capacity, like the average of those at the North who stood behind him. Yet, for all this, he grew in military discretion and knowledge with the years, and, though never pretending to be a technical soldier, he learned to give here a correct supervision, as in all other matters pertaining to a ruler. He experimented with generals of differing temperaments and credentials; he watched campaigns intently in their progress and studied the battles; nor would he rest, day or night, until the generals were found who could command and conquer. To the greatest of these, as to all others, he gave freely and honorably of the nation's resources, and the fullest confidence deserved. As for war itself, he must have felt like Washington, who declared, when at the same stage of human experience, "My first wish is to see this plague of mankind banished from off the earth."

The fame of Abraham Lincoln, enhanced by the deep pity felt for his sad and sudden taking-off,—the martyrdom of a misconception,—has reached the stars, and will spread and endure so long as human rights and human freedom are held sacred. For Americans his name is imperishably joined with that of Washington, under the designation, "Father," which no others yet have borne—the one saviour and founder, the other, preserver and liberator. Washington's work was as completely finished as one great human life could make it; and had Lincoln been spared to the end of the Presidency for which he was rechosen, the capstone to his monument would surely have been inscribed "Reconciler." For no man of his times could so wisely and powerfully, or would so earnestly, have applied himself to the compassionate task of binding together the broken ligaments

of national brotherhood and infusing through the body politic once more the spirit of common harmony and content. Nothing but the clouds of false prejudice and rumor could anywhere have obscured or prevented the rays of so warming and regenerating a personal influence.


APPENDIX.

A. ELECTORAL VOTE OF 1864 FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT.

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B. LENGTH OF SESSIONS OF CONGRESS, 1861-1865.

NUMBER OF CONGRESS.	NUMBER OF SESSION.	TIME OF SESSION.
37th.	{ 1st.	July 4, 1861-August 6, 1861.
	{ 2d.	December 2, 1861-July 17, 1862.
	{ 3d.	December 1, 1862-March 4, 1863.
38th.	{ 1st.	December 7, 1863-July 4, 1864.
	{ 2d.	December 5, 1864-March 4, 1865.



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178
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Hawthorne, Julian
United States

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